Exchange Rate Movements Due to Interest Rates, Speculation, Not Fundamentals — Global Issues

  • Opinion by Jomo Kwame Sundaram (kuala lumpur, malaysia)
  • Inter Press Service

US Fed pushing up interest rates
For no analytical rhyme or reason, US Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) chairman Jerome Powell insists on raising interest rates until inflation is brought under 2% yearly. Obliged to follow the US Fed, most central banks have raised interest rates, especially since early 2022.

Typically, inflationary episodes are due to either demand pull or supply push. With rentier behaviour better recognized, there is now more attention to asset price and profit-driven inflation, e.g., ‘sellers inflation’ due to price-fixing in monopolistic and oligopolistic conditions.

Recent international price increases are widely seen as due to new Cold War measures since Obama, Trump presidency initiatives, COVID-19 pandemic responses, as well as Ukraine War economic sanctions.

These are all supply-side constraints, rather than demand-side or other causes of inflation.

The Fed chair’s pretext for raising interest rates is to get inflation down to 2%. But bringing inflation under 2% – the fetishized, but nonetheless arbitrary Fed and almost universal central bank inflation target – only reduces demand, without addressing supply-side inflation.

But there is no analytical – theoretical or empirical – justification for this completely arbitrary 2% inflation limit fetish. Thus, raising interest rates to address supply-side inflation is akin to prescribing and taking the wrong medicine for an ailment.

Fed driving world to stagnation
Thus, raising interest rates to suppress demand cannot be expected to address such supply-side driven inflation. Instead, tighter credit is likely to further depress economic growth and employment, worsening living conditions.

Increasing interest rates is expected to reduce expenditure for consumption or investment. Thus, raising the costs of funds is supposed to reduce demand as well as ensuing price increases.

Earlier research – e.g., by then World Bank chief economist Michael Bruno, with William Easterly, and by Stan Fischer and Rudiger Dornbusch of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology – found even low double-digit inflation to be growth-enhancing.

The Milton Friedman-inspired notion of a ‘non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment’ (NAIRU) also implies Fed interest rate hikes inappropriate and unnecessarily contractionary when inflation is not accelerating. US consumer price increases have decelerated since mid-2022, meaning inflation has not been accelerating for over a year.

At least two conservative monetary economists with Nobel laureates have reminded the world how such Fed interventions triggered US contractions, abruptly ending economic recoveries. Although not discussed by them, the same Fed interventions also triggered international recessions.

Friedman showed how the Fed ended the US recovery from 1937 at the start of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s second presidential term. Recent US Fed chair Ben Bernanke and his colleagues also showed how similar Fed policies caused stagflation after the 1970s’ oil price hikes.

De-dollarization?
However, the US dollar has not been strengthening much in recent months. The greenback has been slipping since mid-2023 despite continuing Fed interest rate hikes a full year after consumer price increases stopped accelerating in mid-2022.

Many blame recent greenback depreciation on ‘de-dollarization’, ironically accelerated by US sanctions against its rivals. Such illegal sanctions have disrupted financial payments, investment flows, dispute settlement mechanisms and other longstanding economic processes and arrangements authorized by the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund and UN charters.

Even the ‘rule of law’ – long favouring the US, other rich countries and transnational corporate interests – has been ‘suspended’ for ‘reasons of state’ due to economic warfare which continues to escalate. Unilateral asset and technology expropriation has been justified as necessary to ‘de-risk’ for ‘national security’ and other such considerations.

Horns of currency dilemma
For many monetary authorities, the choice is between a weak currency and higher interest rates. With growing financialization over recent decades, big finance has become much more influential, typically demanding higher interest income and stronger currencies.

Central bank independence – from the political executive and legislative processes – has enabled financial lobbies to influence policymaking even more. For example, Malaysia’s household debt share of national output rose from 47% in 2000 to over four-fifths before the COVID-19 pandemic, and 81% in 2022.

There is little reason to believe recent exchange rates have been due to ‘economic fundamentals’. Currencies of countries with persistent trade and current account deficits have strengthened, while others with sustained surpluses have declined. Instead, relative interest rate changes recently appear to explain more.

Thus, both the Japanese yen and Chinese renminbi depreciated by at least six per cent against the US dollar, at least before its recent tumble. By contrast, British pound sterling has appreciated against the greenback despite the dismal state of its real economy.

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the Need for Choice — Global Issues

The progress made in HIV prevention is nothing short of a global success story. It is time that TB caught up to HIV. Medicine is simply too advanced for us to tolerate how one disease can be beaten back yet another continues to flourish. Credit: Jeffrey Moyo/IPS.
  • Opinion by Violet Chihota (johannesburg)
  • Inter Press Service

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), over the past two decades, new HIV infections decreased by 49%, HIV-related deaths decreased by 61% and an estimated 18.6 million lives were saved because of new treatments that minimise the infection and prevent its spread.

We have so many options for HIV prevention at our disposal, including the dapivirine vaginal ring, oral Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP), harm reduction for people who use drugs, condoms for both men and women, voluntary medical male circumcision and the recently approved long-acting cabotegravir, with other options in development.

We have a suite of prevention tools because everyone is different, and people need to be able to choose their methods according to the way they live their lives. We observe a similar abundance of choice within family planning with oral pills, a variety of injectables, intra-uterine devices and condoms—we share this prevention method with HIV programs.

We do not have this many options for TB prevention, but the world needs to adapt to embrace choice if we are to meet the globally agreed-upon goal of reducing TB deaths by 90% by 2030—referred to as the “End TB targets.”

The urgency of the need is clear: an estimated 1.6 million people lost their lives to the disease in 2021, the second consecutive year the death toll went up after 14 years of progress. In Africa, an estimated 2.5 million people contracted the disease in 2021, one million of which were never diagnosed and treated.

Yet there are glimmers of good news. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, estimates of TB incidence have slowly declined over the past few years in Angola, Ethiopia, Gabon, the Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia—all countries with high burdens of TB.

Of these countries, Zambia has also had success in finding and diagnosing an increasing number of these infections; the pandemic impacted the surveillance efforts of the other governments.

As for HIV, there is no effective vaccine to prevent TB in adults: the BCG vaccine only prevents severe TB in children. However, there are ways to prevent TB when someone is potentially exposed to an infected person. In the workplace or when a family member at home becomes sick, for example, prevention starts with masking, which was traditionally used in clinical care settings. The other ways work through prophylactic regimens. For TB, we initially only had isoniazid that could be taken for six, nine, 12 or 36 months depending on country guidelines, but now we have shorter regimens that allow for patient choice.

These options include regimens lasting one (1HP) and three months (3HP), with different combinations of the antibiotic drugs rifapentine and isoniazid, all with vitamin B6 supplements to help counter some of the side effects of treatment. There is also a three-month regimen of rifampicin and isoniazid (often given to children and adolescents) and a four-month regimen of rifampicin alone. Longer courses of isoniazid taken for 6–36 months also remain options, though most people are eligible to take a shorter rifapentine- or rifampicin-based regimen and should be given the choice to do so.

We need to do a better job of making sure that people at risk of TB have access to the full range of prevention options. A recent peer-reviewed study underlines this point, estimating that tracing the personal contacts of people diagnosed with TB and providing them with prevention treatment would save the lives of 700,000 children under the age of 15 and 150,000 adults by 2035.

Even the financial benefits of the prevention program, in terms of increased economic productivity, would outweigh the costs. Nobody questions the need to have options for HIV prevention or family planning, but questions arise when trying to roll out a one-month TB prevention regimen when there’s already a three-month regimen available. We need them all. We also need to collect more data to differentiate which prevention regimens are best for each patient type to ensure success.

The WHO guidelines for preventive TB treatment create the possibility of choice among TB preventive treatments by not ranking the regimens by preference or effectiveness. But health care facilities and outreach programs need to embrace that range of options and make sure that a choice exists in practice. Supply chains may limit choice initially, but if there is no demand for more options from providers, there is no impetus to expand the supply chains.

The progress made in HIV prevention is nothing short of a global success story. It took a combination of scientific ingenuity and innovation, combined with an intensive dedication of resources that made a range of preventive options available around the world.

It is time that TB caught up to HIV. Medicine is simply too advanced for us to tolerate how one disease can be beaten back yet another continues to flourish.

Violet Chihota is an Adjunct Associate Professor and Chief Specialist Scientist at the Aurum Institute. She has been a researcher in global health for over 10 years, designing and managing the conduct of clinical research studies in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Cameroon, Georgia, India and Malaysia.

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Health, Nutrition & Heroes in Rural Afghanistan — Global Issues

A doctor prescribes medicine for mothers and children during a UNICEF-supported mobile health and nutrition team visit. Credit: Karim / UNICEF
  • Opinion by James Elder (kabul, afghanistan)
  • Inter Press Service

I recently traveled to eastern Afghanistan to meet some of the inspiring heroes who, this year already, helped UNICEF reach around 19 million children and their families with health and nutrition services.

UNICEF’s incredible health and nutrition response is supported by people across Afghan society. One of them is Mangal, a hero on two wheels. Every morning, Mangal picks up vaccines at a UNICEF-supported district hospital.

He carefully packs them in a cooler, which he straps to his motorbike before setting off to remote villages. Mangal braves rough, narrow roads, the scorching heat, and genuine security risks.

“I ride for nine kilometres every day to bring these vaccines to the people who need them,” he tells me. “They understand how important it is to protect their children from diseases. They don’t need any persuasion to come here. They greet me with gratitude and hope.”?

Some of Mangal’s supplies land here, with a UNICEF-supported mobile health and nutrition team providing services straight to the communities who need them most and who have no other way to access health care.

Like so much of UNICEF’s health and nutrition work across Afghanistan, these programmes are game-changers.

But these teams have their work cut out for them.

“Nearly half of all children under five in Afghanistan are malnourished, a truly devastating number,” UNICEF’s head of nutrition, Melanie Galvin, tells me. “Some 875,000 of them are expected to need treatment for severe acute malnutrition, the most lethal form of undernutrition and one of the top threats to child survival across the globe.”

Ramping up the response means staffing up the response, too. UNICEF has more than doubled the number of places where a child can be treated.

“Last year we put more nutrition nurses and nutrition counsellors into overflowing hospitals,” Melanie says. “We put them directly into communities where people live. We put them into mobile clinics that reach very small and isolated populations. We put them into day care centre spaces in poor urban areas.”

Mobile health and nutrition teams are critical in reaching rural areas with basic services like pre-natal checkups, vaccinations, psycho-social counselling, and ready-to-use therapeutic food (RUTF). It’s a heartbreaking condition to see up close. In this photo, little Zarmina receives an RUTF sachet from Melanie.

RUTF really is a magical paste – energy dense and full of micronutrients. Used to treat severe acute malnutrition, also known as severe wasting, RUTF is made using peanuts, sugar, milk powder, oil, vitamins and minerals, and has helped treat millions of children in Afghanistan.

As we tour a hospital, Dr. Fouzia Shafique, UNICEF Afghanistan’s Principal Health Advisor, explains how UNICEF has managed to support so many children, despite all the challenges.

“Health clinics, family teams of community workers, community-based schools, vaccinators, and trained female health workers,” she tells me. Donors such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank have also been critical partners, helping UNICEF provide care even in difficult-to-reach areas of the country.

So many of the life-saving interventions I encountered on my mission are made possible by the tireless work of UNICEF staff such as Dr. Shafique and Dr. Nafi Kakar, who fill a multitude of roles, including inspecting vaccines and parts of the cold chain system that is used to store them.

Helping families access quality primary and secondary health care means supporting thousands of health facilities, covering operating costs, paying the salaries of tens of thousands of health workers, and procuring and distributing medical supplies.

Together, these efforts are helping UNICEF reach many of the more than 15 million children in Afghanistan who need support. It’s a difficult number to comprehend, but easier to appreciate when you meet some of those very same children.

There’s the baby fighting for her life in an incubator; the children working for their families in fields of unexploded mines; the children grappling with the anxieties and pressures of poverty; or the girls deprived of their greatest hope – education. Each child is like my own. Unique. Each child is special.

The smiles say it all: For Dr. Shafique and young girls in Afghanistan, it’s been a good day. But there remains so much to do. Supporting the health and well-being of people in Afghanistan isn’t only about access to health services, it’s also about the protection of rights – notably, ensuring rights and freedoms for women and girls.

Given the enormity of UNICEF’s role in the health and nutrition sector, it’s critical for UNICEF – and for children in Afghanistan – that funding is maintained. So that the country’s children can grow up safe, healthy and be the heroes in their own stories.

Source: UNICEF Blog
The UNICEF Blog promotes children’s rights and well-being, and ideas about ways to improve their lives and the lives of their families. It also brings insights and opinions from the world’s leading child rights experts and accounts from UNICEF’s staff on the ground in more than 190 countries and territories. The opinions expressed on the UNICEF Blog are those of the author(s) and may not necessarily reflect UNICEF’s official position.

James Elder is UNICEF Spokesperson in Afghanistan.

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A War That Could Have Been Averted — Global Issues

  • Opinion by Lawrence Wittner (albany, usa)
  • Inter Press Service

The Problem of Russian Policy

The problem on this score, though, was that Vladimir Putin was determined to revive Russia’s “great power” status. Although his predecessors had signed the UN Charter (which prohibits the “use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”), as well as the Budapest Memorandum and the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership (both of which specifically committed the Russian government to respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity), Putin was an ambitious ruler, determined to restore what he considered Russia’s imperial grandeur.

This approach led not only to Russian military intervention in Middle Eastern and African nations, but to retaking control of nations previously dominated by Russia. These nations included Ukraine, which Putin regarded, contrary to history and international agreements, as “Russian land.”

As a result, what began in 2014 as the Russian military seizure of Crimea and the arming of a separatist rebellion in eastern Ukraine gradually evolved into the full-scale invasion of February 2022?the largest, most devastating military operation in Europe since World War II, with the potential for the catastrophic explosion of the giant Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and even the outbreak of nuclear war.

The official justifications for these acts of aggression, trumpeted by the Kremlin and its apologists, were quite flimsy. Prominent among them was the claim that Ukraine’s accession to NATO posed an existential danger to Russia.

In fact, though, in 2014?or even in 2022?Ukraine was unlikely to join NATO because key NATO members opposed its admission. Also, NATO, founded in 1949, had never started a war with Russia and had never shown any intention of doing so.

The reality was that, like the U.S. invasion of Iraq nearly two decades before, the Russian invasion of Ukraine was out of line with both international law and the imperatives of national security. It was a war of choice organized by a power-hungry ruler.

The Problem of UN Weakness

On a deeper level, the war was avoidable because the United Nations, established to guarantee peace and international security, did not take the action necessary to stop the war from occurring or to end it.

Admittedly, the United Nations did repeatedly condemn the Russian invasion, occupation, and annexation of Ukraine. On March 27, 2014, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution by a vote of 100 nations to 11 (with 58 abstentions), denouncing the Russian military seizure and annexation of Crimea.

On March 2, 2022, by a vote of 141 nations to 5 (with 35 abstentions), it called for the immediate and complete withdrawal of Russian military forces from Ukraine. In a ruling on the legality of the Russian invasion, the International Court of Justice, by a vote of 13 to 2, proclaimed that Russia should immediately suspend its invasion of Ukraine.

That fall, when Russia began annexing the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, the UN Secretary-General denounced that action as flouting “the purposes and principles of the United Nations,” while the UN General Assembly, by a vote of 143 nations to 5 (with 35 abstentions), called on all countries to refuse to recognize Russia’s “illegal annexation” of Ukrainian land.

Tragically, this principled defense of international law was not accompanied by measures to enforce it. At meetings of the UN Security Council, the UN entity tasked with maintaining peace, the Russian government simply vetoed UN action. Nor did the UN General Assembly circumvent the Security Council’s paralysis by acting on its own. Instead, the United Nations showed itself well-meaning but ineffectual.

This weakness on matters of international security was not accidental. Nations?and particularly powerful nations?had long preferred to keep international organizations weak, for the creation of stronger international institutions would curb their own influence.

Naturally, then, they saw to it that the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations, could act on international security issues only by a unanimous vote of its membership. And even this constricted authority proved too much for the U.S. government, which refused to join the League.

Similarly, when the United Nations was formed, the five permanent seats on the UN Security Council were given to five great powers, each of which could, and often did, veto its resolutions.

During the Ukraine War, Ukrainian President Volodymir Zelensky publicly lamented this inability of the United Nations to enforce its mandate. “The wars of the past have prompted our predecessors to create institutions that should protect us from war,” he remarked in March 2022, “but they unfortunately don’t work.”

In this context, he called for the creation of “a union of responsible countries . . . to stop conflicts” and to “keep the peace.”

What Still Might Be Done

The need to strengthen the United Nations and, thereby, enable it to keep the peace, has been widely recognized. To secure this goal, proposals have been made over the years to emphasize UN preventive diplomacy and to reform the UN Security Council.

More recently, UN reformers have championed deploying UN staff (including senior mediators) rapidly to conflict zones, expanding the Security Council, and drawing upon the General Assembly for action when the Security Council fails to act. These and other reform measures could be addressed by the world organization’s Summit for the Future, planned for 2024.

In the meantime, it remains possible that the Ukraine War might come to an end through related action. One possibility is that the Russian government will conclude that its military conquest of Ukraine has become too costly in terms of lives, resources, and internal stability to continue.

Another is that the countries of the world, fed up with disastrous wars, will finally empower the United Nations to safeguard international peace and security. Either or both would be welcomed by people in Ukraine and around the globe.

Lawrence S. Wittner (https://www.lawrenceswittner.com/ ) is Professor of History Emeritus at SUNY/Albany, the author of Confronting the Bomb (Stanford University Press) and other books on international issues, and a board member of the Citizens for Global Solutions Education Fund.

Source: Citizens for Global Solutions (CGS) which envisions a peaceful, free, just, and sustainable world community

Disclaimer:
The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect the official policy of Citizens for Global Solutions.

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Brazil Back on the Green Track — Global Issues

  • Opinion by Ines M Pousadela (montevideo, uruguay)
  • Inter Press Service

Lula’s presence at COP27 was a signal to the world that Brazil was willing to become the climate champion it needs to be. Following a request by the Brazilian Forum of NGOs and Social Movements for Environment and Development, Lula offered to host the 2025 climate summit in Brazil; it has now been confirmed that COP30 will be held in Belém, gateway to the Amazon River.

At COP27 Lula also said he intended to revive and modernise the 45-year old Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organisation, a body bringing together the eight Amazonian countries – Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela – to take concerted steps to protect the Amazon rainforest.

Four years of regression

In his four years in office, Lula’s far-right climate-denier predecessor Jair Bolsonaro dismantled environmental protections and paralysed key environmental agencies by cutting their funding and staff. He vilified civil society, criminalised activists and discredited the media. He allowed deforestation to proceed at an astonishing pace and emboldened businesses to grab land, clear it for agriculture by starting fires and carry out illegal logging and mining.

Under Bolsonaro, already embattled Indigenous communities and activists became even more vulnerable to attacks. By encouraging environmental plunder, including on protected and Indigenous land, the government enabled violence against environmental and Indigenous peoples’ rights defenders. A blatant example was the murder of Brazilian Indigenous expert Bruno Pereira and British journalist Dom Phillips in June 2022. The two were ambushed and killed on the orders of the head of an illegal transnational fishing network. Both the material and intellectual authors of the crimes have now been charged and await trial.

Reversing the regression

Having being elected on a promise to reverse environmental destruction, the new administration has sought to restructure and resource monitoring and enforcement institutions. It strengthened the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), the federal agency in charge of enforcing environmental policy, and the National Foundation of Indigenous Peoples (FUNAI), which for the first time is now headed by an Indigenous person, Joenia Wapichana.

Bolsonaro had transferred FUNAI to the Ministry of Agriculture, run by a leader of the congressional agribusiness caucus. Instead of protecting Indigenous land, it enabled deforestation and the expansion of agribusiness.

In contrast, Lula’s first political gestures were to create a new ministry for Indigenous peoples’ affairs, appointing Indigenous leader Sonia Guajajara to lead it, and to make Marina Silva, a leader of the environmentalist party Rede Sustentabilidade, Minister for the Environment, a position she had held between 2003 and 2008.

Lula also restored the Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Amazon, launched in 2004 and implemented until Bolsonaro took over. In February, the government set up a Permanent Inter-Ministerial Commission for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation and Fires in Brazil to coordinate actions across 19 ministries and develop zero deforestation policies.

The strategy establishes a permanent federal government presence in vulnerable areas with the aim of eliminating illegal activities, setting up bases and using intelligence and satellite imagery to track criminal activity.

The newly appointed Federal Police’s Director for the Amazon and the Environment, Humberto Freire, launched a campaign to rid protected Indigenous land of illegal miners. It appears to be paying off: in July he announced that around 90 per cent of miners operating in Yanomami territory, Brazil’s largest protected Indigenous land, had been expelled. According to police sources, there were 19 mine-related deforestation alerts in April 2023 – compared to 444 in April 2022.

But the fight isn’t over. There are still a couple of thousand miners active and the criminal enterprises employing them remain very much alive. The key task of recovering damaged land and rivers can only begin once they’re all driven away for good. And an issue that cries out for international cooperation remains unresolved: violence and environmental degradation continue unabated in Yanomami communities across the border in Venezuela, and will only increase as illegal miners jump jurisdictions.

Achieving the ambitious zero-deforestation goal will require efforts on a much bigger scale than those of the past. And such efforts will further antagonise very powerful people.

Obstacles ahead

With the environmental agenda back on track, the pace of Amazon deforestation slowed down in the first six months of 2023, falling by 34 per cent compared to the same period in 2022. However, numbers still remain high and reductions are uneven, with two states – Roraima and Tocantins – showing increases. Deforestation is also still rising in another important part of Brazil’s environment, the Cerrado, where preservation areas are few and most deforestation happens on private properties.

For the Amazon, a crucial test will come in the second half of the year, when temperatures are higher. A stronger El Niño phase, with warming waters in the Pacific Ocean, will make the weather even drier and hotter than usual, helping fires spread fast. Anticipating this, IBAMA has scaled up its recruitment of firefighters to expand brigades in Indigenous and Black communities and conduct inspections and impose fines and embargoes. To discourage people from starting fires to clear land for agriculture, the agency prevents them putting that land to agricultural use.

But in the meantime, Brazil’s Congress has gone on the offensive. In June, the Senate made radical amendments to the bill on ministries sent by Lula, diluting the powers of the Ministries of Indigenous Peoples and Environment and limiting demarcation of Indigenous lands to those already occupied by communities by 1998, when the current constitution was enacted.

Indigenous leaders have complained that many communities weren’t on their land in 1998 because they’d been expelled over the course of centuries, and particularly during the 1964-1985 military dictatorship. They denounced the new law as ‘legal genocide’ and urged the president to veto it. Civil society has taken to the streets and social media to support the government’s environmental policies.

They face a formidable enemy. A recent report by the Brazilian Intelligence Agency exposed the political connections of illegal mining companies. Two business leaders directly associated with this criminal activity are active congressional lobbyists and maintain strong links with local politicians. They also stand accused of financing an attempted insurrection on 8 January.

Against these shady elites, civil society wields the most effective weapon at its disposal, shining a light on their dealings and letting them know that Brazil and the world are watching, and will remain vigilant for as long as it takes. The stakes are too high to drop the guard.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.


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Blue Tourism Spurs Development Goals in Bangladesh — Global Issues

Deer sanctuary at Nijhum Dwip – the island of tranquility.
  • Opinion by Ramiz Uddin, Mohammad Saiful Hassan (dhaka, bangladesh)
  • Inter Press Service

Coastal tourism is the largest market segment in the world, accounting for 5% of GDP and contributing 6-7% of total employment. Furthermore, coastal and maritime tourism will employ 1.5 million additional people worldwide by 2030.

Though Blue Tourism is not a new concept, but off late Bangladesh has been realizing its importance as it can help earning a lot of foreign exchange contribute to its GDP and accelerate the pace of achieving SDGs by 2030.

Blue Tourism: A Potential Blue Economy Avenue for Bangladesh

According to Asian Development Bank (ADB), coastal and maritime tourism has immense potential in the blue economy and could become one of the largest sources of tourism revenue in Bangladesh. Ocean contributed $6.2 billion in 2015 in total value addition to the Bangladesh’s economy which implies 3 percent of GDP (Business Standard 2020).

Potentials of Blue Tourism in Bangladesh

Maritime area of 207K sq. km, with 580 km of coastline, 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone, and 12 nautical mile territorial zones creates unprecedent opportunities for Bangladesh to accelerate the growth of blue economy.

Icing on the top are the 75 large and small islands in the coastal and maritime zone of Bangladesh, which are regarded as touristy sites for their rich biodiversity. Coral reefs, seagrass reefs, sandy beaches, sandbars, marshes, flood basins, estuaries, peninsulas, mangroves etc. are a few examples of the aquatic life.

Currently these zones are endowed with 17 fish sanctuaries, 5 national parks, and 10 wildlife sanctuaries, all of which can spur the tourism sector’s expansion. As a result of the discovery of numerous new sea beaches, the sector continues to expand and diversify.

Policies and interventions introduced to nurture the potential

The government of Bangladesh along with the vibrant private sector have introduced various initiatives to develop and promote blue tourism in Bangladesh.

Since 2015, the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) has been working to unleash the potentials of Blue-Economy. To ensure rapid implementation Government of Bangladesh (GoB) has highlighted major action points in the seventh five-year plan (7FYP) and eighth five -year plan (8FYP) of Bangladesh.

Additionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), GoB, had formed the “Blue Economy Cell” in 2017 to coordinate the running blue economy related projects across sectoral ministries and departments. The government of Bangladesh has also laid emphasis on the BLUE tourism in different development plans including Perspective Plan-2041, and Delta Plan-2100.

In order to exploit the tourism potential, Sea cruises between Bangladesh and India have already been launched in March 2019. To encourage foreign visitors to Cox’s Bazar’s largest sea beach, the Bangladesh Economic Zone Authority (BEZA) has been establishing three exclusive tourism parks there. These parks include Naf Tourism Park, Sabrang Tourism Park, and Sonadia Eco-Tourism Park.

Bangladesh Tourism Board has formulated a Tourism Master Plan for 25 years (2023-2047) for the country. Primarily a total of 255 tourist sites under 11 tourist clusters have been identified.

These tourist sites are potential for Eco-Tourism, Beach & Island Tourism, Pilgrimage/Spiritual Tourism, Archaeological & Historical Tourism, Riverine Tourism, Adventure and Sports Tourism, Rural Tourism, Ethno-tourism, MICE Tourism and Cruise Tourism in this coastal and maritime region.

The tourism master plan includes 200+ potential interventions overall. The Bangladesh Tourism Master Plan calls for the immediate development of 13 islands altogether in the coastal region.

Bangladesh Tourism Board (BTB) and UNDP Accelerator Lab Bangladesh’s Joint Initiative:

In the last quarter of 2022, Bangladesh Tourism Board (BTB) in collaboration with UNDP Accelerator Lab has conducted research on Blue Tourism in Bangladesh, especially in the coastal regions. The core objectives of the joint research comprise identifying the coastal and maritime tourism resources, facilities, and tourist activities in Bangladesh, mapping tourist minds, and identifying the sustainability of Blue Tourism in Bangladesh.

However, with the technical assistance of UNDP Bangladesh Accelerator Lab, Bangladesh Tourism Board (BTB) has begun to work on the execution of Bangladesh’s Tourism Master Plan.

Dr. Ramiz Uddin is Head of Experimentation, UNDP Accelerator Lab, Bangladesh; Mohammad Saiful Hassan is (Deputy Secretary), Deputy Director (Research and Planning), Bangladesh Tourism Board, Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism – Bangladesh.

Source: UNDP

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Election with No Democracy on the Horizon — Global Issues

Credit: Eswatini Government/Twitter
  • Opinion by Andrew Firmin (london)
  • Inter Press Service

A long history of repression

There’ll be some notable absentees at the next election. At least two members of parliament (MPs) certainly won’t be running again: Mthandeni Dube and Mduduzi Bacede Mabuza were convicted of terrorism and murder in June. Their real crime was to do what Swazi MPs aren’t supposed to do: during protests for democracy that broke out in 2021, they dared call for political reform and a constitutional monarchy.

Dube and Mabuza could face up to 20 years in jail. In detention they were beaten and denied access to medical and legal help. They were found guilty by judges appointed and controlled by the king. In Eswatini, the judiciary is regularly used to harass and criminalise those who stand up to Mswati’s power: people such as trade union leader Sticks Nkambule, subject to contempt of court charges for his role in organising a stay-at-home strike demanding the release of Dube and Mabuza. Other activists face terrorism charges.

But not every crime is so zealously prosecuted. In January, human rights lawyer Thulani Maseko was shot dead by unidentified assailants. Maseko was chair of the Multi-Stakeholder Forum, a network that brings together civil society groups, political parties, businesses and others to urge a peaceful transition to democracy. He’d previously spent 14 months in jail for criticising Eswatini’s lack of judicial independence. He was also Dube and Mabuza’s lawyer. There’s been little evident investigation of his killing.

There’s plenty more blood on the king’s hands. The 2021 democracy protests were initially triggered by the killing of law student Thabani Nkomonye. At least 46 people are estimated to have been killed in the ensuing protests. Security forces reportedly fired indiscriminately at protesters; leaked footage revealed that the king ordered them to shoot to kill.

In some areas security forces went house to house, dragging young people out for beatings. Hospitals were overwhelmed with the injured. People who survived shootings weren’t allowed to keep the bullets extracted from them, since this would have constituted evidence. Some bodies were reportedly burned to try to conceal the state’s crimes. When a second wave of protest arose in September 2021, led by schoolchildren, Mswati sent the army into schools, and then closed schools and imposed a nationwide protest ban. Hundreds of protesters and opposition supporters were jailed. A dusk-to-dawn curfew was enforced with the army on the streets and an internet shutdown imposed.

To this day, no one has been held accountable for the killings. There’s also been zero movement towards reform.

Farce of an election forthcoming

Following the intervention of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the king agreed to hold a national dialogue. But two years on, that hasn’t happened. Instead he held a Sibaya – a traditional gathering in which he was the only person allowed to speak.

Now the election is going ahead without any constructive dialogue or reform. The chances of reform-minded potential MPs winning significant representation are slimmer than ever. To do so, they’d have to navigate a two-round process that is exclusionary by design, with candidates first needing to win approval at the chiefdom level. No party affiliations are allowed.

To further rein in those elected, Mswati directly appoints most of the upper house and some of the lower house. And just to make sure, he picks the prime minister and cabinet, can veto legislation and remains constitutionally above the law.

It’s a system that serves merely to fulfil a kingly fantasy of consultation and pretend to the outside world that democracy exists in Eswatini. Official results from the last two elections were never published, but it’s little wonder than turnout in this electoral farce has reportedly been low.

With the king unwilling to concede even the smallest demands, evidence suggests that repression is further intensifying ahead of voting. The king has imported South African mercenaries – described as ‘security experts’ – to help enforce his reign of terror. There are reports of a hit list of potential assassinations. Lawyers who might defend the rights of criminalised activists and protesters report coming under increasing threat.

Time for international pressure

People have been killed, jailed and forced into exile, but desire for change hasn’t gone away. After all, people in Eswatini aren’t asking for much. They want a competitive vote where they can choose politicians who serve them rather than the king, and they want a constitutional monarchy where the king has limited rather than absolute powers. If they got that, they might even get an economy that works in the public interest, rather than as a vast mechanism designed to funnel wealth to the royal family while everyone else stays poor.

The pretence of an election shouldn’t fool the outside world. Civil society keeps calling on African regional bodies not to let them down. In May the Multi-Stakeholder Forum urged the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to back an eight-point plan to respect human rights and enable dialogue. The demands were presented by Tanele Maseko, Thulani Maseko’s widow.

Eswatini’s activists also expect more of SADC, and of the government of South Africa, the country where so many of them now live in exile. Governments and organisations that claim to stand for democracy and human rights need to exert some pressure for genuine dialogue leading to a transition to democratic rule. They shouldn’t keep letting the king get away with murder.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

© Inter Press Service (2023) — All Rights ReservedOriginal source: Inter Press Service



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Wagner Mutiny Could Push a Weak Russia Closer to Iran — Global Issues

A weaker Russia needs Iran more; on the other hand, a weaker Russia threatens both countries’ authoritarian model of governance.
  • Opinion by Emil Avdaliani (tbilisi, georgia)
  • Inter Press Service

When a mutiny led by one-time Vladimir Putin ally and Wagner Group chief Evgeny Prigozhin began on June 24, 2023, Iranian officials were uneasy. The sudden unrest came at a time of unprecedented alignment between Tehran and Moscow and caught the Iranian regime off-guard.

Iranian media reacted to the events in a variety of ways. Hard-line Fars News Agency published numerous articles on the unfolding events and explained the reasons for the mutiny, essentially parroting information provided by Russian news outlets.

Fars also criticized Western media for double standards for its apparent approval of a revolt led by someone equally if not more brutal than Putin.

The Nour Agency was more explicit in accusing the West of purposefully fomenting Putin’s downfall. The same agency, however, also published more restrained versions such as one noting that threats to the West would multiply if Prigozhin was able to take control of Russia’s nuclear arsenal.

The Tasnim Agency featured a series of articles as well as analyses that also blamed the West for exacerbating Russia’s difficult position. Hardline Kayhan newspaper predictably accused the West of direct involvement in internal Russian affairs.

Other analysts were more nuanced, and many blamed the mutiny on Moscow’s failure to meet its military goals in Ukraine. The former head of the Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Relations Committee, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, argued that Putin emerged weaker from the mutiny.

On the official level, Iran openly supported its northern neighbor. Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman spoke of the rule of law, while Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian expressed hopes that Russia would prevail. President Ebrahim Raisi called Putin two days after the revolt ended to convey his “full support.”

Iran’s official support for the Russian government and its leader was not surprising. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, China, and many other countries expressed the same view. What matters is that despite a seemingly careful management of the crisis, uncertainty about Russia’s geopolitical power and, most of all, Putin’s ability to control the situation lingers for Iran.

The stakes are high. The two have been lukewarm partners despite a spurt of activity since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Historical grievances as well as conflicting regional ambitions have often prevented the expansion of cooperation since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The war in Ukraine marked a notable break from the previous era. Pressured by the West, Russia openly shifted toward Asia and the Islamic Republic. Expanding trade through the North-South corridor as well as growing military cooperation have increased the stakes for Iran over how well Russia fares both in Ukraine and domestically.

In many ways, the present alignment is exceptional; such cooperation has not been seen since the late 16th century when both Russia and Persia feared the expanding Ottoman Empire.

A Goldilocks approach: Russia should neither be too strong nor too weak

Yet modern Iran is not interested in a highly powerful Russia that could block Iranian ambitions in the South Caucasus and Middle East. At the same time, a weak Russia would constitute a dangerous development, paving the way for greater Western influence along Iran’s northern border and potentially even leading to the reversal of Moscow’s dependence on Tehran.

Russia’s internal destabilization would also reverberate badly for Iran since the latter has had its own share of internal disturbances since the death in police custody of Mahsa Amini in 2022.

Wagner’s success would have shaken the very foundation on which the Eurasian states have been building a new order: a strong security apparatus that uses modern technologies to control dissent.

Until recently, Eurasian powers had seemed to show that they had harnessed modernity and that the concept was no longer solely associated with the West. The Wagner mutiny, however, exposed that this order is vulnerable and that a modern authoritarian state can easily fall into disarray.

On one level, however, Prigozhin’s failure to achieve whatever his goals were presents an ideal scenario for Iran. Russia is weakened, but not too much and the longer this state of affairs continues, the better for Iran.

Indeed, Moscow serves as a linchpin in the Islamic Republic’s efforts to divert Western attention from the Middle East and gain further momentum in terms of regional influence and its nuclear program. Given the likelihood of Russia continuing the war in Ukraine, this trend could further solidify in coming years.

The mutiny and the ensuing reported purge in the military ranks revealed cracks in the Russian elite, but also provides the Islamic Republic with opportunities to advance its position in bilateral ties.

Putin cannot afford to lose friends, which means greater avenues for Iran to act. Tehran might become more emboldened in the South Caucasus, where it has grasped an emerging vacuum as a result of Moscow’s distraction and pushed for closer ties with Armenia, Russia’s long-time ally.

Another area is the nuclear negotiations where Russia might even lend further support to Iran not to reach a consensus with the West. In Syria, Russia could be more vocal against Israeli strikes against Iranian positions.

Perhaps the biggest opportunity for Iran lies in space and military cooperation. In other trade, Iran might achieve a preferential agreement with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union by the end of this year. Another area for growth could be in Russian investments in Iran.

Under a recently signed agreement, Moscow agreed to finance a railway link for a new transport corridor. This could be a precursor for investment in other sectors of Iran’s embattled economy.

Longer term, Iranian elites recognize that Russia is unlikely to win the Ukraine war, at least not decisively enough, and that the present stalemate is the best that the Kremlin can expect. This dire picture for Russia means its push toward Asia will only grow, feeding into Iran’s own “Look East” agenda, which has encountered some pushback recently over failed attempts to attract investments from China, India, and other Asian actors.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of silk roads.

Source: Stimson Center, Washington DC

IPS UN Bureau

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Challenges & Opportunities — Global Issues

Ibrahim Mayaki, Africa Union Special Envoy for Food Systems
  • Opinion by Kingsley Ighobor (united nations)
  • Inter Press Service

This is the first time the AU is designating a Special Envoy specifically dedicated to food systems. Previously, notable individuals such as Rwanda’s Donald Kaberuka served as Special Envoy for Financing and Michel Sidibé from Mali as Special Envoy for the African Medicines Agency.

Firstly, we could enter a post-Ukraine war era that will be characterised by a crisis in food systems.

Leaders must not only establish the food systems but should also ensure their effectiveness in achieving desired outcomes

The market has witnessed an unfavourable evolution, and African countries are suffering the consequences of that war. We have observed shortages of vital resources such as fertilisers, seeds, wheat, etc. The crisis and our response to it have revealed a lack of co-ordinated efforts.

Hence, the first reason for appointing a Special Envoy is to ensure preparedness for such a crisis, even as we anticipate more crises in the future.

The second reason relates to the many initiatives addressing food systems issues in Africa. We have some complexity in terms of initiatives, and this complexity necessitates better management and coherence.

Without proper co-ordination, Member States and their stakeholders may struggle to comprehend the direction we are heading in. Therefore, the appointment aims to foster preparedness and enhance coherence among these initiatives.

The third reason, closely linked to the previous two, pertains to resource mobilisation. Specifically, it refers to the need to mobilise domestic resources to address the challenges faced in food systems.

We also have the resources of multilateral development banks and other institutions that can support Africa’s endeavours in transforming its food systems.

Q: Apart from the Ukraine crisis, what other factors are jeopardising Africa’s food systems?

I will start by unpacking the concept of food systems. Previously, and still now, we talked about agriculture, agricultural production, rural economy, diversification, agricultural productivity, food security and insecurity.

We are talking about food systems now because it embraces the entire spectrum, in an integrated manner, of processes, from the farmer to the consumer, and, in-between, the numerous actors and sectors.

Additionally, it emphasizes the importance of providing consumers with essential information and addressing the impacts of climate change, particularly in regions like Africa that suffer greatly despite being net zero emitters.

If we look at Africa today, it’s true that we have reduced extreme poverty in the past 20 to 25 years, but at the same time there is an increase in malnutrition.

Our food import bill is still very high, beyond $60 billion a year. The small-scale farmers who produce 80 per cent of the food we eat also suffer from malnutrition and food insecurity, which is abnormal.

We have utilised frameworks such as CAADP and the Malabo Declaration to address agricultural development. The Malabo Declaration is considered a precursor to food systems because it opened agriculture to other sectors.

It is a kind of CAADP phase two, and it has been well implemented with over 40 countries adopting national agricultural investment plans. The African Development Bank has started to develop compacts at the national levels to enable countries have frameworks that will attract financing.

So, we have the frameworks, but we need two radical things to occur.

The first one is to have a whole-of-government approach toward food systems transformation and not leave it to the agriculture or the environment ministries.

Secondly, we need to invest more in food systems to reduce food insecurity. I said at the Ibrahim Governance Weekend that food insecurity is not a question of production; it’s a question of poverty. At the end of the day the main aim is to tackle poverty.

FACT BOX
Africa’s food import bill is beyond $60 billion a year.
Africa will have approximately 2.5 billion people by 2050

We need a moonshot for Africa’s land restoration movement

The COP26 Africa needs

Now is the time to sprint if we want to end hunger, achieve other SDGs. Regarding CAADP, we see that many countries are still not meeting their commitment to invest 10 per cent of national budgets in agriculture and rural development?

You are right. Only around 10 to 12 countries out of the 50-plus have managed to reach the target of investing 10 per cent of their national budgets in agriculture.

However, some countries claim to meet the 10 percent threshold, but their expenditures include items that are not directly linked to food systems or the transformation of agriculture through a sound integrated plan.

When you have a head of state who prioritises agricultural transformation and provides the drive that leads to results and impact, that transformation happens. So, the issue of leadership is critical.

Technically, we know what needs to be done—agricultural techniques, access to market and finance, and increasing yields—but we need the political solution and determination to move forward.

Sometimes you have leadership but lack the necessary systems. Leaders must not only establish the systems but also ensure their effectiveness in achieving desired outcomes.

Q: How do you anticipate the AfCFTA’s potential to strengthen Africa’s food systems, considering the complexities and the need for an integrated approach?

The AfCFTA aims to resolve the issues of tariff and non-tariff barriers and to facilitate the flows of goods and services. These require working on normative issues such as rules and regulations.

But it’s not the AfCFTA by itself that will facilitate production. The success of the AfCFTA in enhancing our food systems transformation is contingent upon the availability of robust infrastructure such as roads, railways, and storage facilities.

So, the AfCFTA is an important instrument, but it must be complemented by sound policies and well-developed infrastructure.

Food insecurity is not a question of production; it’s a question of poverty. At the end of the day the main aim is to tackle poverty

Can that be done?

Again, I emphasize the importance of effective national leadership in addressing our prevailing challenges, as many of them necessitate solutions at the national level. While regional solutions are crucial, national governments need to embrace and implement these regional solutions.

Furthermore, it is vital to ensure coherence among all our initiatives. We should not adopt disparate approaches from various institutions, as this would create a landscape of competing initiatives. Instead, we must assert our strategic frameworks and urge our partners to align with these frameworks.

These frameworks include CAADP, the Malabo Declaration, and the African Common Position on Food Systems, which was developed through inclusive national dialogues involving over 50 countries.

Q: How does the Africa Common Position on Food Systems inform your preparation and participation in the upcoming UN Food Systems Stocktaking Moment?

At the UN Food Systems and Stocktaking exercise, each region of the world will present a position. Africa’s position will revolve around three key issues.

The first one is financing food systems transformation. It should be a priority for our partners that our capacity to mobilise domestic resources is not undermined.

The second is climate, which will need to be looked at in a very realistic manner. Despite commitments made at the various COPS, many of them remain unfulfilled. If these commitments cannot be respected, we must explore alternative approaches to climate finance.

The third is about our small-scale farmers. The farmers are a part of a private sector we are talking about. The private sector is not only agribusiness; it also includes small-scale farmers who have the capacity and knowledge to transform our food systems. They need to be supported, as it is done in the US and Europe.

At the stocktaking exercise, what will also be looked at is how far we have gone in implementing the conclusions of the 2021 Food Systems Summit and what lessons each region can learn from the others.

Q: With Africa’s projected population reaching approximately 2.5 billion by 2050, coupled with the existing challenge of over 250 million malnourished Africans, is there a sense of heightened concern among policymakers and stakeholders?

This question is extremely pertinent because Africa’s population is set to double by 2050. The most critical concern is the challenge of feeding over 1 billion additional people. Failure to address this issue with the necessary capacity and solutions will not only strain our existing governance systems but also heighten social fragility.

Given our demographic situation, the risk of encountering numerous political crises becomes imminent.

Urgency is paramount, necessitating an alarmist approach and accelerating the implementation of solutions, especially considering that a significant portion of the projected population growth already exists today.

This acceleration must be achieved through the appropriate policies and political determination.

Source: Africa Renewal, United Nations

IPS UN Bureau


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A Call for Global Partnership — Global Issues

Over half the people in Africa still don’t have electricity access — a major contributor to persistent poverty.  Credit: Energy 4 Impact Senegal
  • Opinion by Philippe Benoit, David Sandalow (washington dc)
  • Inter Press Service

Renewable energy is an important part of the solution – and Africa enjoys an enormous potential in this regard. With some of the world’s highest levels of solar irradiance, vast expanses of land with favorable wind conditions and powerful rivers with immense hydroelectric potential, Africa is teeming with renewable energy resources. However the continent’s progress in tapping into this potential lags, leaving a huge energy access challenge as well as a power generation deficit that is stunting business and other drivers of inclusive economic growth.

As the world gears up for the 28th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP28) to be held in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the need to address Africa’s energy needs sustainably is all too apparent. Doing so will require rethinking the approach and reshaping policies to dramatically grow Africa’s energy system.

This will require big and bold actions, including massive investments in large-scale infrastructure. It will also require investment in information and other soft assets.  And, significantly, it will also necessitate  small and micro-scale grassroots initiatives which are particularly important to ensure that local populations remain active participants in the process.

The shortage of energy in Africa is a pressing problem. Over half the people in Africa still don’t have electricity access — a major contributor to persistent poverty.  This gap drives households to rely on inefficient and polluting energy sources like charcoal, wood, and kerosene. This pervasive energy deficit, highlighted in the ‘Tracking SDG7: The energy progress report for 2022’ has profound implications for health, education, and sustainable development across the continent.

An even larger portion of the population lacks access to clean cooking technologies, a crisis disproportionately affecting women and girls, and exposing them to harmful household air pollution that was responsible in 2019 for approximately 700,000 deaths across Africa. Rather than diminishing, the number of people without access is projected to potentially rise from 923 milion in 2020 to 1.1 billion in 2030.

But Africa’s energy problem extends beyond the lack of access to electricity and clean cooking targeted by SDG#7.  In too many places across the continent, there is a lack of sufficient and reliable electricity to power businesses that are the backbone of Africa’s growth drive.  The result is a combination of inadequate supply or expensive generators acquired to compensate for the inefficiencies.  Fundamentally, Africa’s ability to stimulate local entrepreneurs or attract international developers and capital is too often being undermined by a weak electricity network.

The shift in focus to renewables provides an opportunity to change the narrative and realities of Africa’s power system.  The large amounts of financing being discussed for climate (including in the lead-up to and at COP 28) – amounts which tend to exceed the levels of funding traditionally mobilized for poverty alleviation – provide an important opportunity for the continent.

Mobilizing funding to harness Africa’s bountiful renewable energy would not only help to meet its current and increasingly large future energy needs, but also contribute to global efforts to avoid prospective greenhouse gas emissions.

Moreover, Africa’s renewables are large enough to both meet domestic needs, and also help to power green development abroad, including through the export of green electricity to Europe or even, eventually, hydrogen generated from its massive hydropower resources.

Unlocking Africa’s renewable potential will require supportive policies, robust regulations, technological innovation, and substantial investment. Strong, sound and predictable regulatory frameworks and institutions are key.

Better information is also key. For example, the African Energy Commission has established the Strategic Framework on the African Bioenergy Data Management  that seeks to raise awareness of the potential of the bioenergy sector, reflecting the specificities of the reality on the ground in the region.

Given Africa’s limited financial resource base, any solution requires reaching beyond Africa’s borders.  Wealthy nations can bring capital, expertise, and adapted technologies to the continent. South-South cooperation can encourage peer learning, the dissemination of technological solutions adapted to local climatic conditions and the developing country economic context, and support the deployment of the increasing financial capacities of emerging economies to support Africa’s renewables.

Multilateral development banks, development finance institutions, export credit agencies and private capital should also all do more.

The hosting of COP28 in the UAE provides an opportunity to mobilize funding for Africa from a broader set of actors and countries, moving beyond the traditional North/South divide.  In fact, climate finance has been identified by the COP28 host as one of the key goals of this COP. As COP28 President Sultan Al-Jaber said at last month’s climate finance summit held in Paris, “For countries that have done the least to cause climate change, climate finance remains unaccessible, unavailable and unaffordable….” Can COP 28, with UAE leadership, deliver for Africa on this potential?

One UAE initiative – the Zayed Sustainability Prize – has already helped promote local action in addressing these challenges.  (One of the authors is a member of the Selection Committee for the Prize.) Over the years, the Zayed Sustainability Prize has supported sustainable change around the world by recognising and rewarding innovative and impactful organizations working to overcome development barriers, including limited access to reliable power, clean water, quality healthcare, and healthy food.

For example, M-KOPA, which won in the Energy category in 2015, uses digital technology to help its customers make micropayments towards essential products and services, such as smartphones, refrigerators, solar panels, even bank loans and health insurance. Last month, it closed US $250 million in new funding to expand its fintech services to underbanked consumers in Kenya, Nigeria, and more recently, Ghana.

Another winner was the Starehe Girls Centre which empowers disadvantaged girls by providing them access to quality education. The school won the Prize in 2017 in the Global High Schools category in recognition of its efforts to reduce its utility bills through the installation of solar panels and more efficient lighting. These financial savings have allowed it to admit more girls from disadvantaged backgrounds.

Generating local action is a critical input to ensure that massive investment programs translate into a just transition for households. To this end, large-scale infrastructure must be accompanied by people-centric programs.

Africa’s renewable energy potential could both help drive enormous economic growth in the region while also helping the world address the challenge of climate change. The potential is there, and it will require action …  in ways big and small.

(Article first published in Nation (Kenya edition) on July 3, 2023)

Philippe Benoit is research director for Global Infrastructure Analytics and Sustainability 2050. He previously held management positions at the World Bank and the International Energy Agency and has over 20 years of experience working on Africa.

David Sandalow is Inaugural Fellow at the Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University, and a member of the Selection Committee of the Zayed Sustainability Prize.

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