WINDHOEK, Namibia, Jun 30 (IPS) – In almost every conversation I’ve had about gender-based violence (GBV), the question “why don’t they leave?” inevitably comes up.
After many years of working in this space, I have learned that the answer is not as simple as we think. The nature of GBV is quite complex. Numerous layers and factors affect individuals both internally and externally.
These can include the nature of the relationship, the sense of responsibility, the sporadic nature of violence, fears and uncertainty.
A significant part of the complexity of GBV lies in the fact that it is committed by someone with whom the victim is in a relationship and thus someone they deeply love and care about.
Trying to reconcile how someone you love can hurt you in that way is usually only the initial shock. But it keeps victims trying to figure out what went wrong in the relationship.
BLAME-SHIFTING
Victims have been known to take on a sense of responsibility for the violence they face. Some tend to believe they provoked or caused the problem.
This is usually a result of blame-shifting by the abuser. Society also contributes to this when they subject victims to questions like “what did you do to aggravate him?”
Esther Nantana
This engenders a sense of guilt and an accompanying sense of responsibility to prevent further violence.
This is wrongfully placed on victims when the abusers are at fault. Also, no level of “instigation” warrants physical aggression or abuse. Physical violence is unacceptable even when it only occurs once in a relationship.
And in most cases, when it happens once, it is often likely to reoccur. It may not even happen frequently, but it will.
And those moments when it’s not happening pull the victim back into the relationship – thinking the last time it happened was the last time it would happen.
ASSUMPTIONS
When we try and picture an abusive relationship, we tend to assume it’s violent all the time. This is not always the case.
Abusive relationships are usually filled with other moments. Even happy moments. The abuser who gets upset and violent is the same person making grand gestures and declaring their love daily.
Abusers beg and cry, showing remorse and regret, just to try prove they are still “good people”. They tend to play on the emotions of the victims because of the close nature of intimate relationships. This eventually makes it easy for the abuse to reoccur in cycles.
It takes the victim quite a few times before they can confidently say they want to break out of the cycle. Regrettably, even after deciding to leave, issues of safety are paramount.
Statistics show the most dangerous time is when victims attempt to leave the relationship. In some cases, it can end fatally.
As abusive partners try to maintain power and control, they can become more violent, threatening to end the lives of their partners and even threatening the lives of other loved ones involved.
CHALLENGES
Victims wanting to leave abusive relationships face enormous challenges. Where do they get adequate support? Do they know where to go? How do they survive economically? Where will they live?
Then there are fears of not being believed or supported. Or having their reports and accounts invalidated. They are also pressured by family and friends to remain in relationships for the sake of the children and to maintain the facade of a good family image.
These are only some of the issues involved with trying to leave. It’s difficult, and it is challenging, and it cannot happen overnight.
So next time you hear about a person who stayed in an abusive relationship, treat them and the situation with grace and understanding. It takes a lot of courage to report abuse the first time and even more courage to keep reporting it and trying to get out.
Our loved ones in these situations need empathy, support, and love. This gives them the strength to leave eventually.
Esther Nantana is currently a project coordinator for the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in Namibia. Previously, Esther co-led the Women and Youth Development/Capacity Building cluster at the African Union. She graduated from the Indrani Fellowship in May 2023. She is also a public health and gender advocate and a blogger; website esthernantana.com
Investment requirements for adaptation are huge, and they are growing every day as rising emissions are increasing adaptation needs. Credit: Isaiah Esipisu/IPS
Opinion by Philippe Benoit, Gareth Phillips (washington dc)
Inter Press Service
To meet this challenge, large amounts of private capital are once again needed — and this will require climate finance innovation targeted at adaptation, specifically.
The journey from this month’s Paris climate finance summit to COP 28 hosted later this year by the United Arab Emirates – and where financing is likely to be a prominent subject — provides opportunities to raise the profile of this often overlooked need to fund adaptation. While there is relatively little discussion of this topic, it is nonetheless a key to achieving the dual climate goals of reducing emissions while also preparing for the impacts of climate change that are now unavoidable and projected to increase.
Annual funding needs for mitigation have been estimated at around $600 billion by 2030 in emerging economies for energy alone, with private capital providing three-quarters of the required amounts. The reported needs for adaptation are relatively smaller, albeit still only partially identified. For example, annual adaptation needs for developing countries have been estimated at $160-$340 billion by 2030, including more than $50 billion for Africa. These adaptation amounts are beyond any reasonable estimate of the funding capacity of their governments, especially when added to the requirements for mitigation.
When it comes to adaptation, the discussion is often focused on public sector funds. For example, the Green Climate Fund, a multi-government facility, looks to provide funding for adaptation at levels that match mitigation. Generally, adaptation projects have been seen as providing public goods and, accordingly, have looked to funding approaches reliant on public sector resources, frequently in the form of grants. This greatly limits financing options and amounts.
Yet, the investment requirements for adaptation are huge, and they are growing every day as rising emissions are increasing adaptation needs. This will require more than just public sources; private capital is needed. But in order to unlock this capital, more attention and creativity must be directed to developing new mechanisms for adaptation.
In considering private funding for adaptation, there are three distinct but interrelated major groups of actors.
The first are companies exposed to climate-related risks in their operations. This includes a variety of agri-businesses, electricity network enterprises, port operators, tourism industry actors and construction companies. The issue here is largely encouraging these companies to spend more on adapting their businesses to climate change.
A second potential source is the producers and consumers of fossil fuel products whose previous activities have fueled climate change we must adapt to. For example, just as companies have customer programs to raise finance to offset their emissions (e.g., airlines), consumers might also be motivated to support investments to address the impacts of their emissions.
The third and critical source is third-party private capital, including commercial banks and private equity investors. This constitutes a massive potential source of funding (the bond market totals in the trillions), and it is the focus of the discussion that follows.
The existing mitigation carbon markets provide a potentially fertile precedent for raising third-party private capital. It is important to recognize that the genesis of carbon markets was governments creating regulatory frameworks that gave value to emissions reductions — governments set targets and created mechanisms that offered both financial incentives and flexibility to meet those targets through capital spending.
This also helped lay the groundwork for the parallel non-governmental voluntary markets. Under these types of structures, investors are incentivized to pay for carbon avoidance which makes projects financially attractive — thereby providing project sponsors with access to capital for investments in activities, sectors and regions that were otherwise unbankable.
A similar approach could be taken for adaptation; namely, the creation of a regulatory or voluntary framework in which payments to projects that provide genuine adaptation benefits are recognized and valued.
Eligible adaptation actions might include climate-resilient agriculture goods and services, investments in cold storage, improved treatment and reuse of wastewater, coastal protection, conservation of biodiversity to protect nature’s ability to adapt and actions to mitigate forest fires, a topic that has received increased attention recently. Importantly, this isn’t just a musing.
The African Development Bank, where one of us is the manager of climate and environment finance, has been developing such a facility: the Adaptation Benefits Mechanism. The ABM mechanism creates a financial product for third-party investors (private capital, donors, consumers) to fund project developers in return for Certified Adaptation Benefits, which attribute a value to lowering or avoiding the negative impacts of climate change on agriculture, people’s health, biodiversity, buildings, businesses and other assets.
The ABM product is designed to be priced at a level that enables the developer to fund what would otherwise be an unbankable adaptation investment. Significantly, it provides these developers with access to new capital sources that can make more adaptation projects a reality.
Notwithstanding these efforts, there remains a general shortage of instruments and proposals to attract more private capital to adaptation. Overcoming this lack will require putting more intellectual and creative resources into adaptation finance, including by the world’s leading financial centers. The private sector has more to contribute to this area, but unleashing its power will require financial innovation.
With this month’s Paris climate finance summit now completed, the current lead-up to COP 28 to be held later this year is an opportunity not to be missed to advance the effort to raise more private capital for adaptation.
(First published in The Hill on June 14, 2023).
Philippe Benoit is research director for Global Infrastructure Analytics and Sustainability 2050 and has over 20 years of experience in international finance and sustainability, including management positions at the World Bank. He is also adjunct senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.
Gareth Phillips is the manager of climate and environment finance at the African Development Bank Group.
NEW YORK, Jun 28 (IPS) – For the last 30 odd years, I have maintained that religions matter. I noted the reasons for why they matter, and always listed how they matter —as social service providers, as first responders in humanitarian crisis; as mediators in tensions and conflicts, as upholders of common good and the values of humanity; as protectors of children and of the most vulnerable; and even as political actors.
All to name but a few. I still feel amused when some of those I trained among the UN staff and the faith-based NGO community, quote something I said, in public – albeit without even being aware they are quoting (I am trying to be kind here) – such as: “we should not be talking about whether religions matter, but how they matter”.
In 2007, while at UNDP, I was told, more than once, “we do not do religion”. By the time I left the UN in 2020, after building two bodies – an Interagency Task Force on Religion and its Multi Faith Advisory Council – it was clear that almost all UN entities were competing to ‘do religion’. In fact, some UN entities are competing for religious funding.
While I have not lost that faith in faith itself, over the last years, I have grown increasingly incredulous of those who would speak in the name of ‘religion’. It is hard not to feel distinctly bemused, when versions of ‘if religious actors/leaders are not at the table, they will be on the menu]’, are being told in one gathering after another.
Often by the same kinds of speakers, among the same kinds of audiences, albeit meeting more and more frequently – and often more lavishly — in different cities around the world.
The reason for bemusement, is not disillusion with the unparalleled roles that various religious institutions and communities of faith play. Far from it. These roles are, in short, vast. In fact, they are as impossible to quantify, as they are implausible to assume full comprehension of.
After all, how do you accurately measure the pulse of our individual spiritualities – let alone our collective sense thereof? Religious leaders, religious institutions, faith-based and faith-inspired NGOs (FBOs) – let alone faith communities – are massive in number, and permeate all the world’s edifices, peoples and even languages. Faiths, and expressions of religiosity, are likely as numerous as the hairs on an average head (not counting those who may be lacking vigour in that department).
No, the reason for bemusement is disillusionment with the trend of commercialisation of religion, the business of ‘doing religion’. The emerging marketplace of “religion and ” is reminiscent of not too many decades ago, when so many academics, consultants, think tanks, NGOs, worked on the business of democracy and/or good governance and/or human rights. Then, as now, projects, programmes, initiatives, meetings, and more meetings, were hosted.
A global emerging elite of ‘experts’ in the above (or variations thereof) permeated the four and five-star hotel meeting rooms, gave business to caterers and conference centres as they traipsed the ‘conference circuits’ from north to south, populated proposals to governments, philanthropists and various donor entities.
They defined the missions of for-profit consultancies claiming to enable the strategic capabilities, to inform the media presences, to refine the narratives, to provide the leadership coaching, to jointly express the common values, to uphold the good in public service… And so on.
We are not living in better democracies now, in spite of all that business. Will we have more faithful societies? Will people pray more, for one another and serve more selflessly now that ‘religion’ is in? Somehow, I doubt it.
By the time we realised the extent of the commercialisation of democracy and human rights, the commercial nature had corrupted much of the sagacity – and the necessary courage – there was. Even autocrats bought into the business of doing democracy and human rights, and used the narratives to enhance their respective agendas.
Few democratic actors worked together, and even fewer collaborated to serve – and save – the whole of humanity. As with any business venture, the motive of profit – and power – of some, dominated.
And rather than a consolidated civil society effort holding decision makers accountable for the sake of the most vulnerable, and collectively and successfully eliminating the tools of harm, we are living in the era where money, weapons – including nuclear ones – control over resources, and war (including war on this earth), dominate.
Today, some of the most authoritarian and self-serving regimes, and some of the most power-seeking individuals, and their retinues, are vested in the business of ‘religion’. And why not? It is among the most lucrative domains of financial, political and social influence.
Decades of study, however, point to some simple questions to ask, to distinguish the transactional nature of ‘religious affairs’ claiming to be for the good of all, from those actually serving the common good.
The questions include the following:
How many of those engaged in the work of religion (whether as religious or secular actors) actually give of or share, their varied resources, to/with one another (including those from other/different religions, entities, age groups, countries, races, etc.)?
How many different religious organisations plan and deliver, jointly, the same set of services to the same set of needs, in the same neighborhoods or in the same countries?
How many ‘religious actors’ actually partner with ‘secular’ civil society organisations to hold institutions of political and financial power equally accountable – if need be, at cost to their own welfare. In other words, how many stand on principle, irrespective of the cost?
And, my personal favourite: what are these religious actors’ respective positions on women’s rights, on gender equality and/or on women’s leadership?
The more diplomatic way to frame that is also one of the most powerful litmus tests: which human rights do these actors working on/with/for religion, value more? You see, those who are engaged in transactional practices wearing a religious garb, will invariably prioritise some rights, or some privileges, over others.
The answer to this question therefore, will indicate the difference between a coalition of religious fundamentalists (including secular power seekers and some religious and political leaders), and a multilateral alliance dedicated to serving the common good – for each and all, barring none, especially in the most challenging of times.
Azza Karam is a Professor of Religion and Development at the Vrij Universiteit of Amsterdam and served as a member of the UN Secretary General’s High Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism.
SAN FRANCISCO, USA, Jun 27 (IPS) – A recent Justice Department report concluded that “systemic” racial bias in the Minneapolis Police Department “made what happened to George Floyd possible.”
During the three years since a white police officer brutally murdered Floyd, nationwide discussions of systemic racism have extended well beyond focusing on law enforcement to also assess a range of other government functions.
But such scrutiny comes to a halt at the water’s edge — stopping short of probing whether racism has been a factor in U.S. military interventions overseas.
Hidden in plain sight is the fact that virtually all the people killed by U.S. firepower in the “war on terror” for more than two decades have been people of color. This notable fact goes unnoted within a country where — in sharp contrast — racial aspects of domestic policies and outcomes are ongoing topics of public discourse.
Certainly, the U.S. does not attack a country because people of color live there. But when people of color live there, it is politically easier for U.S. leaders to subject them to warfare — because of institutional racism and often-unconscious prejudices that are common in the United States.
Racial inequities and injustice are painfully apparent in domestic contexts, from police and courts to legislative bodies, financial systems and economic structures. A nation so profoundly affected by individual and structural racism at home is apt to be affected by such racism in its approach to war.
Many Americans recognize that racism holds significant sway over their society and many of its institutions. Yet the extensive political debates and media coverage devoted to U.S. foreign policy and military affairs rarely even mention — let alone explore the implications of — the reality that the several hundred thousand civilians killed directly in America’s “war on terror” have been almost entirely people of color.
The flip side of biases that facilitate public acceptance of making war on non-white people came to the fore when Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022. News coverage included reporting that the war’s victims “have blue eyes and blond hair” and “look like us,” Los Angeles Times television critic Lorraine Ali noted.
“Writers who’d previously addressed conflicts in the Gulf region, often with a focus on geopolitical strategy and employing moral abstractions, appeared to be empathizing for the first time with the plight of civilians.”
Such empathy, all too often, is skewed by the race and ethnicity of those being killed. The Arab and Middle Eastern Journalists Association has deplored “the pervasive mentality in Western journalism of normalizing tragedy in parts of the world such as the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and Latin America. It dehumanizes and renders their experience with war as somehow normal and expected.”
Persisting today is a modern version of what W.E.B. Du Bois called, 120 years ago, “the problem of the color line — the relation of the darker to the lighter races.” Twenty-first century lineups of global power and geopolitical agendas have propelled the United States into seemingly endless warfare in countries where few white people live.
Racial, cultural and religious differences have made it far too easy for most Americans to think of the victims of U.S. war efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya and elsewhere as “the other.”
Their suffering is much more likely to be viewed as merely regrettable or inconsequential rather than heart-rending or unacceptable. What Du Bois called “the problem of the color line” keeps empathy to a minimum.
“The history of U.S. wars in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America has exuded a stench of white supremacy, discounting the value of lives at the other end of U.S. bullets, bombs and missiles,” I concluded in my new book War Made Invisible. “Yet racial factors in war-making decisions get very little mention in U.S. media and virtually none in the political world of officials in Washington.”
At the same time, on the surface, Washington’s foreign policy can seem to be a model of interracial connection. Like presidents before him, Joe Biden has reached out to foreign leaders of different races, religions and cultures — as when he fist-bumped Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at their summit a year ago, while discarding professed human-rights concerns in the process.
Overall, in America’s political and media realms, the people of color who’ve suffered from U.S. warfare abroad have been relegated to a kind of psychological apartheid — separate, unequal, and implicitly not of much importance.
And so, when the Pentagon’s forces kill them, systemic racism makes it less likely that Americans will actually care.
Norman Solomon is the national director of RootsAction.org and executive director of the Institute for Public Accuracy. He is the author of a dozen books including War Made Easy. His latest book, War Made Invisible: How America Hides the Human Toll of Its Military Machine, was published in June 2023 by The New Press.
Opinion by Marco Bitschnau (neuchatel, switzerland)
Inter Press Service
NEUCHATEL, Switzerland, Jun 26 (IPS) – It’s been seven months since Florida Governor Ron DeSantis celebrated a brilliant re-election victory in the midst of an otherwise mixed Republican midterm performance. He had come in with nearly 20 per cent more votes than Democrat Charlie Crist.
This was an almost surreally good result for a state that, until a few years ago, was considered a veritable swing state – and still is, according to many local media. His fabulous result made Florida’s already successful chief executive the man of the hour overnight.
Every smile, every gesture, every Caesar-like sweep of the crowd by the beaming victor seemed to say: here is someone who could actually challenge Donald Trump for the Republican presidential nomination in 2024. Someone who shares many of his strengths but few of his weaknesses.
A steep downward spiral
Today, these scenes seem like something from another world. Trump, who had basically been written off at one point, has now overtaken his opponent in almost all of the major opinion polls: most recently, Trump’s lead according to Quinnipiac was 31 percentage points, (33 at FOX News, 34 at Morning Consult and 42 at Harvard/Harris).
To some extent, the results are even more disastrous for DeSantis at the individual state level. In West Virginia, for example, a poll at the end of May saw him trailing behind Trump by a whopping 45 percentage points, with only 9 per cent thinking he was the right candidate.
Admittedly, even under the best of circumstances, the Harvard lawyer wouldn’t be a good fit for the coal mining towns of Appalachia. But falling below the 10 per cent mark should still wound his ego.
It is unclear what this rapid decline in pre-election popularity can be attributed to. On the one hand, of course, it seems possible that the mid-term election hype surrounding DeSantis was too great and that the situation is simply returning to normal.
On the other hand, it may relate to the criminal proceedings against Trump, his increased media presence as a result and an incipient nostalgia for his time in office. But there is a widespread view that the challenger himself is not entirely free of his own misery.
DeSantis’ presidential candidacy was announced comparatively late, the campaign launch with Twitter boss Elon Musk – in theory, an impressive idea – suffered from technical defects, and the narrative of the valiant fight against ‘wokeness’ also seems to be wearing thin these days. In this case, as so often in life, oversaturation creates frustration.
All the more so, as one should know how to abandon a topic if it threatens to bog down the discourse and to change the branding strategy – a skill that the governor, who tends toward micromanagement, evidently cannot claim as one of his strengths.
But then, the ensuing exchange of blows did not inspire an image of a confident leader. Instead of being celebrated as a winner, DeSantis escalated the conflict, which has since become a tangle of legal confusion and has led to a freeze on Disney’s investments in the state.
Even if the 44-year-old still gets the legal upper hand in the end, the scratches on his image as ‘a tough man of action’ cannot be glossed over so quickly. They also pose a big risk for him: the impression seems to be gaining ground that, despite all his shrewdness, he lacks a certain something – the assertiveness and the authority of his rival, who is still surrounded by a post-presidential aura.
And nowhere is this difference in image more evident than when Trump and DeSantis refer to each other.
While Trump has been touring the country for months, ranting about ‘Ron DeSanctimonious’ as a nobody ‘who needs a personality transplant’ and owes his success to him alone, people in the DeSantis camp are at a loss as to how to counter this strategy.
Some don’t want to get involved in a mudslinging contest where they can only lose against the Insulter-in-Chief. Others see the greater danger – too much restraint, following the old proverb that ‘the best defence is a good offence’.
Beating Trump at his own game
Trump’s own campaign history is, of course, the best example of how successful this second strategy can be: in 2016, with a deliberately hyper-aggressive manner, he managed to repudiate all of his competitors and redirect existing loyalties to himself.
This Trump was someone who savagely lashed out at his hapless predecessors, Mitt Romney and John McCain – and was enthusiastically acclaimed for it by people who had supported both.
He was someone who openly accused George W. Bush of ‘destabilising the Middle East’ and waging unjust wars – and was met with approval from people who had spent half their lives defending those same wars. Someone who wanted to turn the Grand Old Party into his personal electoral vehicle – and the more brazenly he pursued this goal, the more open doors he charged through.
According to this logic, Trump would have to be ‘out-Trumped’, so to speak, in order to knock him off his pedestal. He would have to be ridiculed, with doubt cast on his assertiveness. Ask him where the promised border wall went, why Mexico didn’t pay for it and why Chinese products are still flooding the US market.
Accuse him of being too soft on criminals and too hard on freedom-loving patriots. Call him a failure because he has proven incapable of carrying out the Make America Great Again agenda. In short: turn his own weapons against him. However, it is hardly to be expected that DeSantis, with his wait-and-see attitude, will rise to the task anytime soon. The fear of prematurely losing support among the Trump supporters who are still to be wooed is likely too great.
The Indian-born biotech entrepreneur Vivek Ramaswamy, who is also vying for the Republican nomination and enjoys the advantage of being able to throw his punches from outside the political field of vision, is more skilfull Although he greatly respects Trump, he recently went on record saying that Trump failed in his fight against the cartels and has kept very few of his promises: ‘I think I’m closer to Trump in 2015 than Trump today is to Trump in 2015.’
It’s not a bad move to position himself as an alternative for voters who want to make a distinction between personalities and political positions. It’s a strategy that was successful enough for the unknown Ramaswamy to now rank in the polls ahead of established party figures like Tim Scott and Nikki Haley, whose half-hearted campaigns – both of whom are obviously eyeing the vice presidency – are still struggling.
For DeSantis, whose options are more limited, it remains a fight with unequal weapons – and against time. In order to show that he actually has a real chance, he has to reverse the disastrous poll trend as soon as possible and unite a broad coalition of all those behind him, who have little interest in a third attempt by ex-President Trump.
This includes moderate Republicans who recognise a power-conscious pragmatist behind the rhetorical bombast, the old party establishment just waiting for the right opportunity to free itself from the Babylonian captivity of the last few years, but also various libertarians, evangelicals and grassroots conservatives from the orbit of former presidential aspirant Ted Cruz, who believed that Trump ruled in an overly dirigiste manner, or who don’t consider him sufficiently ideologically sound.
Forging and maintaining such a heterogeneous alliance requires not only political mobility and a strong ground game but also a bulging war chest – and at least in this respect, DeSantis seems capable of scoring.
Despite the botched start, his campaign raised a whopping $8.2 million within 24 hours of announcing his candidacy, while Trump has managed to raise only $9.5 million over the past six months. The fact that this man from the small town of Dunedin has won the hearts of so many donors is more than just a sign of encouragement.
Anyone who has sufficient financial resources on the hellishly expensive US primary election stage can also get through a dry spell here and there without having to fear direct operational collapse. And this much is certain: in his fight against Trump, the eternal comeback kid, DeSantis will need every penny.
Marco Bitschnau is pursuing a PhD in political sociology at the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies (SFM) at the University of Neuchâtel and is a research associate at the Swiss National Science Foundation. His research focuses on migration, populism, democracy and the welfare state.
Source: International Politics and Society (IPS)-Journal published by the International Political Analysis Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin
PARIS, Jun 23 (IPS) – As the Summit for a New Global Financing Pact unfolds in Paris on 22-23 June, Forus, a global network representing over 22,000 civil society organisations across Africa, Latin America, Asia, Europe and the Pacific, calls for the respect of human rights and for meaningful inclusion of civil society in shaping financial systems and structures.
The summit, co-hosted by India, could help find common ground on finance that drives progress at key events later in 2023 and in 2024 – the G20 summit in New Delhi, the COP28 climate talks in Dubai, and the Finance in Common summit with public development banks in Cartagena.
As part of the summit, Sarah Strack, Forus Director, is amplifying civil society’s voices at the high-level Finance in Common event in the presence of French President Emmanuel Macron and other leaders, to discuss and leverage the role of Public Development Banks in financing the SDGs, scaling up sustainable finance, and supporting inclusion. Forus has been engaging in the Finance in Common initiative since its inception in 2020 with the aim to ensure that a people-based approach to development is pursued.
“If we want to have a chance to tackle the most pressing challenges and the multiple crises of our time in a way that really puts first the interests and needs of people, then a shift of mindset and a new financial framework are absolutely necessary. It is essential that civil society plays a central role in shaping this new paradigm at every stage. Let us not forget the wealth of knowledge and leadership present at the local level. By actively engaging and collaborating with communities, we can genuinely measure our progress and honor the commitments we have made to those most in need,” says Sarah Strack.
Harsh Jaitli, CEO of the Voluntary Action Network India (VANI), is representing Forus as an official respondent in the Summit Roundtable “Power Our Planet: Act today. Save tomorrow”, co-hosted by Global Citizen and CISCO. The event seeks to rally for immediate action on economic, social, and climate justice, engaging both public and private sectors to catalyze renewable energy investment in climate-vulnerable countries to reduce energy poverty and accelerate the low-carbon transition.
Harsh Jaitli of VANI states that the New Global Financial Pact will require improved partnerships and the building of trust.
“Double standards have negatively impacted our collective capacity to deliver on effective development and climate related programmes. In some countries, multinational corporations respect human rights, fiscal and climate regulations, but in other countries decisions are made to violate them. Not only does this send the wrong message that some countries and populations are more important than others, but also jeopardizes our collective efforts to affect change. Multinational corporations should commit to respecting human rights, fiscal and climate regulations in all countries and in a consistent manner. When no strong regulations exist, this is the opportunity for multinationals to be proactive and to apply strong rules, which are coherent with their policies,”says Harsh Jaitli.
Julien Comlan Agbessi, Coordinator of the Regional Coalition of West Africa (REPAOC) emphasizes the importance of multi-stakeholder cooperation. Agbessi explains that cooperation between the private sector and the civil society organisations is possible, since the private sector could leverage hugely on the experience and outreach of civil society. “Many poverty alleviation programs and projects with significant funding implemented over the past decades have failed to deliver for communities. Transformative investments in low-income countries and climate impacted countries require putting the needs of people first,” says Julien Comlan Agbessi.
Lina Paola Lara Negrette, Coordinator of the Confederación Colombiana de ONG (Ccong), states that the New Global Financial Pact must incorporate stronger and more meaningful engagement with civil society.
“Civil society has an important role to play in ensuring the accountability and transparency of both government and private sector actors. Civil society can work closely with governments and the private sector to ensure the delivery of social and environmental needs in all investments, which includes respect of human rights”.
Olivier Bruyeron, President of the French platform of CSOs Coordination SUD, equally emphasizes the importance of partnerships with the public and private sector, “CSOs hold valuable knowledge and expertise on international solidarity needed to construct sustainable global solutions and to link them with local development” adds Olivier Bruyeron.
Marianne Buenaventura is project coordinator at Forus.
LONDON, Jun 23 (IPS) – Long before Hollywood highlighted the dangers of commercial fishing in The Perfect Storm, Deadliest Catch and other programming, governments around the world knew that this was one of the most hazardous jobs, killing thousands of fishers every year.
Until last fall, how many people perish while working in the seafood industry has never been clear. But now, through research commissioned by The Pew Charitable Trusts and conducted by the FISH Safety Foundation, a nonprofit organization in New Zealand dedicated to improving safety at sea, we know the truth: Worldwide, fishing is responsible for the deaths of more than 100,000 people every year, along with a staggering number of life-altering injuries.
And although there is a way to limit some of these risks, namely through the ratification of an international treaty known as the Cape Town Agreement (CTA), there has been little movement to date protecting fishers. But with the CTA, which is the only global agreement specifically designed to tackle the safety of the environment fishers work in, this could change.
This agreement focuses on safety standards for industrial-size fishing vessels and would grant fishers the same structural integrity, safety precautions, and training that have been in place for other seafarers for decades.
More than 3 billion people rely on seafood for a significant source of protein, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) expects that demand to grow.
But although many of us are familiar with the thrill of the chase depicted in media—big fish, bigger boats and even bigger waves—we’re unfamiliar with who is most at risk on the water. The answer is vulnerable and lowest-income people.
People, often the most marginalized, are frequently coerced and even forced to work on unsafe vessels and in conditions that in many cases meet the definition of slavery—long workdays, crowded and filthy sleeping quarters, violent and abusive superiors, insufficient nutrition, little or no safety equipment or medical care, and no chance of escape.
These conditions have been documented throughout the world’s ocean, in both national and international waters, from the largest industrial ships to small subsistence rafts and canoes.
Three intergovernmental bodies share responsibility for fishing, fishers and safety: the FAO, along with the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). But none have full decision-making authority—and all lack the data to expose the dangerous realities of commercial fishing. To make matters worse, coordinated action across these organizations has been missing.
But today, there’s no longer any excuse for ignoring the high death rates at sea. The Cape Town Agreement—coupled with two other treaties—give authorities the leverage they need to protect fishers on large-scale industrial vessels that traverse international waters.
Fisher safety provides a powerful incentive for full ratification of the CTA. And the agreement should not be difficult to implement; many developed nations have already adopted its recommended guidelines for their fleets.
Unfortunately, this fact is being used as an argument against the treaty. Specifically, that because some large fleets already adhere to the guidelines, ratification is unnecessary and will not improve safety for fishers.
But this misses an important point. Ratification will help show leadership and encourage other countries to improve safety standards, which could help the most endangered workers.
The agreement needs 22 countries with a combined 3,600 vessels to go into force. Ratification by three more countries, with a combined 1,500 eligible vessels, will meet that goal.
However, it should have been met already. In 2019, 51 countries committed to ratify the agreement by October 2022, but most haven’t followed through, despite the number of fatalities each year.
Those avoidable deaths should move these countries to act—now. The other two treaties in force are the FAO Port State Measures Agreement, which works to prevent illegally caught fish from entering the seafood supply chain, and the 2007 ILO Work in Fishing Convention C188, which sets standards for working conditions onboard vessels. However, to better protect fishers, more countries are needed to join all three treaties and implement them.
It is time for countries to acknowledge that fisher fatalities are a serious problem, many fishing-related deaths are preventable, and despite the complexity, they want to find effective solutions.
We know for certain that fishers who work each day to bring their catch to tables or the marketplaces around the world put their lives in danger. As people demand more and more fish, we can’t—and shouldn’t—go another year without stronger safety rules for fishing, starting with ratification of the Cape Town Agreement.
Peter Horn, who directs efforts to end illegal fishing as part of The Pew Charitable Trusts’ international fisheries program, has spent more than 30 years in the British Royal Navy, where he reached the rank of commander, and served in the Fishery Protection Squadron.
LONDON, Jun 23 (IPS) – The violence keeps coming in Myanmar, under military rule since February 2021. The junta stands accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, with evidence of systematic use of killings, rape, torture and other gross human rights violations in its attempt to suppress forces demanding a return to democracy.
Even humanitarian aid is restricted. Recently the junta refused to allow in aid organisations trying to provide food, water and medicines to people left in desperate need by a devastating cyclone. It’s far from the first time it’s blocked aid.
Crises like this demand an international response. But largely standing on the sidelines while this happens is the regional intergovernmental body, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Its recent summit, held in Indonesia in May, failed to produce any progress.
ASEAN’s inaction
ASEAN’s response to the coup was to issue a text, the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), in April 2021. This called for the immediate cessation of violence and constructive dialogue between all parties. ASEAN agreed to provide humanitarian help, appoint a special envoy and visit Myanmar to meet with all parties.
Civil society criticised this agreement because it recognised the role of the junta and failed to make any mention of the need to restore democracy. And the unmitigated violence and human rights violations are the clearest possible sign that the 5PC isn’t working – but ASEAN sticks to it. At its May summit, ASEAN states reiterated their support for the plan.
A major challenge is that most ASEAN states have no interest in democracy. All 10 have heavily restricted civic space. As well as Myanmar, civic space is closed in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
It wouldn’t suit such states to have a thriving democracy on their doorstep, which could only bring greater domestic and international pressure to follow suit. States that repress human rights at home typically carry the same approach into international organisations, working to limit their ability to uphold human rights commitments and scrutinise violations.
Continuing emphasis on the 5PC hasn’t masked divisions among ASEAN states. Some appear to think they can engage with the junta and at least persuade it to moderate its violence – although reality makes this increasingly untenable. But others, particularly Cambodia – a one-party state led by the same prime minister since 1998 – seem intent on legitimising the junta.
Variable pressure has come from ASEAN’s chair, which rotates annually and appoints the special envoy. Under the last two, Brunei Darussalam – a sultanate that last held an election in 1965 – and Cambodia, little happened. Brunei never visited the country after being refused permission to meet with democratic leaders, while Cambodia’s prime minister, Hun Sen, visited Myanmar last year. The first post-coup visit to Myanmar by a head of government, this could only be construed as conferring legitimacy.
Indonesia, the current chair, hasn’t appointed a special envoy, instead setting up an office headed by the foreign minister. So far it appears to be taking a soft approach of quiet diplomacy rather than public action.
Thailand, currently led by a pro-military government, is also evidently happy to engage with the junta. While junta representatives remain banned from ASEAN summits, Thailand has broken ranks and invited ASEAN foreign ministers, including from Myanmar, to hold talks about reintegrating the junta’s leaders. A government that itself came to power through a coup but should now step aside after an election where it was thoroughly defeated looks to be attempting to bolster the legitimacy of military rule.
ASEAN states seem unable to move beyond the 5PC even as they undermine it. But the fact that they’re formally sticking with it enables the wider international community to stand back, on the basis of respecting regional leadership and the 5PC.
The UN Security Council finally adopted a resolution on Myanmar in December 2022. This called for an immediate end to the violence, the release of all political prisoners and unhindered humanitarian access. But its language didn’t go far enough in condemning systematic human rights violations and continued to emphasise the 5PC. It failed to impose sanctions such as an arms embargo or to refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Civil society in Myanmar and the region is urging ASEAN to go further. Many have joined together to develop a five-point agenda that goes beyond the 5PC. It calls for a strategy to end military violence through sanctions, an arms embargo and a referral of Myanmar to the ICC. It demands ASEAN engages beyond the junta, and particularly with democratic forces including the National Unity Government – the democratic government in exile. It urges a strengthening of the special envoy role and a pivoting of humanitarian aid to local responders rather than the junta. ASEAN needs to take this on board.
A fork in the road
ASEAN’s current plan is a recipe for continuing military violence, increasingly legitimised by its neighbours’ acceptance. Ceremonial elections could offer further fuel for this.
The junta once promised to hold elections by August, but in February, on the coup’s second anniversary, it extended the state of emergency for another six months. If and when those elections finally happen, there’s no hope of them being free or fair. In March, the junta dissolved some 40 political parties, including the ousted ruling party, the National League for Democracy.
The only purpose of any eventual fake election will be to give the junta a legitimising veneer to present as a sign of progress – and some ASEAN states may be prepared to buy this. This shouldn’t be allowed. ASEAN needs to listen to the voices of civil society calling for it to get its act together – and stick together – in holding the junta to account. If it doesn’t, it will keep failing not only Myanmar’s people, but all in the region who reasonably expect that fundamental human rights should be respected and those who kill, rape and torture should face justice.
Paraquat is currently banned in over 67 countries, including China, the EU, and Brazil. In the US, it’s labelled as a restricted-use substance, meaning that farmworkers are still allowed to spray it on crops as long as they receive proper EPA training and certification. Credit: Atraxia Law
Opinion by Miguel Leyva (san diego, california, us)
Inter Press Service
San Diego, California, US, Jun 22 (IPS) – The US agricultural industry has been one of the key sectors driving our country’s continuous demographic and economic growth. Unfortunately, farmworkers are one of the least protected professional groups, with minority and migrant agricultural laborers suffering disproportionately higher health risks due to deeply-entrenched discriminatory policies and practices.
Although acknowledged as essential workers during the height of the covid pandemic, minority farmworkers still have to contend with inadequate working conditions and insufficient social protections that leave them and their communities vulnerable to the enduring effects of toxic agrochemicals.
Rooted in Environmental Racism
Throughout the 20th century, redlining kept low-income ethnic communities segregated in areas with substandard living conditions. At the same time, racist lending practices enabled white Americans to operate and own 94 to 98 percent of US farmland, further preventing the social mobility of marginalized groups and their capacity to amass generational wealth.
The disproportionate health burdens minorities endure due to systemic prejudice is better described as “environmental racism.” Notably, approximately 83% of the US agricultural labor force is Hispanic. In rural areas where agriculture is the primary source of employment, this phenomenon is propagated by the excessive use of synthetic pesticides.
As the main ingredient in popular products like Gramoxone and Parazone, paraquat (paraquat dichloride) is an extremely effective herbicide used to combat weed species that have developed resistance to conventional pest-control chemicals. In the US, it’s labeled as a restricted-use substance, meaning that farmworkers are still allowed to spray it on crops as long as they receive proper EPA training and certification.
According to data from the US Geologic Survey, more than 17 million pounds of paraquat are used in US agriculture every year, with states like California, Texas, Illinois, and Mississippi spraying over 1 million pounds on crops annually. Other states where annual paraquat applications exceed 500,000 pounds/year include Tennessee, Oklahoma, Ohio, Arkansas, Louisiana, North Carolina, Missouri, South Dakota, Iowa, and Washington.
In California’s mainly-Hispanic counties, minority farmworkers and agricultural communities endure disproportionate levels of pesticide exposure. Although not exclusive to the Golden State, with similarly high rates documented in Florida, North Carolina, Idaho, and Washington, clinical studies carried out in the Central Valley illustrate the toxic burdens plaguing Latino and migrant workers.
The steep health toll minority farmworkers and their families pay is punctuated not only by the lacking occupational protections that current pesticide regulations provide but also by farm owners’ disregard for EPA-mandated worker protection standards. While owners are obliged to provide safety training, personal protective equipment, and prevent workers’ access to fields until exposure risks subside, they rarely follow regulations given the low chance of penalties and insufficient institutional enforcement.
Additionally, the linguistic barriers migrant and minority farmworkers encounter make it less likely that they will fully understand safety guidelines or seek medical help when pesticide poisoning occurs. At the same time, non-English speakers who aren’t aware of their rights are far more susceptible to unscrupulous employers’ exploitative practices.
Combating Social Injustice in the Agricultural Sector
Despite the risks, ethnic farmworkers put up with unsafe working conditions and hesitate voicing their discontent since doing so may endanger their employment status and prevent them from earning the income their families rely on.
Faced with a plethora of socio-economic and occupational hazards, vulnerable minority workers and their communities rely on state and federal institutions to create a legal framework that provides adequate protection against toxic environmental exposure. However, the EPA controversially approved paraquat’s relicensing until 2035, discounting mounting evidence of the herbicide’s potential for enduring harm.
Several environmental, public health, and farmworkers’ rights organizations contested the EPA’s decision, determining the Agency to reconsider paraquat’s relicensing for agricultural purposes, with a final decision expected later this year. Such actions are vital and embolden disenfranchised minority groups who often lack the resources or political influence to confront industry interest groups who oppose pesticide policy reform.
Moving forward, Congress could help reduce exposure risks in the agricultural industry by restoring partial or complete jurisdiction over pesticide regulations to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), enabling better coordination with the EPA on regulatory and enforcement issues. Meanwhile, more attention should be afforded to legislative proposals such as Sen. Corry Booker’s Protect America’s Children from Toxic Pesticides Act (PACTPA), which seeks to ban dangerous pesticides like paraquat, impose more stringent penalties on uncompliant farm owners, and mandate bilingual labeling for pesticides.
Farmworkers who have worked with Paraquat pesticide either as a sprayer, chemical mixter, tank filler and have been diagnosed witth Parkinsons’ should file a Paraquat claim to obtain rightful compensation. People living near farming communities where Paraquat was sprayed and were diagnosed with Parkinson’s are also eligible for a claim.
Miguel Leyva is a case manager with Atraxia Law and helps agricultural workers harmed by Paraquat exposure compile the documentation and medical records needed to file a toxic exposure claim.
The UN General Assembly in session. Credit: UN Photo
Opinion by Florian Krampe, Adam Day (stockholm, sweden)
Inter Press Service
STOCKHOLM, Sweden, Jun 22 (IPS) – The wildfires raging in Canada are yet another reminder that climate change is already having an impact on all our lives. As the smoke clears around the United Nations building in New York, we are likely to see a renewed push for the UN Security Council to tackle the security risks posed by climate change, including in the upcoming New Agenda for Peace policy brief from UN Secretary-General António Guterres.
Recent reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), supported by a growing body of scientific evidence, reach the inescapable conclusion that climate change is a meaningful factor in the risks of violent conflict.
In fact, one group of experts recently suggested that only a ‘misreading of the state of science’ could allow any doubt over the links between climate change and insecurity.
Despite the evidence, and despite the Security Council having already passed more than 70 resolutions and statements on climate-related security risks, efforts to make climate change a standing item on the Security Council’s agenda have so far failed.
While some permanent and elected members favour broadening the Security Council’s mandate to cover responses to all ‘threats to peace and security’, including climate change, others—notably China and Russia—want to keep Security Council business restricted to deploying peace operations, imposing sanctions, authorizing the use of military force and creating tribunals.
The Security Council seems likely to continue its incremental approach, recognizing some country-specific climate–security links in resolutions (e.g. mentioning climate-driven recruitment into an armed group) without tackling the broader security impacts of the climate crisis.
Even this limited scope offers some real opportunities for addressing climate-related security issues in conflict settings that are already on the Security Council’s agenda. Nevertheless, it is time to ask whether more can be achieved within the UN system on broader climate–security challenges outside the Security Council chamber, in particular through the UN General Assembly.
There are many instances where the General Assembly has acted when the Security Council has become deadlocked. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377—also known as the 1950 Uniting for Peace resolution—allows the General Assembly to call emergency sessions on threats to peace and security when this happens.
After laying unused for 25 years, the resolution was invoked in February 2022 in relation to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Furthermore, there is a surprisingly rich history of the General Assembly adopting a wide range of actions on security matters linked to human rights violations.
We here consider some of the arguments for the General Assembly taking a bigger role in addressing climate–security challenges.
A more inclusive forum
One of the objections to the Security Council’s role on climate–security (and indeed more generally) is that it is not an inclusive or meaningfully representative body. The 10 elected members have only two years to shape an issue, after which they rotate off the Council.
Thus, most of the time, the 188 UN member states, without the five permanent Security Council seats, have no say in the Council’s agenda. With every member state represented, the General Assembly is arguably a more representative forum for negotiating responses to a global issue such as climate change and its ensuing security risks.
Better access to the science
The scientific knowledge base on climate change and its impacts is developing fast. To design appropriate and timely multilateral responses, member states need regular access to the latest evidence, and this is another area in which the General Assembly’s offers important opportunities.
The Security Council could theoretically invite any scientist or expert to brief it on climate-related security risks, but in practice it has offered little access. The situation has improved significantly in the past five years thanks to the Climate Security Mechanism and the Informal Expert Group on Climate Security.
Also, efforts by the Peacebuilding Commission to broaden the climate–security discussion and introduce more evidence have only partially succeeded thus far.
The General Assembly has a more open and potentially dynamic set of processes for bringing in the latest climate and political science, and is able to consider evidence across the development, humanitarian and human rights arenas—where many of the human security impacts of climate change are most acutely felt.
In addition, its inclusive format means it can increase visibility of evidence coming from the most affected regions.
Generating new stimulus
Finally, the General Assembly can potentially galvanize a much broader range of integrated action across the UN system than can the Security Council. This is a distinct advantage, as the complex and dynamic ways in which climate-related security risks take shape mean that lasting solutions to them require coordinated responses across sectors.
In addition, engagement on climate-related security risks in the General Assembly could generate important new stimulus for the UN Climate Change Conferences as well as international financial institutions.
How could the General Assembly take up the climate–security challenge?
The General Assembly has plenty of shortcomings. On contentious issues, it tends to issue fairly toothless statements, and it has struggled to generate action on some of the most pressing issues of our time.
That said, a more concerted effort to activate the General Assembly on climate, peace and security could have a broader impact across the system, including potentially within the Security Council. As the General Assembly considers how to revitalize its work, we offer four possible entry points:
1. Put climate–security challenges on the agenda.
It is worth noting that when Ireland and Niger attempted to pass a resolution on climate and security in the Security Council in 2021, it was co-sponsored by 113 member states beyond the Council. This demonstrates the widespread support for tackling climate-related security issues at the multilateral level. During the next General Assembly session, which starts in September, the General Assembly’s new president, Dennis Francis, could play a crucial role in building on this support. Holding open debates on climate, peace and security and offering opportunities for high-level events in September could help to consolidate member states’ views. And pushing for the co-facilitators of the Summit of the Future to include climate, peace and security would also help to keep member states focused on the issue.
2. Build on the new right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment.
Last year’s landmark General Assembly resolution (UN General Assembly Resolution A/76/L.75) establishing the human right to a clean, healthy, sustainable environment offers an important entry point for climate-related security issues. The strong links between human rights violations and violent conflict are well documented and could offer an important role for the Human Rights Council to take up this issue as well. The General Assembly’s recognition of environmental human rights should lead to greater focus on how violations can lead to risks of violence, and could be the basis for targeted actions such as investigations into violations of the right to a clean environment, or a call by the General Assembly for the Security Council to place climate on its agenda as a standing item.
3. Amplify the evidence.
The General Assembly is able to establish commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions on any issue it deems necessary. While in the past it has tended to create such bodies to address serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, there is no reason the General Assembly could not also demand fact-finding around the security risks posed by climate change. Indeed, even the process of trying to establish such a commission could help to highlight the issue in a way that could also put pressure on the Security Council to act.
4. Mandate other bodies and enable financing.
The General Assembly has an extraordinarily powerful role in setting the mandates of other bodies in the multilateral system. For example, it oversees the work of the Peacebuilding Commission and could consider expanding the commission’s mandate to include climate-related risks more explicitly. The General Assembly could also push for the IPCC to have a dedicated scientific track on climate, peace and security. In addition, the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) could catalyse an increase in funding dedicated to climate, peace and security, in peace operations and beyond.
Ultimately, the General Assembly cannot be the only forum for advancing multilateral action on climate-related security risks. But greater activity within the General Assembly could have a ripple effect across the system, potentially driving action on other fronts, and even pressuring the Security Council to take up the issue more directly.
Dr Adam Day (United States/United Kingdom) is the Head of the UN University Centre for Policy Research in Geneva and leads programming on peacebuilding, climate security, human rights, global governance and emerging risks; Dr Florian Krampe is the Director of SIPRI’s Climate Change and Risk Programme.
We use cookies on our website to give you the most relevant experience by remembering your preferences and repeat visits. By clicking “Accept”, you consent to the use of ALL the cookies.
This website uses cookies to improve your experience while you navigate through the website. Out of these, the cookies that are categorized as necessary are stored on your browser as they are essential for the working of basic functionalities of the website. We also use third-party cookies that help us analyze and understand how you use this website. These cookies will be stored in your browser only with your consent. You also have the option to opt-out of these cookies. But opting out of some of these cookies may affect your browsing experience.
Necessary cookies are absolutely essential for the website to function properly. These cookies ensure basic functionalities and security features of the website, anonymously.
Cookie
Duration
Description
cookielawinfo-checkbox-analytics
11 months
This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Analytics".
cookielawinfo-checkbox-functional
11 months
The cookie is set by GDPR cookie consent to record the user consent for the cookies in the category "Functional".
cookielawinfo-checkbox-necessary
11 months
This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookies is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Necessary".
cookielawinfo-checkbox-others
11 months
This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Other.
cookielawinfo-checkbox-performance
11 months
This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Performance".
viewed_cookie_policy
11 months
The cookie is set by the GDPR Cookie Consent plugin and is used to store whether or not user has consented to the use of cookies. It does not store any personal data.
Functional cookies help to perform certain functionalities like sharing the content of the website on social media platforms, collect feedbacks, and other third-party features.
Performance cookies are used to understand and analyze the key performance indexes of the website which helps in delivering a better user experience for the visitors.
Analytical cookies are used to understand how visitors interact with the website. These cookies help provide information on metrics the number of visitors, bounce rate, traffic source, etc.
Advertisement cookies are used to provide visitors with relevant ads and marketing campaigns. These cookies track visitors across websites and collect information to provide customized ads.
