In 2010-2011, a devastating drought led to more than 260,000 deaths beyond normal levels of expected mortality in Somalia. Yet almost no one died in Ethiopia after a severe drought in 2015. Credit: Abdurrahman Warsameh/IPS
Opinion
Inter Press Service
Oct 28 (IPS) – The Horn of Africa is facing its worst drought in 40 years. Scientists suspect that a multi-year La Niña cycle has been amplified by climate change to prolong dry and hot conditions.
After multiple failed harvests and amid high global food prices, the Horn is confronted with a severe food security crisis. Some 37 million people face acute hunger in the region, which includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.
In Somalia alone, 40% of the population is facing food insecurity: about 6.7 million people. In neighbouring Ethiopia, the proportion is lower – 20% – but the absolute numbers are higher at 20.4 million.
It was not too long ago that drought led to highly divergent impacts between Somalia and Ethiopia. In 2010-2011, a devastating drought led to more than 260,000 deaths beyond normal levels of expected mortality in Somalia. Yet almost no one died in Ethiopia after a severe drought in 2015.
Using the cases of the two countries, among others, the book shows why Somalia had a famine in the early 2010s while Ethiopia did not, despite both being exposed to severe droughts.
The biggest differences were that, compared with Somalia, Ethiopia enjoyed a state with more capacity and more political inclusion, and made good use of foreign aid. These are factors that I identify in the book as contributing to how climate change is affecting the security of states. I include famine as a form of insecurity.
Better outcomes are expected in states with high capacity to deliver services, high political inclusion where all social groups are represented in government, and where international assistance is welcomed and shared broadly.
Two sets of conditions, two different outcomes
So how did Somalia and Ethiopia stack up on the three factors that contribute to a bad situation being made worse?
In the lead-up to Somalia’s famine in 2011, the country faced persistent problems of a weak national government that was being challenged by Al-Shabaab, a violent Islamist militia that controlled significant territory in the south of the country. The Somali government had limited ability to deliver services in the areas it controlled, let alone areas under Al-Shabaab.
For its part, the Ethiopian government invested in social safety net programmes to feed people in the midst of the drought through cash transfers, employment programmes and food assistance.
The issue of sections of the society being excluded was also in greater evidence in Somalia than in Ethiopia. A number of marginalised groups, notably the Bantu Somalis and the Rahanweyn clan, were among the most affected by the drought. Better connected groups diverted aid that otherwise would have benefited these communities.
Finally, Somalia was in much worse shape when it came to aid. Al-Shabaab militants were blocking aid into the country, which led to a number of humanitarian groups withdrawing from Somalia. In addition, the US, through the Patriot Act, discouraged NGOs from providing aid for fear it would end up in Al-Shabaab’s hands. Together, this meant that little humanitarian assistance came into Somalia precisely at the time when the country needed it most. Hundreds of thousands died.
Ethiopia was a favourite of the international community for foreign assistance. It received funds that supported its social safety net programmes, which helped it prepare for the drought and administer emergency aid supplies.
The current food security crisis in the Horn of Africa, however, reveals persistent vulnerability in both countries.
As Ethiopia’s case shows, progress can be undone. Rising political exclusion is leading to huge food security risks, particularly in the Tigray region where aid is currently largely blocked amid the ongoing violent conflict.
Equally worrisome is Somalia’s situation, where both local and external actors have struggled to build state capacity or inclusion in the face of a long-running violent insurgency.
What can work
My book provides some hopeful insights, as well as caution. It shows that for countries like Ethiopia and Bangladesh, international assistance can help address weak state capacity. Donors worked with local officials to address specific climate hazards, like drought and cyclones.
Such international assistance helped compensate for weak state capacity through discrete investments in early warning systems, targeted social services, such as food assistance or cash transfers, and hazard-specific protective infrastructure, such as cyclone shelters.
Those examples suggest that climate adaptation can save lives and contribute to economic prosperity.
However, as the unfolding dynamic in Ethiopia shows, progress can be reversed. Moreover, it’s far more challenging for external actors to build inclusive political institutions if local actors are not so inclined.
With climate change intensifying extreme weather events around the world, it is incumbent upon policymakers to enhance the practice of environmental peacebuilding, both to resolve ongoing conflicts through better natural resource management and to prevent future emergencies.
Dusk approaches in Yangon, Myanmar. Credit: Unsplash/Alexander Schimmeck
Opinion by Noeleen Heyzer (united nations)
Inter Press Service
UNITED NATIONS, Oct 27 (IPS) – The political, human rights and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar continues to take a catastrophic toll on the people, with serious regional implications.
More than 13.2 million people are food insecure, about 40 percent of the population is living below the poverty line and 1.3 million are internally displaced. Military operations continue with disproportionate use of force including aerial bombings, burning of civilian structures, and the killing of civilians including children.
I condemn the indiscriminate airstrikes on a celebration in Kachin State that killed large numbers of civilians days ago. The People’s Defence Forces are also accused of targeting civilians.
The plight of the Rohingya people, along with other forcefully displaced communities, remains desperate, with many seeking refuge through dangerous land and sea journeys. The price of impunity is a grave reminder that accountability remains essential.
Since the release of the Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Myanmar, violence between the Arakan Army and the military in Rakhine has escalated to levels not seen since late 2020, with significant cross-border incursions, endangering all communities, harming conditions for durable return, and prolonging the burden on Bangladesh as host of about 1 million Rohingya refugees.
As the Myanmar crisis deepens, I continue to promote a coordinated international strategy, in line with my mandate, engaging all stakeholders for an inclusive Myanmar-led process to return to the democratic transition.
A child looks after his younger sibling in Myanmar. Credit: World Bank/Tom Cheatham
My first visit to Myanmar as Special Envoy in August to meet the military’s Commander-in-Chief was part of broader efforts by the UN to urgently support a return to civilian rule based on the will and needs of the people.
I made six requests during the visit: ending aerial bombing and burning of civilian infrastructure; delivery of humanitarian assistance without discrimination; the release of all children and political prisoners; a moratorium on executions; the well-being of and engagement with State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.
I also highlighted Myanmar’s responsibility for creating conducive conditions for the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees. Soon after, I visited Dhaka and Cox’s Bazar on the five-year anniversary of the Rohingya’s mass displacement, where I expressed the United Nations’ appreciation for Bangladesh’s generosity and heeded Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s statements that the current situation is unsustainable.
A highlight of the visit was my discussions with women and youth in the refugee camps. They made it clear that they need to be engaged directly in discussions and decisions about their future.
Their rights and protection, in particular their citizenship, freedom of movement and security, must be guaranteed, guided by the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State. Going forward, I will continue to strengthen co-operation with ASEAN and engagement with all stakeholders.
While there is little room for the de-escalation of violence or for “talks about talks” in the present zero-sum situation, there are some concrete ways to reducing the suffering of the people. Recognizing that many more people will be forced to flee the violence,
I will continue to urge ASEAN to develop a regional protection framework for refugees and forcefully displaced persons. The recent forced return of Myanmar nationals, some of whom were detained on arrival, underlines the urgency of a coordinated ASEAN response to address shared regional challenges caused by the conflict.
Education and skills development are powerful tools to prepare Rohingya refugees for their return to Myanmar, which I continue to advocate, working closely with leaders of ASEAN and neighbouring countries as well as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
Key Ethnic Armed Organizations and the National Unity Government have together appealed for me to convene an Inclusive Forum for engagement to facilitate protection and humanitarian assistance to ALL people in need, in observance of International Humanitarian Law.
I have also initiated a women, peace and security (WPS) platform on Myanmar with the Foreign Minister of Indonesia to amplify the needs of women affected by the conflict, and their leadership as agents of change.
To conclude, there is a new political reality in Myanmar: a people demanding change, no longer willing to accept military rule. I will continue to appeal to all governments and other key stakeholders to listen to the people and be guided by their will to prevent deeper catastrophe in the heart of Asia.
Noeleen Heyzer, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar, in her address to the United Nations General Assembly’s Third Committee 25 October 2022
NEW YORK, Oct 26 (IPS) – Held in-person for the first time in three years, the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank last week in Washington, D.C. failed to offer solutions to the dozens of developing countries in debt distress or on the forewarned global recession instigated by monetary tightening.
Meanwhile, austerity measures are reinforced through a repeated emphasis on fiscal tightening, underpinned by a monetarism upheld by the IMF and rich country central banks.
The scenario of a dual tightening in both monetary and fiscal policy is only exacerbated by the absence of political will among creditors to cooperate in debt restructuring, bolstered by narratives of losing market access to financial flows.
New loan programs are created by the IMF to boost concessional financing for food price shocks, climate transitions and liquidity shortfalls. However, these very loans create new debt and reinscribe the very austerity measures that worsen the challenges of inflation and climate.
Within these asymmetries of power and access in the world economy, and the foreclosing of developmental policy tools for developing countries, what then is the fate of the vast majority of people and nations in the world?
The IMF’s World Economic Outlook warned of an imminent recession amidst a shift of financial regime from cheap and easy money to an aggressive synchronization of global monetary tightening.
“In short, the worst is yet to come, and for many people 2023 will feel like a recession,” said IMF Chief Economist Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas. Convening the world’s finance ministers, central bank governors, and financial market leaders, the IMF announced a slowdown in global growth by 2.7%, down from the 3.2% growth projected for this year.
On the heels of a global pandemic followed by the war in Ukraine, the US Federal Reserve’s interest rate hikes, aimed toward domestic price stability, is creating a global push toward more expensive money.
A stronger dollar, higher international and domestic interest rates, coupled with depreciating currencies and sell-offs in many developing country assets, is generating protracted economic and social pain across the globe.
The spillover impacts are seen in soaring food and fuel prices, increases in dollar-denominated debt and imports costs, volatile commodity markets and debt distress intensifying into a 50-year record across the developing world.
The UN’s 2022 Trade and Development Report warns that the most vulnerable countries and communities are being hit the hardest. Warnings of another ‘lost decade’ abound, in that the current interest rate hikes resemble those of 1979-82, which triggered debt crises in over 40 developing countries where ‘structural adjustment programs’ through IMF loans contributed to a decade of lost growth and development across the Global South.
The tightrope global central banks are walking is acknowledged by IMF Managing Director, Kristalina Georgieva, who says, “Not tightening enough would cause inflation to become de-anchored and entrenched — which would require future interest rates to be much higher and more sustained, causing massive harm on growth and massive harm on people.
On the other hand, tightening monetary policy too much and too fast — and doing so in a synchronized manner across countries — could push many economies into prolonged recession.”
Meanwhile, the topline recommendation of the IMF’s Global Financial and Stability Report is that “central banks must act resolutely to bring inflation back to target.” Doing otherwise would risk credibility and market volatility, or in other words, create difficulties in market access to financial and investment flows and/or worsen borrowing terms.
One of the central tenets of neoclassical economic consensus among global central banks is that of maintaining price stability through a low inflation target of 2%. Financial rulemakers have for decades deemed inflation a threat to economic growth by way of the specter of hyperinflation. However, empirical evidence points to the contrary.
Collating data from 31 countries from 1961-94, World Bank chief economist Michael Bruno and William Easterly concluded that the inflation does not lead to lower growth, even when the significant oil price increase of 1974-75 is included.
The US Federal Reserve’s own historical archives demonstrate that the so-called ‘Great Inflation’ of 1965-82 did not harm growth either. In light of these studies by neoclassical economists and central bank institutions, economists Anis Chowdhury and Jomo Kwame Sundaram argue that “there is no empirical basis for setting a particular threshold, such as the now standard 2% inflation target – long acknowledged as ‘plucked from the air.’”
From press conferences to panel speeches, the IMF leadership repeats that the danger of “entrenched” inflation requires a global commitment to tackle it head on through global to domestic monetary tightening.
This stems in large part from a belief that once inflation begins, it has an inherent tendency to accelerate. Consequently, IMF loans and surveillance recommend central bank independence (from the executive) as a means to ensure unbiased financial policymaking, while critics contend that it has only enhanced the influence and power of big banks and financial actors, largely at the expense of the real economy.
However, history again demonstrates that inflation does not accelerate easily, even when workers have more bargaining power, or wages are indexed to consumer prices – as in some countries.
Lost decade redux?
The IMF’s Fiscal Monitor, published on October 12, called upon all policymakers to “maintain a tight fiscal stance, so that fiscal policy does not work at cross-purposes with monetary policy.” In essence, fiscal policy must serve monetary policy in its “fight against inflation,” by retrenching public spending for the singular objective of sending “a powerful signal that policymakers are aligned in the fight against inflation.”
The rationale is straightforward: “In a time of high inflation, policies to address high food and energy prices should not add to aggregate demand.” Increased demand is anathema, as it “forces central banks to raise interest rates even higher.”
The fiscal tightening is not new. In 2021, 131 governments started scaling back public spending. The geographic and population scale of austerity cuts is expected to intensify up to 2025.
Governments are implementing, or discussing, a range of fiscal adjustment policies, such as targeting social protection, regressive taxation, reducing public expenditure in social sectors, eliminating subsidies, privatizing public services or State-Owned Enterprises, pension reforms, labor flexibilization.
All have long histories of negative social impacts on economic and social rights, such as the right to food, water, health, housing, education, and livelihoods. The human impact will reach over 6 billion people, or 85% of humanity, in 2023.
In a time of poly-crisis, retrenching public spending and imposing regressive taxes that disproportionately hurt the poor, especially women, not only extinguishes the hope of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030, but more fundamentally, regresses decades of fighting poverty.
Meanwhile, the IMF’s Board has approved the creation of two new loan facilities, the new Food Shock Window, available for a year to countries reeling from the global food price crisis, and the Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST), through which many rich countries may re-channel their unused Special Drawing Rights if the funds are used to address “external shocks, including climate change and pandemics” by rules set out by the Fund.
While both loans address urgent threats, they also create new debt. The RST is also conditional upon an IMF loan program hinged on fiscal consolidation.
The severity of the food crisis warrants aid in the form of grants not loans. Based on prior research done by the World Bank and Center for Global Development on food price spikes, Oxfam estimates that another 65 million people could be pushed below the $1.90 extreme poverty line as a consequence of food price increases.
Debt crises nearing point of no return
Despite the imminent threat of a debt crises imploding across many developing countries, sovereign debt solutions, the Group of 20, IMF, World Bank as well as the Institute of International Finance, the consortium of private financial actors, have to date failed to create viable solutions.
The G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative, which suspended debt payments for 73 low-income countries, was terminated at the end of 2021. And two years after the Common Framework was established in 2020, it’s multiple flaws have led even the World Bank to call it a ‘slow-motion debt tragedy.’
One key dilemma is the lack of political will to enforce a comparability of treatment, where all creditors, including private, participate on equivalent terms or restructuring and in the principle of burden sharing. Another challenge is the glacial pace of restructuring is not only protracted but also riddled with uncertainty.
Middle-income countries, where the vast majority of the world’s poor reside and where serious debt defaults are taking place, are not included. Low-income countries fear that access to commercial financing will be cut off if they apply to the Common Framework, as evidenced by Fitch and S&P slashed Ethiopia’s sovereign rating when the nation applied to the Common Framework in 2021.
Out of the three countries that have so far asked for their debt to be treated – Chad, Ethiopia and Zambia – only Zambia has seen some forward movement.
The narratives coming from within the IMF reiterate a subservience to market access and creditor interests. Across panels and webinars, senior level IMF staff remarked that a large debt restructuring is a serious event, which may result in a decrease of future multilateral and private financing, in amounts that outweigh the financing gained in relief or restructuring.
Some warned that private creditors will not participate in debt restructuring where national fiscal instability reigns. To secure market access, countries have to tighten fiscal belts even more. The logic here is that financial stability imperative for accessing private credit requires fiscal consolidation that generates social devastation.
The lack of official creditor participation and the dilemma of transparency, referring in large part to China, was repeatedly stressed as a key problem. At the same time, an old and wholly condescending trope of the need to increase debtor discipline in light of its financial mismanagement and irresponsibility repeatedly emerged.
Meanwhile, there is no mention of the often-legalized corruption of private actors, such as tax evasion and avoidance, speculative and/or rigged trading. Amidst the talk, actual debt solutions are in omission. While political will is already in short supply, the lack of cooperation toward problem-solving is exacerbated by the finger-pointing between the creditor groups of bilateral, private, and multilateral.
History has repeatedly illustrated the way forward on debt, and the waves of austerity that it generates. For decades, advocates and policymakers alike have called for a transparent and binding debt workout mechanism within a multilateral framework for debt crisis resolution, in a process convening all creditors.
The UN General Assembly has adopted multiple resolutions calling for such a mechanism over the years. Debt justice movements from across the developing world have urged for the cancellation of all unsustainable and illegitimate debts in a manner that is ambitious, unconditional, and without repercussions for future market access.
Past cases show how reducing debt stock and payments allow for countries to increase their public financing for urgent domestic needs.
The principle of burden-sharing ensures genuine debt relief, as does the commitment to include all creditors in an automatic or orderly way. Recognizing that multilateral institutions account for around one-third of the outstanding debt of low- and lower-middle-income countries, the World Bank and IMF must participate in such efforts.
They should both cancel debt payments owed, and the IMF should eliminate surcharges. Protection needs to be provided to debtor states against holdouts and lawsuits by non-participating creditors, while laws and procedures for responsible borrowing and lending need to be ensured to protect citizens and communities against corrupt, predatory and odious debts.
Last but not least, an automatic mechanism for a debt standstill in the wake of an extreme exogenous shock should be created. As proposed by the G77 group of developing countries in the UN General Assembly in response to the global financial crisis of 2007-8, such a mechanism must “be established for a determined period in response to external catastrophe events, as climate and natural disasters, health pandemic, military conflict and inflation.” The prescience of the G77 group in 2009 offers a salient message.
While the developing world has little recourse but to ‘dance to the tune of the Federal Reserve,’ the devastating toll of the human, social and economic crisis must be addressed through tools and choices that can be generated.
The question is how to muster political will, be it from the moral pressure of global justice movement to analysis of the effects that soaring poverty and intensifying climate change will have on the very survival of our planet and species.
Bhumika Muchhala is development economist and senior advocate on economic governance at Third World Network. She works on research, analysis, advocacy and public education on the international political economy of development, feminist economics and decolonial theory and approaches.
Opinion by Jomo Kwame Sundaram, Anis Chowdhury (sydney and kuala lumpur)
Inter Press Service
SYDNEY and KUALA LUMPUR, Oct 25 (IPS) – Widespread adverse reactions to the UK government’s recent ‘mini-budget’ forced new Prime Minister Liz Truss to resign. The episode highlighted problems of macroeconomic policy coordination and the interests involved.
Macro-policy coordination
But macroeconomic, specifically fiscal-monetary policy coordination almost became “taboo” as central bank independence (CBI) became the new orthodoxy. It has been accused of enabling CBs to finance government deficits. Critics claim inflation, even hyperinflation, becomes inevitable.
Anis ChowdhuryGovernment finance ministries and CBs are the two main macroeconomic policy protagonists. Poor ‘macro-policy’ coordination has generated problems, including contradictory policy responses. This has meant more macroeconomic and financial instability, worrying markets and investors.
Fiscal policy – notably variations in government tax and spending – mainly aims to influence long-term growth and distribution. CB monetary policy – e.g., variations in short-term interest rates and credit growth – claims to prioritize price and exchange rate stability.
By the early 1990s, the ‘Washington consensus’ implied the two macro-policy actors should work independently due to their different time horizons. After all, governments are subject to short-term political considerations inimical to monetary stability needed for long-term growth.
Claiming to be “technocratic”, CBs have increasingly set their own goals or targets. CBI has involved both ‘goal’ and ‘instrument’ independence, instead of ‘goal dependence’ with ‘instrument independence’.
CBI was ostensibly to avoid ‘fiscal dominance’ of monetary policy. Meanwhile, government fiscal policy became subordinated to CB inflation targets. For former Reserve Bank of Australia Deputy Governor Guy Debelle, monetary policy became “the only game in town for demand management”.
Debelle noted that except for rare and brief coordinated fiscal stimuli in early 2009, after the onset of the global financial crisis, “demand management continued to be the sole purview of central banks. Fiscal policy was not much in the mix”.
Jomo Kwame SundaramSub-optimal outcomes
But more than three decades of “divorce” between independent CBs and fiscal authorities have failed to deliver its promised benefits. Instead, monetary policy dominance has worsened financial instability.
Adam Posen found the costs of disinflation, or keeping inflation low, higher in OECD countries with CBI. Carl Walsh found likewise in the European Community.
For Guy Debelle and Stanley Fischer, CBs have sought to enhance their credibility by being tougher on inflation, even at the expense of output and employment losses.
Committed to arbitrary targets, independent CBs have sought credit for keeping inflation low. They deny other contributory factors, e.g., labour’s diminished bargaining power and globalization, particularly cheaper supplies.
John Taylor, author of the ‘Taylor rule’ CB mantra, concluded CB “performance was not associated with de jure central bank independence”. De jure CB independence has not prevented them from “deviating from policies that lead to both price and output stability”.
The de facto independent US Fed has also taken “actions that have led to high unemployment and/or high inflation”. As single-minded independent CBs pursued low inflation, they neglected their responsibility for financial stability.
CBs’ indiscriminate monetary expansion during the 2000s’ Great Moderation enabled asset price bubbles and dangerous speculation, culminating in the global financial crisis (GFC).
Since the GFC, “the financial sector has become dependent on easy liquidity… To compensate for quantitative easing (QE)-induced low return…, increased the risk profile of their other assets, taking on more leverage, and hedging interest rate risk with derivatives”.
Independent CBs also never acknowledge the adverse distributional consequences of their policies. This has been true of both conventional policies, involving interest rate adjustments, and unconventional ones, with bond buying, or QE. All have enabled speculation, credit provision and other financial investments.
They have also helped inefficient and uncompetitive ‘zombie’ enterprises survive. Instead of reversing declining long-term productivity growth, the slowdown since the GFC “has been steep and prolonged”.
Dire consequences
The pandemic has seen unprecedented fiscal and monetary responses. But there has been little coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities. Unsurprisingly, greater pandemic-induced fiscal deficits and monetary expansion have raised inflationary pressures, especially with supply disruptions.
This could have been avoided if policymakers had better coordinated fiscal and monetary measures to unlock key supply bottlenecks. War and economic sanctions have made the supply situation even more dire.
Government debt has been rising since the GFC, reaching record levels due to pandemic measures. CBs hiking interest rates to contain inflation have thus worsened public debt burdens, inviting austerity measures.
Thus, countries go through cycles of debt accumulation and output contraction. Supposed to contain inflation, they adversely impact livelihoods. Many more developing countries face debt crises, further setting back progress.
Needed reforms
Sixty years ago, Milton Friedman asserted, “money is too important to be left to the central bankers”. He elaborated, “One economic defect of an independent central bank … is that it almost invariably involves dispersal of responsibility… Another defect … is the extent to which policy is … made highly dependent on personalities… third … defect is that an independent central bank will almost invariably give undue emphasis to the point of view of bankers”.
Thus, government-sceptic Friedman recommended, “either to make the Federal Reserve a bureau in the Treasury under the secretary of the Treasury, or to put the Federal Reserve under direct congressional control.
“Either involves terminating the so-called independence of the system… either would establish a strong incentive for the Fed to produce a stabler monetary environment than we have had”.
Undoubtedly, this is an extreme solution. Friedman also suggested replacing CB discretion with monetary policy rules to resolve the problem of lack of coordination. But, as Alan Blinder has observed, such rules are “unlikely to score highly”.
Effective fiscal-monetary policy coordination requires appropriate supporting institutions and operating arrangements. As IMF research has shown, “neither legal independence of central bank nor a balanced budget clause or a rule-based monetary policy framework … are enough to ensure effective monetary and fiscal policy coordination”.
Although rules-based policies may enhance transparency and strengthen discipline, they cannot create “credibility”, which depends on policy content, not policy frameworks.
For Debelle, a combination of “goal dependence” and “instrument or operational independence” of CBs under strong democratic or parliamentary oversight may be appropriate for developed countries.
There is also a need to broaden membership of CB governing boards to avoid dominance by financial interests and to represent broader national interests.
But macro-policy coordination should involve more than merely an appropriate fiscal-monetary policy mix. A more coherent approach should also incorporate sectoral strategies, e.g., public investment in renewable energy, education & training, healthcare. Such policy coordination should enable sustainable development and reverse declining productivity growth.
As Buiter urges, it is up to governments “to make appropriate use of … fiscal space” created by fiscal-monetary coordination. Democratic checks and balances are needed to prevent “pork-barrelling” and other fiscal abuses and to protect fiscal decision-making from corruption.
Civil society organisations at the Finance in Common Summit. Credit: Noel Emmanuel Zako
Opinion by Bibbi Abruzzini (abidjan, ivory coast)
Inter Press Service
ABIDJAN, Ivory Coast, Oct 21 (IPS) – A coalition of civil society organisations is demanding public development banks (PDBs) to take radical and innovative steps to tackle human rights violations and environmental destruction. No project funded by PDBs should come at the expenses of vulnerable groups, the environment and collective liberties, but should instead embody the voices of communities, democratic values and environmental justice.
The demands, part of a collective statement signed by more than 50 civil society organisations, come as over 450 PDBs gather in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, from October 19th, for a third international summit, dubbed Finance in Common.
The COVID-19 pandemic and climate emergency, coupled with human rights violations and increasing risks for activists worldwide, is bringing the need to change current practices into even sharper focus. While public development banks may drag their feet on addressing intersecting and structural inequalities, civil society organisations are taking actions aimed at creating dignified livelihoods by embedding development with concrete affirmative measures towards climate, social, gender, and racial justice.
PDBs cannot be reluctant to act. They need to hit the target when it comes to supporting the transformation of economies and financial systems towards sustainability and addressing the most pressing needs of citizens worldwide – from food systems to increasing support for a just transition towards truly sustainable energy sources. PDBs must recognise that public services are the foundation of fair and just societies, rather than encouraging their privatisation and keep austerity narratives alive.
9 out of 10 people live in countries where civic freedoms are severely restricted, and with an environmental activist killed every two days on average over the past decade, development banks have an obligation to recognize and incorporate human rights in their plans and actions, following a “do not harm” duty.
Civil society organisations at the Finance in Common Summit. Credit: Noel Emmanuel Zako
Communities cannot be left out of the door. They need to be given the space to play the rightful role of driving forces in the answers to today’s global challenges, without them PDBs will move backwards rather than forward – and this means more environmental degradation, less democratic participation, and to put it bluntly an even greater crisis than the one we are facing today. And nobody needs that.
The recommendations in the collective civil society statement emerge from a three-year process of engagement and exchange, involving civil society networks in an effort to shape PDBs policies and projects. You can find some of their words and messages below.
As the call for accountability grows, the Finance in Common summits are an opportunity for PDBs to show moral leadership and help remedy the lack of long-term collaborations with civil society, communities and indigenous groups, threatening to curtail development narratives and practices.
Here are the messages from civil society organisations from around the globe directed at public development banks.
Oluseyi Oyebisi, Executive Director of Nigeria Network of NGOs (NNNGO) the Nigerian national network of 3,700 NGOs said: “The Sahara and Sahel countries especially have been facing the most serious security crisis in their history linked with climate change, social justice and inequalities in the region. Marked by strong economic (lack of opportunities especially for young people), social (limitation of equitable access to basic social services) and climatic vulnerabilities, the region has some of the lowest human development indicators in the world – even before the covid pandemic. Access to affected populations is limited in some localities due to three main factors: the security situation, the poor state of infrastructures and difficult geographic conditions. PDBs must prioritise civil society organisations and Communities initiatives supporting state programs of decentralization, security sector reforms and reconciliation. This will help reduce the vulnerability of populations and prevent violent extremism.”
Mavalow Christelle Kalhoule, Forus Chair and President of Spong, the NGO network of Burkina Faso said: “Development projects shape our world; from the ways we navigate our cities to how rural landscapes are being transformed. Ultimately, they impact the ways we interact with one another, with plants and animals, with other countries and with the food on our plates. The decisions taken by public development banks are therefore existential. Such responsibility comes with an even greater one to include communities directly concerned by development projects, those whose air, water and everyday lives are affected for generations to come. For this to happen, public development banks must reinforce their long-term efforts to create dialogue with civil society organisations, social movements and indigenous communities in order to fortify the democratic principles of their work. We encourage them to listen, to ask and to cooperate in innovative ways so that development stays true to its original definition of progress and positive change; a collective, participative and fair process and a word which has a meaning not for a few, but for all.”
Tity Agbahey, Africa Regional Coordinator, Coalition for human rights in development said: “Many in civil society have expressed concerns about Finance in Common as a space run by elites, that fails to be truly inclusive. It is a space where the mainstream top-down approach to development, instead of being challenged, is further reinforced. Once again, the leaders of the public development banks gathered at this Summit will be taking decisions on key issues without listening to those most affected by their projects and the real development experts: local communities, human rights defenders, Indigenous Peoples, feminist groups, civil society. They will speak about “sustainability”, while ignoring the protests against austerity policies and rising debt. They will speak about “human rights”, while ignoring those denouncing human rights violations in the context of their projects. They will speak about “green and just transition”, while continuing to support projects that contribute to climate change.”
Comlan Julien AGBESSI, Regional Coordinator of the Network of National NGO Platforms of West Africa (REPAOC), a regional coalition of 15 national civil society platforms said: “Regardless of how they are perceived by the public authorities in the various countries, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) contribute to covering the aspects and spaces not reached or insufficiently reached by national development programmes. Despite the undeniable impact of their actions on the living conditions of populations, NGOs remain the poor cousins of donor funding, apart from the support of certain philanthropic or charitable organisations. In such a context of scarce funding opportunities, aggravated by the health crisis due to COVID-19 and the subsequent economic crisis, Pooled Finance, which is in fact a paradigm shift, appears to be a lifeline for CSOs. This is why REPAOC welcomes the commitments made by both the Public Development Banks and the Multilateral Development Banks to directly support CSO projects and programmes in the same way as they usually do with governments and the private sector. Through the partnership agreements that we hope and pray for between CSOs and banks, the latter can be assured that the actions that will be envisaged for the benefit of rural and urban communities will certainly reach them with the guarantees of accountability that their new CSO partners offer”.
Frank Vanaerschot, Director of Counter Balance, said: “As one of this year’s organisers of the Finance in Common Summit, the EIB will brag about the billions it invests in development. The truth is the bank will be pushing the EU’s own commercial interests and promoting the use of public money for development in the Global South to guarantee profits for private investors. Reducing inequalities will be second-place at best. The EIB is also co-hosting the summit despite systemic human rights violations in projects it finances from Nepal to Kenya. Instead, the EIB and other public banks should work to empower local communities by investing in the public services needed for human rights to be respected, such as publicly owned and governed healthcare and education – not on putting corporate profits above all else.”
Stephanie Amoako, Senior Policy Associate at Accountability Counsel said: “PDBs must be accountable to the communities impacted by their projects. All PDBs need to have an effective accountability mechanism to address concerns with projects and should commit to preventing and fully remediating any harm to communities”.
Jyotsna Mohan Singh, Regional Coordinator, Asia Development Alliance said: “PDBs should have a normative core; they should start with the rights framework. This means grounding all safeguards into all the various rights frameworks that already exist. There are rights instruments for indigenous people, the elderly, women, youth, and people living with disability. They are part and parcel of a whole host of both global conventions and regional conventions. Their approach should be grounded in those rights, then it will be on a very firm footing.
Asian governments need to support, implement, and apply strict environmental laws and regulations for all PDBs projects. The first step is to disseminate public information and conduct open and effective environmental impact assessments for all these projects, as well as strategic environmental assessments for infrastructure and cross-border projects.”
Opinion by Manzoor Qadir, Guillaume Baggio (hamilton, canada)
Inter Press Service
HAMILTON, Canada, Oct 20 (IPS) – Global progress has been staggeringly inadequate against Sustainable Development Goal 6, “clean water and sanitation for all.”
According to the latest SDGs progress assessment, 2 billion people still lack safely managed drinking water, 3.6 billion lack sanitation services, and 3 billion lack basic hygiene services.
Waterborne diseases continue to take a heavy toll on the global community, with hotspots in developing countries most acutely affected.
To address this crisis, the United Nations launched the SDG 6 Global Acceleration Framework in 2020 to fast-track progress. The framework is a roadmap for aligning national policies and financial resources and scaling up action at all levels, but it has two fundamental flaws that need to be addressed.
Impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic
First, the Framework largely overlooks the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the means by which safe drinking water, sanitation, and hygiene services will be provided where needed.
The pandemic badly affected and continues to affect the financial, political, and institutional structures and the social fabric of countries. Debt and inflation in many countries are rising while foreign investment declined by 35 per cent from 2019 to 2021.
The ability to make critical capital improvements has also been drastically affected during the pandemic, causing a delay in completing planned water and sanitation infrastructure and further enfeebling already underfunded services in developing countries.
Global and national financial, political, and institutional structures need to be reshaped, and the social fabric repaired as part of a truly transformative sustainability agenda.
Undervaluing SDGs interlinkages
Second, the SDG 6 Global Acceleration Framework undervalues the potential of strengthening interlinkages across SDGs. While it recognizes the importance of SDG 6 interlinkages, it does not call for systematic change in traditional forms of decision-making in the water and sanitation sector.
The risks of addressing SDGs individually without considering their interlinkages was the subject of warnings early in this global process. Moreover, SDG interlinkages are context-specific and depend on several factors, such as geography, governance, or socio-economic conditions.
The current economic slowdown could push another 263 million people into extreme poverty in 2022 — a number roughly equal to the combined populations of Germany, France, the UK and Spain — further compounding challenges across critical dimensions of sustainable development, such as health, education, gender, and water and sanitation.
Policy coherence is indispensable to sustainable development. A post-pandemic framework for sustainability requires policies that are mutually supportive across multiple sectors. Countries must move on from merely identifying interlinkages between SDGs to strengthening and acting on them.
Two actions to bridge the gaps
The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic clearly necessitate better coordinated multi-sectoral policies. Next year, UN Member States meet at the UN 2023 Water Conference for the midterm review of the Water Action Decade 2018-2028, an effort to galvanize social, economic, and environmental action.
National decision-makers and development actors need to act on the following recommendations:
1. Prioritizing critical SDG 6 targets in the post-pandemic context. This means reshaping and strengthening today’s inadequate means of implementation and coming to the UN 2023 Water Conference with bold pledges, concentrating resources on bringing drinking water, sanitation, and hygiene services to the most vulnerable people — women and girls, migrants, the urban poor, schools, and hospitals, by 2030.
2. Harnessing the potential of SDGs interlinkages in policies and implementation plans at all levels. Accelerating the achievement of SDG 6 supports many other SDGs, particularly those related to health, education, food, gender equality, energy, and climate change. In the context of scarce financial resources and insufficient capacity, countries can prioritize strongly interlinked SDGs to yield achievements across multiple sectors.
We have seen and heard continuous global commitments to support the necessary conditions for sustainable development. In the post-pandemic context, progress in the water and sanitation sector has a new multifaceted purpose offering a wealth of benefits. It is time to realize them.
Guillaume Baggio is a Research Assistant at the Department of Physical and Environmental Sciences, University of Toronto, and Manzoor Qadir is Assistant Director at the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health.
UNU-INWEH is supported by the Government of Canada and hosted by McMaster University.
Opinion by Lars Jensen, George Gray Molina (united nations)
Inter Press Service
UNITED NATIONS, Oct 19 (IPS) – Developing low- and middle-income economies are taking hard hits from global economic developments outside their control. Monetary tightening in advanced economies coupled with increasing fears of a global recession have weakened currencies, sent interest rates soaring, and investors fleeing.
All of which is contributing to a rapid deterioration of an already damaging debt crisis which is, as ever, hitting the most vulnerable the hardest.
In new research released by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 54 developing (low- and middle-income) economies are identified as suffering from severe debt problems, equal to 40 percent of all developing economies. 1
Providing this group of countries with the debt relief they need should be a manageable task for the international economy as the group only accounts for little more than 3% of the world economy. Failing to do so, however, could result in catastrophic development setbacks as the group of 54 accounts for more than 50 percent of the world’s extreme poor and 28 of the world’s top-50 most climate vulnerable countries.
Countries are stuck between a rock and a hard place. They cannot spend what is required to protect their citizens and safeguard their development prospects while continuing to also service their fast-rising debt burdens.
Time is running out. Without an urgent step-up of debt relief efforts from the international community, many more defaults will follow, and the debt crisis will turn into an entrenched development crisis as history has taught us.
Contrary to the advice given in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, in the face of high interest rates, inflation, and debt levels, the International Monetary Fund is now urging countries to reign in fiscal spending while providing targeted and time-bound support to vulnerable populations.
But many developing economies cannot easily shift to effective and targeted social transfers or quickly increase tax revenues, – as the administrative capacity to do so takes years to build up.
Without a viable alternative in the form of access to orderly and comprehensive debt restructuring, and additional liquidity support from the international community, countries will have to choose between a string of messy and costly defaults and/or abrupt spending cuts with disastrous consequences for low-income and vulnerable populations and development prospects at large.
Furthermore, both options greatly increase the risk of political and social unrest threatening further setbacks and a deepening crisis.
We must also remember that these things are happening against the backdrop of an intensifying climate crisis which we can only combat together as a global community. Without a rethink on debt relief the global climate transition will be delayed, the economic costs of the transition will rise, and developing economies, who have contributed the least to the problem, will continue to bear a disproportionate size of the costs.
Developing economies must be allowed sufficient fiscal space to undertake ambitious sustainable development plans – including the undertaking of much-needed climate adaptation and mitigation investments.
Debt relief is one of several crucial components of providing it. The G20’s Common Framework for Debt Treatments, under which countries with debt distress can seek a restructuring, will have to be reformed, including a shift in focus towards comprehensive debt restructurings in return for sustainable development objectives.
This will require a change in attitude and sense of urgency, especially among major official creditors, as well as full debt transparency from both debtors and creditors. In our latest paper we discuss possible ways forward for the Common Framework focusing on country eligibility, debt sustainability analyses, official creditor coordination, private creditor participation, policy conditionalities and the use of debt clauses that target future economic and fiscal resilience.
Decisions on debt relief can no longer wait.
Nineteen developing economies – more than one-third of developing economies issuing dollar debt in international markets – have now lost markets access on account of skyrocketing interest rates, more than doubling from 9 countries at the beginning of 2022.
Similarly, credit ratings have been sliding with 27 countries – close to one-third of credit-rated developing economies – rated either ‘substantial risk, extremely speculative, or default’, up from 10 countries at the beginning of 2020.
Hard-won development gains achieved in the global south over decades are now being eroded by the intertwined cost-of-living and debt crises. Not only will a deepening development crisis result in great human suffering, but the cost of regaining whatever development gains are lost will increase substantially the longer we wait.
It is inconceivable, both morally and economically, that we would allow a development crisis to escalate when the international community has the resources needed to stop it now.
Lars Jensen is Economist at UNDP Strategic Policy Engagement Unit.; George Gray Molina is Head of Strategic Engagement and Chief Economist at UNDP
Opinion by Jomo Kwame Sundaram, Anis Chowdhury (sydney and kuala lumpur)
Inter Press Service
SYDNEY and KUALA LUMPUR, Oct 18 (IPS) – Preoccupied with enhancing their own ‘credibility’ and reputations, central banks (CBs) are again driving the world economy into recession, financial turmoil and debt crises.
Wall Street ‘cred’
Most CB governors believe ‘credibility’ is desirable and must be achieved by fighting inflation at any cost. To justify their own more harmful policies, they warn inflation is ‘damaging’.
Anis Chowdhury
They argue CBs need ‘independence’ from governments to pursue ‘credible’ monetary policy. Inflation targeting to ‘anchor’ inflation expectations is supposed to generate desired ‘confidence’. But CBs have been responsible for many costly failures.
The US Fed deepened the 1930s’ Great Depression, the 1970s’ stagflation and the early 1980s’ contraction, besides contributing to the 2008-09 global financial crisis (GFC). Hence, CB notions of ‘credibility’ and ‘independence’ need to be reconsidered.
But why did the Fed behave as it did? Some economic historians insist it was “to promote the interests of commercial banks, rather than economic recovery”.
Monetary policy before and during the Great Depression “was designed to cause the failure of non-member banks, which would enhance the long-run profits of the Fed’s member banks and enlarge the regulatory domain”.
Others concluded, “Federal Reserve errors seem largely attributable to the continued use of flawed policies” to defend the ‘gold standard’, and its poor understanding of monetary conditions.
Central banks contractionary
Worse, few lessons were learnt. Instead of protecting the gold standard, or being counter-cyclical, fighting inflation is the new CB preoccupation. Even worse, most CBs now commit to an arbitrarily-set inflation target of 2%, first promoted by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand over three decades ago.
Jomo Kwame Sundaram
Major CB interventions have caused both economic booms or bubbles and busts or contractions, often without mitigating inflation. Such “go-stop” monetary policy swings have caused asset price bubbles and financial fragility besides sudden contractions.
Ben Bernanke’s research team found the major damage from the 1970s’ oil price shocks was due to the “tightening of monetary policy” response. Other research attributed the 1970s’ stagflation largely to the Fed’s “go-stop” monetary policy, worsened by policymakers’ “misperceptions” and “faulty doctrine”.
Volcker’s actions betrayed the Fed’s dual mandate to pursue both full employment and price stability. First in the Employment Act of 1946, it was re-codified in the 1978 ‘Humphrey-Hawkins’ Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act.
The World Bank warns of dire developing country debt crises following policy-induced recessions. Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund has warned developing economies with dollar-denominated debt of imminent foreign exchange crises.
Stop-go new norm
Fed, Bank of England and European Central Bank policy approaches still justify “go-stop” monetary policy reversals. Resulting booms or bubbles and busts also feature in other recent crises, e.g., the GFC.
CBs enabled credit expansion in the 2000s, culminating in the GFC. More worryingly, the “near-consensus view” is that independent CBs have failed to achieve – let alone protect – financial stability.
Easy credit and rising stock and housing markets have involved rapid credit and loan growth worsening asset price bubbles. Regulatory oversight became increasingly lax as investors ‘chased yield’. Leverage grew, using dodgy ‘derivative’ products, making proper risk assessment difficult.
Guy Debelle, once Deputy Governor of Australia’s CB, noted, “The goal of financial stability has generally been left vague”. Hence, CBs failed to see significant build-up of financial instability”. Soon after, the Lehman Brothers’ collapse precipitated the GFC.
With less investment in the real economy, supply capacity is falling behind still growing demand. Pandemic, war and sanctions have also disrupted supplies.
Raising interest rates, CBs now race to reverse earlier monetary expansion. Credit contractions are squeezing economies, hitting poorer countries especially hard.
Reviewing historical data, the author of the ‘Taylor rule’ – whom many CBs profess to follow – concluded, “The classic explanation of financial crises, going back hundreds of years, is that they are caused by excesses – frequently monetary excesses – which lead to a boom and an inevitable bust”.
Independence for what?
CB independence (CBI) advocates often claim low inflation during the Great Moderation was due to CB credibility. But inflation in most countries declined from the mid-1990s, with or without CBI.
The alleged causation has been much exaggerated, and is certainly not as strong as argued. Claiming CBI ensures low inflation also denies other relevant variables, e.g., labour market casualization and globalization.
Debelle observed, “How much can be attributable to central bank independence or the inflation target is difficult to disentangle … assessment mostly relies on assertion, rather than empirical proof”.
CBI fetishism has also allowed central bankers to ignore distributional consequences of monetary policies. This has often enabled financial asset owners, speculators and creditors. CBI has also meant neglecting development responsibilities.
Emphasizing CBI also implies “a very narrow view of central bank functions”. This has made economies more prone to financial instability and crisis. Clearly, CBI is no harmless ‘elixir’ ensuring low inflation.
Residents of the Fontanar neighborhood in the Cuban capital are pleased with the incorporation of electric three-wheel vehicles to shorten distances between sectors within Boyeros, one of the municipalities that make up Havana. CREDIT: Jorge Luis Baños/IPS
by Luis Brizuela (havana)
Inter Press Service
HAVANA, Oct 17 (IPS) – The incorporation of small electric vehicles for public transport, together with initiatives that encourage the use of bicycles, represent opportunities and challenges for Cuba to sustainably and inclusively combat the chronic problems in urban mobility.
“Connecting nearby places with electric means of transportation has been very timely and a relief,” said Dania Martínez, referring to the well-known Ecotaxis, six-seater vehicles that since June have been providing transportation between neighborhoods within the municipality of Boyeros, one of the 15 that make up Havana.
The teacher and her son were waiting for one of these vehicles at the Fontanar shopping center to take them to Wajay, their neighborhood on the outskirts of Havana, when IPS asked them what they thought about the service.
“Public transportation is not good in this area, far from the city center, and private taxis charge you a high fee. Just getting somewhere else five kilometers away can be difficult. Hopefully the three-wheelers will spread to other places,” Martinez said.
She was referring to light motorized vehicles that resemble some kinds of Asian autorickshaws, which are also known locally as motocarro or mototaxi, with a capacity for six people in the back.
With a range of 120 kilometers, these three-wheeled electric vehicles cover three two- to four-kilometer routes for a price of four pesos, or 17 cents at the official exchange rate in a country with an average monthly salary equivalent to about 160 dollars.
The fleet of 25 vehicles is part of the Neomovilidad project, implemented by the General Directorate of Transportation of Havana (DGTH) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) office in Cuba.
“From its start in 2019, Neomovilidad has aimed to strengthen the regulatory framework for an efficient transition to a low-carbon urban transport system in Havana, with a positive environmental impact,” Reynier Campos, director of the project, told IPS.
During the first three months of operation, more than 135,000 people were transported, with an estimated monthly emission reduction potential of 6.12 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent.
On the downside, Ecotaxis can only recharge at night by connecting to the national power grid, 95 percent of which depends on the burning of fossil fuels to generate electricity. Recharging is carried out at the three-wheel vehicles’ parking area and is done at night because it takes about six hours.
However, there are plans to contract power from solar parks of the state-owned electric utility Unión Eléctrica de Cuba, in order to offset consumption, executives said.
Other fleets of Ecotaxis provide service in the municipalities of La Habana Vieja, Centro Habana and Guanabacoa, also with UNDP support, and contribute to the national commitment to climate change mitigation actions.
Campos explained that Neomovilidad is a pilot project in Boyeros that could be extended to other Havana municipalities and cities of this Caribbean island nation of 11.1 million people, where public transportation is one of the most pressing long-term issues.
Reynier Campos, head of the Neomovilidad project, stressed that the initiative proposes to strengthen the legislative framework and promote public policies based on four lines that contribute to Sustainable Urban Mobility and help reduce carbon emissions in Cuba. CREDIT: Jorge Luis Baños/IPS
Long-standing problem
With its 2.2 million residents and tens of thousands of people who live here on a short-term basis, Havana has 1.4 million people using transportation daily, one million of whom use the state-owned bus company Empresa de Ómnibus Urbanos, according to the Ministry of Transportation.
But the most recent official reports acknowledge that less than 50 percent of the fleet of public buses are currently operating in the capital.
The Cuban government blames the U.S. embargo as the main obstacle to the purchase of spare parts, as well as the lack of access to credit to repair and renovate buses, the main form of public transportation.
Problems with the availability of fuel and the number of drivers who find work in sectors with greater economic benefits also undermine an irregular service whose most visible face is the overcrowded stops at peak hours.
Figures indicate that 26 percent of the total estimated passengers in Havana use private taxis, which charge higher rates that not everyone can afford.
There are also non-agricultural transportation cooperatives with cabs and minibuses, as well as buses of the state-owned Transmetro Company, that provide services with set schedules.
About 80 percent of Latin America’s inhabitants live in towns and cities, and urban public transport remains essential in regional mobility plans.
Cuba is quietly taking steps to encourage the use of alternative vehicles and increase electricity production from renewable sources, which plans aim to raise from the current five to 37 percent by 2030.
As a result of flexible customs regulations for their importation, as well as assembly, it is estimated that half a million bicycles, motorcycles and electric three-wheelers are in circulation on the island, helping families get around.
However, high prices and sales only in foreign currency hinder their spread. Some of the most economical ones cost over 1,000 dollars, while others range from 2,000 to 5,000 dollars in government stores.
Mirelis Cordovés, driver of one of the electrocycles, makes 11 trips a day on the Fontanar-Wajay route, in the Boyeros municipality of the Cuban capital. She is pleased to have a job and a higher income to support her nine-year-old son, whom she is raising on her own. CREDIT: Jorge Luis Baños/IPS
Gender focus to reduce gaps
Neomovilidad stands out for encouraging the incorporation of women as drivers and promoting female employment.
“In addition to giving me a job, my income is higher, helping me support my nine-year-old son,” Mirelis Cordovés, a single mother who is one of the 13 women who now form part of the project’s team of drivers, told IPS.
Latin American nations such as Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Panama have adopted national policies related to the development of electric mobility.
In the case of Cuba, the proposal is “a vision for the development of electromobility from the Ministries of Transport, Energy and Mines and Industry, with guidelines and priority lines in public transport, including the conversion of vehicles,” said Campos.
He said that Neomovilidad proposes to promote public policies that contribute to Sustainable Urban Mobility.
The project urges considering the specific mobility needs of each social group and mainstreaming variables such as gender, age and accessibility, in order to reduce gaps.
The National Gender Equality Survey, conducted in 2016 but whose results were released in February 2019, showed that women primarily bear the burden of care work.
They are the ones who spend the most time taking children, family members or other people under their care to schools, hospitals or to buy food, the survey showed.
Transportation was identified as one of the top three problems for Cuban women, second only to low incomes and housing shortages.
The study drew attention to the correlation between time use and income inequality, because cheaper transportation options (public buses) increase travel delays.
Experts consulted by IPS consider that in the case of Cuba, a developing nation shaken by a three-decade economic crisis and pressing financial problems, there is no need to wait for solutions that demand large resources, if small and accessible alternatives can be devised to organize and facilitate mobility.
The Neomovilidad stand during the 2022 International Transport Fair at the Pabexpo fairgrounds in Havana. The project includes a pilot system of public bicycles, with six bicycle stations and 300 bikes, which should start offering its services before the end of 2022. CREDIT: Jorge Luis Baños/IPS
Integrating bicycles
As part of Neomovilidad, a pilot system of public bicycles should be inaugurated before the end of 2022, with six stations and 300 bicycles, also in the municipality of Boyeros.
The autonomous venture Inteliforja will operate the bicycle mobility system as a local development project, in conjunction with the DGTH, after winning a bidding process.
“The main activity will be the rental of bicycles at affordable prices. It will include other services such as parking, mechanical workshops, as well as complementary activities such as bicycle touring, package delivery and community activities to encourage the use of this means of transport,” explained Luis Alberto Sarmiento, one of the managers of Inteliforja.
“We plan to install a solar panel-powered station there to charge students’ motorcycles and electric bicycles,” said the young entrepreneur.
“Farther in the future, when we have more resources, we plan to introduce bicycles or three-wheelers for the transportation of elderly and disabled people,” Sarmiento added.
Although electric mobility and the use of bicycles are seen as promoting more open, safer, cleaner and healthier cities, Cuba faces multiple challenges in this regard, starting with the need to lower the price of vehicles and ensure the stable availability of parts and components.
Other pending issues are the lack of recharging points for refueling outside the home, the lack of bicycle lanes or green lanes, in addition to the urgent need to repair a road network, 75 percent of which is classified as in fair or poor condition.
Protesters attend a march against the military coup in Myanmar. Credit: Unsplash/Pyae Sone Htun
Opinion by Jan Servaes (brussels)
Inter Press Service
BRUSSELS, Oct 14 (IPS) – The update on September 26, 2022, of the human rights situation in Myanmar to the UN Human Rights Council says it all: “The people of Myanmar have been caught in a rapid downward spiral, with growing suffering, fear, and insecurity. Urgent action is needed to reverse this catastrophic situation and to restore peace, democracy, and sustainable development”.
Since the military overthrew an elected government on February 1, 2021, and took power in a country ruled by generals for five of the past six decades, the situation for the majority of the population has become increasingly desperate.
The coup, which ended 10 years of provisional democracy initiated by the previous junta, has devastated Myanmar’s economy, leading to mass displacement of people as a result of fighting between armed groups and the military, and relentless bombing on civilian targets of the Burmese Air Force.
According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), a non-profit organization that tracks military action and is frequently cited by the United Nations, 2,343 is the number of opponents of the junta that have been killed since the coup. Killed.
1,5,821 opponents of the coup have been arrested by the junta, the AAPP says.
160 people were killed in one day on March 27, 2021, as the junta celebrated the annual Armed Forces Day, the bloodiest day in its crackdown on democracy activists.
According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 1,320,000 people have been displaced by fighting. It is estimated that about 14.4 million people—about a quarter of Myanmar’s population—have been displaced from their homes and are in need of humanitarian assistance.
30 is the percentage by which Myanmar’s economy has shrunk as a direct result of the coup, the World Bank says. According to the World Bank, 1 million jobs were lost in Myanmar in 2021.
Potentially $2.8 billion in economic losses from internet shutdowns in Myanmar by 2021.
More than 60 is the percentage of the value of the kyat currency that has been lost against the dollar since the coup. Capital flight and a decline in foreign investment & aid, and money transfers have led to a shortage of foreign currency. The military regime’s attempts to restrict imports and ration foreign currencies have boosted illegal border trade with China and Thailand. A widening disparity between Thailand’s and Myanmar’s trade figures suggests that smuggling from Thailand has not only recovered to pre-coup levels, but also appears to have reached an all-time high. This boom questions the junta’s claim of a trade surplus. Moreover, it has been fueled by the regime’s own heavy-handed efforts to control trade.
Compared to March 2020, poverty is estimated to have tripled. With about 40 percent of the population living below the national poverty line by 2022, nearly a decade of progress in poverty reduction has been undone.
18 was the percentage contraction the World Bank predicted for Myanmar’s economy in the fiscal year starting April 1, 2021. Failure to see a substantial rebound in economic growth – with GDP estimated to remain in 2022 at around 13 percent lower than in 2019 – continues to test the resilience of the Myanmar population. Food insecurity is on the rise and households are increasingly resorting to negative coping mechanisms – including reducing consumption and asset sales – in the face of uncertainty.
The suicide rate has continued to rise since the coup as financial hardship, political repression and the collapse of the health care system are negatively impacting mental health.
26 is the total number of years in prison that deposed 77-year-old Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi will face if given the maximum sentences in the remaining lawsuits against her.
Press freedom regresses fast. The country has become a worse jailer of journalists than China. Since the coup, military authorities have arrested about 142 journalists and media workers, an estimated 57 of whom are still in prison in Myanmar, six more than are believed to be imprisoned in China. The junta has forced at least 12 media outlets to shut down, pushing hundreds of media workers to flee the country and revive the exiled media outlets that reported on the country under the last military junta prior to 2011.
ASEAN is increasingly frustrated with the lack of progress on the Five Point Consensus – a non-binding agreement drafted in April 2021. While many countries have criticized the junta’s lack of “willingness” to comply with the framework, Malaysia has gone a step further and put forward the idea of suspending Myanmar.
Jan Servaes was UNESCO-Chair in Communication for Sustainable Social Change at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He taught ‘international communication’ in Australia, Belgium, China, Hong Kong, the US, Netherlands and Thailand, in addition to short-term projects at about 120 universities in 55 countries. He is editor of the 2020 Handbook on Communication for Development and Social Change. https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-981-10-7035-8
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