Tag: Marc Saxer

What Will Tomorrows World Order Look Like? — Global Issues

Marc Saxer
  • Opinion by Marc Saxer (brussels, belgium)
  • Inter Press Service

BRUSSELS, Belgium, Nov 21 (IPS) – Ukraine, the Caucasus and the Middle East. The latest eruptions of violence mark the end of Pax Americana. The rise of new powers is shifting the global balance of power. Whether tomorrow’s world will be bipolar or multipolar still remains to be seen.

If the Sino-American system rivalry escalates into a new Cold War, we could see a bipolar order of competing blocs becoming reality once again. Should the remaining centres of power manage to retain their strategic autonomy, however, tomorrow’s world is likely to remain a multipolar one.

This global development has fundamental consequences for the world order. Will the erosion of the hegemony of Western liberal democracies mean an end to the liberal world order? Can the multilateral institutions co-founded by the United States, along with their normative foundations, survive if the ‘world’s policeman’ no longer has either the power or the will to guarantee them?

Will universal institutions that are open to all states and whose norms are binding for everyone still be around in the future? To put it even more pointedly, can the universal nature of human rights survive in a multipolar world where civilisations with different values compete against one another?

Marc SaxerThe rise of illiberal particularism

Let us take a look at the ideological dimension of the struggle for tomorrow’s world order. The liberal order is being challenged both domestically and globally by competing concepts of order. In the West, liberal universalism is coming under pressure from different forms of illiberal particularism.

The far right is dismantling the rule of law and transforming liberal republics with strong minority rights into illiberal majority democracies. Their aim is to limit democratic participation and the blessings of the welfare state to a nativist majority. As the ‘America First’ and the Brexit campaigns show, right-wing populists try to break free from the chains of international law which impede their goal of illiberal transformation of the state and society.

Yet, the identitarian left is no stranger to particularistic tribalism either. The incitement of people with different skin colors, origins, religions or sexual identities against one another undermines the egalitarian ethos of the republic. Attempts to limit dissenters’ freedom of speech, to culturally relativize infringements of the law or to bypass the parliamentary system by means of political commissars arise from an illiberal spirit. At the end of the day, selective condemnation of human rights violations makes a mockery of the universalist ideas of equal rights for all.

If these forms of particularism are allowed to affect state policy, the West’s commitment to universal norms is undermined. It is true that China and Russia instrumentalize the Global South’s criticism of the West’s double standards for their own ends. But it was the West itself that damaged its own moral authority by breaching international law in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.

This loss of legitimacy and relative loss of power weakens the West’s ability to assert itself. Wherever isolationist or nationalist forces come to power, there is also a lack of political will to advocate for international law and human rights around the world. This is not a good omen for the future of the liberal world order and its universal fundamental values.

Russia and China

The Global South’s criticism of the neo-conservative spread of democracy by force of arms points out that there have always been proponents of an American Empire in Washington, and indeed there still are to this day. In Russia and China, in particular, defensive and offensive varieties of neo-imperial concepts of order are gaining attention.

On the defensive side, Russia and China are calling for the non-intervention of the liberal West in their civilizations’ internal matters. On the offensive side, with recourse to their imperial history, they are laying claim to a position as an independent power center in a hierarchically organized world order.

Russia has ideologically disguised its attempt to use armed force to create an exclusive sphere of influence by drawing a distinction between a vital Eurasian and decadent Western civilization. Ironically, these neo-imperial fantasies are especially popular in nationalist circles in the ‘decadent West’. Perhaps the renewed popularity of the Huntington thesis of a ‘clash of civilizations’ stems from the particularistic yearning to sort a chaotic world into tribes made up of ‘people who are like us’ and ‘people who are not’.

China, on the other hand, promotes, with reference to its millennia-old high culture, the idea that civilizations can live in harmony if their own cultures and traditions are respected. Instead of the universality of human rights, Beijing’s ‘Global Civilization Initiative’ talks about ‘common values of humanity’, which every culture must interpret with respect for their ‘own conditions and unique features’.

Within the United Nations framework, China advocates its own interpretation, which places the right to economic and social development above political and civil rights. Philosopher Zhao Tingyang re-introduces the ancient Tianxia system (‘all under heaven’) as a normative superstructure for a world order with Chinese characteristics. Critics worry that all these rediscoveries of concepts from China’s imperial history conceal an attempt to justify the hegemony of the old and new Middle Kingdom in Asia.

China’s attempts to undermine the equality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors elicit just as much outrage as the West’s humanitarian interventions, which critics castigate as cynical ploys to use universal rights as a pretext to interfere in a country’s domestic affairs. In the Global South, the Westphalian principles enshrined in the UN Charter are positioned against the encroachment by imperial and liberal ideas of order.

Instead of a hierarchical order, in which the vassal states group around imperial poles, they insist that all sovereign nation-states are equal under international law in spite of asymmetries of size and power. The principle of territorial integrity aims to put a stop to violent attacks from the imperial centers.

On the other hand, the principle of non-interference is upheld against the humanitarian interventions of the liberal internationalists and the structural adjustment programmes of global governance institutions. This resentment against external interference is the reason why the Western narrative of systemic rivalry between democracy and autocracy finds so little resonance in the Global South.

Finding consensus in a multipolar world

Since its foundation in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the international system of states has been designed without central authority. The US hegemon selectively performing the role of the ‘world’s policeman’ after the end of the Cold War was always only a poor substitute.

In the future, Washington is unlikely to have either the will or power to sanction violations of universal norms. The crucial question is therefore whether, in a multipolar and thus normatively pluralistic world, in which civilizations with different values and historical experiences, a unilateralist minimum consensus can be formed based purely on voluntarism.

Which concept of order eventually prevails will depend on the balance of power in the struggle for tomorrow’s world order. If the West wants to maintain a liberal order, it will have to refrain from the intrusions of humanitarian interventionism, which are perceived as imperialist, and double standards with regard to the application of universal norms.

This does not mean abandoning the fundamental values of democracy and human rights, but it does mean refraining from disseminating those values by means of armed force and economic coercion. Whether or not the West can bring itself to implement this change, of course, will depend in particular on the outcome of the internal conflict between the illiberal particularists and liberal universalists.

From a progressive point of view, the universalist commitment to equal rights for all is the most effective antidote to the endless zero-sum games between identitarian tribes, which are causing society as a whole to stagnate.

To prevent a global clash of civilizations, where every culture relativises the rules of coexistence, we need to stand by universalist norms. If the norms currently underpinning the world order, with its Christian and natural law connotations, are no longer acceptable for everyone, an equal dialogue between the civilizations is required to work out which universal principles can be agreed on instead.

The concern is, however, that a reasoned debate about the West’s enlightened self-interest in the preservation of an international order rooted in universally applicable norms is in danger of being drowned out by the din of morally charged culture wars.

Advocates of a concert of the great powers remind us that respect of the superpowers’ exclusive zones of influence prevented the Cold War from escalating into a hot war (for instance during the Cuban Missile Crisis). The price of this relative stability in the imperial centers is, however, never-ending proxy wars on the periphery. The rejection of neo-imperialist concepts of order also feeds off the reluctance of the overwhelming majority of states to kowtow to the dominance of one pole.

Large parts of the Global South – including important voices in China and Eastern Europe – advocate for the renaissance of a Westphalian order of equal and sovereign states. If the West lacks the political will and the power to preserve the liberal order, maintaining peaceful coexistence based on the UN Charter’s principles of equality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, may just be the best of all worse worlds.

Marc Saxer coordinates the regional work of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in the Asia Pacific. Previously, he led the FES offices in India and Thailand and headed the FES Asia Pacific department.

Source: International Politics and Society (IPS)-Journal published by the International Political Analysis Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin

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A Geoeconomic Tsunami — Global Issues

The world economy is currently going through a lot of turmoil. The re-organization is in full swing. To survive, not only companies but entire nations need to adapt their development models.
  • Opinion by Marc Saxer (berlin)
  • Inter Press Service

BERLIN, Mar 02 (IPS) – When tectonic plates shift, the earth shakes. Tsunamis race around the globe in the form of shock waves. The global economy has experienced three such earthquakes in recent years. The Covid-19 pandemic has made us aware of the vulnerability of a globally integrated economy.

When important components are stuck in quarantine in China, production lines in Germany come to a halt. Thus, in the organization of global supply chains – which for decades have been trimmed down for efficiency (‘just in time’) – resilience (‘just in case’) will play a more important role in the future.

After the end of the unipolar moment, larger and smaller powers are vying for the best positions in the new world order. In the hegemonic conflict between China and the United States, the government under Joe Biden has verbally disarmed, but its export controls in the high-tech sector have all the more bite.

This politicizes the framework conditions for investment decisions. Market access, infrastructure projects, trade agreements, energy supplies and technology transfers are more and more being evaluated from a geopolitical point of view.

Companies are increasingly faced with the decision of choosing one IT infrastructure, one market and one currency system over the other. The major economies may not decouple from each other across the board, but diversification (‘not all eggs in one basket’) is gaining momentum, especially in the high-tech sector. As this develops, we cannot rule out the possibility that economic blocs will form.

Marc Saxer

The experience with the ‘human uncertainty factor’ in the pandemic is also resulting in the acceleration of digital automation. Robots and algorithms make it easier to protect against geopolitical risks.

In order to bring these vulnerabilities under control, the old industrialized countries are reorganizing their supply chains. It remains to be seen whether this is purely for economic or logistical reasons (re-shoring or near-shoring), or whether geopolitical motives also play a role (friend-shoring).

Bloc formations

China must respond to these challenges. The fate of the People’s Republic will depend on whether it succeeds in charging to the head of the pack in worldwide technology, even without foreign technology and know-how. Anyone who believes that Beijing has no countermeasures up its sleeve will soon be proven wrong.

In order to compensate for the closure of the developed export markets, the Silk Road Initiative has been opening up new sales markets and raw material suppliers for years. At the last party congress, the Chinese Communist Party officially approved a reversal of its development strategy.

From now on, the gigantic home market will be the engine of the ‘dual circular economy’. Export earnings are still desired, but strategically they are being relegated to a supportive role.

One impetus behind China’s massive build-up of gold reserves serves is the goal of having its own (digital) currency take the place of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency. Because China benefits more than anyone else from open world markets, it is continuing to rely on a globally networked world economy for the time being. Alternatively, Beijing could also be tempted to create its own economic bloc.

The foundations for this have already been put into place, with the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the BRICS Development Bank (NDB), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Silk Road Initiative (BRI) and bilateral cooperation in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East.

The difficulties that Western companies face in the Chinese market should provide just a sample of what is looming if China makes market entry into such a bloc contingent on good political will.

But it is not just China. Generally, for all of Asia as the new center of the world economy, these geoeconomic disruptions are tantamount to a tsunami. And the disruptions could hit developing countries particularly hard.

Whether they are being cut from global supply chains for the sake of resilience or due to geopolitical factors, this brings equally devastating results. Of course, some economies are hoping to benefit from the diversification strategies of developed countries (i.e. the ‘China plus one’ strategy).

But digital automation neutralizes what is often their only comparative advantage – cheap labor costs. Why should a European medium-sized company have to deal with corruption and power cuts, quality problems and sea routes lasting weeks, when the robots at home produce better and cheaper?

Algorithms and artificial intelligence are also likely to replace millions of service providers in outsourced back offices and call centers. How are developing countries supposed to feed their (sometimes explosively) growing populations if, in the future, simple jobs are to be performed by machines in industrialized countries? And what do these geoeconomic disruptions mean for the social and political stability of these countries?

As with Europe, most Asian states depend on China’s dynamism for their economic development – and on the guarantees of the US for their security. Therefore, to varying degrees, they resist pressure to choose sides.

Whether it will be possible to escape the pull of geoeconomic bi-polarization over the long term, however, is still an open question. If the splitting of IT infrastructures continues, it could be too costly to play in both technological worlds.

American regulations prevent products with certain Chinese components from entering the market; but those who want to play on the Chinese market will not be able to avoid a steadily increasing share of Chinese components.

Reducing economic vulnerabilities through diversification

This type of global economy would also pose an existential challenge to export nations such as Germany. Even the short-term cutting off of Russian energy is a Herculean task. Decoupling from China at the same time seems difficult to imagine. But burying one’s head in the sand will not be enough.

Neither nations nor businesses will be able to escape the pressure from Washington and Beijing. In the future, important economic, technological, and infrastructural decisions will increasingly be subject to geopolitical considerations. Therefore, reducing one-sided vulnerabilities through diversification is the right thing to do.

On the other hand, some of the lessons drawn from the over-reliance on Russian energy before the war seem short-sighted. For decades, the German economy has integrated itself more deeply into the world economy than many other countries, with the goal of avoiding violent conflicts through interdependence.

It cannot break out of these interdependencies from one day to the next. Reducing economic vulnerabilities through diversification is therefore the right move, while decoupling for ideological reasons is the wrong one. Germany should therefore beware of sacrificing its economic future to an overly ambitious value-based foreign policy.

This is because losses of prosperity translate into fears of the future and social decline at home – a fertile breeding ground for right-wing populists and conspiracy theorists.

The geopolitical race, digital automation and the reorganization of supply chains according to resilience criteria are mutually reinforcing processes. It is not only companies that have to rethink their business models – entire national economies need to adapt their development models in order to be able to survive in a rapidly changing global economy.

The particular difficulty lies in having to make investment decisions today without being able to foresee exactly what the world of tomorrow will look like. Looking into the crystal ball, some think they can see an age of de-globalization. And in fact, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the peak of globalization, as measured by the volume of world trade and capital exports has already passed.

However, de-globalization is not synonymous with a relapse into autarkic national economies. A stronger regionalization of the more networked global economy is more likely. In view of the political, social and cultural upheavals of turbo-globalization, this need not be the worst of possible outcomes.

One thing is certain: A geoeconomic tsunami will roll around the globe, crushing old structures in its path. The hope is that out of the ‘creative destruction’ that Joseph Schumpeter spoke of, there will emerge a more resilient, sustainable and diversified global economy.

However, without political shaping of the new world economic order, the opposite could also occur. Politically, this means adapting the rule-based world order so that it remains a stable framework for an open world economy because even the organization of a regionalised world economy needs global rules of the game that everyone adheres to.

Therefore, with few exceptions, nearly all nations have a great interest in the functioning of rules-based multilateralism. However, in the Global South, there is already a great deal of distrust towards the existing world order.

In reality, according to some, this amounts to the creation of the old and new colonial powers, whose supposedly universal norms do not apply to everyone but are instead violated at will by the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

In order to break through current blockages, such as those of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the emerging powers must be granted representation and a voice in the multilateral institutions that would be commensurate with their newfound importance.

Europe will have to accept a relative loss of influence because, as a rule-based supranational entity, its survival and prosperity depend on an open, rule-based world (economic) order.

Instead of morally elevating itself above others, Europe must concentrate all its energies on maintaining the conditions for the success of its economic and social model. In order to prevent the regionalization of the world economy from turning into the formation of competing blocs with high prosperity losses for everyone, there is a need for new partnerships on an equal footing beyond the currently popular comparisons of democracies and autocracies.

In order for new trust to develop, the global challenges (climate change, pandemics, hunger, migration) that particularly affect the Global South must finally be tackled with determination.

Marc Saxer coordinates the regional work of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in the Asia Pacific. Previously, he led the FES offices in India and Thailand and headed the FES Asia Pacific department

Source: International Politics and Society (IPS)-Journal published by the International Political Analysis Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin

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A New World Order is Dawning

Pinched between two antagonistic blocs, the United Nations was in a deadlock for decades. Credit: United Nations
  • Opinion by Marc Saxer (berlin)
  • Inter Press Service

BERLIN, Jul 18 (IPS) – With the invasion of Ukraine, Russia effectively destroyed the European peace order. Now, Europe needs to find ways to contain its aggressive neighbour, while its traditional protector, the United States, continues its shift of focus to the Indo-Pacific.

This task, however, becomes impossible when China and Russia are driven into each other’s arms because, if anything, the key to end the war in Ukraine lies in Beijing. China hesitates to be dragged into this European war as bigger questions are at stake for the emerging superpower:

Will the silk road be wrecked by a new iron curtain? Shall it stick to its ‘limitless alliance’ with Russia? And what about the territorial integrity of sovereign states? In short: for China, it is about the world order.

The unipolar moment after the triumph of the West in the Cold War is over. The war in Ukraine clearly marks the end of the Pax Americana. Russia and China openly challenge American hegemony. Russia may have proven to be a giant with clay feet, and has inadvertently strengthened the unity of the West.

But the shift of the global balance of power to East Asia is far from over. In China, the United States has encountered a worthy rival for global predominance. But Moscow, Delhi, and Brussels also aspire to become power hubs in the coming multipolar order.

So, we are witnessing the end of the end of history. What comes next? To better understand how world orders emerge and erode, a quick look at history can be helpful.

What is on the menu?

Over the course of the long 19th century, a great power concert has provided stability in a multipolar world. Given the nascent state of international law and multilateral institutions, congresses were needed to carefully calibrate the balance between different spheres of interest.

The relative peace within Europe, of course, was dearly bought by the aggressive outward expansion of its colonial powers.

Marc Saxer

This order was shattered at the beginning of the World War I. What followed were three decades of disorder rocked by wars and revolutions. Not unlike today, the conflicting interests of great powers collided without any buffer, while the morbid domestic institutions could not mitigate the devastating social cost of the Great Transformation.

With the founding of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the foundations of a liberal order were laid after the end of World War II. However, with the onset of the Cold War, this experiment quickly ran into a quagmire.

Pinched between two antagonistic blocs, the United Nations was in a deadlock for decades. From the Hungarian Revolution over the Prague Spring to the Cuban missile crisis, peace between the nuclear powers was maintained through the recognition of exclusive zones of influence.

After the triumph of the West in the Cold War, American hyperpower quickly declared a new order for a now unipolar world. In this liberal world order, rule-breaking was sanctioned by the world’s policeman.

Proponents of the liberal world order pointed to the rapid diffusion of democracy and human rights around the globe. Critics see imperial motifs at work behind the humanitarian interventions. But even progressives place great hopes in the expansion of international law and multilateral cooperation.

Now that the West is mired in crises, global cooperation is again paralysed by systemic rivalry. From the war in Georgia over the annexation of Crimea to the crackdown in Hong Kong, the recognition of exclusive zones of influence is back in the toolbox of international politics.

After a short heyday, the liberal elements of the world order are jammed again. China has begun to lay the foundations of an illiberal multilateral architecture.

How will great power competition play out?

In the coming decade, the rivalries between great powers are likely to continue with undiminished vigour. The ultimate prize of this great power competition is a new world order. Five different scenarios are conceivable.

First, the liberal world order could survive the end of the unipolar American moment. Second, a series of wars and revolutions can lead to the total collapse of order. Third, a great power concert could bring relative stability in a multipolar world but fail to tackle the great challenges facing humanity.

Fourth, a new cold war may partly block the rule-based multilateral system, but still allow for limited cooperation in questions of common interest. And finally, an illiberal order with Chinese characteristics. Which scenario seems the most probable?

Many believe that democracy and human rights need to be promoted more assertively. However, after the fall of Kabul, even liberal centrists like Joe Biden und Emmanuel Macron have declared the era of humanitarian interventions to be over.

Should another isolationist nationalist like Trump or others of his ilk come to power in Washington, London, or Paris, the defence of the liberal world order would once and for all be off the agenda. Berlin is in danger of running out of allies for its new value-based foreign policy.

In all Western capitals, there are broad majorities across the ideological spectrum that seek to up the ante in the systemic rivalry with China and Russia. The global reaction to the Russian invasion shows, however, that the rest of the world has very little appetite for a new bloc confrontation between democracies and autocracies.

The support for Russia’s attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine – values especially smaller countries unwaveringly adhere to – should not be read as sympathy for a Russian or Chinese-led order, but as deep frustration over the US empire.

Seen from the Global South, the not-so-liberal world order was merely a pretext for military interventions, structural adjustment programmes, and moral grandstanding. Now, the West comes to realise that in order to prevail geopolitically, it needs the cooperation of undemocratic powers from Turkey to the Gulf monarchies, from Singapore to Vietnam.

The high-minded rhetoric of the systemic rivalry between democracies against autocracies is prone to alienate these much-needed potential allies. But if even the West were to give up on universalism of democracy and human rights, what would be left of the liberal world order?

Are the great power rivalries that play out in the background of the war in Ukraine, the coups in Western Africa and the protests in Hong Kong only the beginning of a new period of wars, coups, and revolutions?

The ancient Greek philosopher Thucydides already knew that the competition between rising and declining great powers can beget great wars. So, are we entering a new period of disorder?

Not only in Moscow and Beijing, but also in Washington, there are thinkers that seek to mitigate these destructive dynamics of the multipolar world through a new concert of great powers. The coordination of great power interests in fora from the G7 to the G20 could be the starting point for this new form of club governance. The recognition of exclusive zones of influence can help to mitigate conflict.

However, there is reason for concern that democracy and human rights will be the first victims of such high-powered horse-trading. This form of minimal cooperation may also be inadequate to tackle the many challenges humankind is facing from climate change over pandemics to mass migration.

The European Union, an entity based on the rule of law and the permanent harmonisation of interests, may have a particularly hard time to thrive in such a dog-eat-dog world.

Not only in Moscow, some fantasize about a revival of imperialism that negates the right to self-determination of smaller nations. This dystopian mix of technologically supercharged surveillance state on the inside and never-ending proxy wars on the outside is eerily reminiscent of George Orwell’s 1984. One can only hope that this illiberal neo-imperialism is shattered in the war in Ukraine.

The Russian recognition of separatist provinces of a sovereign state have rung the alarm bells in Beijing. After all, what if Taiwan follows this model and declares its independence? At least rhetorically, Beijing has returned to its traditional line of supporting national sovereignty and condemning colonialist meddling in internal affairs.

There are debates in Beijing whether China should really side with a weakened pariah state and retreat behind a new iron curtain, or would benefit more from an open and rules-based global order.

So, what is this ‘Chinese Multilateralism’ promoted by the latter school of thought? On the one hand, a commitment to international law and cooperation to tackle the great challenges facing humankind, from climate change over securing trade routes to peacekeeping.

However, China is only willing to accept any framework for cooperation if it is on equal footing with the United States. This is why Beijing takes the United Nations Security Council seriously, but tries to replace the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund with its own institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

If Chinese calls for equal footing are rejected, Beijing can still form its own geopolitical bloc with allies across Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America. In such an illiberal order, there would still be rule-based cooperation, but no longer any institutional incentives for democracy and human rights.

Hard choices: what should we strive for?

Alas, with a view of containing an aggressive Russia, a rapprochement with China may have its merits. For many in the West, this would require an about-face. After all, the recently fired German admiral Schönbach was not the only one who wanted to enlist Russia as an ally for a new cold war with China.

Even if Americans and Chinese would bury the hatchet, a post-liberal world order would pose a predicament for Western societies.

Is the price for peace really the right to self-determination of peoples? Is cooperation to tackle the great challenges facing humankind contingent on the rebuttal of the universality of human rights? Or is there still a responsibility to protect, even when the atrocities are committed in the exclusive zone of influence of a great power rival?

These questions go right to the West’s normative foundation.

Which order will prevail in the end will be determined by fierce great power competition. However, who is willing to rally around the banner of each different model differs significantly. Only a narrow coalition of Western states and a handful of Indo-Pacific value partners will come to the defence of democracy and human rights.

If this Western-led alliance of democracies loses the power struggle against the so-called axis of autocracies, the outcome could well be an illiberal world order with Chinese characteristics.

At the same time, the defence of international law, especially the inviolability of borders and the right to self-defence, are generally in the interest of democratic and authoritarian powers alike. An alliance for multilateral cooperation with the United Nations at its core finds supports across the ideological spectrum.

Finally, there could be issue-based cooperation between different centres. If ideological differences are set aside, hybrid partners could cooperate, for instance, in the fight against climate change or piracy, but be fierce competitors in the race for high-tech or energy.

Thus, it would not be surprising if the United States were to replace their ‘alliance of democracies’ with a more inclusive coalition platform.

Politically, Germany can only survive within the framework of a united Europe. Economically, it can only prosper in open world markets. For both, a rules-based, multilateral order is indispensable. Given the intensity of today’s systemic rivalry, some may doubt its feasibility. However, it is worth remembering that even at the heyday of the Cold War, within the framework of a constrained multilateralism, cooperation based on common interests did occur.

From arms control over the ban of the ozone-killer CFC to the Helsinki Accords, the balance sheet of this limited multilateralism was not too bad. In view to the challenges facing humankind, from climate change over pandemics to famines, this limited multilateralism may just be the best among bad options. For what is at stake is the securing of the very foundations of peace, freedom, unity, and prosperity in Europe.

Marc Saxer coordinates the regional work of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in the Asia Pacific. Previously, he led the FES offices in India and Thailand and headed the FES Asia Pacific department.

Source: International Politics and Society published by the Global and European Policy Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin.

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