Tag: Armed Conflicts

The Ukraine War – Will it Ever End? — Global Issues

  • Opinion by Daud Khan (rome)
  • Inter Press Service

ROME, Jul 10 (IPS) – There seems to be no end in sight to the war in Ukraine. On the contrary it continues to escalate. The latest ratchet up has been the decision by the USA to supply the Ukrainian army with cluster bombs. These are nasty weapons which scatter and explode over a wide area. They are specifically designed to kill people rather that destroy infrastructure, military installations or communication hubs. They also have a sting in the tail – some of the bomblets remain unexploded, effectively becoming anti-personnel mines. These can turn wide swathes of territory into virtual no-go areas.

Daud Khan

In recognition of the awful nature of these bombs, their use, transfer, production, and stockpiling has been prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, an international treaty signed in 2008 by 108 countries. However, several major military powers, including the China, Russia and the USA have not signed the Convention, as did not the Ukraine.

Cluster bombs have been used by both sides in the current war. This has not only caused high human casualties but already turned many areas into a minefield that will take decades to clear up. But reportedly stocks of such bombs in the Ukraine are running low and the decision of the USA would effectively help them continue a flagging counter-offensive. In particular, it is expected that they would help dislodge Russian forces that are dug in inside Ukrainian territory.

The latest move once again raises awkward questions – what is this war about, how long will it last and will anyone come out a winner.

As in all wars, there are many short-term proximate causes. Depending on the lens which one uses, the war is about protecting the rights of Russian speaking people in the Donbas; or about the rights of all Ukrainians – Russian or Ukrainian speaking – to follow their desire to be part of a liberal democratic Europe. But there are also long-term interests at play. Depending on one’s political views this war is about an irredentist and power hungry Putin. An alternative view is that the war is about Russian resistance to the continued eastern expansion of NATO and the creation of a well-armed, albeit denuclearized, Ukraine – a thorn in the side of Russia.

Whatever view one wishes to take on various causes, this is undoubtedly an existential war for the Russian state as it is now, for the Ukraine state as it is now, and the unipolar, US dominated world as it is now. If the Ukrainians win, it would be the end the Putin regime. It would also signal the end to his aspirations for a Greater Russian, to his dreams of making Russia once again a global power, and to his hopes of using Russian energy and other mineral resources to build domestic prosperity.

If on the other hand, should the Russians win it would be the end of Ukraine aspirations to be a part of a liberal democratic Europe, to be part of the EU and a member of NATO. Russian victory would also mean a serious blow to the USA, its allies and to the existing world order.

The very high stakes implies that none of the major protagonists can afford to walk away without a clear cut victory. This is in contrast to other recent wars such as the Afghan wars that Russia and the USA fought. Strategic interests were at stake even in these wars – Russia wanting access to a warm water port on the Indian Ocean and the USA wanting a friendly regime in Kabul to contain Islamic terrorism. Walking away from those wars certainly involved giving up these strategic objectives as well as a major loss of prestige. But the stakes were nowhere as high as in the current Ukraine Russia war.

And so it is unlikely we will be seeing any serious attempt towards a ceasefire, even less a convening of parties around a negotiating table. Unfortunately the most likely scenario is that the war will continue. Not only that, it is likely to escalate as it has over the last year from an initial dispatch of “defensive weapons”, to dispatch of long range missiles, modern tanks, and now cluster bombs. The next step will most likely be the dispatch of modern airplanes such as the F-16 on which Ukrainian pilot are already being trained. And then? Maybe some use of some sort of battlefield nuclear weapons.

And while the war in Europe drags on and escalates, there is an elephant in the room – China, the archenemy of the USA. How will they behave as the USA and its allies supply increasingly sophisticated weapons to Ukraine? Will they try and bolster Russia with who they have a “friendship with no limits”? Or would they be tempted to make a grab for Taiwan while the USA is tied up in the Ukraine.

There are dangerous and uncertain times ahead.

Daud Khan works as consultant and advisor for various Governments and international agencies. He has degrees in Economics from the LSE and Oxford – where he was a Rhodes Scholar; and a degree in Environmental Management from the Imperial College of Science and Technology. He lives partly in Italy and partly in Pakistan.

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An Outsider With an Army — Global Issues

Credit: UNICEF/Aleksey Filippov
  • Opinion by Roland Bathon (berlin)
  • Inter Press Service

BERLIN, Jul 07 (IPS) – The Wagner uprising – despite its short duration – has demonstrated the vulnerability of Putin’s power system.

In the past, the oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin seemed like a dark, mysterious figure somewhere from the depths of the Kremlin’s web of secrets. This also has to do with the fact that he did those ‘jobs’ for the Russian government that took place in a semi-official grey area — such as mercenary assignments in Syria or Africa, or even before that the operation of the Petersburg troll factory with a network of fake media and disinformation machinery.

“The war in Ukraine has created a humanitarian and human rights catastrophe, traumatized a generation of children, and accelerated the global food and energy crises,” said Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, addressing the UN Security Council. June 2023

As his mercenary army PMC Wagner – to which he only openly professed his allegiance at a very late stage – gained considerable combat experience in more and more wars, his personal military power continued to grow. The Wagner fighters, in fact, are his personal soldiers.

This was to become evident in the recent military uprising led by Prigozhin, as the soldiers immediately occupied the large city of Rostov on his orders, advanced on Moscow and simply ignored orders from the Russian authorities to arrest Prigozhin.

As Wagner is the largest Russian-based mercenary formation – according to the British Ministry of Defence, it grew to up to 50,000 soldiers in January – Prigozhin became a real power factor in Russia.

Roland Bathon

Military versus political power

In the purely political sphere, however, Prigozhin was by no means as powerful of a factor to the extent as it was repeatedly interpreted abroad on the basis of his mysterious aura. The pool of media under his control was much smaller than that of ‘businessmen from Putin’s immediate entourage’, Russian journalist and Kremlin expert Andrey Pertsev noted in an analysis after the start of the war. In polls on the most important Russian politicians, his name never appeared in the results, and his earlier calls for a general mobilisation were met with zero sympathy from the Russians.

For Putin, the interactions with Prigozhin never had any special status until his open revolt. According to the Russian political scientist Tatyana Stanovaya, the oligarch was never close enough to the head of state to entrust him with an important political office. Prigozhin’s tasks always remained informal — he used the niches that official state organs could not or would not fill. Thus, he was never integrated into the front row of Russian politics.

Yet, it was precisely this lack of integration that led to the emergence of a dual structure which turned out to be dangerous for the overall structure of Russian power. Prigozhin increasingly staged himself as a counter-elite – even though he himself came from this social class – and progressively engaged in power struggles with the official military hierarchy around the Russian Ministry of Defence. This also succeeded because officially, he always remained a ‘private citizen’ without an office in the top political ranks.

The military leadership countered by wanting to subordinate all volunteer units such as Wagner back to its own command through contractual structures. Prigozhin refused. But here, too, his political isolation and weakness within the Russian apparatus became apparent.

All other leaders of such units, such as Chechen strongman Ramzan Akhmadovich Kadyrov, bowed to the order. Putin himself put his foot down in favour of his Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, who was repeatedly criticised by Prigozhin, and described the contract closures as necessary.

The uprising

Hope was fading away for Prigozhin, a fact that could also become dangerous for him as a person. And so, it came to his uprising – a surprise for all observers. After harsh criticism of the entire war conduct in Ukraine, he mobilised his mercenaries, captured the headquarters of the Russian Southern Forces in Rostov in a coup d’état and sent an advance detachment of Wagner fighters on their way to Moscow – an open military uprising.

Yet, here, too, the great discrepancy between Prigozhin’s military and political influence became immediately apparent. His soldiers quickly advanced up to 200 kilometres on Moscow, destroying initial resistance from government troops on the way, for example, by shooting three helicopters and an aeroplane out of the sky.

His mercenaries followed his orders unconditionally, refused to arrest Prigozhin as ordered by the domestic intelligence service FSB and secured power in Rostov with a massive military presence.

But Prigozhin’s lack of political influence was equally evident. One after another, regional governors declared their loyalty to Putin, and Kadyrov even provided troops to push Wagner PMC out of Rostov.

No one from the presidential administration voiced criticism of the leadership – instead, they united behind the Kremlin. Prigozhin acted militarily quickly and thus gained situational advantages over the sluggish state apparatus. But it was clear that a prolonged armed conflict would consolidate the shaken apparatus and – in case his uprising failed – Prigozhin would face a quick death or a long imprisonment.

The fact that the Kremlin did not take the chance and commissioned Belarusian ruler Alexander Lukashenko to mediate was again due to military uncertainties. For no one knew to what extent war-weary Russian army units would actually fight their mercenary compatriots or perhaps would even partially defect.

After all, the Wagner fighters were able to move into Rostov without any significant resistance, and no one knew how many military officers shared Prigozhin’s anti-establishment populism. The quick end of the revolt also superficially brought back to the Russian hinterland a central element of Putin’s rule: stability.

As a result, both sides in the conflict came to a surprisingly quick agreement. Prigozhin was able to leave for Belarus with Putin’s guarantee of free passage, his entourage obtained immunity from prosecution and retreated to the rear of the Donbass combat zone. An uncertainty remains for the oligarch in that he could still be ‘secretly’ killed.

‘This is the style of the current government’ notes historian Nikolai Svanidze. The FSB also seems to be investigating Prigozhin. But all of this is still better than the almost certain death that would have awaited him and many of his men if the uprising had continued.

For the Kremlin, this action meant damage control, even if the image of being a guarantor of security and stability in Russia was tarnished. Prigozhin thus achieved more than he could have hoped for – if only because he escaped abroad unharmed.

The uprising will leave a lasting mark on the Putin system. Prigozhin and his Wagner army were his personal project, notes Maxim Trudolyubov, editor-in-chief of the exiled Russian newspaper Meduza.

In his view, Putin also used Prigozhin in the war against Ukraine to humiliate those generals who had been unsuccessful in his personal campaign. Now, the ‘PMC uprising’ – despite its short duration – shows the vulnerability of Putin’s power system.

Roland Bathon is a freelance journalist. He writes mainly about Russia and Eastern Europe.

Source: International Politics and Society (IPS), published by the Global and European Policy Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin.

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How the Security Council can Better Pursue Accountability for International Crimes Against Children — Global Issues

A young refugee boy, pictured in a temporary displacement camp in Kalak, Iraq, in June 2014. Credit: Amnesty International
  • Opinion by Janine Morna (florida usa)
  • Inter Press Service

FLORIDA USA, Jul 03 (IPS) – Around 2018, when Anwar was 14 or 15 years old, his father, a member of IS, forced Anwar to train with the group as a young teenager. He even made Anwar watch as he inflicted brutal punishments on people who broke IS’ rules.

The suffering was intolerable. Anwar tried to run away from his father and flee IS-controlled territory on multiple occasions. “I hated everyone,” he said.

In 2011, as the early versions of IS began to re-emerge in Iraq, the UN was quick to document violations the armed group had committed against children. That year, the UN Secretary-General included the group in the organization’s annual report on children and armed conflict, in which perpetrators of grave violations are named and shamed. The UN is required to negotiate action plans with parties listed in the report as part of efforts to stop and prevent the violations from occurring in future.

While the annual report is a powerful tool that prompts action in many contexts, it has had little impact on groups like IS, which are unlikely to engage in dialogue with the UN.

Over the last 11 years, numerous parties listed in the annual report can be classified as ‘persistent perpetrators’ — armed groups and forces that have appeared in the report for more than five consecutive years, and have failed to respond to reports on the violations they have committed against children. IS has been listed in the report for the last 13 years.

The UN Security Council has previously focused on the issue of persistent perpetrators, including by passing a resolution and holding an open debate in 2012 where they emphasized the importance of addressing violations committed by these groups and forces. It has also made efforts to promote sanctions against recalcitrant parties.

A young refugee boy, pictured in a temporary displacement camp in Kalak, Iraq, in June 2014. Credit: Amnesty International

Despite these initiatives, the UN Security Council and its subsidiary, the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict (Working Group), could do much, much more to support meaningful accountability.

Domestic prosecutions of crimes against children

The Working Group, as the primary body carrying out the UN Security Council’s agenda on children and armed conflict, should strengthen its calls for the UN and its donors to help countries to develop and implement domestic legislation that criminalizes grave violations against children. It should also support national criminal justice systems to pursue accountability, in line with international fair trial standards.

Today, many prosecutions of non-state perpetrators of grave violations – like IS in Iraq and Syria, and Boko Haram in Nigeria – take place in domestic counterterrorism courts which, in many cases, fail to include crimes under international law, let alone crimes against children.

The Working Group must encourage the trial of individual members of these groups in national courts that are capable of adjudicating international crimes. Prosecutions could occur in the state where the crimes took place and, where relevant, in states that exercise universal jurisdiction – a legal principle whereby states can prosecute offenders of certain grave crimes irrespective of the location of the crime and the nationality of the perpetrator or victim.

When trials on crimes against children take place in counterterrorism courts, the relevant authorities must enable prosecutors and judges to draw on international law, provide sufficient resources to pursue the prosecutions, and ensure defendants can exercise their full fair trial rights.

In cases involving children associated with armed groups and forces, states should treat children who are accused of crimes during their association primarily as victims of violations of international law and not only as perpetrators, in accordance with international standards. Children should never be prosecuted for mere affiliation with an armed group or force.

Cooperating with the International Criminal Court and other international mechanisms

In situations where domestic legal systems are unable or unwilling to pursue prosecutions of crimes against children, the Working Group should explore opportunities to collaborate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other international justice mechanisms, such as the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) on Syria or the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar to achieve accountability.

This type of collaboration was envisioned when the Working Group first adopted a list of actions it could take in response to grave violations against children. Effective cooperation between international justice mechanisms is critical to achieve a measure of comprehensive justice.

The Working Group’s engagement with the ICC has historically been limited, but it is now time to further develop connections between the two bodies. The Office of the Prosecutor for the ICC has welcomed opportunities to “strengthen cooperation with relevant actors” and earlier this year launched a public consultation to renew its policy on children that “will build upon new approaches… affect meaningful change”.

In the past, some Working Group members have considered indicating when parties have likely committed a war crime or other crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. They have also explored the possibility of sharing their conclusions with the ICC, and arranging for the prosecutor of the ICC to share briefings with the Working Group.

Ten years ago, some members of the Working Group also considered, in the absence of a UN Security Council referral, inviting states that are party to the Rome Statute to refer situations to the ICC, in which armed groups or forces have committed grave violations against children. Unfortunately, deeply divided opinions about the ICC among Council members have, in the past, limited the adoption of these recommendations.

Children must be protected

On July 5, the UN Security Council will host its annual Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict. The occasion offers all UN member states an opportunity to publicly commit to efforts to broaden and strengthen accountability for violations against children.

As a first step, member states should call for the UN Secretary General to, once again, identify persistent perpetrators in the annual reports on children and armed conflict, a practice that was stopped in 2017.

The Council has the power to take greater action in response to some of the world’s most egregious perpetrators of crimes against children. It is unacceptable that children like Anwar should have to wait so long for justice and accountability.

Janine Morna, is Thematics Researcher – Children, Amnesty International’s Crisis Response Programme

*Name changed to protect identity.

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The USAs Systemic Racism includes Its Wars — Global Issues

  • Opinion by Norman Solomon (san francisco, usa)
  • Inter Press Service

SAN FRANCISCO, USA, Jun 27 (IPS) – A recent Justice Department report concluded that “systemic” racial bias in the Minneapolis Police Department “made what happened to George Floyd possible.”

During the three years since a white police officer brutally murdered Floyd, nationwide discussions of systemic racism have extended well beyond focusing on law enforcement to also assess a range of other government functions.

But such scrutiny comes to a halt at the water’s edge — stopping short of probing whether racism has been a factor in U.S. military interventions overseas.

Hidden in plain sight is the fact that virtually all the people killed by U.S. firepower in the “war on terror” for more than two decades have been people of color. This notable fact goes unnoted within a country where — in sharp contrast — racial aspects of domestic policies and outcomes are ongoing topics of public discourse.

Certainly, the U.S. does not attack a country because people of color live there. But when people of color live there, it is politically easier for U.S. leaders to subject them to warfare — because of institutional racism and often-unconscious prejudices that are common in the United States.

Racial inequities and injustice are painfully apparent in domestic contexts, from police and courts to legislative bodies, financial systems and economic structures. A nation so profoundly affected by individual and structural racism at home is apt to be affected by such racism in its approach to war.

Many Americans recognize that racism holds significant sway over their society and many of its institutions. Yet the extensive political debates and media coverage devoted to U.S. foreign policy and military affairs rarely even mention — let alone explore the implications of — the reality that the several hundred thousand civilians killed directly in America’s “war on terror” have been almost entirely people of color.

The flip side of biases that facilitate public acceptance of making war on non-white people came to the fore when Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022. News coverage included reporting that the war’s victims “have blue eyes and blond hair” and “look like us,” Los Angeles Times television critic Lorraine Ali noted.

“Writers who’d previously addressed conflicts in the Gulf region, often with a focus on geopolitical strategy and employing moral abstractions, appeared to be empathizing for the first time with the plight of civilians.”

Such empathy, all too often, is skewed by the race and ethnicity of those being killed. The Arab and Middle Eastern Journalists Association has deplored “the pervasive mentality in Western journalism of normalizing tragedy in parts of the world such as the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and Latin America. It dehumanizes and renders their experience with war as somehow normal and expected.”

Persisting today is a modern version of what W.E.B. Du Bois called, 120 years ago, “the problem of the color line — the relation of the darker to the lighter races.” Twenty-first century lineups of global power and geopolitical agendas have propelled the United States into seemingly endless warfare in countries where few white people live.

Racial, cultural and religious differences have made it far too easy for most Americans to think of the victims of U.S. war efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya and elsewhere as “the other.”

Their suffering is much more likely to be viewed as merely regrettable or inconsequential rather than heart-rending or unacceptable. What Du Bois called “the problem of the color line” keeps empathy to a minimum.

“The history of U.S. wars in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America has exuded a stench of white supremacy, discounting the value of lives at the other end of U.S. bullets, bombs and missiles,” I concluded in my new book War Made Invisible. “Yet racial factors in war-making decisions get very little mention in U.S. media and virtually none in the political world of officials in Washington.”

At the same time, on the surface, Washington’s foreign policy can seem to be a model of interracial connection. Like presidents before him, Joe Biden has reached out to foreign leaders of different races, religions and cultures — as when he fist-bumped Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at their summit a year ago, while discarding professed human-rights concerns in the process.

Overall, in America’s political and media realms, the people of color who’ve suffered from U.S. warfare abroad have been relegated to a kind of psychological apartheid — separate, unequal, and implicitly not of much importance.

And so, when the Pentagon’s forces kill them, systemic racism makes it less likely that Americans will actually care.

Norman Solomon is the national director of RootsAction.org and executive director of the Institute for Public Accuracy. He is the author of a dozen books including War Made Easy. His latest book, War Made Invisible: How America Hides the Human Toll of Its Military Machine, was published in June 2023 by The New Press.

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Environmental Crisis Compounds Humanitarian Disaster Following Dam Destruction — Global Issues

The Destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam in Ukraine has left thousands displaced and disastrous impacts on the environment. Credit: Ukraine Red Cross/Twitter
  • by Ed Holt (bratislava)
  • Inter Press Service

BRATISLAVA, Jun 23 (IPS) – As well as creating a humanitarian crisis, the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam in Ukraine has wrought enormous environmental damage which may never be undone, ecologists have said.

The collapse of the dam in the Kherson region on June 6 put more than 40,000 people in immediate danger from flooding and left hundreds of thousands without access to drinking water, according to Ukrainian officials.

The reservoir at the dam, which continued to drain days after the dam’s destruction, held 18 cubic kilometres (4.3 cubic miles) of water – a volume roughly equal to the Great Salt Lake in Utah – and was the source of fresh water for large parts of the south of the country.

The disaster – which Kyiv says was the result of Russian sabotage –  flooded scores of villages, towns and cities along the Dnieper River. Entire settlements were destroyed, with houses washed away or almost completely submerged by the floodwaters.

Although those waters have begun to recede in many places now, and the immediate risk from drowning has largely abated, other grave dangers remain, with Ukraine’s health ministry warning of the threat of water and food-borne diseases as dead bodies, chemicals, landfills, and waste from toilets could contaminate floodwaters and wells.

President Volodymyr Zelensky also highlighted a potential danger from anthrax as floodwaters may have disturbed animal burial sites, and Health Ministry officials told IPS that they were especially concerned about the risk of cholera in the weeks to come.

The death toll was at least 52, with Russia giving 35 in its territory and Ukraine saying 17.

And those who have been evacuated are unlikely to be able to return to their homes for some time, if at all, adding tens of thousands of already vulnerable people to the country’s ongoing crisis of internal displacement.

“There are already 5 million people internally displaced in Ukraine. This will put more strain on already stretched services,” Olivia Headon, spokesperson for the International Organisation for Migration, which is helping with rescue efforts in affected areas, told IPS.

But while the human toll of the disaster is becoming increasingly apparent, so too is its massive environmental impact.

Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrij Melnyk has called the destruction of the dam “the worst environmental catastrophe in Europe since the Chernobyl disaster”, and many local experts believe the ecological effects will be felt for decades to come.

“Some ecosystems could recover within a dozen years from the flooding itself the drop in groundwater level upstream of the dam is permanent – unless the dam is rebuilt – so ecosystems will never recover,” Natalia Gozak, Wildlife Rescue Field Officer in Ukraine for the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), told IPS.

The area downstream from the dam – which includes three national parks – is rich in wildlife, some of it very rare.

Local environmental groups estimate that hundreds of thousands of animals have been affected by the dam’s destruction and that tens of thousands have been killed.

They fear a loss of endemic endangered species – areas home to nearly all known locations of the rare ant species Liometopum microcephalum, as well as 70% of the world population of Nordmann’s birch mouse (Sicista loriger), have been flooded.

Meanwhile, ecosystems which were already endangered are now having to deal with either too much or too little water and could disappear.

Ecologists are also worried about a massive loss of bird life while the draining of the reservoir at the dam will also result in major freshwater fish stocks in Ukraine being lost.

The loss of water from the dam reservoir and the major canals it served also spells an end to water supplies for land used to grow crops and other produce which feeds not only Ukrainians but many millions in developing countries too. Forty percent of the World Food Programme’s wheat supplies come from Ukraine.

“In future years, the greatest impact will be seen in southern agricultural areas, which are now left without water supplies. These areas will already have changed next summer depending on what adaptation measures are possible and what action is taken,” said Gozak.

She added that in areas where irrigation channels are no longer being filled from the reservoir, agriculture will stop. “It is possible there will be desertification ,” she said.

The IFAW says this drying of land will subsequently affect local microclimates and cause temperature shifts, while wind erosion will blow sand and soil all over neighbouring areas, impacting both people and nature.

Meanwhile, there are other long-term environmental threats.

Pollution is one as floodwaters have washed an estimated 150 tons of machine oil has been washed as far down as the Black Sea, according to Ukrainian officials. Huge oil slicks have also been seen on the waters in Kherson city’s port and industrial facilities.

And there have been warnings that parts of the river and surrounding lands may now be full of mines.

Some areas of Ukraine have been heavily mined since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion last year, and it is believed the floodwaters dislodged many of them.

While there have been reports of some exploding as they hit debris on their way downstream, many are likely to have remained unexploded and covered in silt and mud or buried under other debris.

International rescue groups say that finding where they are and then demining them would be a very slow process, even without the ongoing war.

“We’re mapping the likelihood of where the mines were and where they might end up. The area around the dam was heavily mined to stop an amphibious assault, and we don’t know precisely how many mines there are. There could be thousands of mines involved, but we hope not tens of thousands,” Andrew Duncan, a weapon contamination coordinator for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), told IPS.

“If the fighting stopped and we were able to get into the area, it would be a case of all reasonable effort being made to locate the mines. But this is a very slow process. Any affected land will be out of commission for years,” he added.

But that is not all.

About 150 kilometres upstream from Nova Kakhovka is the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant which draws its cooling water from the dam’s reservoir. The reactors at the plant, which had been under the control of Russian forces since early on in the war, had been shut down prior to the disaster, but they still needed water to cool them and prevent a nuclear catastrophe.

While officials at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have said that alternative sources, including a large pond next to the plant, can provide cooling water for a number of months, the disaster has highlighted the potential for an even greater catastrophe at the site, others say.

Ukrainian nuclear scientist Mariana Budjeryn, Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard Kennedy School, told international media: “If the Russians would do this with Kakhovka, there’s no guarantee they won’t blow up the reactor units at the Zaporizhzhia plant that are also reportedly mined – three of the six. It wouldn’t cause a Chernobyl, but massive disruption, local contamination and long-term damage to Ukraine.”

Regardless of what may or may not come to pass at the nuclear plant, the effects of the dam’s destruction will be felt by both people and nature for a long time to come.

Olena Kozachenko (NOT REAL NAME), an office worker from the Korabel district in the Kherson region, told IPS: “We’re all going to have to live with the dangers, such as dislodged mines, for a long time after the flooding.”

Gozak added: “The human toll of the disaster is probably greater than the environmental toll it will take years and years for ecosystems and habitats to get back to how they were if it can happen at all.”

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Military Junta Gets a Free Pass — Global Issues

  • Opinion by Andrew Firmin (london)
  • Inter Press Service

LONDON, Jun 23 (IPS) – The violence keeps coming in Myanmar, under military rule since February 2021. The junta stands accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, with evidence of systematic use of killings, rape, torture and other gross human rights violations in its attempt to suppress forces demanding a return to democracy.

Even humanitarian aid is restricted. Recently the junta refused to allow in aid organisations trying to provide food, water and medicines to people left in desperate need by a devastating cyclone. It’s far from the first time it’s blocked aid.

Crises like this demand an international response. But largely standing on the sidelines while this happens is the regional intergovernmental body, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Its recent summit, held in Indonesia in May, failed to produce any progress.

ASEAN’s inaction

ASEAN’s response to the coup was to issue a text, the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), in April 2021. This called for the immediate cessation of violence and constructive dialogue between all parties. ASEAN agreed to provide humanitarian help, appoint a special envoy and visit Myanmar to meet with all parties.

Civil society criticised this agreement because it recognised the role of the junta and failed to make any mention of the need to restore democracy. And the unmitigated violence and human rights violations are the clearest possible sign that the 5PC isn’t working – but ASEAN sticks to it. At its May summit, ASEAN states reiterated their support for the plan.

A major challenge is that most ASEAN states have no interest in democracy. All 10 have heavily restricted civic space. As well as Myanmar, civic space is closed in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

It wouldn’t suit such states to have a thriving democracy on their doorstep, which could only bring greater domestic and international pressure to follow suit. States that repress human rights at home typically carry the same approach into international organisations, working to limit their ability to uphold human rights commitments and scrutinise violations.

Continuing emphasis on the 5PC hasn’t masked divisions among ASEAN states. Some appear to think they can engage with the junta and at least persuade it to moderate its violence – although reality makes this increasingly untenable. But others, particularly Cambodia – a one-party state led by the same prime minister since 1998 – seem intent on legitimising the junta.

Variable pressure has come from ASEAN’s chair, which rotates annually and appoints the special envoy. Under the last two, Brunei Darussalam – a sultanate that last held an election in 1965 – and Cambodia, little happened. Brunei never visited the country after being refused permission to meet with democratic leaders, while Cambodia’s prime minister, Hun Sen, visited Myanmar last year. The first post-coup visit to Myanmar by a head of government, this could only be construed as conferring legitimacy.

Indonesia, the current chair, hasn’t appointed a special envoy, instead setting up an office headed by the foreign minister. So far it appears to be taking a soft approach of quiet diplomacy rather than public action.

Thailand, currently led by a pro-military government, is also evidently happy to engage with the junta. While junta representatives remain banned from ASEAN summits, Thailand has broken ranks and invited ASEAN foreign ministers, including from Myanmar, to hold talks about reintegrating the junta’s leaders. A government that itself came to power through a coup but should now step aside after an election where it was thoroughly defeated looks to be attempting to bolster the legitimacy of military rule.

ASEAN states seem unable to move beyond the 5PC even as they undermine it. But the fact that they’re formally sticking with it enables the wider international community to stand back, on the basis of respecting regional leadership and the 5PC.

The UN Security Council finally adopted a resolution on Myanmar in December 2022. This called for an immediate end to the violence, the release of all political prisoners and unhindered humanitarian access. But its language didn’t go far enough in condemning systematic human rights violations and continued to emphasise the 5PC. It failed to impose sanctions such as an arms embargo or to refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Civil society in Myanmar and the region is urging ASEAN to go further. Many have joined together to develop a five-point agenda that goes beyond the 5PC. It calls for a strategy to end military violence through sanctions, an arms embargo and a referral of Myanmar to the ICC. It demands ASEAN engages beyond the junta, and particularly with democratic forces including the National Unity Government – the democratic government in exile. It urges a strengthening of the special envoy role and a pivoting of humanitarian aid to local responders rather than the junta. ASEAN needs to take this on board.

A fork in the road

ASEAN’s current plan is a recipe for continuing military violence, increasingly legitimised by its neighbours’ acceptance. Ceremonial elections could offer further fuel for this.

The junta once promised to hold elections by August, but in February, on the coup’s second anniversary, it extended the state of emergency for another six months. If and when those elections finally happen, there’s no hope of them being free or fair. In March, the junta dissolved some 40 political parties, including the ousted ruling party, the National League for Democracy.

The only purpose of any eventual fake election will be to give the junta a legitimising veneer to present as a sign of progress – and some ASEAN states may be prepared to buy this. This shouldn’t be allowed. ASEAN needs to listen to the voices of civil society calling for it to get its act together – and stick together – in holding the junta to account. If it doesn’t, it will keep failing not only Myanmar’s people, but all in the region who reasonably expect that fundamental human rights should be respected and those who kill, rape and torture should face justice.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.


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A Guide on How Russian Oligarchs Dodge Sanctions — Global Issues

  • Opinion by Matti Kohonen (london)
  • Inter Press Service

LONDON, Jun 22 (IPS) – The author is Executive Director of Financial Transparency CoalitionThe sanctions against Russian oligarchs who hold billions of dollars have mostly failed to have a real impact beyond freezing a few yachts and properties. So, what went wrong? Now we know.

The “Rotenberg Files”, a mass leak of over 42,000 emails and documents, has showed how Russian oligarchs Boris and Arkady Rotenberg hid their assets and those of Vladimir Putin, using trusts and private equity investment funds, taking advantage of the lack of public beneficial ownership registries.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and especially since 2022, sanctions on Russian oligarchs and legal entities linked to the Russian invasion of Ukraine include 12,900 designations against Russia. Some estimates say that Russian oligarch offshore wealth is over US$1 trillion, but sanctions so far have only frozen US$58 billion, due to difficulty in establishing ownership.

Sanctions vary but have been mainly implemented by G7 countries and the European Union. Their effectiveness depends on setting up beneficial ownership registries that cover all possible legal vehicles, and the obligation to cross-check beneficial owners against sanctions regimes by a wide variety of professional enablers for due diligence purposes.

This has largely not happened. Despite progress in establishing centralised beneficial ownership registries, a commitment made by nearly 100 countries, very few of them are open to public access and are ridden with loopholes. In reality, global South countries are now leading the way in establishing effective BO registries after the European Court of Justice ended public access to EU-wide BO registries in November 2022.

This has allowed trusts to become the legal vehicle of choice by Russian oligarchs to hide their wealth. They are also very hard to detect as the presence of a trust deed can be kept at a lawyer’s office if there is no requirement to register the trust in a beneficial ownership registry. Many BO registries do require declaring trusts, but there are loopholes that allow for setting up trusts in jurisdictions that do not require registration of trusts or have loopholes regarding thresholds or exemptions. Only 65 countries require some form of registration of trusts.

Eight of the 18 BVI companies mentioned in the Rotenberg leaks were ultimately dissolved, and two relocated to Cyprus. This implies that Cyprus has become a key location to use trusts and other instruments to conceal ownership. As a European Union member, Cyprus was obliged to create a central register of beneficial ownership in line with the EU’s fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive. Trusts based in Cyprus do come under this requirement, but the Rotenbergs used a loophole in the BO laws to conceal ultimate ownership that goes around the existing EU 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive.

They effectively created a complex ownership structure around different entities in order to be below the trigger points for reporting beneficial ownership (in most cases 25 percent of control), yet still retaining control through power through potential voting coalitions in the complex structure that were concealed elsewhere. The structure used by the Rotenbergs involved a US entity that is owned by entities elsewhere, including Italy, the UK, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Bahamas (four entities), the British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands,

Along with trusts, private equity firms have been revealed as another preferred vehicle to dodge sanctions. Investment vehicles called “closed mutual funds,” in Russian abbreviated as “ZPIFs,” held these assets. They are not considered legal entities under Russian law, and thus are not under obligations to reveal their shareholders to the authorities. The leaked files show that 13 ZPIFs were linked to the Rotenbergs.

To evade questions about the true nature of the beneficial owners, the leaked files show that “there is a practice where the General Director of the Management Company is recognized as the ultimate beneficiary”. The ZPIF’s invested in Russian companies, Monaco real estate, and other assets where beneficial ownership checks do not take place. Companies where they owned minority stakes could do business relatively normally.

Private equity and mutual funds are a global concern. According to a recent report, “Private Investments, Public Harm”, there are nearly 13,000 investment advisers in an $11 trillion industry with little or no anti-money laundering due diligence responsibilities in the USA, with the real possibility that sanctioned oligarchs use such vehicles to conceal their ownership. The US Enablers Act seeks to remove the exemption from due diligence checks from investment managers but the bill did not pass last December.

Art is another way to conceal ownership, as art dealers are not under any reporting requirements for money laundering purposes. A July 2020 report by a U.S. Senate subcommittee detailed an elaborate scheme in which the Rotenberg brothers spent more than US$18 million on art purchases in the months after they were sanctioned by the U.S. in March 2014. They acquired several artworks, including a US$7.5 million René Magritte, through a web of offshore companies based in Cyprus and the British Virgin Islands.

The tools to hide wealth used by Russian oligarchs to evade sanctions are exactly the same than the ones used by those behind natural resource crimes such as illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, or indeed wealthy billionaires abusing laws to pay less than what they should in taxes. One cannot create a regime to just catch Russian billionaires. An overhaul of ownership transparency, from companies and trusts to art, vessels, aircraft and among other asset classes, including private equity and hedge funds, is required. Otherwise Russian oligarchs and kleptocrats around the world will continue dodging controls, keeping their shady money safely hidden.

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No Peace Until Peace For All — Global Issues

  • Opinion by Yasmine Sherif (new york)
  • Inter Press Service

NEW YORK, Jun 14 (IPS) – As we head into June, we will commemorate a number of important international days that call for much-needed support to protect refugees, end child labour, stop sexual violence in conflict and ensure human rights for the innocent children victims of aggression.

Together, this work will propel our efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. To deliver on these commitments, we urgently appeal for substantial, sustained increases in public and private sector funding support for quality education – especially for the more than 222 million crisis-impacted girls and boys who desperately need it.

These include refugee girls and boys fleeing conflict in Sudan. In May, ECW made important new commitments to keep Sudan’s children, wherever they are, in school – as outlined in the joint Op-Ed by The Rt. Hon. Gordon Brown and I in The Times.

During my mission with UNHCR and UNICEF to the border region of Chad with Sudan just two weeks ago, we announced a fast-acting emergency response to UNHCR and civil society with total funding in Chad now topping US$41 million. Here, I would like to appeal for additional funding to UNICEF who stands ready to deliver urgently needed education to host-communities already living in abject poverty along the borders in Chad.

Together with governments, donors and civil society partners, we are working to expand our support in response to the refugee arrivals in other neighbouring countries as we unite in our efforts to respond to the enormous, urgent needs accounted for in the Regional Refugee Response Plan.

At the May 2023 G7 Summit in Hiroshima, under the leadership of the Government of Japan, global leaders committed to “ensuring continued support to the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), Education Cannot Wait (ECW) and UN agencies, including UNESCO and UNICEF, as key partners in helping countries to build stronger education systems for the most marginalized children.” As outlined in the G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communique, this is an investment in “resilient, just and prospering societies.”

We must now turn these commitments into actions. This means every nation in the G7 must step up their support. As we lead into ECW’s four-year 2023-2026 Strategic Plan, we will welcome much needed substantial and new commitments from G7 leaders for the ECW strategic period.

The private sector will also play a key role in our resource mobilization plans. Our teams are working across the globe to develop new and innovative public-private partnerships, such as our recently announced agreement with the Zurich Cantonal Bank and the Government of Switzerland. Without the private sector and entrepreneurial spirit, we cannot meet the rapidly growing needs. In other words, abnormal problems require extraordinary solutions.

We will also work with Arab States, Nordic States and G20 nations to create new models for funding that crowd-in resources and know-how to deliver the depth, speed and agility needed to ensure quality education and holistic supports in places like Sudan, Ukraine and beyond.

Colombia has emerged as a model of this cross-sectorial approach. In this month’s high-level interview, we speak with Mireia Villar Forner, the United Nations Colombia Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian, who highlights the power of education in building sustainable development pathways. This is done through coordinated joint programmes through the United Nations coordination mechanisms. This is indeed one of the chief reasons that have allowed ECW to deliver with development depth and humanitarian speed.

Through ECW’s Multi-Year Resilience Programmes, we are providing transformative education investments in the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. This is good for business, good for government and good for the world. It also provides an optimized investment opportunity for Overseas Development Assistance, corporate social responsibility and philanthropic giving. By investing in education, we are investing in all of the SDGs. Without education, how can any of them be achieved?

The month of May was also Mental Health Awareness Month, and we announced an ambitious new target to have at least 10% of resources go to mental health and psychosocial services. We do so because we firmly believe that mental health is essential, if not also existential, to children and adolescents who having survived the most painful forms of violence and disasters.

I have no doubt that 2023 will go down as a landmark year in global funding support for education. ECW and our strategic partners will not stop until our work is done. There can be no peace, until there is peace for all, to cite Dag Hammarskjold. Indeed, there can be no peace without education. We will leave no child behind.

Yasmine Sherif is Director of Education Cannot Wait.

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Conflict & Hunger Deeply Embedded in War-Ravaged Yemen — Global Issues

Abdulwasea Mohammed addressing UN Member States, UN agencies, fellow NGOs during Protection of Civilians Week last month. Credit: Oxfam
  • Opinion by Abdulwasea Mohammed (sana’a, yemen)
  • Inter Press Service

SANA’A, Yemen, Jun 06 (IPS) – During the week of May 21, the UN held its annual week dedicated to the Protection of Civilians. The themes of the week’s events, particularly the side events, I had the honor of participating in, mirrored many of the pressing issues in Yemen, as conflict continues.

While there is some hope as peace negotiations are underway, millions of Yemenis are still feeling the acute impacts of war. I had the opportunity to address some of the representatives of UN member states, UN agencies and fellow NGOs, who are taking a leading role on these issues, including Conflict and Hunger and Community-Led Approaches of Civilian Protection.

I also was able to share many of these key messages with members of US Congress and UN missions during my time in the US. As we look ahead, we need to see the conversations from the week put into action.

Conflict and hunger are deeply intertwined in Yemen, just as they are around the world – Conflict continues to be the top driver of extreme hunger. The humanitarian response including food, cash, clean water, is saving lives every day, but without clear signs for lasting peace, hunger and other potentially deadly challenges that cannot be ended in Yemen.

And in our case, the same can be said about economic factors – many continue to overlook the impact the shattered economy has had on pushing food insecurity to catastrophic levels. We need both inclusive peace and large-scale economic action to help Yemenis continue to survive and recover.

Restrictions on imports over the years, continued financial shocks and economic deterioration as well as increased prices of fuel and food commodities, and disruptions to livelihoods and services, have driven millions to hunger.

The World Bank has estimated that around half the 233,000 deaths in Yemen since 2015 are attributable to the indirect impact of the war – from lack of food, healthcare and infrastructure. What is even more painful is, in many areas, there is plenty of food in markets, but most Yemenis are not able to afford it.

The indirect impacts are overwhelming but this is also in addition, unfortunately, to very direct impacts on food production and essential infrastructure due to fighting. At Oxfam, we have documented farms being targeted, fishing boats being fired at, and unexploded ordnance, cluster munitions and landmines—all of them putting agricultural areas out of use.

To address all of these threats and their devastating impacts, we need community-based and community-led action. At the UN I spoke specifically about hunger and community-led protection, but this approach can be applied across humanitarian response and steps toward early recovery.

In times of crisis, community leaders, local organizations, and neighbors are the true first responders, arriving first and staying long after larger groups may have to leave. They are more effective in some ways, and have the knowledge to support the most vulnerable members of society. These groups need more resources to do their work effectively.

This is a concrete way for the aid community to make a difference in Yemen now and going forward – to reframe and revise support to community-based protection and funding to local organizations, with a focus on building trust over long-term relationships.

Donors should provide longer timeframes for organizations to accomplish the goals in a project and provide more flexible funding and support to truly build on the success of community-level work.

Yemen, just like all humanitarian responses, is a complicated place to work, and sometimes time runs out on funding, before a project even begins after dealing with security, logistical and bureaucratic challenges.

Of course, local groups alone cannot tackle one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises, and organizations like Oxfam should listen to their priorities, assess how to best support the work underway, and fill in the gaps to provide a complementary response.

Taking all of these risks and approaches into account, it is key that policies and programs addressing conflict-induced hunger address the specific needs and experiences of the most vulnerable, including women and displaced people.

All of these groups should be able to weigh in on issues impacting them as part of this an inclusive and effective humanitarian response, economic recovery, and sustainable peace.

Targeted programs to support their economic empowerment, such as providing access to finance, technical assistance, and market opportunities; and improving access to education all would make a massive difference for these groups, and for Yemen as a whole.

Above all, we have to address the root causes of the conflict and its impacts in a holistic way. For there to be progress, we must ensure that any negotiated peaceful resolution includes these same voices of women and other marginalized groups and addresses the underlying issues such as political and economic inequality that have contributed to the conflict and ensure no one is left behind.

I hope the Protection of Civilians Week was a point of reflection and a renewed call to action for those that gathered, as it was for me. Each context is unique, but there is much to learn from each other. I spoke at events alongside experts from the Lake Chad Basin, South Sudan, and more – and we all had something to learn from our successes, failures, and recommendations.

With more resources in the right hands alongside a recommitment to peace, Yemenis – along with those caught in similar spirals of hunger and insecurity – can have a hopeful way forward.

Abdulwasea Mohammed is Yemen Advocacy, Campaigns Media Manager at Oxfam.

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Waiting Game for Nigerian Students Awaiting Evacuation on Egyptian Border — Global Issues

Student evacuees from Sudan wait to return to Nigeria. Credit: Handout
  • by Abdullahi Jimoh (abuja)
  • Inter Press Service

ABUJA, May 30 (IPS) – Seven weeks after the bloody conflict in Khartoum, Sudan started, and 41 days after the Nigerian government began the evacuation of residents studying there, students are still on the Egyptian border waiting to be airlifted back to their home country.

“Today is exactly one week after we left Khartoum for Port Sudan. Our living conditions are not favourable, but the biggest problem is the lack of communication from the (Nigerian) embassy,” said Abdul-Hammid Alhassan, a student who was evacuating war-torn Khartoum and travelling to Port Sudan. This was the first time IPS interviewed him. The distance between the cities was 825 kilometres, and he and his colleagues felt abandoned. Now weeks later, he is still waiting.

“Our food supply isn’t constant; we don’t have enough water and good medical care, although there are people with poor health among us,” he told IPS on May 9, 2023. His voice trembles with fear and rage.

Now he has a greater problem; while most of his fellow students have been evacuated, he remains behind.

One and a half weeks into the bloody confrontation between the Sudanese Arms Force (SAF) and the Rapid Support Force (RSF) in Sudan, the Nigerian government started to evacuate the students—after other countries like Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States who quickly to evacuated their nationals from the warzone.

In preparation for the evacuation, the government paid USD 1.2 million through the Central Bank of Nigeria via the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) for 40 buses to convey the students to Aswan in Egypt.

On April 26, Nigerians in Diaspora Commission’s chair Abike Dabiri Erewa said that 5,500 students were ready for evacuation to the Egyptian border to return to Nigeria. An evacuee told IPS that the buses arrived around 2 pm Central Africa Time (CAT), but the evacuation didn’t go as planned, with a media outlet HumanAngle saying the fleeing students were left in the desert by the drivers who complained about non-payment of the balance. After the payment was settled, the evacuees continued on their route.

On May 4, 376 students arrived in Abuja, and they were each given N100 thousand (about USD 216) as a stipend so they could travel back to their families. By May 11, a further 2,246 had been evacuated, according to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) – but Alhassan was not among them.

He is convinced something “fishy” is behind the delays. Weeks later, he is still awaiting transport home.

“They are selecting our names at random. We don’t know when we will leave here, but I’m convinced there is a kind of ploy and corruption going on to keep us staying as long as possible to keep the cash flowing from the federal government,” he said hopelessly.

On May 30, Alhassan says he and what he estimates to be about 300 fellow students (both women and men) still hadn’t been evacuated.

An official from Nigerian Embassy in Khartoum said they were working to return the remaining students to Nigeria.

“The embassy is available, and officials were there for screening exercise while waiting for the federal government to schedule the flight,” the official told IPS.

The Director General of the National Emergency Management Agency, Mustapha Ahmed, told IPS that NEMA had been trying to evacuate all the students and follow Embassy recommendations and advice.

“We only wait for Embassy’s recommendations, they advise, and we follow,” Ahmed said.

Sani Bala Sheu, a Kano-based current affairs analyst and former Civil Liberties Organization (CLO) activist speculated there was something untoward at play.

“In a situation like this, there will certainly be corruption,” he said. “Why can’t the Nigerian government deploy the methods of Dubai or Turkey and other advanced countries in evacuating their citizens? The federal government should ensure that all the students returned home safely.”

Mukhtar Saeed, one of the Nigerian student refugees in Port Sudan and among 265 that were airlifted to Nigeria in mid-May, said he was anxious because Alhassan is not among those who have returned.

“He wasn’t allowed to pass by the embassy officials because he had been very vocal since the war started, so they marked him and decided to punish him for absolutely no reason,” Saeed told IPS.

Why Do Nigerian Students Study Abroad?

The budget for education falls short of the 15-20 percent recommended by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization UNESCO for developing countries, with 8.2 percent of the budget allocation.

A long-term disagreement between the government and the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) in an eight-month strike and closure of higher education facilities.

As a result, middle-class Nigerians seek education from abroad. Data from Campus France shows that Nigeria tops among the migrating sub-Saharan students in Africa, with 71,700 Nigerian students representing 17 percent studying abroad, according to its 2020 study.

Middle-class northerners from Nigeria who are predominantly Muslim sought higher education in Sudan.

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