Wars and conflicts have pushed more than 139 million people in 24 countries into acute food insecurity. Credit: FAO
Opinion by Mario Lubetkin (rome)
Inter Press Service
ROME, May 25 (IPS) – This is an op-ed by Mario Lubetkin, Assistant Director-General at FAOIf the war in Ukraine, that was initiated three months ago, does not end, and without a reduction in the growing number of conflicts in other parts of the world, hunger will only continue to increase.
As rarely seen in recent history, issues related to agrifood systems and world food security are at the centre of global and regional debates and actions in the search of possible solutions to prevent the rapid worsening of world hunger as a result of war and other conflicts.
It also seeks to accelerate efforts to transform agrifood systems, to ensure inclusive and environmentally sound development and better nutrition.
“Peace is essential to protect people from hunger,” FAO Director-General Qu Dongyu has repeatedly said at major world forums.
Ukraine is obviously the country most affected by the war because of the human suffering and the destruction of food supply and value chains.
However, the consequences of this conflict are also being felt by low-income and food-importing countries that depend on Russia and Ukraine for food, grain, fuel and fertilizer supplies, especially in Africa and Asia, as they face an unprecedented rise in food prices.
At the end of March, just over a month after the start of the war, on 24 February, food products increased by 12.6%, the highest increase since 1990, according to data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
At the end of April, prices fell slightly; however, the prospects for the coming months are far from encouraging.
According to a recent study by FAO, World Food Programme (WFP), and other institutions, around 193 million people in 53 countries were already suffering from acute food insecurity and in need of very urgent assistance in 2021, almost 40 million more than in 2020.
It is expected that the figures will continue to increase in 2022 if wars and conflicts continue.
Afghanistan alone represents approximately 20 million people in this situation, half of its population, with very high figures also in Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen.
Wars and conflicts have pushed more than 139 million people in 24 countries into acute food insecurity; extreme weather events have been responsible for extreme hunger for another 23 million people in eight countries, while economic shocks have enormously affected 30 million people in 21 countries.
These data demonstrate the increasingly close relationship between conflicts, climate change, economic and financial crises, as well as energy and health problems, with the fight against hunger.
All this in a context already worsened by the effects of COVID-19 in recent years, which further aggravated the situation of people who numbered more than 800 million at the beginning of the pandemic. The effects of COVID-19 increased that figure by an additional 100 million, not to mention the problems of malnutrition that affect more than 3 billion people.
The war increased prices, especially of wheat, corn and oilseeds as well as fertilizers. These increases come on top of already high increases in the worst period of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Wheat export forecasts for Russia and Ukraine have been revised downwards, and while other players such as India and the European Union have increased their offers, solutions remain very limited, and prices are expected to remain high.
Countries likely to be most affected by their dependence on wheat imports from European countries at war include Egypt and Turkey, as well as several African countries such as Congo, Eritrea, Madagascar, Namibia, Somalia and Tanzania.
In addition, some countries that rely heavily on imported fertilizers from Russia are exporters of grains and high-value commodities such as Argentina, Bangladesh and Brazil.
To face this difficult reality for a group close to 60 countries, FAO is proposing at major international forums, such as the Group of Seven (G7) meeting in Stuttgart, Germany, this month, the creation of a global Food Financing Fund.
This Fund would be designed to help the most affected countries cope with rising food prices and thus contribute to alleviating the situation of 1.8 billion people.
To guarantee greater market transparency, this specialized agency of the United Nations, together with the countries of the Group of 20 (G20), is promoting the strengthening and expansion of the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS).
It is an inter-agency platform designed to improve the transparency of food markets, established in 2011 by the world’s most powerful countries following the global food price increases of 2007-2008 and 2010.
At the same time, the aim is to support Ukrainian rural families with rapid action to enable them to cultivate crops in time for the harvest that begins in the coming months, which represents an essential source of income for the country’s 12 million rural inhabitants, almost a third of its population.
This involves, for example, distributing potato-planting inputs for to thousands of Ukrainian producers in at least 10 provinces and making targeted economic transfers.
Addressing these dramatically growing emergencies, investing in the healthier, more nutritious and equitable agrifood systems, applying science and innovation more intensely to these processes, and reducing food losses can solve the food situation of hundreds of millions of people.
“Time is short and the situation is dire,” warned Qu at the United Nations Security Council on 19 May.
ATHENS, Greece, May 25 (IPS) – Putin’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has sparked a new introspection in the West. A number of commentators, most of them writing from the US and the UK, have come up with their latest scapegoat: Germany’s to blame, they say, with its decades-long policy of appeasing Russia. Really?
People love to dislike Germany. Often for good reasons. Successive Merkel administrations were hard-hearted in their management of the eurozone crisis, imposing crippling austerity on the South. They prioritised Germany’s narrow economic interests when dealing with illiberal regimes, including an aggressive Turkey.
Germany pursued a similar policy with Russia, too, weaving a tight web of economic relations. Since the turning point of 24 February, it is clear that this policy has outlived its usefulness. But the vitriol hurled at Germany has been excessive in the extreme: ‘Putin’s useful idiots’ was the verdict of a recent Politico Europe article on Germany’s leaders. The German president was prevented from visiting Kyiv after being declared persona non grata. It’s all getting rather out of hand.
Understanding the German perspective
Extreme criticism of this sort is not only about Germany and how to deal with brutal leaders like Putin. It is also about Europe’s role in the international system. And it has gone too far, for at least four reasons:
First, history.
Having acknowledged the crimes of Nazism, Germany was re-established on new foundations after 1945. No other country has made historical guilt such an integral part of its national self-consciousness.
George PagoulatosThis led to the drawing up of a pacifist constitution, the consignment of German nationalism to the fringes, and seven-plus decades of commitment to European integration. When the Germans justify Nord Stream by citing the destruction wrought by Hitler’s Germany on Russia, or when they say they don’t want German tanks rolling into Ukraine killing Russian soldiers, there is deep historical content in it.
One could dismiss it as a thing of the past, but vacuous it isn’t, nor is it just pretext.
Second, Ostpolitik.
The Social Democrats in Germany today inherited Willy Brandt’s post-1960s doctrine of cooperation, dialogue and detente with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. This policy, which has been adhered to by every administration since, contributed to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and to the peaceful reunification of the two Germanies.
As a member of NATO, Germany did not cease to play an active role in the containment of the Soviet bloc. But it complemented this role with a farsighted policy of opening up to the Soviet Union. A wise policy which was vindicated.
Third, Realpolitik.
There is no doubt that its nexus of commercial transactions with Putin’s Russia has been commercially beneficial for Germany. Should anyone be surprised if a state chooses to act according to its economic interests? And indeed, the mercantilism of an export-led German economy that grows on the back of foreign trade often leads German foreign policy to forge relations with authoritarian regimes.
Nord Stream 2 did leave Germany fully dependent on Russian gas. However, the Scholz administration shut the pipeline down immediately after the invasion of Ukraine and moved forward to support all the heavy sanctions imposed, accepting the resulting economic damage.
But the key point here is this: If Europe’s main weapon for responding to Putin’s aggression is economic sanctions, it is precisely the density of the commercial relations with Russia that makes sanctions an effective lever capable of delivering real pressure.
Without these transactions, Putin would have nothing to lose – sanctions would be utterly meaningless! Economic interdependence gives Europe the power to exercise a deterrent by escalating sanctions. Even if it stands to bear a good part of the cost of them itself.
Building bridges not walls
There is nothing black and white about dealing in the long term with a militaristic authoritarian rival, one that holds nuclear weapons. It requires an ever-evolving mix of incentives and sanctions to encourage positive behaviour, discourage negative actions, and respond directly to aggression; a toolkit containing both engagement and containment to be applied in alternating doses.
The German logic of dealing with Russia is helping to maintain a balanced European foreign policy mix, which would otherwise be heavily skewed toward atavistic Cold War hawkishness.
Fourth, Europe.
Peace in post-war Europe owes much to the pragmatic restraint of its leaderships, the taming of nationalisms, the forging of mutually beneficial cooperation. The EU owes its historical success to building bridges, not walls. Of course, when things change, Europe (and Germany) change their mind, to paraphrase Keynes.
The EU cannot and must not abandon its doctrine of soft power; rather, it must complement it with hard power and defensive deterrence. But holding the European leaders who sought to engage Russia as a partner responsible for Putin’s war is worse than revisionism. It is a plain distortion of logic.
This article was originally published on ekathimerini-com
George Pagoulatos is a professor at the Athens University of Economics and Business, visiting professor at the College of Europe, and director general of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Two boys collect fresh bread for their families at a bakery rehabilitated by WFP in Aleppo. Credit: WFP/Jessica Lawson. May 2022.
Opinion by Sinan Hatahet (istanbul)
Inter Press Service
ISTANBUL, May 20 (IPS) – Moscow’s decision to intervene militarily in Syria in 2015 effectively preserved the Assad regime in Damascus. Russian air power and intelligence support, along with Iranian-backed militias on the ground, allowed the regime to beat the opposition and brutally reassert its control over much of Syria.
Syria remains one of the World Food Programme’s biggest emergencies, and the numbers are staggering. A quarter of all refugees in the world are Syrian and they have sought safety in 130 countries. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine has made a political solution in Syria even more unlikely. Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation is deteriorating dramatically.
Since March 2020, the conflict seems to be entering a new period of stalemate with the delineation of three distinctive territories with static frontlines.
Yet this latest de-escalation phase is inherently volatile and has persisted chiefly thanks to the Russian-Turkish fragile entente in north-western Syria and the US interim but still ongoing presence in north-eastern Syria.
Ultimately, Assad’s endgame is to regain control of all the Syrian territory, and he has shown no signs of commitment toward negotiating a peaceful epilogue to the conflict.
Assad believes he has time on his side. In the West and in the region, there is lagging support for regime change in Damascus and adopting an alternative framework for a gradual transition towards ‘peace’.
Even Assad’s opponents seem to have pragmatically abandoned their initial objective of toppling the regime and are primarily seeking to preserve a form of autonomy instead. Nevertheless, without an agreement with Damascus all forms of autonomous governance in Syria are vulnerable and dependent on temporary arrangements among the foreign backers of the different ‘authorities’ on the ground.
Sinan Hatahet
Assad’s backers
Assad’s capacity to reclaim undivided authority over Syria depends on the continuous support of his allies, but so does his survival. The precarious state of Syria’s economy, US and EU sanctions, and severely damaged infrastructure constantly threaten the state’s integrity and capacity to maintain its institutions. To prevent a structural collapse of the Syrian state, both Russia and Iran are playing pivotal roles.
Iran provides oil, gas, and funds, while Russia provides security and diplomacy to accelerate Assad’s regional and international rehabilitation, which is synonymous with investments and financial aid. Thus, it is safe to assume that Syria is particularly exposed to the Ukraine war’s fallout as Russia is expected to divert its attention and resources away from the region.
A distracted Russia in Ukraine has several implications on Syria’s current state of affairs – but to varying degrees. Militarily and security-wise, even though Turkey or the US could exploit Russian weaknesses in Syria to challenge the status quo, it is highly doubtful as it would demand further commitment to Syria, and currently there does not seem to be an appetite to engage more.
Geopolitically, the Ukrainian conflict may lead to structural changes in neighbouring security complexes and further strengthen Turkey and Iran as regional powers. Still, the extent of its impact on Syria is also limited. Instead, it is primarily worsening economic and humanitarian conditions from which Syrians are likely to suffer.
Syria’s rising food insecurity
Although Moscow does not back Damascus financially, and Russian exports represent only 3.7 per cent of Syrian imports, the latter depends on critical Russian produces such as wheat and fodder.
Wheat is essential for food security, given the centrality of bread in Syrians’ diets. Syria’s annual need is estimated at around 4.3 million tonnes; in 2021, Syria imported 1.2 million tons and produced only 1.05 million tons resulting in long-hours lines for bread In regime-held areas, and unprecedented hikes in prices.
The deterioration of Syrian food security is not a product of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Still, it is expected to worsen as access to Russian food products is currently interrupted.
Moreover, alternative food supplies are not easy to find as imports from most countries are compromised by sanctions and the lack of Syrian foreign currency reserves to finance such transactions.
For the time being, Damascus seems to rely on India to compensate for the loss of Russian wheat and fodder. Still, in the long run, the sustainability of such a route is questionable, especially given the increasing costs of supply chains and the growing global inflation rates.
The economic effects of the war in Ukraine have already been felt across Syria. Various products related to wheat and flour production have already seen rapid surges in market prices. The impact is not only felt in regime-held territories but also in north-western and north-eastern Syria, which previously did not suffer from a lack of access to international markets.
The prices of basic imported commodities have also risen. Access to adjacent markets also became more difficult as several countries, including Turkey, started imposing bans on exporting grains, cooking oil, and other agricultural commodities to Syria.
The availability problem
The rise in prices has also impacted humanitarian aid. In March, the national average cost of the World Food Programme’s standard food basket increased by 24 per cent over one month. Similarly, the health sector has been affected. Medical facilities in opposition-held areas rely entirely on international funding to provide essential services and medication.
In addition to the disruption in supply chains and increased costs, allocated funds for the sector dropped by more than 40 per cent in the last ten months, resulting in the closure of hospitals and vital services.
Finally, the Russian-Western diplomatic confrontation and the lack of a political venue for de-escalation would potentially threaten the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Syria. The UNSC’s unanimous adoption of resolution 2585 in June 2021 to renew cross-border aid delivery for another 12 months was the result of a US-Russian dialogue that seems improbable as the Ukraine conflict rages on.
The interruption of cross-border aid delivery would demand a quick and effective response to bring relief to the two million civilians and IDPs in need in Idlib and northern Aleppo.
Fundamentally, the Ukrainian conflict will not trigger a paradigm shift in the Syrian conflict. It will instead entrench the status quo, further complicate negotiations over a political transition, and worsen the humanitarian conditions in the country.
The international community believes that food security in Syria is an affordability issue, which justifies the maintenance of sanctions as a lever against Assad. Nevertheless, the most recent dynamics show an increasing availability problem.
To prevent a looming food security catastrophe, humanitarian and donor countries should ensure the continuous flow of humanitarian assistance to Syria, as they should maintain their efforts to compartmentalise aid delivery from political and securities issues.
The Assad regime has shown no signs of relinquishing any of its ‘sovereign rights’ in delivering aid in Syria. However, similar to 2014, desperate times call for desperate measures, and Damascus could be coarse into accepting a new model. But more than ever, Syria needs a different approach to deliver much-needed humanitarian aid.
Sinan Hatahet is a Senior Associate Fellow at Al Sharq Forum and advises a number of think tanks on Syria. Previously, he headed the media office of the Syrian National Coalition.
Source: International Politics and Society (IPS)-Journal published by the International Political Analysis Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin
NEW YORK, May 10 (IPS) – “Whatever the circle of hell in which we live,
I think we are free to break out of it.”
– Jean-Paul Sartre, Preface to the Deutsche Gramaphon recording of No Exit
Mr. Vladimir Putin’s illegal War of Aggression in Ukraine, launched on February 24, 2022, brought into stark relief the fractured state of Global Peace and Security. Militarized conflicts, civilian deaths and forced migration in the tens of millions have been ongoing for decades, with little or no relief to the beleaguered victims.
The war in Ukraine appears to have displaced other ongoing major wars in Yemen, Ethiopia, and Myanmar in the global public imagination thanks to the 24/7 news cycle. The primary mandate of the United Nations is to ensure the maintenance of Global Peace and Security, sadly we seem to have neither, apart from a lot of talk by eminent personages with little or no action to redress the dystopian realities and carnage on the ground.
The Latin motto res, non verba comes to mind – meaning “deeds, and not words” – as quite an appropriate model for the United Nations to adopt rather than sticking to ‘business as usual’ – which is quite lame and pathetic to say the least in these trying times.
Secretary-General António Guterres must not leave diplomacy, mediation, and negotiation to half-baked UN diplomats out in the field and even within his own Executive Office – UN-EOSG.
In the context of current world affairs and international relations, it is imperative that the Secretary-General plays a more pivotal and far-greater active role to uphold the primary mandate of the United Nations and ensure the maintenance of Global Peace and Security.
The time for protecting the image and status of the UN Secretary-General is over, as well as being held hostage by the P-5 Permanent Member States of the UN Security Council who have run roughshod over all current and previous UN Secretaries-General.
Rather than being risk averse, Secretary-General Guterres must play a much more active and visible role on the global stage and behind-the-scenes – traveling incessantly to war-torn UN member states to meet the protagonists regularly and personally mediating, using his high office and moral standing to good effect – to boost UN mediation efforts.
Reminiscent of the active and energetic interventions of one of his predecessors, the late Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, who sadly paid the ultimate price along with 15 other UN advisors, bodyguards, and aircrew when their plane was shot down on September 18, 1961, in Northern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe.
In today’s geopolitical environment, Secretary-General Guterres cannot be seen as one of the last of a long line of diplomats and politicians to visit a war-torn region, as was the case of his recent visit in late April 2022 to Moscow and Kyiv – to put it bluntly this is bad optics.
Secretary-General Guterres must use his Executive Office to better effect and the global public needs to be aware and supportive. Given the very high stakes involved he must be much more proactive regarding Ukraine, and all ongoing wars and armed conflicts in evenhanded fashion – without fear nor favor.
On the plus side Secretary-General Guterres did call the war in Ukraine “evil and unacceptable” and called for justice. However, Guterres’ call fell on deaf ears in Moscow, demonstrated by the fact that Russia launched five missiles striking central Kyiv less than one hour after he held a news conference with Ukrainian President Vlodymyr Zelenskyy.
So, what is to be done when a P-5 Permanent Member State of the UN Security Council goes “rogue” – i.e., beyond the bounds of civilized, rules-based behavior of a nation-state in the 21st Century adhering to tenets of Global Peace and Security enshrined in the UN Charter, the Laws of War, the Geneva Conventions, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – as in the case of Mr. Putin and his government?
Notwithstanding the fact that Secretary-General Guterres is a former Prime Minister of Portugal, he must demonstrate his independence from the Western powers, and immediately follow-up on his Moscow and Kyiv visit by visiting Beijing to enlist President Xi Jingping’s not-so-inconsequential support to put pressure on Moscow to end the aggression in Ukraine and call off the dogs of war.
And while he is negotiating in Beijing, he must also secure the support of China to pressure the Tatmadaw Kyi military junta to standdown and restore democracy without delay in Myanmar to provide relief to its beleaguered peoples. Non-confrontational diplomacy is the key to success in Beijing something that Secretary-General Guterres is adept at doing, which he should use to good effect considering that the Chinese are not belligerents.
Beijing is more inclined towards global trade and commerce and promoting their ambitious “Belt and Road Initiative” global megaproject, which is undoubtedly being hampered by war in Ukraine.
After two bloody world wars where tens of millions of human beings died, nobody wants another largescale inter-European war, which has potential ramifications for militaries and civilians well beyond Europe.
In fact, Mr. Putin’s War of Aggression in Ukraine is already deepening world hunger given that global wheat production, storage and supply is severely hampered by fighting. The power of the United Nations is a reflected power – i.e., that of its leading member states adhering to a rules-based system of global governance – and that power is what all UN Secretaries-General must harness for the greater good through the arts of diplomacy, mediation, and negotiation to maintain Global Peace and Security.
Secretary-General Guterres is urgently called upon to demonstrate his leadership and political acumen in these dystopian and troubled times, using his moral courage as a beacon to rally global publics to support the mandate and mission of the United Nations. The UN Secretary-General cannot and must not be relegated to the role of bystander while belligerents run amok, he/she must lead, irrespective of the personal cost, without fear nor favor.
As for Secretary-General Guterres a devout Catholic (close to His Holiness Pope Francis an outspoken critic of war), he cannot accomplish this mammoth task alone – to enhance his moral authority he needs to harness the power and voice of civil society together with that of the world’s multiple religions – all working together at manifold levels to maintain Global Peace and Security.
Dr Purnaka L. de Silva is Professor UN Studies (M.A. Program) at the School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, and Director, Institute of Strategic Studies and Democracy (ISSD) Malta. In March 2022 he received Seton Hall University’s College Adjunct Faculty Teacher of the Year Award, and in December 2021 was nominated Diplomacy Professor of the Year by the School of Diplomacy and International Relations.
NEW YORK, May 09 (IPS) – Dr. Alon Ben-Meir, a retired professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University (NYU), taught courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies for over 20 years.A revised Iran nuclear deal based on the 2015 JCPOA could provide the basis for a new Biden administration strategy that would limit Iran’s nuclear program to peaceful purposes and ensure that Tehran’s public pronouncement that it is not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons becomes a de facto reality.
Righting the Wrong
Regardless of how flawed the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA; aka Iran nuclear deal) may be, it was by far better than having no deal. Trump’s withdrawal from the deal was most unfortunate as it did nothing but bring Iran ever closer to the nuclear threshold. Despite its public pronouncements to the contrary,
Tehran remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons at some point in the near future; however, it can change its position once it returns to the original deal and together with the US builds upon it. Nonetheless, to change the dynamic of the conflict and determine what it might take to modify Iran’s position, we need to better understand what is behind its nuclear ambitions.
Thus, it is important to first examine the clergy’s mindset and their motivation to acquire nuclear weapons in spite of Western powers’ objections and irrespective of the weighty, if not crippling sanctions that have been imposed on the country over the years.
With a long and proud history, vast natural and human resources (with a population of more than 90 million), rich culture, and geostrategic location, Iran feels that it is entitled to become the region’s hegemon where it can exert considerable influence.
Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has felt threatened and isolated, living in fear of a US-orchestrated regime change. As such, Iran commits nearly $25 billion of its annual budget to the military (an increase of 11 percent from 2020, making it the 14th largest military spender in the world) and over the years it has built a powerful conventional armed forces led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Given however the limitations of Iran’s conventional military power projection, the next phase of its national defense doctrine was the development of a nuclear weapons program designed to achieve three main objectives.
Why Iran seeks nuclear weapons
First, Iran’s determination to realize its ambition of regional hegemony would be substantially augmented by the possession of nuclear weapons. Iran has no intention of threatening or using such weapons against any of its adversaries—especially Israel, which is in possession of second-strike nuclear capability that could wipe out half the country—but the mere fact of being a nuclear power will give it the prestige and regional sway that it desires.
Second, by acquiring nuclear weapons, Iran wants to establish the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) and thus deter any nuclear power, such as the US or Israel, from attacking it, knowing full well that no country with nuclear weapons has been attacked since World War II.
India and Pakistan, who fought three conventional wars over Kashmir, have refrained from waging another war since they acquired nuclear weapons. The same can be said about North Korea, and if Ukraine kept its nuclear arsenals, Russia very likely would not have dared to invade it.
Third, as a predominantly Shiite state, Iran seeks to be on par with Sunni Pakistan and Jewish Israel, and cannot allow itself to be overshadowed by either. Moreover, Iran would feel confident that it can shield itself from regime change orchestrated by the US in particular.
Iran’s nuclear weapon strategy
Although Iran has time and again stated that it has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons and may remain true to its public narrative, based on solid intelligence evidence, Iran is seeking to achieve nuclear latency and produce enough weapons-grade uranium to construct three to four nuclear weapons in short order.
However, it may well take Iran 18 months to two years to miniaturize a nuclear head to be fitted onto a ballistic missile.
Meanwhile, the clergy is prepared to sign off on a return to the original deal provided that their demands are met. This would include removing most if not all the sanctions to get the financial relief they desperately need, unfreezing tens of billions of dollars, and removing the IRGC’s militant arm, the Quds Force, from the US terrorist list, which Iran is insisting upon and should not be a deal breaker.
As things stand now, once Iran returns to the original deal, it will wait for the expiration of the sunset clauses in 2031 to resume its nuclear weapon program; the Iranians are known for their patience, and they feel that time and God are on their side.
For the Biden administration to address Iran’s concerns and dissuade it from taking the final leap to acquire deliverable nuclear weapons, it must develop a three-pronged strategy: a) change its public narrative and convey to the Iranian public that the US has no intention of undermining Iran’s sovereignty and national security; b) craft a renewed JCPOA, build on it, and help Iran to become a constructive member of the international community; and c) establish a regional security architecture that will include all the countries from the Gulf to the Mediterranean.
Changing the public narrative
How the Iranian government and people perceive the US’ intentions matters greatly in shaping their public opinion. Any bellicose statements and threats emanating from the US or Israel plays directly into the hand of the clergy, as they will use these adversarial pronouncements to show their public that the US is Iran’s foremost enemy.
In so doing they not only justify their enmity toward the US but also blame it for the economic hardship the public is experiencing. For the Biden administration to impact Iranian public opinion, it must refrain from using acrimonious rhetoric and make it clear by every possible means that the US holds no animosity toward Iran and is open to settle any and all disputes with the government peacefully and collaboratively.
It should be noted that even after 43 years of reign by the clergy, the majority of the Iranian population, especially the youth, remain Western-oriented and would like nothing more than to restore normal relations with the West, to where they can travel and study.
We should also remember that before the 1979 revolution, Iran was one of the closet allies of the US, and two or three generations has not changed the public’s Western-leaning cultural foundation. Similarly, seventy years of Soviet communist domination did not alter the eastern European countries’ political orientation, which sought to join the Western democracies immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Needless to say, changing public narratives in and of itself will not be sufficient – it must be accompanied by action and sincere efforts to create a new environment not only to lend credibility to the new approach but in fact change the dynamic of the conflict.
Building on the renewed JCPOA
For that to happen, the Biden administration ought to make it clear to Iran that by returning to the original deal it can benefit greatly, not only from the initial phase of lifting the sanctions and unfreezing tens of billions of dollars but also by building on the new deal through:
1. Beginning a process of normalizing relations between Washington and Tehran by establishing initial diplomatic relations;
2. Renouncing publicly any effort to seek regime change, which is a prerequisite for any kind of Iranian cooperation;
3. Starting trade relations between the two countries and supporting Iran in joining the World Trade Organization;
4. Committing to not undertaking military or cyber-attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities as long as its nuclear program remains peaceful; and finally,
5. Creating a joint commission to address a host of conflicting issues to reduce tensions and build trust.
In return, Iran will be required first and foremost to end its nuclear weapons program and agree to unfettered and permanent monitoring of its nuclear facilities, stop threatening other countries, especially Israel, and cease its support of extremist and terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad.
Certainly, given that Israel is consistently threatened by Iran, it should be allowed to give its input regarding these issues through the US, without blowing its national security concerns out of proportion. Since Iran denies being engaged in any nefarious activity, the negotiation about these sensitive issues, including its cruise and ballistic missiles program, ought to obviously take place behind the scenes.
There will be many who would argue that such an approach amounts to nothing more than a pipe dream. They maintain that the Iranian government is religiously fanatic, politically radical, militarily aggressive with grandiose strategic ambitions, illogical, and a major destabilizing force in the region.
Indeed, anyone who listens to the clergy’s denunciations and condemnations of the US and Israel would concur that the Iranian regime is perhaps irredeemable and that only regime change would alter its behavior. One cannot dismiss this argument out of hand as Iran’s conduct in the region and beyond speaks for itself.
That said, the people of Iran want to grow, flourish, and live in peace, and the ruling clergy knows that they cannot achieve this as long as they remain economically hamstrung by sanctions while continuing to treat the US as a mortal enemy. Culturally, the Iranians are known to be calculating and strategically savvy.
To be sure, notwithstanding the leadership’s adversarial public posture and utterances against the US, they certainly prefer normal relations with America than perpetual enmity.
This however, should not preclude the US from pursuing a new Middle Eastern strategy that would effectively compel Iran to choose between two options: either to become a constructive player in the region or a perpetual enemy who must always be constrained by any means necessary, including the use of force.
Establishing a regional security architecture
As the Biden administration embarks on the process of reconciliation with Iran, it should concurrently begin discussions with its Middle Eastern allies—the six Arab Gulf states, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and Egypt—to form a regional security alliance.
Such an alliance is more likely to be established at the present than at any other time in the past, especially because of the Abraham Accords, where Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates in the Gulf, along with Sudan and Morocco, have normalized relations with Israel. The remaining Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman—are already collaborating with Israel on many fronts, especially on security and intelligence-sharing.
The purpose of such an alliance would be to challenge Iran’s regional ambitions and pose a veiled threat to its national security, compelling Iran to choose between two options. Iran can either gradually moderate its position and become a constructive player in and outside the region, or stick to its ambition to become a nuclear power once the new deal runs its course.
If Iran chooses the latter, the Biden administration should then consider building the infrastructure that would provide a nuclear umbrella to all member states of the alliance, something that was floated by Hillary Clinton when she ran for president.
This strategy may seem far-fetched and undoable simply because of the huge differences in perception and the ultimate objectives of each side. But then we have to admit that since the 1979 Iranian revolution, the enmity and distrust between the US and Iran has only deepened.
Indeed, if there was an opportunity to build on the original deal and create more constructive relations between the US and Iran, it was blown away by Trump’s withdrawal from the deal. This has only further deepened Iran’s distrust of the US, which predates the 1979 revolution and is rooted in the US-backed overthrow of the democratically elected Mosaddegh government in 1953, despite the fact that they continued to maintain good relations from 1953 to 1979.
After 43 years of continuing hostility, it is time for a new approach. Iran is a large and powerful country and is not going anywhere. It occupies one of the most strategic locations in the world and thus it cannot be simply ignored, or written off as an irredeemable enemy that responds only to the threat or use of force.
A return to the original deal offers a perhaps rare opportunity to open a new chapter in the relations between the US and Iran and bring an end to a consuming conflict that will otherwise continue to dangerously destabilize the region.
The US can now change the dynamic of the conflict by offering Iran a promising prospect for economic prosperity and growth while enhancing its national security, or be subject to constant sabotage, crippling sanctions, and potential military attacks on its nuclear facilities, as President Biden and Israel vowed to never allow Iran to become a nuclear power.
The US can make this overture not only because it has nothing to lose, but also because it can demonstrate resolute leadership and be ready to change course by offering a solution from a position of strength, even if it stands only a small chance of success.
Since Iran consistently denies having any ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, this strategy will allow it to forsake its nuclear weapons program without losing face, while leveraging constructively its vast potential as a major regional power.
WASHINGTON DC, May 02 (IPS) – The writer is Executive Director, Arms Control Association, Washington DC.Russian President Vladimir Putin’s brutal war on Ukraine, along with his implied threats of nuclear weapons use against any who would interfere, has raised the specter of nuclear conflict.
Last month, CIA Director William Burns said that although there is no sign that Russia is preparing to do so, “none of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons.”
As the war drags on, it is vital that Russian, NATO, and U.S. leaders maintain lines of communication to prevent direct conflict and avoid rhetoric and actions that increase the risk of nuclear escalation.
Provocations could include deploying tactical nuclear weapons or developing new types of nuclear weapons designed for fighting and “winning” a regional nuclear war.
For these and other reasons, U.S. President Joe Biden was smart to announce in March that he will cancel a proposal by the Trump administration for a new nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), a weapon last deployed in 1991.
Before President Donald Trump, two Democratic and two Republican administrations had agreed that nuclear-armed cruise missiles on Navy ships were redundant and destabilizing and detract from higher-priority conventional missions.
Moreover, re-nuclearizing the fleet would create serious operational burdens. In 2019, Biden called this weapon a “bad idea” and said there is no need for new nuclear weapons. He was right then and is right to cancel the system now.
Nevertheless, some in Congress are pushing to restore funding for a nuclear SLCM to fill what they say is a “deterrence gap” against Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons arsenal and to provide a future president with “more credible” nuclear options in a future war with Russia in Europe or with China over Taiwan. A fight over the project, which would cost at least $9 billion through the end of the decade, is all but certain.
The arguments for reviving the nuclear SLCM program are as flimsy as they are dangerous. Serious policymakers all agree that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. But deploying nuclear-armed cruise missiles at sea would undoubtedly increase the possibility of nuclear war through miscalculation.
By deploying both conventional and nuclear-armed cruise missiles at sea, any launch of a conventional cruise missile inherently would send a nuclear signal and increase the potential for unintended nuclear use in a conflict with a nuclear-armed adversary because the adversary would have no way of knowing if the missile was nuclear or conventional.
Furthermore, even if Russia’s stockpile of 1,000 to 2,000 short-range nuclear warheads is larger in number than the U.S. stockpile of 320, there is no meaningful gap in capabilities. Superficial numerical comparisons ignore the fact that both sides already possess excess tactical nuclear destructive capacity, including multiple options for air and missile delivery of lower-yield nuclear warheads.
Both also store their tactical warheads separately from the delivery systems, meaning preparations for potential use would be detectable in advance.
If one president authorized the use of these weapons under “extreme” circumstances in a conventional war, as the policies of both countries allow, neither side would need or want to use more than a handful of these highly destructive weapons.
Although tactical nuclear bombs may produce relatively smaller explosive yields, from less than 1 kiloton TNT equivalent to 20 kilotons or more, their blast, heat, and radiation effects would be unlike anything seen in warfare since the 21-kiloton-yield atomic bomb that destroyed Nagasaki.
Proponents of the nuclear SLCM claim that if Putin used a tactical nuclear weapon to try to gain a military advantage or simply to intimidate, the U.S. president must have additional options to strike back with tactical nuclear weapons. They further argue that he should strike back even if that results in nuclear devastation within NATO and Russian territory.
Theories that nuclear war can be “limited” are extremely dangerous and ignore the unimaginable human suffering nuclear detonations would produce. In practice, once nuclear weapons are used by nuclear-armed adversaries, there is no guarantee the conflict would not quickly escalate to a catastrophic exchange involving the thousands of long-range strategic nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals.
As Gen. John Hyten, head of U.S. Strategic Command, said in 2018 after the annual Global Thunder wargame, “It ends bad. And the bad, meaning, it ends with global nuclear war.” As the supercomputer in the 1983 movie War Games ultimately calculated, “The only winning move is not to play.”
Adding a new type of tactical nuclear weapon to the U.S. arsenal will not enhance deterrence so much as it would increase the risk of nuclear war, mimic irresponsible Russian nuclear signaling, and prompt Russia and China to build their own sea- or land-based nuclear cruise missile systems. Biden made the right decision to cancel Trump’s proposed nuclear SLCM, and now Congress needs to back the president up.
The Arms Control Association (ACA), founded in 1971, is a national nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Through public education and media programs and its flagship journal, Arms Control Today, the ACA provides policymakers, the press, and the interested public with authoritative information, analysis, and commentary on arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, and related national security issues.
“At a time when the people of the UK have opened their hearts and homes to Ukrainians, the government is choosing to act with cruelty and rip up their obligations to others fleeing war and persecution” says HRW report. Credit: UNOHCR
by Baher Kamal (madrid)
Inter Press Service
MADRID, Apr 21 (IPS) – In what looks pretty much like an ‘operation clean sweep’ aiming at getting rid of more and more migrants, refugees and asylum seekers by shipping them far away, the process of ‘externalisation’ of millions of victims of wars, poverty, climate crisis and political persecution, is now growing fast
In fact, in a short period of time, reports by major human rights organisations have revealed how the US and Europe, in addition to Australia, are increasingly sending migrants, refugees and asylum seekers to other countries, regardless of their human rights records.
Take the case, for example, of the United Kingdom, which plans to ship asylum seekers to Rwanda, a proceeding that Human Rights Watch (HRW) has classified as a “cruelty itself.”
In a report by Yasmine Ahmed and Emilie McDonnell, the two human rights defenders said that shirking its obligations to persons seeking asylum at its shores, the UK government has on 14 April 2022 signed an agreement with Rwanda to send asylum seekers crossing the English Channel there.
“Under the new Asylum Partnership Arrangement, people arriving in the UK irregularly or who arrived irregularly since January 1, 2022 may be sent to Rwanda on a one-way ticket to have their asylum claim processed and, if recognized as refugees, to be granted refugee status there.”
Victims of ‘their’ wars
It should be noted that many of the shipped migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are victims of long wars launched by US-led coalitions with the intensive participation of the United Kingdom’s military forces.
Such is the case, for example, of the war in Afghanistan (which lasted 20 years); in Iraq and in Libya, let alone Syria (now entering its tewlveth year), and the huge Western weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to fuel their continued bombing on Yemen (so far for over seven years).
Cruel, ineffective and likely unlawful
The Human Rights Watch report said that the UK is arguing that offshoring asylum seekers to Rwanda complies with its international legal obligations.
“However, offshore processing is not only cruel and ineffective, but also very likely to be unlawful,” add Yasmine Ahmed and Emilie McDonnell.
“It creates a two-tiered refugee system that discriminates against one group based on their mode of arrival, despite refugee status being grounded solely on the threat of persecution or serious harm and international standards recognizing that asylum seekers are often compelled to cross borders irregularly to seek protection.”
UN “firmly” opposed
The deal reportedly made by the United Kingdom to send some migrants for processing and relocation to the Central African nation of Rwanda, are at odds with States’ responsibility to take care of those in need of protection, the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, said on 14 April 2022.
In an initial response, UNHCR spelled out that it was not a party to negotiations that have taken place between London and Kigali, which it is understood were part of an economic development partnership.
According to news reports, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, has said the scheme costing around $160 million, would “save countless lives” from human trafficking, and the often treacherous water crossing between southern England and the French coast, known as the English Channel, UNHCR explained.
“UNHCR remains firmly opposed to arrangements that seek to transfer refugees and asylum seekers to third countries in the absence of sufficient safeguards and standards,” said UNHCR’s Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Gillian Triggs.
Triggs described the arrangements as shifting asylum responsibilities and evading international obligations that are “contrary to the letter and spirit of the Refugee Convention.”
Rwanda’s “appalling human rights record”
Furthermore, Rwanda’s appalling human rights record is well documented, the two human rights activists went on. In 2018, Rwandan security forces shot dead at least 12 refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo when they protested a cut to food rations. Extrajudicial killings
According to the Human Rights Watch’s report ”Rwanda has a known track record of extrajudicial killings, suspicious deaths in custody, unlawful or arbitrary detention, torture, and abusive prosecutions, particularly targeting critics and dissidents.”
In fact, the UK directly raised its concerns about respect for human rights with Rwanda, and grants asylum to Rwandans who have fled the country, including four just last year.
“At a time when the people of the UK have opened their hearts and homes to Ukrainians, the government is choosing to act with cruelty and rip up their obligations to others fleeing war and persecution.”
Greece: Migrants stripped, robbed, and forced to Turkey
Just one week earlier, Human Rights Watch on 7 April 2022 reported from Athens that Greek security forces are employing third country nationals, men who appear to be of Middle Eastern or South Asian origin, to push asylum seekers back at the Greece-Turkey land border.
“They then turn the migrants over to masked men, who force them onto small boats, take them to the middle of the Evros River, and force them into the frigid water, making them wade to the riverbank on the Turkish side. None are apparently being properly registered in Greece or allowed to lodge asylum claims.”
There can be no denying that the Greek government is responsible for the illegal pushbacks at its borders, and using proxies to carry out these illegal acts does not relieve it of any liability, said Bill Frelick, refugee and migrant rights director at Human Rights Watch.
“The European Commission should urgently open legal proceedings and hold the Greek government accountable for violating EU laws prohibiting collective expulsions.”
Human Rights Watch interviewed 26 Afghan migrants and asylum seekers, 23 of whom were pushed back from Greece to Turkey across the Evros River between September 2021 and February 2022.
The 23 men, 2 women, and a boy said they were detained by men they believed to be Greek authorities, usually for no more than 24 hours with little to no food or drinking water, and pushed back to Turkey.
“The men and boy provided first hand victim or witness accounts of Greek police or men they believed to be Greek police beating or otherwise abusing them.”
Greece uses of migrants as police auxiliaries in pushbacks
Sixteen of those interviewed by Human Rights Watch said the boats taking them back to Turkey were piloted by men who spoke Arabic or the South Asian languages common among migrants.
“They said most of these men wore black or commando-like uniforms and used balaclavas to cover their faces. Three people interviewed were able to talk with the men ferrying the boats. The boat pilots told them they were also migrants who were employed by the Greek police with promises of being provided with documents enabling them to travel onward.”
Reacting to this, Bill Frelick, refugee and migrant rights director at Human Rights Watch, said that at a time when Greece welcomes Ukrainians as ‘real refugees,’ it conducts cruel pushbacks on Afghans and others fleeing similar war and violence.
“The double standard makes a mockery of the purported shared European values of equality, rule of law, and human dignity.” (To be continued).
A rainy day in the camps under COVID-19 lock-down, Maina IDP camp, Kachin, Myanmar. Credit: UNICEF/UNI358777/Oo.
Opinion by Navid Hanif (united nations)
Inter Press Service
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 18 (IPS) – As the world is rocked by a confluence of crises, the global economic outlook for 2022 is becoming ever more uncertain and fragile. Prospects for sustainable development for all and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 are bleak, particularly for developing countries.
The war in Ukraine is adding further stresses to a world economy still reeling from the COVID-19 pandemic and under growing strain from climate change. These cascading crises affect all countries, but the impact is not equal for all.
While some, mostly developed countries, had access to cheap financing to cushion the socio-economic impacts of the pandemic and invest in recovery, many others did not.
Massive recovery packages in rich countries contrast sharply with poor countries, which had to juggle essential expenditures. For many, education and development budgets had to be cut to respond to COVID-19.
Growth prospects are severely constrained in the developing world – even before taking the war in Ukraine and its repercussions into account, 1 in 5 developing countries are not expected to return to pre-COVID income levels by 2023.
This situation is likely to get worse because the fallout from the war is exacerbating the challenges confronted by developing countries. Food and fuel prices are reaching record highs. This strains the external and fiscal balances of import-dependent countries.
Supply chain disruptions add to inflationary pressures, setting up a very challenging environment for Central Banks – rising prices combined with deteriorating growth prospects. Tighter financial conditions and rising global interest rates will make it increasingly difficult, and no doubt impossible for some, to roll over their existing commercial debt.
Many vulnerable countries will not be able to absorb the combined shocks of a disrupted recovery, rising inflation, and sharply rising borrowing costs. Sri Lanka has just defaulted, and more widespread debt distress may well be on the horizon – which is likely to put the Sustainable Development Goals out of reach.
The lack of adequate and affordable financing for developing countries is making timely realization of the 2030 Agenda increasingly difficult. Their governments often have few avenues to raise funds domestically, due to underdeveloped domestic financial markets. But borrowing from abroad is both risky and expensive, with some African countries paying over 8% on their Eurobond issuances in 2021.
As the 2022 Financing for Sustainable Development Report notes, the only way to achieve a more equitable recovery is to bridge this finance divide. It will take determined action, on several fronts.
First, developing countries will need additional concessional public financing. Bilateral providers and the international financial institutions have stepped up in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, but additional funding was not enough to prevent this divergent recovery. The fallout from the war in Ukraine is widening financing gaps and countries will need additional support.
Credit: UN Photo/Cia Pak
A first key test of international solidarity will be on Official Development Assistance (ODA). Additional support for refugees from the conflict in Ukraine, while important, must not come at the expense of cross-border ODA flows to other countries in need.
Development banks should make available more long-term countercyclical finance at affordable rates, easing financing pressures during crises. Donors should ensure that multilateral development banks see their capital increased and concessional windows replenished generously.
One immediate step development banks and official bilateral creditors could take themselves is to use state-contingent clauses more systematically in their own lending. This would mean automating debt repayment standstills, providing breathing space to countries in crises.
Development banks and development finance institutions at all levels could also work to strengthen the ‘development bank system’. National institutions tend to be smaller and fewer in the poorest countries. They would greatly benefit from capacity and financial support.
Multilateral and regional development banks can in turn benefit from national banks’ detailed knowledge of local markets.
Second, we must improve the costs and other terms of borrowing faced by developing countries in international financial markets. Excess returns for investors hint at market inefficiencies. We must close gaps in the international financial architecture – the lack of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism adds uncertainty – and improve transparency by both debtors and creditors.
Transparency and better information for investors can help reduce costs. Short-term credit ratings are also an issue. Rating agencies assess a country’s creditworthiness over a very short horizon, often three years. Meanwhile, many public investments in sustainable development – in infrastructure, education, or innovation – only pay off over a much longer period.
Credit assessments are systematically biased against long-term investments. Thus, they poorly serve those investors that have long investment horizons, such as pension funds. Long-term sovereign ratings that take into account such investments, as well as long-term risks such as climate change, should complement existing assessments. Scenario analysis can help overcome the inherent difficulties of such long-term assessments.
Countries can also exploit growing investor interest in sustainable development and climate action. Sovereign green bonds, which can sometimes be issued at reduced cost (“greenium”), are a fast-growing market segment. A commitment to marine conservation recently helped Belize achieve more favorable terms with private creditors in debt restructuring.
Development finance institutions could also help by providing partial guarantees to sovereign borrowers, lowering interest in exchange for commitments to invest in the SDGs and climate action.
Third, many countries will need debt relief to avoid a protracted and costly debt crisis. Once debt has reached unsustainable levels, providing additional credit, even if at concessional rates, will only delay the reckoning.
The current mechanisms to deal with countries in debt distress are clearly inadequate. The Common Framework set up by the G20 in the fall of 2020 was a step in the right direction, but its shortcomings have become all too apparent.
No restructurings have been completed yet; there is no good answer to treating commercial debt; and many highly indebted developing countries are not eligible to approach the Common Framework at all.
The G20 must step up efforts to implement and deliver on the Common Framework more effectively. But as a more widespread debt crisis becomes a frightening possibility, a more fundamental reform of the sovereign debt architecture must be on the table as well.
The United Nations can provide a neutral venue that brings together creditors and debtors on equal footing to advance such discussions.
We at the UN believe that the SDGs can still be met. But without concerted bold action now on all fronts, the road ahead is looking very bumpy. Timely and bold policy choices will get us there.
Navid Hanif is the Director of the Financing for Sustainable Development Office of the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). He is also the UN sous Sherpa to the G20 finance and main tracks. He joined UNDESA in 2001. He was Senior Policy Adviser in the Division for Sustainable Development and member of the team for the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg in 2002. He served as the Chief of Policy Coordination Branch and later Director in the office for Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) support. He was the first head of the DESA Strategic Planning Unit established in 2010.
Opinion by Lysa John, Oli Henman (london / johannesburg)
Inter Press Service
LONDON / JOHANNESBURG, Apr 15 (IPS) – Russia’s war in Ukraine has left many communities facing catastrophe. In a world already wracked by multiple crises such as searing inequality and escalating climate change, this conflict is tearing through communities.
Millions of people are directly affected. They face fragile circumstances, with immeasurable sadness caused by the death of loved ones, loss of livelihoods, displacement, destruction of homes, interruption of education, and more.
The conflict has also placed huge new burdens on the multilateral system, putting a further break on progress towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals that has already been set back by the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Civil society representatives from both Ukraine and Russia have expressed their deep concerns about the needless suffering caused by the war. In Ukraine, they are responding to the situation in vital ways, from documenting war crimes and gathering information about missing persons to urging international institutions to live up to their responsibilities on peace and accountability.
In Russia, civil society has exposed media restrictions that have helped create a disinformation nightmare while protesting against the injustice of war.
The impacts of this conflict are being felt far beyond the war zones. Disruptions in international commerce are feeding inflation and food insecurity around the world disproportionately impacting the impoverished and excluded.
In this scenario, civil society groups across all continents have come together to support a five-point call for action issued by the Action for Sustainable Development coalition.
The message to the international community is simple:
We call for an immediate end to the war in Ukraine, a ceasefire and a withdrawal of Russian forces, and the phased removal of all sanctions according to an agreed timeline. The devastation of many cities and the killing of innocent civilians and civilian infrastructure cannot be justified.
Furthermore, it is unacceptable and insufficient that so far only a handful of men – and visibly no women – appear to have been involved in the peace negotiations.
We call for the peace negotiations to include civil society and representatives of those who are directly affected, especially from Ukraine and Russia, and particularly women.
2. Respect international human rights
We stand in solidarity with the people of Ukraine. The rights of civilians must be respected. After more than a month of conflict, the humanitarian impacts are leading to massive displacement of people, loss of lives and livelihoods. We are very concerned that this grave violation of international law will have an extremely adverse impact on security and democracy in Europe and the world.
We also call for human rights to be respected in Russia. Many Russian people have stood up to condemn violence and their voices must be heard. Peaceful protest must be recognised as a legitimate form of expression.
We call for human rights to be fully respected in Ukraine and Russia, including international humanitarian rights and civic freedoms.
3. Stop militarism and aggression around the world
The rise in militarism and conflict is not limited to Russia. It is part of a growing catalogue of armed conflict. Violence in all its forms – authoritarianism, corruption and indiscriminate repression – affects the lives of millions of people around the globe and violates the human rights of people young and old in countries including: Afghanistan, Brazil, Central African Republic, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Palestine, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen, to name just a few.
These conflicts often affect communities already living with fragile infrastructure and the devastating impacts of climate change. All conflicts must be treated with the same level of concern. The lives of everyone affected by conflict are of equal value.
We call for the same level of support to end conflicts and ensure financial support for displaced peoples and refugees from all conflicts.
4. Shift military funds to a just and sustainable future
The war in Ukraine has already had a devastating impact on the world economy, especially on global south countries. There are likely to be major disruptions and significant increases in the costs of energy and production, and increased food costs. At the same time budgets are being redirected towards military spending.
The militarism of Russia is fuelled by fossil fuels and it is therefore critical to halt investment in fossil fuels and shift immediately to renewable forms of energy. It is crucially important that we reduce oil and gas consumption and rapidly scale up investments in renewables in order to combat the climate crisis, and that we do so immediately.
We call for a specific commitment at the UN to reduce spending on military conflicts and to reinvest this spending on social protection and clean energy.
5. Establish a global peace fund
We call on member states to remember the founding vision of the UN and its Security Council, to deliver on the main reason it was created: to avoid any kind of war and the suffering of humankind.
The 2030 Agenda sets out a path towards a peaceful, just, sustainable and prosperous world. much more ambitious steps and actions must be undertaken to ensure that its targets and goals are met.
We call on member states to establish a global peace fund to strengthen the role of international mediators and peacekeepers. The UN must act!
The international community cannot be a bystander in Ukraine or any other conflict. We all have a responsibility to defend universal human rights and humanitarian principles by acting against cruelty and injustice wherever it may be.
Oli Henman is the Global Coordinator the Action for Sustainable Development coalition in London. Lysa John is the Secretary General of the global civil society alliance, CIVICUS in Johannesburg.
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