Opinion by Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi (the hague, netherlands)
Inter Press Service
THE HAGUE, Netherlands, Jul 13 (IPS) – On the night of 17 July 1998, the outcome of the Diplomatic Conference convened to create the International Criminal Court was still uncertain. Hundreds of state representatives and civil society organizations assembled in the FAO headquarters in Rome, holding their breath in anticipation.
Finally, after midnight, euphoric delegations could applaud the outcome of the vote: 120 states in favour, 7 against and 21 abstentions. A long-standing dream was to become reality: the creation of a permanent criminal court to investigate and try perpetrators of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The crime of aggression was also included, but only in a programmatic way pending agreement about its definition and the conditions under which the Court could exercise jurisdiction. These questions were only resolved 12 years later in the first review conference held in Kampala, Uganda in 2010.
In the 25 years that followed the adoption of the Statute, successive judges and prosecutors contributed to operationalizing this Court, simultaneously desired and feared by different actors of the international community. States and civil society expected much of this unparalleled institution and its potential to impact positively on conflict resolution.
The creation of an international court with jurisdiction over international crimes was not in and of itself something new. The International Criminal Court followed the steps of the post-war Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, as well as those created by the United Nations Security Council 50 years later for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Silvia Fernandez de GurmendiHowever, the establishment of the first permanent international criminal jurisdiction, represented a key paradigm shift. Contrary to special tribunals, the International Criminal Court was not created to exercise jurisdiction solely in predetermined situations but to decide for itself, fully independently, where to investigate and who to prosecute. The ability to select situations in the world where to intervene gave it powers never previously granted to any other court.
To counterbalance this ambitious mandate, the Court was conceived as a complementary institution of last resort, with the power to act only in those cases of inaction or lack of genuine action by national systems.
Furthermore, despite its global vocation, the International Criminal Court was not granted universal jurisdiction. Unless the United Nations Security Council requests the Court to act, the Court may only investigate and prosecute in situations in which the states in whose territories the crime are committed or the states of nationality of the perpetrators are parties to the Rome Statute.
In its 25 years of operations and within the parameters set by its constituent treaty, the Court has demonstrated its capacity to investigate and prosecute in multiple situations of extremely grave crimes in Africa, Asia, America and Europe. It has also demonstrated the possibility of involving the victims of those crimes in its proceedings and of repairing the harm suffered by hundreds of thousands of them, either directly and indirectly.
For the first time, the Rome Statute introduced elements of reparative justice which allow victims to participate in the proceedings to make observations and to request reparation. These elements were later incorporated by the legal frameworks of other international courts and today form an integral part of international criminal justice.
The Court has achieved significant accomplishments, but has also suffered difficulties in its functioning. Currently, the Assembly of States Parties is undertaking, together with the Court and civil society, a holistic review to strengthen of the Rome Statute system by accelerating proceedings and improving the performance, governance, and work culture of the Court.
This review also seeks to strengthen cooperation by states and to design suitable strategies to increase political support and protect the institution and everyone who collaborate with it against threats and attacks.
Today, the Rome Statute has 123 state parties. This is a significant number that comprises two thirds of states in the international community. However, it is still insufficient to achieve the Court’s global aspirations.
Broadening the universality of the Court is of crucial importance. Today the world needs more justice than ever. The atrocities of the twentieth century that led to the creation of the Court have not ceased and there is a growing erosion of multilateralism and the rule of law.
Despite current circumstances, there is cause for hope. The international community has redoubled its demand for justice and multiplied the initiatives to make it a reality. The establishment of the Court reaffirmed the obligation to investigate and prosecute and contributed to consolidate the concept that justice is an indispensable component of sustainable peace.
In addition to proceedings by the International Criminal Court and other international tribunals, more states are willing to exercise universal jurisdiction over international crimes. New mechanisms are being created to ensure the collection and preservation of evidence that may assist these international or national efforts.
We are seeing the emergence of a global justice system, or a justice “eco-system”, within which international and national courts have a role to play – sometimes a central role, sometimes a complementary or supporting one.
In July 1998, the Court was an idea yet to be realized. Twenty-five years after its creation, the hope is that more states will join this historical effort to maximize its potential to impart justice in our tumultuous world.
Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi is President of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute; Former Judge and former President of the International Criminal Court.
STOCKHOLM, Sweden, Jul 12 (IPS) – The road to hell is paved with good intentions.
Proverb of unknown originThe war in Ukraine continues unabated; young men are sacrificed on battlefields, towns laid waste by aerial attacks, the threat of nuclear disasters is looming. People within an often formerly friendly inclined Europe are now wondering if Vladimir Putin has gone insane. The war in Ukraine is generally called “Putin’s war” and in April 2021 Putin signed a legislation providing him the right to run for two more consecutive terms, thus he could stay in power till 2036.
Nazi Germany was equalled with Hitler, the Soviet Union with Stalin, Communist China with Mao, and now Russia with Putin. Another example of the identification of an entire nation with a totalitarian ruler was Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe. A president who apart from participating in the invasion of a neighbouring country led his nation into a bloody civil war.
When I in the year 2000 was working for the Swedish International Development Cooperation (Sida) it was questioned why the Swedish Government every year granted SEK 140 million (USD 15 million) in development aid to Zimbabwe, a country governed by a scorned Robert Mugabe. At that time, Zimbabwe’s GNI had in one year shrunk by 13 percent, among other things due to unbudgeted expenses for the country’s participation in a war in the DR Congo (from 1998 to 2003 Zimbabwe’s participation in this war cost USD 1 million a day). A badly managed land reform had drastically reduced agricultural production. Even before the crisis 75 percent of the population was unable to meet necessary needs of food, clothing, schooling, health care and housing. Unemployment was over 60 percent, while 25 percent of the adult population was infected with HIV/AIDS.
Misery was blamed on Mugabe’s misrule, but Swedish support to Zimbabwe continued during his reign. Since Swedish aid was initiated in the early1980s Zimbabwe had by the year 2000 received SEK 5 billion (approximately USD 460 million). Economic support currently amounts to USD 28 million per year.
Swedish relations with Robert Mugabe indicate difficulties opinion leaders face while analysing the power game of other nations. For fear of being seen as harbouring neo-colonial attitudes “experts” often withheld critical judgment and were apt to name various leaders as ”hopes for Africa”. Unfortunately personal benefits from supremacy may prove to be a fatal temptation , several heroes of yesterday have after their seizure of power turn into despots.
In the case of Zimbabwe (which at the time was “Rhodesia” governed by a white minority party, the Rhodesian Front) it was reasonable to oppose a regime that kept the majority of a nation’s population out of power because of the colour of their skin. Swedish debate has often been characterized by two different worldviews, either that the world consists of democracies and dictatorships, with the former being on the good side, or that an enduring conflict subsists between the “West” and the “Rest”, where “West” is seen as the villain. According to the latter understanding , it did not matter if Zanu (PF), the party of Robert Mugabe, actually pursued one-party rule, any opposition towards the “ancient colonial world order” was OK.
It was thus more justifiable to support an armed struggle than the democratic consensus policy proclaimed by another Zimbabwean liberation group, Zapu, headed by Joshua Nkomo. The influential Pierre Schori, international secretary of the Swedish Social Democratic Party and close assistant to Prime Minister Olof Palme, supported the “eloquent and radical” Mugabe:
I think that it had to do with personal contacts. In the case of Zimbabwe, we did not choose between Zapu and Zanu, but I think that when Joshua Nkomo came to Sweden it was often through the churches, while Robert Mugabe was more of a pure freedom fighter.
Mugabe spoke fluent English, with an “exquisite” Oxford accent. He liked “open conversations and intellectual debates”, and in spite of an aversion to English colonialism he was an admirer of “Anglophone culture” and a fan of cricket, attesting that it “civilizes people and creates good gentlemen.”
Mugabe had been arrested in 1963 and was after 1966 transferred to a cell he shared with Zanu’s leader Ndabaningi Sithole. Mugabe remained in custody for a further eight years, devoting his time to studies. He gained a masters in economics, a bachelor of administration, and two law degrees from the University of London. Amnesty International’s Swedish Group 34 had as its lot to support the imprisoned freedom fighter. One member of the group later stated;
– He took advantage of the opportunity to study in prison and asked us to get literature. So we members shared the expenses and sent books to him. At that time, Mugabe was considered as a good guy. He was very fond of children and always remembered all our children’s names and greeted them in his letters. In addition to the books, Mugabe also asked for help with items such as a pair of pyjamas and tubes of toothpaste. Before his release, I and Eva Moberg , who had started the group, went and bought a suitcase, which we sent to him with his wife Sally.
In 1958, Mugabe had moved to Ghana to gain a teacher’s certificate at the Achimota College where he met his first wife, Sally Hafton. During Mugabe’s imprisonment Sally first moved to London, where she taught at the Africa Centre. She also lived for several years in Sweden, mostly in the village of Heby, north of the university town of Uppsala. She kept close contact with the members of Amnesty Group 34. Mugabe appreciated that Sally was staying in Sweden, which he considered to be a “safe country”. Sally worked as a nanny, learned Swedish and campaigned for Zimbabwe’s freedom struggle, both in Sweden and England. In Sweden, she became a frequently seen and well-liked person.
Mugabe was released in 1974 and resolved to leave Rhodesia for Moçambique. However, Samora Machel, who in 1975 became Moçambique’s president, was suspicious of Mugabe, whom he considered to be immature and belligerent. Furthermore, Machel suspected that Mugabe’s quick rise to power was due to machinations to get rid of Sithole as head of Zanu, a “prison coup” that might have been supported by Rhodesia’s white leader, Ian Smith. Machel put Mugabe under house arrest in Quelimane, far from the Zimbabwean guerrilla camps. It was rumoured that Machel was jealous of Mugabe’s intellectual achievements, preferring more down-to-earth men, especially the Zimbabwean guerrilla commander Josiah Tongogara. Contrary to Machel, Mugabe had never been an active fighter. When Machel in 1980 attended Mugabe’s inauguration as Zimbabwe’s president, he was well aware of Mugabe’s intention to form a one-party government, giving his Shona supporters absolute power. Machel addressed Mugabe:
To ensure national unity, there must be no Shonas in Zimbabwe, there must be no Ndebeles in Zimbabwe, there must be Zimbabweans. Some people are proud of their tribalism. But we call tribalists reactionary agents of the enemy. Zimbabwe is the jewel of Africa. Don’t tarnish it!
Some of Mugabe’s Swedish acquaintances were suspicious of him:
He considered himself to be a superior teacher, a professor. He had six different degrees, he was a learned and well-read man. Therefore, he believed that he was right in everything, and if he was opposed, he went mad.
Politicians and journalists declared that Mugabe could be charming and nice, but it was also alleged that he was a loner; admittedly a hard-working man, a voracious reader and not much given to laughter, but above all – a single-minded and extremely complex person, not easily captured by conventional categories. Some even claimed they considered him to be devoid of ordinary warmth and humanity; emotionally immature, homophobic and xenophobic. The last time a Swedish friend met with him, Mugabe told him:
When we are elected presidents, we suddenly get enormous power in accordance with the constitution that we took over from the colonial power. We can fill positions for relatives, friends and party sympathizers. We live well and have a different life than the vast majority of our citizens. But when we leave the presidential palace, we have nothing, there are no presidential pensions.
Mugabe coveted absolute power and when he obtained it, he hold on to it. Zanu came to act as yesterday’s colonial rulers. Even if power relations had changed, perceptions of power were the same. The Swedish Government did not lack documentation warning about Mugabe’s ambitions, nevertheless its conclusion was that he was Zimbabwe’s strongest leader and moreover “pro-Sweden”, accordingly Swedish aid could not be terminated, and even had to be increased.
Already in 1977, Mugabe declared that “any man who maliciously plants contradictions within our ranks will be struck by the Zanu axe” and he was even more ruthless towards his former brothers in arms – Zapu, and its leader Joshua Nkomo.
Zanu’s power base was among the Shona people, while Zapu found its strongest support among the Ndebeles in Matabeleland. Furthermore, the Cold War was reflected in the two parties’ relations to the outside world. Zapu received Soviet support, while Zanu relied on China, which wanted to undermine Soviet influence in Africa.
In early 1983, the North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade, a unit subordinated to the presidency, began a crackdown on dissidents in Matabeleland. Over the following two years, thousands of Ndebele and Kalanga were accused of being “Zapu-traitors”, detained, marched to “re-education camps”, tortured, raped and/or summarily executed. Although there are different estimates, the consensus of the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) is that more than 20,000 people were killed.
Swedish aid workers were knowledgeable about these atrocities. Nevertheless, Swedish aid continued to be delivered to Zanu-controlled Zimbabwe. The former head of Sida’s aid office in Harare played down the events, declaring that “the civilian population in Matabeleland has been stuck between warring factions.” He advised against using aid as a means of pressure to get Mugabe to stop the mass killing.
After the 93 years old Mugabe finally was removed from power, Zimbabwe continued to spiral down the abyss, while Swedish support is uninterrupted. The country is now ruled by Emmerson Mnangagwa, who once was a close ally to Mugabe. A brutal man who in 1983 described Government opponents as “cockroaches and bugs requiring DDT to be removed.” In 1998, Mnangagwa was put in charge of Zimbabwe’s intervention in the DR Congo wars and accused of “swapping Zimbabwean soldiers’ lives for mining contracts.” Mnangagwa does not further human rights, instead his government has deepened Zimbabwe’s economic struggles, enabled endemic corruption, fuelled instability, and targeted human rights activists and journalists. It is estimated that Zimbabwe may lose up to half the value of its annual GDP of USD 21.4 billion due to corrupt economic activities. Money laundering is among the murky deals said to be carried out under Mnangagwa’s aegis. Under diplomatic cover, criminals send unaccounted cash in exchange of equivalent amounts in Zimbabwean gold, and then sell it for seemingly legitimate money.
Swedish support to Mugabe and his successor might be considered as an effort to alleviate the plight of Zimbabwe’s citizens, but it might also be interpreted as being based on simplifications of a complicated reality and furthermore relying on one man’s power. When Mugabe’s abuse of sovereignty led to massacres, they were minimalized by those of those who had bet on him and the misrule of his successor is hardly noticed.
The world is now wondering whether the majority of Russia’s population will continue to support its strong man. If Putin’s nation will be weaken or strengthened by such encouragement. The stakes are high and predictions are generally gloomy.
Main sources: Yap, Katri P. (2001). Uprooting the weeds: Power, ethnicity and violence in the Matabeleland conflict. Ph.D Thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam and various Swedish newspaper articles.
ROME, Jul 10 (IPS) – There seems to be no end in sight to the war in Ukraine. On the contrary it continues to escalate. The latest ratchet up has been the decision by the USA to supply the Ukrainian army with cluster bombs. These are nasty weapons which scatter and explode over a wide area. They are specifically designed to kill people rather that destroy infrastructure, military installations or communication hubs. They also have a sting in the tail – some of the bomblets remain unexploded, effectively becoming anti-personnel mines. These can turn wide swathes of territory into virtual no-go areas.
Daud Khan
In recognition of the awful nature of these bombs, their use, transfer, production, and stockpiling has been prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, an international treaty signed in 2008 by 108 countries. However, several major military powers, including the China, Russia and the USA have not signed the Convention, as did not the Ukraine.
Cluster bombs have been used by both sides in the current war. This has not only caused high human casualties but already turned many areas into a minefield that will take decades to clear up. But reportedly stocks of such bombs in the Ukraine are running low and the decision of the USA would effectively help them continue a flagging counter-offensive. In particular, it is expected that they would help dislodge Russian forces that are dug in inside Ukrainian territory.
The latest move once again raises awkward questions – what is this war about, how long will it last and will anyone come out a winner.
As in all wars, there are many short-term proximate causes. Depending on the lens which one uses, the war is about protecting the rights of Russian speaking people in the Donbas; or about the rights of all Ukrainians – Russian or Ukrainian speaking – to follow their desire to be part of a liberal democratic Europe. But there are also long-term interests at play. Depending on one’s political views this war is about an irredentist and power hungry Putin. An alternative view is that the war is about Russian resistance to the continued eastern expansion of NATO and the creation of a well-armed, albeit denuclearized, Ukraine – a thorn in the side of Russia.
Whatever view one wishes to take on various causes, this is undoubtedly an existential war for the Russian state as it is now, for the Ukraine state as it is now, and the unipolar, US dominated world as it is now. If the Ukrainians win, it would be the end the Putin regime. It would also signal the end to his aspirations for a Greater Russian, to his dreams of making Russia once again a global power, and to his hopes of using Russian energy and other mineral resources to build domestic prosperity.
If on the other hand, should the Russians win it would be the end of Ukraine aspirations to be a part of a liberal democratic Europe, to be part of the EU and a member of NATO. Russian victory would also mean a serious blow to the USA, its allies and to the existing world order.
The very high stakes implies that none of the major protagonists can afford to walk away without a clear cut victory. This is in contrast to other recent wars such as the Afghan wars that Russia and the USA fought. Strategic interests were at stake even in these wars – Russia wanting access to a warm water port on the Indian Ocean and the USA wanting a friendly regime in Kabul to contain Islamic terrorism. Walking away from those wars certainly involved giving up these strategic objectives as well as a major loss of prestige. But the stakes were nowhere as high as in the current Ukraine Russia war.
And so it is unlikely we will be seeing any serious attempt towards a ceasefire, even less a convening of parties around a negotiating table. Unfortunately the most likely scenario is that the war will continue. Not only that, it is likely to escalate as it has over the last year from an initial dispatch of “defensive weapons”, to dispatch of long range missiles, modern tanks, and now cluster bombs. The next step will most likely be the dispatch of modern airplanes such as the F-16 on which Ukrainian pilot are already being trained. And then? Maybe some use of some sort of battlefield nuclear weapons.
And while the war in Europe drags on and escalates, there is an elephant in the room – China, the archenemy of the USA. How will they behave as the USA and its allies supply increasingly sophisticated weapons to Ukraine? Will they try and bolster Russia with who they have a “friendship with no limits”? Or would they be tempted to make a grab for Taiwan while the USA is tied up in the Ukraine.
There are dangerous and uncertain times ahead.
Daud Khan works as consultant and advisor for various Governments and international agencies. He has degrees in Economics from the LSE and Oxford – where he was a Rhodes Scholar; and a degree in Environmental Management from the Imperial College of Science and Technology. He lives partly in Italy and partly in Pakistan.
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jul 05 (IPS) – When Guatemalans went to the polls on 25 June, distrust and disillusionment were rife. First place in the presidential contest was claimed by none of the candidates: it went to invalid votes, at 17 per cent. Many didn’t bother, resulting in an abstention rate over 40 per cent.
But an unexpected development brought some hope: Bernardo Arévalo, leader of the progressive Movimiento Semilla, made it to the runoff.
Arévalo’s promise to fight against systemic corruption and bring back the numerous justice operators – people such as judges, prosecutors and public defenders – currently in exile to help clean up institutions is causing great concern for those who profit from the current state of affairs. The fact that Arévalo could become Guatemala’s next president has made the election results an instant object of contention.
Corruption and democratic decline
Guatemalan electoral processes aren’t pristine, but that isn’t where the most serious problems lie. Civic freedoms are steadily deteriorating and state institutions have been weakened by predatory elites and coopted by organised crime. Transparency International finds evidence of strong influence by organised criminals over politics and politicians, with some criminals themselves in office.
No wonder Guatemalans have a low level of confidence in state institutions. In the latest Latinobarómetro report, the church was by far the most trusted institution, winning the trust of 71 per cent of people, followed at some distance by the armed forces and police. But only nine per cent of people trust political parties, and trust is also very low in Congress, electoral bodies and the judiciary.
At 25 per cent, satisfaction with the performance of democracy is extremely low – as is the number of people who think the country is ruled for the benefit of all rather than just elites.
The run-up to the vote
Those denouncing corruption, collusion, illegal private sector practices and human rights abuses have increasingly been subjected to smear campaigns, surveillance, harassment and criminalisation by state authorities. Many have been pushed into exile. Rising violence against journalists and human rights defenders, including killings – the latest being that of journalist Orlando Villanueva – recently led the CIVICUS Monitor to downgrade its civic space rating for Guatemala to the second-worst category, repressed.
Restrictions on civic freedoms increased in the run-up to elections, ranging from smear campaigns to criminalisation. On 14 June, José Rubén Zamora, head of the newspaper elPeriódico, which had exposed more than 200 corruption cases, was sentenced to six years in prison for alleged money laundering. Zamora had been subjected to harassment and intimidation for years and had survived an assassination attempt.
An observation mission carried out by Reporters Without Borders and others ahead of voting warned that the absence of basic press freedoms made it impossible to guarantee a legitimate electoral process.
The process was indeed marred by multiple irregularities, starting with the disqualification of several contenders, including Indigenous leader Thelma Cabrera and her running mate, Jordán Rodas Andrade, the only left-wing candidacy polls showed stood a fighting chance. The candidate who led opinion polls, conservative business leader and TikTok star Carlos Pineda, was also disqualified.
What happened on 25 June
With two dozen candidates competing in the presidential race, it was no surprise that none reached the 50 per cent threshold required to avoid a runoff. What was unexpected was Arévalo’s good performance.
The front-runner, Sandra Torres of National Unity of Hope, is a political insider, Guatemala’s first lady between 2008 and 2011. Now standing for the third time in a row, she received 16 per cent of the vote. If elected, she would become Guatemala’s first female president. But she’s by no means a champion of women’s rights: she’s a vocal anti-abortion activist and her running mate is an evangelical pastor.
Runner-up Arévalo is an unusual politician at the head of an unusual party. Originally an academic with social-democratic views, he’s currently a member of Congress, where he leads a five-member progressive caucus. His running mate, low-key feminist Karin Herrera, is a microbiology researcher and university professor.
Unlike many Guatemalan parties, Arévalo’s party wasn’t created as a vehicle for someone’s presidential ambitions or corrupt interests: it was the creature of a group of concerned people that grew out of mass anti-corruption protests that broke out in 2015. In 2019, its presidential candidate was disqualified. But it found its footing among middle class groups, young people and women, particularly in Guatemala City.
The aftermath
Opinion polls had placed Arévalo eighth or ninth among the many contenders, so his performance caught elites off guard.
There’s no guarantee he’ll win the run-off. He’d have to gain the votes of the many who abstained or cast blank and invalid votes. But the fact that Arévalo might win has galvanised those who currently profit from the corrupt status quo, and they’re trying to push him out of the race. A majority of pro-establishment parties, including Torres’s party, have submitted complaints demanding a recount. Their supporters converged outside the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), quickly pushing further and calling for a rerun.
While various incidents were recorded on election day – including instances of vote buying, mostly by parties linked to the ruling alliance – international and domestic observers alike concluded that the results were valid and the gap of more than 200,000 votes between Semilla and the next contender, the outgoing president’s party, was insurmountable.
Mirador Electoral, a civil society platform, denounced pressures on the TSE as an attempted ‘electoral coup’. The European Union’s observer mission and the Organization of American States have called for the will of voters to be respected. Arévalo condemned it all as an intimidatory manoeuvre and called for the TSE, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court to act quickly and responsibly.
Instead, the Constitutional Court ordered the TSE to suspend official certification of results until complaints are resolved. Some fear an attempt to annul the elections will come next.
Guatemala stands at a crossroads. On the eve of voting it seemed on the verge of autocracy. An unexpected result hinted at the possibility of a much brighter path – one that fills many with hope but scares those who see their wealth and power endangered. The coming days and weeks will witness an arm-wrestling match between the past and the future, with three potential outcomes.
In the worst-case scenario, the runoff continues to be delayed by legal appeals and the task of appointing a president ultimately falls to Congress. In the second-worst scenario, a vote-by-vote recount is conducted instead of a simple cross-check of tally sheets, fraud occurs along the way and the ruling party’s candidate takes Arévalo’s runoff spot. Either way, the past wins.
Only if the recount is properly conducted, the results are corroborated and the runoff is held on 20 August will the future have a fighting chance. The corrupt establishment may still beat Arévalo – but this decision belongs to no one but the citizens of Guatemala.
A young refugee boy, pictured in a temporary displacement camp in Kalak, Iraq, in June 2014. Credit: Amnesty International
Opinion by Janine Morna (florida usa)
Inter Press Service
FLORIDA USA, Jul 03 (IPS) – Around 2018, when Anwar was 14 or 15 years old, his father, a member of IS, forced Anwar to train with the group as a young teenager. He even made Anwar watch as he inflicted brutal punishments on people who broke IS’ rules.
The suffering was intolerable. Anwar tried to run away from his father and flee IS-controlled territory on multiple occasions. “I hated everyone,” he said.
In 2011, as the early versions of IS began to re-emerge in Iraq, the UN was quick to document violations the armed group had committed against children. That year, the UN Secretary-General included the group in the organization’s annual report on children and armed conflict, in which perpetrators of grave violations are named and shamed. The UN is required to negotiate action plans with parties listed in the report as part of efforts to stop and prevent the violations from occurring in future.
While the annual report is a powerful tool that prompts action in many contexts, it has had little impact on groups like IS, which are unlikely to engage in dialogue with the UN.
Over the last 11 years, numerous parties listed in the annual report can be classified as ‘persistent perpetrators’ — armed groups and forces that have appeared in the report for more than five consecutive years, and have failed to respond to reports on the violations they have committed against children. IS has been listed in the report for the last 13 years.
The UN Security Council has previously focused on the issue of persistent perpetrators, including by passing a resolution and holding an open debate in 2012 where they emphasized the importance of addressing violations committed by these groups and forces. It has also made efforts to promote sanctions against recalcitrant parties.
A young refugee boy, pictured in a temporary displacement camp in Kalak, Iraq, in June 2014. Credit: Amnesty International
The Working Group, as the primary body carrying out the UN Security Council’s agenda on children and armed conflict, should strengthen its calls for the UN and its donors to help countries to develop and implement domestic legislation that criminalizes grave violations against children. It should also support national criminal justice systems to pursue accountability, in line with international fair trial standards.
Today, many prosecutions of non-state perpetrators of grave violations – like IS in Iraq and Syria, and Boko Haram in Nigeria – take place in domestic counterterrorism courts which, in many cases, fail to include crimes under international law, let alone crimes against children.
The Working Group must encourage the trial of individual members of these groups in national courts that are capable of adjudicating international crimes. Prosecutions could occur in the state where the crimes took place and, where relevant, in states that exercise universal jurisdiction – a legal principle whereby states can prosecute offenders of certain grave crimes irrespective of the location of the crime and the nationality of the perpetrator or victim.
When trials on crimes against children take place in counterterrorism courts, the relevant authorities must enable prosecutors and judges to draw on international law, provide sufficient resources to pursue the prosecutions, and ensure defendants can exercise their full fair trial rights.
In cases involving children associated with armed groups and forces, states should treat children who are accused of crimes during their association primarily as victims of violations of international law and not only as perpetrators, in accordance with international standards. Children should never be prosecuted for mere affiliation with an armed group or force.
Cooperating with the International Criminal Court and other international mechanisms
This type of collaboration was envisioned when the Working Group first adopted a list of actions it could take in response to grave violations against children. Effective cooperation between international justice mechanisms is critical to achieve a measure of comprehensive justice.
The Working Group’s engagement with the ICC has historically been limited, but it is now time to further develop connections between the two bodies. The Office of the Prosecutor for the ICC has welcomed opportunities to “strengthen cooperation with relevant actors” and earlier this year launched a public consultation to renew its policy on children that “will build upon new approaches… affect meaningful change”.
In the past, some Working Group members have considered indicating when parties have likely committed a war crime or other crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. They have also explored the possibility of sharing their conclusions with the ICC, and arranging for the prosecutor of the ICC to share briefings with the Working Group.
Ten years ago, some members of the Working Group also considered, in the absence of a UN Security Council referral, inviting states that are party to the Rome Statute to refer situations to the ICC, in which armed groups or forces have committed grave violations against children. Unfortunately, deeply divided opinions about the ICC among Council members have, in the past, limited the adoption of these recommendations.
Children must be protected
On July 5, the UN Security Council will host its annual Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict. The occasion offers all UN member states an opportunity to publicly commit to efforts to broaden and strengthen accountability for violations against children.
As a first step, member states should call for the UN Secretary General to, once again, identify persistent perpetrators in the annual reports on children and armed conflict, a practice that was stopped in 2017.
The Council has the power to take greater action in response to some of the world’s most egregious perpetrators of crimes against children. It is unacceptable that children like Anwar should have to wait so long for justice and accountability.
In the United States and Canada, overdose deaths, predominantly driven by an epidemic of the non-medical use of fentanyl, continue to break records. Credit: Shutterstock.
by Baher Kamal (madrid)
Inter Press Service
MADRID, Jun 27 (IPS) – How come that in a world where technology is -or is about to be- able to detect an ant in a jungle, the traffickers of death continue to carry out their lucrative criminal activities everywhere and in all fields, from weapons to prostitution, enslavement and drugs, to deadly fake medicines, through oil, gas and poisoned food.
In the specific case of Asia, a specialised organisation reports the Asian ‘Golden Triangle’ is where historically opium was grown to produce heroin for export, but where, in recent years, the trade of “even deadlier and more profitable synthetic drugs have taken over.”
In its June 2023 report, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) informs that East and Southeast Asian synthetic drug supply remains at ‘extreme levels’ and diversifies.
“Thailand, Laos and Myanmar are at the frontlines of illicit trade in Asia dominated by transnational organised crime syndicates.”
Methamphetamine, ketamine…
‘High volumes’ of methamphetamine continue to be produced and trafficked in and from the region while the production of ketamine and other synthetic drugs has expanded.
“Transnational organised crime groups anticipate, adapt and try to circumvent what governments do, and in 2022 we saw them work around Thai borders in the Golden Triangle more than in the past,” said Jeremy Douglas, UNODC Regional Representative for Southeast Asia and the Pacific.
‘Unwanted’ to be seen
“Traffickers have continued to ship large volumes through Laos and northern Thailand, but at the same time they have pushed significant supply through central Myanmar to the Andaman Sea where it seems few were looking.”
Douglas added that criminal groups from across the region also started moving and reconnecting after lengthy pandemic border closures, with late 2022 and early 2023 patterns starting to look similar to 2019.
Hidden in “legal products”
Moreover, synthetic drugs containing a mixture of substances and sometimes “packaged alongside legal products” continue to be found throughout East and Southeast Asia, with serious health consequences for those who knowingly, or unknowingly, consume the products.
Moreover, the world drug problem is a complex issue that affects millions of people worldwide.
Many people who use drugs face stigma and discrimination, which can further harm their physical and mental health and prevent them from accessing the help they need, the UN warns on the occasion of the 2023 International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking (26 June).
“Unprecedented” increase
The increase in the production of synthetic drugs in recent years has been “unprecedented” according to the UNODC Regional Representative.
It is not just drugs which are being trafficked across the region: chemical precursors to manufacture synthetic drugs are being illegally transported into Myanmar in quantities far larger than the drugs that are trafficked out, UNODC further explains.
Trafficking also in people, wildlife, timber…
In fact, a myriad of cross-borders issues, including drug and precursor chemical trafficking, migrant smuggling, human trafficking, wildlife and forestry crime, and, in some locations, the movement of terrorist fighters alongside public health and pandemic-related matters.
The impact of legalising the use of cocaine
Cannabis legalisation in parts of the world appears to have accelerated daily use and related health impacts, according to the World Drug Report 2022, which also details record rises in the manufacturing of cocaine, the expansion of synthetic drugs to new markets, and continued gaps in the availability of drug treatments, especially for women.
According to the report, around 284 million people aged 15-64 used drugs worldwide in 2020, a 26% increase over the previous decade.
“In Africa and Latin America, people under 35 represent the majority of people being treated for drug use disorders.”
Globally, the report estimates that 11.2 million people worldwide were injecting drugs. Around half of this number were living with hepatitis C, 1.4 million were living with HIV, and 1.2 million were living with both.
Reacting to these findings, UNODC Executive Director, Ghada Waly stated: “Numbers for the manufacturing and seizures of many illicit drugs are hitting record highs, even as global emergencies are deepening vulnerabilities.”
At the same time, mis-perceptions regarding the magnitude of the problem and the associated harms are depriving people of care and treatment and driving young people towards harmful behaviour, said Waly.
Key trends by region
In many countries in Africa and South and Central America, the largest proportion of people in treatment for drug use disorders are there primarily for cannabis use disorders. In Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and in Central Asia, people are most often in treatment for opioid use disorders.
In the United States and Canada, overdose deaths, predominantly driven by an epidemic of the non-medical use of fentanyl, continue to break records. Preliminary estimates in the United States point to more than 107,000 drug overdose deaths in 2021, up from nearly 92,000 in 2020.
Conflict zones magnets for synthetic drug production
This year’s report also highlights that illicit drug economies can flourish in situations of conflict and where the rule of law is weak, and in turn can prolong or fuel conflict.
Information from the Middle East and South-East Asia suggest that conflict situations can act as a magnet for the manufacture of synthetic drugs, which can be produced anywhere. This effect may be greater when the conflict area is close to large consumer markets.
Historically, parties to conflict have used drugs to finance conflict and generate income. The 2022 World Drug Report also reveals that conflicts may also disrupt and shift drug trafficking routes, as has happened in the Balkans and more recently in Ukraine.
A possible growing capacity to manufacture amphetamine in Ukraine
According to the UNODC report, “there was a significant increase in the number of reported clandestine laboratories in Ukraine, skyrocketing from 17 dismantled laboratories in 2019 to 79 in 2020. 67 out of these laboratories were producing amphetamines, up from five in 2019 – the highest number of dismantled laboratories reported in any given country in 2020.”
Gender treatment gap
Women remain in the minority of drug users globally yet tend to increase their rate of drug consumption and progress to drug use disorders more rapidly than men do. Women now represent an estimated 45-49% of users of amphetamines and non-medical users of pharmaceutical stimulants, pharmaceutical opioids, sedatives, and tranquillisers.
The treatment gap remains large for women globally. Although women represent almost one in two amphetamine users, they constitute only one in five people in treatment for amphetamine use disorders.
The World Drug Report also spotlights the wide range of roles fulfilled by women in the global cocaine economy, including cultivating coca, transporting small quantities of drugs, selling to consumers, and smuggling into prisons.
LONDON, Jun 23 (IPS) – The violence keeps coming in Myanmar, under military rule since February 2021. The junta stands accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, with evidence of systematic use of killings, rape, torture and other gross human rights violations in its attempt to suppress forces demanding a return to democracy.
Even humanitarian aid is restricted. Recently the junta refused to allow in aid organisations trying to provide food, water and medicines to people left in desperate need by a devastating cyclone. It’s far from the first time it’s blocked aid.
Crises like this demand an international response. But largely standing on the sidelines while this happens is the regional intergovernmental body, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Its recent summit, held in Indonesia in May, failed to produce any progress.
ASEAN’s inaction
ASEAN’s response to the coup was to issue a text, the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), in April 2021. This called for the immediate cessation of violence and constructive dialogue between all parties. ASEAN agreed to provide humanitarian help, appoint a special envoy and visit Myanmar to meet with all parties.
Civil society criticised this agreement because it recognised the role of the junta and failed to make any mention of the need to restore democracy. And the unmitigated violence and human rights violations are the clearest possible sign that the 5PC isn’t working – but ASEAN sticks to it. At its May summit, ASEAN states reiterated their support for the plan.
A major challenge is that most ASEAN states have no interest in democracy. All 10 have heavily restricted civic space. As well as Myanmar, civic space is closed in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
It wouldn’t suit such states to have a thriving democracy on their doorstep, which could only bring greater domestic and international pressure to follow suit. States that repress human rights at home typically carry the same approach into international organisations, working to limit their ability to uphold human rights commitments and scrutinise violations.
Continuing emphasis on the 5PC hasn’t masked divisions among ASEAN states. Some appear to think they can engage with the junta and at least persuade it to moderate its violence – although reality makes this increasingly untenable. But others, particularly Cambodia – a one-party state led by the same prime minister since 1998 – seem intent on legitimising the junta.
Variable pressure has come from ASEAN’s chair, which rotates annually and appoints the special envoy. Under the last two, Brunei Darussalam – a sultanate that last held an election in 1965 – and Cambodia, little happened. Brunei never visited the country after being refused permission to meet with democratic leaders, while Cambodia’s prime minister, Hun Sen, visited Myanmar last year. The first post-coup visit to Myanmar by a head of government, this could only be construed as conferring legitimacy.
Indonesia, the current chair, hasn’t appointed a special envoy, instead setting up an office headed by the foreign minister. So far it appears to be taking a soft approach of quiet diplomacy rather than public action.
Thailand, currently led by a pro-military government, is also evidently happy to engage with the junta. While junta representatives remain banned from ASEAN summits, Thailand has broken ranks and invited ASEAN foreign ministers, including from Myanmar, to hold talks about reintegrating the junta’s leaders. A government that itself came to power through a coup but should now step aside after an election where it was thoroughly defeated looks to be attempting to bolster the legitimacy of military rule.
ASEAN states seem unable to move beyond the 5PC even as they undermine it. But the fact that they’re formally sticking with it enables the wider international community to stand back, on the basis of respecting regional leadership and the 5PC.
The UN Security Council finally adopted a resolution on Myanmar in December 2022. This called for an immediate end to the violence, the release of all political prisoners and unhindered humanitarian access. But its language didn’t go far enough in condemning systematic human rights violations and continued to emphasise the 5PC. It failed to impose sanctions such as an arms embargo or to refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Civil society in Myanmar and the region is urging ASEAN to go further. Many have joined together to develop a five-point agenda that goes beyond the 5PC. It calls for a strategy to end military violence through sanctions, an arms embargo and a referral of Myanmar to the ICC. It demands ASEAN engages beyond the junta, and particularly with democratic forces including the National Unity Government – the democratic government in exile. It urges a strengthening of the special envoy role and a pivoting of humanitarian aid to local responders rather than the junta. ASEAN needs to take this on board.
A fork in the road
ASEAN’s current plan is a recipe for continuing military violence, increasingly legitimised by its neighbours’ acceptance. Ceremonial elections could offer further fuel for this.
The junta once promised to hold elections by August, but in February, on the coup’s second anniversary, it extended the state of emergency for another six months. If and when those elections finally happen, there’s no hope of them being free or fair. In March, the junta dissolved some 40 political parties, including the ousted ruling party, the National League for Democracy.
The only purpose of any eventual fake election will be to give the junta a legitimising veneer to present as a sign of progress – and some ASEAN states may be prepared to buy this. This shouldn’t be allowed. ASEAN needs to listen to the voices of civil society calling for it to get its act together – and stick together – in holding the junta to account. If it doesn’t, it will keep failing not only Myanmar’s people, but all in the region who reasonably expect that fundamental human rights should be respected and those who kill, rape and torture should face justice.
LONDON, Jun 22 (IPS) – The author is Executive Director of Financial Transparency CoalitionThe sanctions against Russian oligarchs who hold billions of dollars have mostly failed to have a real impact beyond freezing a few yachts and properties. So, what went wrong? Now we know.
The “Rotenberg Files”, a mass leak of over 42,000 emails and documents, has showed how Russian oligarchs Boris and Arkady Rotenberg hid their assets and those of Vladimir Putin, using trusts and private equity investment funds, taking advantage of the lack of public beneficial ownership registries.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and especially since 2022, sanctions on Russian oligarchs and legal entities linked to the Russian invasion of Ukraine include 12,900 designations against Russia. Some estimates say that Russian oligarch offshore wealth is over US$1 trillion, but sanctions so far have only frozen US$58 billion, due to difficulty in establishing ownership.
Sanctions vary but have been mainly implemented by G7 countries and the European Union. Their effectiveness depends on setting up beneficial ownership registries that cover all possible legal vehicles, and the obligation to cross-check beneficial owners against sanctions regimes by a wide variety of professional enablers for due diligence purposes.
This has allowed trusts to become the legal vehicle of choice by Russian oligarchs to hide their wealth. They are also very hard to detect as the presence of a trust deed can be kept at a lawyer’s office if there is no requirement to register the trust in a beneficial ownership registry. Many BO registries do require declaring trusts, but there are loopholes that allow for setting up trusts in jurisdictions that do not require registration of trusts or have loopholes regarding thresholds or exemptions. Only 65 countries require some form of registration of trusts.
Eight of the 18 BVI companies mentioned in the Rotenberg leaks were ultimately dissolved, and two relocated to Cyprus. This implies that Cyprus has become a key location to use trusts and other instruments to conceal ownership. As a European Union member, Cyprus was obliged to create a central register of beneficial ownership in line with the EU’s fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive. Trusts based in Cyprus do come under this requirement, but the Rotenbergs used a loophole in the BO laws to conceal ultimate ownership that goes around the existing EU 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive.
They effectively created a complex ownership structure around different entities in order to be below the trigger points for reporting beneficial ownership (in most cases 25 percent of control), yet still retaining control through power through potential voting coalitions in the complex structure that were concealed elsewhere. The structure used by the Rotenbergs involved a US entity that is owned by entities elsewhere, including Italy, the UK, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Bahamas (four entities), the British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands,
Along with trusts, private equity firms have been revealed as another preferred vehicle to dodge sanctions. Investment vehicles called “closed mutual funds,” in Russian abbreviated as “ZPIFs,” held these assets. They are not considered legal entities under Russian law, and thus are not under obligations to reveal their shareholders to the authorities. The leaked files show that 13 ZPIFs were linked to the Rotenbergs.
To evade questions about the true nature of the beneficial owners, the leaked files show that “there is a practice where the General Director of the Management Company is recognized as the ultimate beneficiary”. The ZPIF’s invested in Russian companies, Monaco real estate, and other assets where beneficial ownership checks do not take place. Companies where they owned minority stakes could do business relatively normally.
Private equity and mutual funds are a global concern. According to a recent report, “Private Investments, Public Harm”, there are nearly 13,000 investment advisers in an $11 trillion industry with little or no anti-money laundering due diligence responsibilities in the USA, with the real possibility that sanctioned oligarchs use such vehicles to conceal their ownership. The US Enablers Act seeks to remove the exemption from due diligence checks from investment managers but the bill did not pass last December.
Art is another way to conceal ownership, as art dealers are not under any reporting requirements for money laundering purposes. A July 2020 report by a U.S. Senate subcommittee detailed an elaborate scheme in which the Rotenberg brothers spent more than US$18 million on art purchases in the months after they were sanctioned by the U.S. in March 2014. They acquired several artworks, including a US$7.5 million René Magritte, through a web of offshore companies based in Cyprus and the British Virgin Islands.
The tools to hide wealth used by Russian oligarchs to evade sanctions are exactly the same than the ones used by those behind natural resource crimes such as illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, or indeed wealthy billionaires abusing laws to pay less than what they should in taxes. One cannot create a regime to just catch Russian billionaires. An overhaul of ownership transparency, from companies and trusts to art, vessels, aircraft and among other asset classes, including private equity and hedge funds, is required. Otherwise Russian oligarchs and kleptocrats around the world will continue dodging controls, keeping their shady money safely hidden.
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jun 16 (IPS) – If you’ve never heard of the Cybercrime Convention, you’re not alone. And if you’re wondering whether an international treaty to tackle cybercrime is a good idea, you’re in good company too.
Negotiations have been underway for more than three years: the latest negotiating session was held in April, and a multi-stakeholder consultation has just concluded. A sixth session is scheduled to take place in August, with a draft text expected to be approved by February 2024, to be put to a vote at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) later next year. But civil society sees some big pitfalls ahead.
Controversial beginnings
In December 2019, the UNGA voted to start negotiating a cybercrime treaty. The resolution was sponsored by Russia and co-sponsored by several of the world’s most repressive regimes, which already had national cybercrime laws they use to stifle legitimate dissent under the pretence of combatting a variety of vaguely defined online crimes such as insulting the authorities, spreading ‘fake news’ and extremism.
Tackling cybercrime certainly requires some kind of international cooperation. But this doesn’t necessarily need a new treaty. Experts have pointed out that the real problem may be the lack of enforcement of current international agreements, particularly the 2001 Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention.
When Russia’s resolution was put to a vote, the European Union, many states and human rights organisations urged the UNGA to reject it. But once the resolution passed, they engaged with the process, trying to prevent the worst possible outcome – a treaty lacking human rights safeguards that could be used as a repressive tool.
The December 2019 resolution set up an ad hoc committee (AHC), open to the participation of all UN member states plus observers, including civil society. At its first meeting to set procedural rules in mid-2021, Brazil’s proposal that a two-thirds majority vote be needed for decision-making – when consensus can’t be achieved – was accepted, instead of the simple majority favoured by Russia. A list of stakeholders was approved, including civil society organisations (CSOs), academic institutions and private sector representatives.
Another key procedural decision was made in February 2022: intersessional consultations were to be held between negotiating sessions to solicit input from stakeholders, including human rights CSOs. These consultations have given CSOs the chance to make presentations and participate in discussions with states.
Human rights concerns
Several CSOs are trying to use the space to influence the treaty process, including as part of broader coalitions. Given what’s at stake, in advance of the first negotiating session, around 130 CSOs and experts urged the AHC to embed human rights safeguards in the treaty.
One of the challenges it that, as early as the first negotiating session, it became apparent there wasn’t a clear definition of what constitutes a cybercrime and which cybercrimes should be regulated by the treaty. There’s still no clarity.
The UN identifies two main types of cybercrimes: cyber-dependent crimes such as network intrusion and malware distribution, which can only be committed through the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs), and cyber-enabled crimes, which can be facilitated by ICTs but can be committed without them, such as drug trafficking and the illegal distribution of counterfeit goods.
Throughout the negotiation process there’s been disagreement about whether the treaty should focus on a limited set of cyber-dependent crimes, or address a variety of cyber-enabled crimes. These, human rights groups warn, include various content-related offences that could be invoked to repress freedom of expression.
These concerns have been highlighted by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which has emphasised that the treaty shouldn’t include offences related to the content of online expression and should clearly and explicitly reference binding international human rights agreements to ensure it’s applied in line with universal human rights principles.
A second major disagreement concerns the scope and conditions for international cooperation. If not clearly defined, cooperation arrangements could result in violations of privacy and data protection provisions. In the absence of the principle of dual criminality – where extradition can only apply to an action that constitutes a crime in both the country making an extradition request and the one receiving it – state authorities could be made to investigate activities that aren’t crimes in their own countries. They could effectively become enforcers of repression.
Civil society has pushed for recognition of a set of principles on the application of human rights to communications surveillance. According to these, dual criminality should prevail, and where laws differ, the one with the higher level of rights protections should be applied. It must be ensured that states don’t use mutual assistance agreements and foreign cooperation requests to circumvent domestic legal restrictions.
An uncertain future
Following the third multistakeholder consultation held in November 2022, the AHC released a negotiating draft. In the fourth negotiating session in January 2023, civil society’s major concerns focused on the long and growing number of criminal offences listed in the draft, many of them content-related.
It’s unclear how the AHC intends to bridge current deep divides to produce the ‘zero draft’ it’s expected to share in the next few weeks. If it complies with the deadline by leaving contentious issues undecided, the next session, scheduled for August, may bring a shift from consensus-building to voting – unless states decide to give themselves some extra time.
As of today, the process could still conclude on time, or with a limited extension, following a forced vote on a harmful treaty that lacks consensus and therefore fails to enter into effect, or does so for a limited number of states. Or it could be repeatedly postponed and fade away. Civil society engaged in the process may well think such a development wouldn’t be so bad: better no agreement than one that gives repressive states stronger tools to stifle dissent.
NEW YORK, Jun 14 (IPS) – As we head into June, we will commemorate a number of important international days that call for much-needed support to protect refugees, end child labour, stop sexual violence in conflict and ensure human rights for the innocent children victims of aggression.
Together, this work will propel our efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. To deliver on these commitments, we urgently appeal for substantial, sustained increases in public and private sector funding support for quality education – especially for the more than 222 million crisis-impacted girls and boys who desperately need it.
These include refugee girls and boys fleeing conflict in Sudan. In May, ECW made important new commitments to keep Sudan’s children, wherever they are, in school – as outlined in the joint Op-Ed by The Rt. Hon. Gordon Brown and I in The Times.
During my mission with UNHCR and UNICEF to the border region of Chad with Sudan just two weeks ago, we announced a fast-acting emergency response to UNHCR and civil society with total funding in Chad now topping US$41 million. Here, I would like to appeal for additional funding to UNICEF who stands ready to deliver urgently needed education to host-communities already living in abject poverty along the borders in Chad.
Together with governments, donors and civil society partners, we are working to expand our support in response to the refugee arrivals in other neighbouring countries as we unite in our efforts to respond to the enormous, urgent needs accounted for in the Regional Refugee Response Plan.
At the May 2023 G7 Summit in Hiroshima, under the leadership of the Government of Japan, global leaders committed to “ensuring continued support to the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), Education Cannot Wait (ECW) and UN agencies, including UNESCO and UNICEF, as key partners in helping countries to build stronger education systems for the most marginalized children.” As outlined in the G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communique, this is an investment in “resilient, just and prospering societies.”
We must now turn these commitments into actions. This means every nation in the G7 must step up their support. As we lead into ECW’s four-year 2023-2026 Strategic Plan, we will welcome much needed substantial and new commitments from G7 leaders for the ECW strategic period.
The private sector will also play a key role in our resource mobilization plans. Our teams are working across the globe to develop new and innovative public-private partnerships, such as our recently announced agreement with the Zurich Cantonal Bank and the Government of Switzerland. Without the private sector and entrepreneurial spirit, we cannot meet the rapidly growing needs. In other words, abnormal problems require extraordinary solutions.
We will also work with Arab States, Nordic States and G20 nations to create new models for funding that crowd-in resources and know-how to deliver the depth, speed and agility needed to ensure quality education and holistic supports in places like Sudan, Ukraine and beyond.
Colombia has emerged as a model of this cross-sectorial approach. In this month’s high-level interview, we speak with Mireia Villar Forner, the United Nations Colombia Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian, who highlights the power of education in building sustainable development pathways. This is done through coordinated joint programmes through the United Nations coordination mechanisms. This is indeed one of the chief reasons that have allowed ECW to deliver with development depth and humanitarian speed.
Through ECW’s Multi-Year Resilience Programmes, we are providing transformative education investments in the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. This is good for business, good for government and good for the world. It also provides an optimized investment opportunity for Overseas Development Assistance, corporate social responsibility and philanthropic giving. By investing in education, we are investing in all of the SDGs. Without education, how can any of them be achieved?
The month of May was also Mental Health Awareness Month, and we announced an ambitious new target to have at least 10% of resources go to mental health and psychosocial services. We do so because we firmly believe that mental health is essential, if not also existential, to children and adolescents who having survived the most painful forms of violence and disasters.
I have no doubt that 2023 will go down as a landmark year in global funding support for education. ECW and our strategic partners will not stop until our work is done. There can be no peace, until there is peace for all, to cite Dag Hammarskjold. Indeed, there can be no peace without education. We will leave no child behind.
Yasmine Sherif is Director of Education Cannot Wait.
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