WASHINGTON DC, May 23 (IPS) – Global fisheries are worth more than US$140 billion each year, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. But this hefty sum does not capture the true value of fish to ocean health, and to the food security and cultures of communities around the world.
Unfortunately, many important populations were allowed to be overfished for decades by the same regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) charged with their conservation and sustainable use, and in some regions, this continues.
At the same time, the demand for fish continues to grow— from consumers of high-end bluefin tuna sushi to coastal communities who depend on seafood as their primary source of protein. So, RFMOs and governments must do more to ensure sustainable fishing and long-term ocean health.
More than 20 years ago, the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) entered into force as the only global, binding instrument holding governments accountable for managing the shared fish stocks of the high seas.
Under the agreement, fish should be managed sustainably and consistent with the best available science. Governments that are party to this treaty—and to RFMOs—are supposed to follow its management obligations, and work towards greater sustainability of the transboundary species, including tunas and sharks, vital to the ocean and economies.
Five of those RFMOs focus specifically on tuna management, one each in the Atlantic, eastern Pacific, western and central Pacific, Indian, and Southern oceans. They operate autonomously and, although there is some overlap among their constituent members, each sets its own rules for tuna fishing in its waters.
This makes UNFSA critical to successful management of tuna fisheries. And because the tuna RFMOs manage some of the world’s most iconic species, they often set the tone for how other similar bodies operate.
All of this is pertinent now because UNFSA member governments are meeting in New York May 22-26 to evaluate whether RFMOs are performing consistent with their commitments. A similar review was conducted in 2016, and although management has improved over time, some areas require more work, especially when it comes to ending overfishing and considering the health and biodiversity of the entire ecosystem.
Since 2016, the share of highly migratory stocks that are overfished increased from 36% to 40%, making it all the more urgent for governments to act quickly.
UNFSA calls on RFMOs to be precautionary in how they regulate fishing, although that guidance is not always followed. There are several examples of extensive overfishing of target species, such as bluefin tuna in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans; yellowfin tuna in the Indian Ocean; and mako, oceanic whitetip sharks and other species that are caught unintentionally.
Although the RFMOs that manage these fisheries have stopped the overfishing in some cases, in others they have not. But there are signs of progress. Over the past decade, a new precautionary management approach known as harvest strategies has gained traction among RFMOs.
These strategies (or management procedures) are science-based rules that automatically adjust catch limits based on several factors, such as population status. If widely implemented, they should end overfishing and prevent it from threatening these populations again.
Harvest strategies have already been successful, particularly in the Southern and Atlantic oceans, where they’ve been adopted for several species, including bluefin tuna and cod, fish stocks for which precautionary management has historically been difficult, or even controversial.
While this progress is important, UNFSA members are still falling short in an area they have agreed is critically important: taking an ecosystem approach to management. For generations, fisheries managers focused on individual fish stocks—adopting catch limits and other measures with little thought to the broader ecosystem.
Science shows that maintaining ecosystem health is critical to sustainable fishing. Yet, to date, RFMOs largely have not consistently assessed or addressed the wider impacts of fishing on ecosystems, including predator-prey relationships, habitat for target and non-target species, and other factors.
Instead, most action has been limited to reducing the impact of bycatch on individual shark species. Better data collection and sharing, and more monitoring of fishing activities, could help integrate stronger ecosystem considerations into management. The more RFMOs can build the whole ecosystem into their decisions, the better it will be for their fisheries.
For example, in the western and central Pacific, the $10 billion skipjack tuna fishery is an enormous economic driver for island nations that are threatened by climate change. But the harvest strategy in place there is nonbinding and unimplemented.
For a fishery facing changes in stock distribution due to warming waters, as well as increased market pressures, delayed action on implementation—and a lack of an ecosystem approach—may make matters worse.
At this week’s UNFSA meeting, RFMOs should be commended for the work they have done in the seven years since the last review. Good progress has been made, including improvements to compliance efforts, and monitoring and enforcement to fight illegal fishing.
But many of the legal obligations of the treaty remain unfulfilled. As such, sustainability is still out of reach for some critically important stocks, and almost no ecosystem-based protections are in place.
As governments convene this week, they should look to the lessons of the past—when poor decision-making threatened the future of some fisheries—and seize the opportunity to modernize management and adhere to the promises they have made on conservation. The biodiversity in the world’s ocean shouldn’t have to wait another seven years for action.
Grantly Galland leads policy work related to regional fisheries management organizations for The Pew Charitable Trusts’ international fisheries project.
One of the rainwater harvesting systems installed in rural settlements in eastern El Salvador, in the Central American Dry Corridor. It is based on a system of pipes and gutters, which run from the rooftop to a polyethylene bag in a rectangular hole dug in the yard. CREDIT: Edgardo Ayala / IPS
by Edgardo Ayala (san salvador)
Inter Press Service
SAN SALVADOR, May 22 (IPS) – Chronic water shortages make life increasingly difficult for the more than 10.5 million people who live in the Central American Dry Corridor, an arid strip that covers 35 percent of that region.
In the Dry Corridor, the lack of water complicates not only basic hygiene and household activities like bathing, washing clothes or dishes, but also agriculture and food production.
“This is a very difficult place to live, due to the lack of water,” said Marlene Carballo, a 23-year-old Salvadoran farmer from the Jocote Dulce canton, a rural settlement in the Chinameca municipality, in the eastern El Salvador department of San Miguel.
The municipality is one of the 144 in the country that is located in the Dry Corridor, where more than 73 percent of the rural population lives in poverty and 7.1 million suffer from severe food insecurity, according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
But poor rural settlements have not stood idly by.
The scarcity of water has prompted community leaders, especially women, who suffer the brunt of the shortage, to organize themselves in rural associations to promote water projects.
In the various villages in Jocote Dulce, rainwater harvesting projects, reforestation and support for the development of small poultry farms have arrived, with the backing of local and international organizations, and funding from European countries.
Rainwater harvesting is based on systems such as the one installed in Carballo’s house: when it rains, the water that falls on the roof runs through a pipe to a huge waterproof bag in the yard, which functions as a catchment tank that can hold up to 80,000 liters.
Other mechanisms also include plastic-lined rectangular-shaped holes dug in the ground.
The harvested water is used to irrigate family gardens, provide water to livestock used in food production such as cows, oxen and horses, and even for aquaculture.
Similar projects have been carried out in the rest of the Central American countries that form part of the Dry Corridor.
In Guatemala, for example, FAO and other organizations have benefited 5,416 families in 80 rural settlements in two departments of the country.
Adel Mansour takes his WFP food basket home on a cart in Abyan, Yemen. Credit: WFP/Ahmed Altaf
Opinion by Max Lawson (london)
Inter Press Service
LONDON, May 22 (IPS) – “G7 countries have failed the Global South here in Hiroshima. They failed to cancel debts, and they failed to find what is really required to end the huge increase in hunger worldwide. They can find untold billions to fight the war but can’t even provide half of what is needed by the UN for the most critical humanitarian crises.”
Hunger and debt
“If the G7 really want closer ties to the developing countries and greater backing for the war in Ukraine, then asking Global South leaders to fly across the world for a couple of hours is not going to cut it. They need to cancel debts and do what it takes to end hunger.
“Countries of the Global South are being crippled by a food and debt crisis of huge proportions. Hunger has increased faster than it has in decades, and all over the world. In East Africa two people are dying every minute from hunger. Countries are paying over $200 million a day to the G7 and their bankers, money they could spend feeding their people instead.
“The money they say they will provide for the world’s rapidly growing humanitarian crises is not even half of what the UN is asking for, and it is not clear what, if anything, is new or additional —and the G7 have a terrible track record on double counting and inflating figures each year.
“These food and debt crises are direct knock-on effects of the Ukraine war. If the G7 want support from the Global South, they need to be seen to take action on these issues —they must cancel debts and force private banks to participate in debt cancellation, and they must massively increase funding to end hunger and famine across the world.”
Adak Nyuol Bol stands outside her farm which has been submerged by floodwaters. South Sudan is on the frontlines of the climate crisis and currently experiencing a fourth consecutive year of flooding. Credit: World Food Programme (WFP)
Climate Change
“The G7 owes the Global South $8.7 trillion for the devastating losses and damages their excessive carbon emissions have caused. In the G7 Hiroshima communique they said they recognized that there is a new Loss and Damage fund, but they failed to commit a single cent.
“It is good they continue to recognize the need to meet 1.5 degrees, and stay committed to this despite the energy crisis driven by the war in Ukraine, but they try to blame everyone else —they are far off track themselves to contribute their fair share of what is needed to meet this target and they should have been on track years ago.
“They confirm their commitment to end public funding for fossil energy, they maintain their loophole on new fossil gas, using the war as an excuse. This means they have continued to wriggle out of their commitment to not publicly fund new fossil fuels, making a mockery of their fine statements. The G7 must stop using fossil fuels immediately —the planet is on fire.”
Health
“The G7 had hundreds of fine words on preparing for the next pandemic, but yet failed to make the critical commitment —that never again would the G7 let Big Pharma profiteering and intellectual property rights lead to millions dying unnecessarily, unable to access vaccines. Given a 27 percent chance of a new pandemic within in a decade, this omission is chilling.”
More on debt, food and hunger
“Over half of all debt payments from the Global South are going to the G7 or to private banks based in G7 countries, notably New York and London. Over $230 million dollars a day is flowing into the G7.
Countries are bankrupt, spending far more on debt than on healthcare or food for their people. Debt payments have increased sharply as countries in the Global South borrow in dollars, so rising interest rates are supersizing the payments they must make.
“The G7 saying they support clauses to temporarily suspend debt payments for those countries hit by climate disasters is a positive step and a tribute to Barbados and Prime Minister Mia Mottley for fighting for this. They need to go further and cancel debts for all the nations that need it, a growing number daily.
Money is flooding from the Global South into the G7 economies —that is the wrong direction.”
Max Lawson is Oxfam International’s Head of Inequality Policy.
Footnote: The UNOCHA’s current total requirement for humanitarian crises is nearly $56 billion. The G7 communique says they will commit to providing over $21 billion to address the worsening humanitarian crises this year (paragraph 16).
Some climate scientists said it was unfortunate that western Rwanda experienced flooding despite past investments. For example, some experts were previously convinced that Sebeya, one of the rivers originating in the mountains of western Rwanda, was no longer a threat to the community. Credit: Aimable Twahirwa/IPS
by Aimable Twahirwa (kigali)
Inter Press Service
KIGALI, May 19 (IPS) – Following severe flooding and landslides that hit major parts of Rwanda earlier this month, experts are convinced that investing in the mapping of erosion risk areas could go a long way to keeping the number of casualties down.
Many villagers living along major rivers in Western Rwanda have been among the victims of river erosion and flooding every year.
Felicita Mukamusoni, a river erosion survivor in Nyundo, a mountainous village from Western Rwanda, told IPS that “parts of this village have been eroded to such an extent that we cannot even imagine.”
“I reared cows and goats. My beautiful house was destroyed. The river has taken everything,” she said.
Latest Government estimates indicate that at least 135 people died, and one is still missing following recent flooding and landslides triggered by heavy rains that hit western, northern and southern provinces earlier this month.
In a recent assessment, experts found that land in high-risk areas is mainly used for agriculture, and 61 percent was for seasonal crops. It said that seasonal agriculture exposes soil to splash erosion and further detachment as land is not permanently covered.
The 2022 report on the State of Soil Erosion Control in Rwanda indicates that the erosion control techniques across high-risk areas in Rwanda are still very low.
Erosion control mapping shows that of the 30 districts of Rwanda, land under high erosion risk is about 1,080,168 hectares (45 percent of the total provinces land, which is estimated to be 2,385,830 hectares) of which 71,941 hectares (7 percent of the total risk areas) are at extremely high risk.
According to the same report, at least 190,433 hectares of land are considered very high risk (18 percent), 300,805 hectares are at high risk (28 percent), and 516,999 hectares (48 percent) are at moderate risk.
Dr Charles Karangwa, a climate expert based in Kigali, told IPS that It is unfortunate that fresh disasters happened again despite a lot of investment in the past.
“Rwanda needs to explore other complementary solutions such as water management infrastructure, water harvesting, and where possible, relocate those living in highly risky areas to allow nature to regenerate will help to stabilise the situation both in the long term and medium term,” he said.
Apart from being highly populated, Karangwa pointed out that there is quite a link with geographical vulnerability because of soil erosion risk, which is worsened by high population, and this increased pressure on land.
Flood Management and Water Storage Development Division Manager at Rwanda’s Water Resources Board (RWB), Davis Bugingo, told IPS that among solutions to cope with recurrent disasters in Western Rwanda is the establishment of flood control infrastructures to regulate water flow and reduce flooding risks.
These include the construction of the neighbouring Sebeya retention dam, and Gisunyu gully rehabilitation works expected to significantly contribute to reducing flood impacts in the region.
While accurate and up-to-date data on river flow, topography, and flood vulnerability remains crucial for effective flood management, Bugingo observed that limited data availability and quality could pose challenges in accurate flood forecasting, risk assessment, and planning.
Apart from land use, which contributed to increased flood risks, experts observed that constructions in flood-prone areas, encroachments on riverbanks, and inadequate zoning regulations had exacerbated the impact of floods and hindered effective flood management efforts in western Rwanda.
Most recently, RWB has developed a dedicated application to collect more information to inform future analysis, relocation of people living in risky areas, and adjusting tools used to design flood control infrastructure.
The above tool provides information on flood exposure and areas at risk that can be visualised in 3D and shared the information with the public or other organisations. However, experts are convinced that despite these innovative solutions, limited financial resources may hinder the implementation of these large-scale infrastructure projects, such as dams, flood control structures, gully reclamation and drainage systems.
Rwanda is one of Africa’s most densely populated countries, with large concentrations in the central regions and along the shore of Lake Kivu in the west. This East African country’s total area is 26,338 km2, with a population of 13,246,394.
Bugingo points out that inadequate land use still contributes to increased flood risks.
“Constructions in flood-prone areas, encroachments on riverbanks, and inadequate zoning regulations continue to exacerbate the impact of floods and hinder effective flood management efforts,” he said.
“As reuse and recycling capacities in Europe are limited, a large share of used textiles collected in the EU is traded and exported to Africa and Asia, and their fate is highly uncertain,” says the European Environmental Agency. Credit: Shutterstock.
by Baher Kamal (rome)
Inter Press Service
ROME, May 18 (IPS) – Once the money-making businesses have turned Asia and Africa into their low-cost factories, to produce and market at higher prices their clothes and footwear, obtaining more profits by selling to these two continents around 90% of all their used and textiles waste.
Not only: such a business alleviates the harsh environmental impacts of the lucrative clothing and fashion industry, and the cost of recycling and eliminating the leftovers of these products.
Just know that textiles are on average “the fourth-highest source of pressure on the environment and climate change from a European consumption perspective,” the European Environment Agency (EEA) on 26 April 2023 reported.
Consequently, “Europe faces major challenges managing used textiles, including textiles waste.”
Europe exports much more than textile waste
Lars Mortensen, EEA expert on circular economy, confirms that textile production and consumption in the European Union have significant impacts on the environment and climate.
“Textile consumption causes the third largest land use and water use in the value chain, and the fifth largest material resource use and greenhouse gas emissions. Also, textiles cause pressures and impacts from their chemicals on the environment and climate”.
The poisoning plastic
A 27 January 2023 EEA briefing focusses on another big problem: plastic.
“Plastic-based — or ‘synthetic’— textiles are woven into daily lives in Europe, in the clothes we wear, the towels and the bed sheets, in the carpets, curtains and cushions. And they are in safety belts, car tyres, workwear and sportswear.”
Synthetic textile fibres are produced from fossil fuel resources, such as oil and natural gas, the briefing goes on, adding that their production, consumption and related waste handling generate greenhouse gas emissions, use non-renewable resources and can release microplastics.
EU consumers discard about 5.8 million tonnes of textiles annually – around 11 kg per person – of which about two-thirds consist of synthetic fibres, according to the briefing.
“In Europe, about one-third of textile waste is collected separately, and a large part is exported.”
Africa and Asia are therefore the largest destinations of these toxic fibres.
Simply put: by exporting European used clothes and textiles waste, their impacts necessarily fall on the shoulders of Africans and Asians.
A highly uncertain fate
Indeed, “as reuse and recycling capacities in Europe are limited, a large share of used textiles collected in the EU is traded and exported to Africa and Asia, and their fate is highly uncertain,” says the European Environmental Agency.
In fact, throughout the past two decades, Africa has been the main continent receiving used textiles from the European Union (EU), importing more than 60% of EU exports.
But while in 2000 Asia received only 26% of EU exports, by 2019 it had significantly increased its share to 41% of EU imports. This is almost equal to Africa, which still imported 46% of EU exports.
Where do second-hand clothes end up?
In the African countries studied, the EEA report says that the import of used textiles seems to be mainly meant for local reuse. This is because there is a demand for cheap, used clothes from Europe, which seem to be preferred to new items.
“What is not fit for reuse mostly ends up in open landfills and informal waste streams.”
In Asia, however, most of the used textiles are imported to so-called economic zones where they are sorted and processed. In the countries studied for this briefing, import for local reuse is restricted.
Instead, used textiles seem to be recycled locally, mostly downcycled into industrial rags or filling, or re-exported either for recycling in other Asian countries or reuse in Africa.
“Textiles that cannot be recycled or re-exported are likely to end up in the general waste management system, most of which is landfilling.”
The big figures…
According to this European Union (EU)’s agency that ‘delivers knowledge and data to support Europe’s environment and climate goals’:
The amount of used textiles exported from the EU has tripled over the last two decades from slightly over 550,000 tonnes in 2000 to almost 1.7 million tonnes in 2019.
The fate of used textiles exported from the EU is highly uncertain. The perception of used clothing donations as generous gifts to people in need does not fully match reality,
Used clothing is increasingly part of a specialised and traded global commodity value chain,
In 2019, 46% of used textiles ended up in Africa: Imported, used textiles on this continent primarily go towards local reuse as there is a demand for cheap, used clothes from Europe. What is not fit for reuse mostly ends up in open landfills and informal waste streams,
In 2019, 41% of used textiles ended up in Asia. Most used textiles on this continent are imported to dedicated economic zones where they are sorted and processed,
The used textiles are mostly downcycled into industrial rags or filling, or re-exported for recycling in other Asian countries or for reuse in Africa. Textiles that cannot be recycled or re-exported are likely to end up in landfills.
… The big exporting hubs
“Some EU countries, such as Germany, Poland and the Netherlands, have exported more than others and seem to have acted as import-export hubs for used textiles from the EU.”
There is no clear reason explaining why five out of 27 EU Member States and the United Kingdom account for around 75% of all EU used textile exports, adds the EEA.
Therefore, it is likely that the largest exporters have been sending used textiles abroad, collected locally and from other EU countries, says the European agency.
Thus, another reason for the concentration of exports in a few EU countries could be that these large exporting countries are acting as export hubs.
“In other words, they are importing used textiles from other EU Member States for re-export beyond the EU. Ports/harbours for international shipment in some of these countries make them logical export hubs.”
Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands have large export harbours.
… and the big increase
EU used textile exports have grown significantly over the last two decades, the EEA reports, explaining that exports of textile waste outside the EU have been steadily increasing to reach 1.4 million tonnes in 2020.
Still, another problem appears: how to avoid that waste streams are falsely labelled as second-hand goods when exported from the EU and in this way escape the waste regime?
EU used textile exports are characterised by a lot of uncertainty, adds the EEA. First, there is uncertainty around the types of textiles exported as well as their quality.
In other words, it says, if used textiles exported from the EU are of too low quality to be reused, or are not reused for very long or do not replace new clothing purchases, they may not really replace new production or benefit the environment.
“Instead, the exports will only lead to more textiles ending up in landfills.”
A man with poached kudu in Kenya. Credit: Richard Moller/Tsavo Trust
by Busani Bafana (bulawayo)
Inter Press Service
BULAWAYO, May 18 (IPS) – Meat from wild animals is relished across Africa and widely traded, but scientists are warning that eating bush meat is a potential health risk, especially in the wake of pandemics like COVID-19.
A study at the border settlements of Kenya and Tanzania has found that while people have been aware of the risks associated with eating bushmeat, especially after the COVID-19 outbreak, they don’t worry about hunting and eating wild animals that could transmit diseases.
On the contrary, the demand for bushmeat has increased, the 2023 study by the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) and TRAFFIC and other partners found.
No Beef With Bushmeat
Bushmeat is a collective term for meat derived from wild mammals, reptiles, amphibians, and birds that live in the jungle, savannah, or wetlands. Bushmeat comes from a variety of wild animals, including monkeys, pangolins, snakes, porcupines, antelopes, elephants, and giraffes.
The study — the first ever to look at disease risk perceptions of wild meat activities in rural communities in East Africa — was conducted in December 2021, and 299 people were interviewed in communities on the Kenya-Tanzania border.
Key findings of the study revealed that levels of education played a critical role in understanding zoonotic disease transmission; a majority of the people interviewed who had higher levels of education were more aware of the risks of disease transmission.
Nearly 80 percent of the respondents had learned about COVID-19 from mass media sources, but this did not impact their levels of wild meat consumption. Some even reported increased consumption. Hoofed animals, such as antelopes, gazelles and deer, were found to be the most consumed species, followed by birds, rodents and shrews.
Scientist and lead study author at ILRI, Ekta Patel, commented that it was important to commence the study in Kenya given the limited information on both rural and urban demand for wild meat and the potential risks associated with zoonotic diseases. The Kenya-Tanzania border is a known hotspot for wild meat consumption.
Zoonotic diseases are those that originate in animals — be they tamed or wild — that then mutate and ‘spill over’ into human populations. Two-thirds of infectious diseases, from HIV/AIDS, which are believed to have originated in chimpanzee populations in early 20th century Central Africa, to COVID-19, believed to have originated from an as-yet undetermined animal in 2019, come from animals.
Confirming that there is no COVID health risk of consuming wild meat, Patel said that given the COVID-19 pandemic, which is thought to originate from wildlife, the study was investigating if the general public was aware of health risks associated with frequent interactions with wildlife.
Patel said some of these risks of eating bush meat include coming into contact with zoonotic pathogens, which can make the handler unwell. Other concerns are linked to not cooking meats well, resulting in foodborne illnesses.
“The big worry is in zoonotic disease risks associated with wild meat activities such as hunting, skinning and consuming,” Patel told IPS.
Africa is facing a growing risk of outbreaks caused by zoonotic pathogens, according to the World Health Organisation (WHO). The global health body reported a 63% increase in zoonotic outbreaks in the region from 2012-2022 compared to 2001-2011.
Control or Ban?
Scientists estimate that 70 percent of emerging infectious diseases originated from animals, and 60 percent of the existing infectious disease are zoonotic. For example, Ebola outbreaks in the Congo basin have been traced back to hunters exposed to ape carcasses. She called for governments to implement policies to control zoonotic disease transmission risks through community engagements to change behaviour.
The study, while representative of the small sample, offered valuable insights about bushmeat consumption trends happening across Africa, where bushmeat is many times on the menu, says Martin Andimile, co-author of the study and Research Manager at the global wildlife trade monitoring network TRAFFIC.
Pointing to the need to improve hygiene and standards of informal markets while at the same time providing communities with alternative protein sources, Andimile believes bushmeat consumption should be paused, citing the difficulty of regulating this source of meat.
“I think people in Africa have other options to get meat besides wild meat although some advocate that they get meat from the wild because of cultural reasons and that it is a delicacy, government systems cannot control the legal exploitation of wildlife,” Andimile told IPS. “I think bushmeat consumption should be stopped until there is a proper way of regulating it.”
Andimile said while some regulation could be enforced where the population of species are healthy enough for commercial culling to give communities bushmeat, growing human populations will impact the offtake of species from the wild.
“Bushmeat consumption is impacting species as some households consume bushmeat on a daily basis, and it is broadly obtained illegally (and is) cheaper than domestic meat,” Andimile told IPS.
Maybe regulation could keep bushmeat on the menu for communities instead of banning it, independent experts argue.
“Wild meat harvesting and consumption should not be banned as this goes against the role of sustainable use in area-based conservation as made clear by recent CBD COP15 decisions,” Francis Vorhies, a member of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Sustainable Use and Livelihoods Specialist Group (SULi), says. He called for an enabling environment for sustainable and inclusive wild meat harvesting, which means better regulations and voluntary standards such as developing a FairWild-like standard for harvesting wild animals.
Another expert, Rogers Lubilo, also a member of the IUCN SULi, concurs that bushmeat consumption should not be banned because it is a major source of protein. He argued that local communities who live side-by-side with wildlife would like to access bushmeat like they used to before, but the current policies across many sites incriminate bushmeat when acquired from illegal sources.
“There is a need to invest in opportunities that will encourage access to legal bushmeat,” Lubilo said. “The trade is big and lucrative, and if harnessed properly with good policies and the ability to monitor, would be part of the broadened wildlife economy.”
Eating Species to Extinction
There is some evidence that the consumption of bushmeat is impacting the species’ population, raising fears that without corrective action, people will eat wildlife to extinction.
The IUCN has warned that bushmeat consumption and trade have driven many species closer to extinction, calling for its regulation. Hunting and trapping are listed as a threat to 4,658 terrestrial species on the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, including 1,194 species in Africa.
At least 5 million tons of bushmeat are trafficked every year in Central Africa. Africa is expected to lose 50 percent of its bird and mammal species by the turn of the century, says Eric Nana, a member of the IUCN SULi.
Nana notes that bushmeat trafficking from Africa into European countries like France, Switzerland, Belgium and the UK remains a largely understudied channel. He said estimates show that more than 1,000 tons are trafficked yearly.
“Much of the reptile-based bushmeat trade in Africa is technically illegal, poorly regulated, and little understood,” Patrick Aust, also a member of IUCN SULi, said, adding that reptiles form an important part of the bushmeat trade in Africa and further research is urgently needed to better understand conservation impacts and socioeconomic importance.
Opinion by Daniel Bradlow (pretoria, south africa)
Inter Press Service
PRETORIA, South Africa, May 18 (IPS) – Zambia defaulted on its debt in November 2021 but has not yet reached an agreement with its creditors. Its president recently warned that this situation is hurting its citizens and undermining its democracy because “you cannot eat democracy”.
Given their adverse economic, social, and political impacts, it should be expected that human rights considerations would play an important role in sovereign debt restructurings. Unfortunately, this is not the case, even though all negotiating parties have human rights responsibilities or obligations.
It is unclear why these actors pay so little attention to human rights in the sovereign debt restructuring context. One possibility is that they are not sure how to incorporate human rights into their transactions.
This should not be surprising. It is difficult to understand the causal linkages between a sovereign debt crisis and the deteriorating human rights situation that follows. There can be multiple such linkages and the lines of causation can run in different directions.
Consequently, a human rights consistent debt restructuring will be fact and context specific and will require the parties to understand their role in both creating the situation and in mitigating or eliminating the adverse human rights impacts.
This requires the parties to have a common approach to analysing the debt crisis and its anticipated economic, financial, human rights, environmental, social and governance impacts. Thus, they could benefit from having a mutually acceptable set of principles that incorporates all these issues.
In 2021, I received a grant from the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa to explore the feasibility of my proposal to establish a DOVE (Debts of Vulnerable Economies) Fund. This fund would buy the debts of sovereigns in distress and state that it would only support sovereign debt restructurings that were consistent with widely accepted international norms and standards.
My work on this project revealed shortcomings with all the existing international standards and led me to develop the DOVE Fund Principles. The principles are based on 20 existing international norms and standards developed by states, international organisations, industry associations and civil society organisations. They can provide a common framework for the negotiations between states and their creditors. They are now set out and explained.
The DOVE Fund Principles
Principle 1: Guiding Norms: Sovereign debt restructurings should be guided by the following 6 norms: Credibility, Responsibility, Good Faith, Optimality, Inclusiveness, and Effectiveness.
• Credibility: The Negotiating Parties and the Affected Parties are confident that the restructuring process can produce an Optimal Outcome. The “Negotiating Parties” are the sovereign debtor, its creditors and their advisors. The “Affected Parties” are the residents of the debtor country and those individuals whose savings either directly or indirectly finance the debt being restructured.
• Responsibility: The Negotiating Parties seek an agreement that respects their respective economic, financial, environmental, social, human rights and governance obligations and/or responsibilities.
• Good Faith: The Negotiating Parties intend to reach an agreement that takes account of all their rights, obligations and responsibilities.
• Optimality: The Negotiating Parties seek an “Optimal Outcome”, that addresses the circumstances in which the transaction is being negotiated, the parties’ respective rights, obligations and responsibilities, and offers them the best possible mix of economic, financial, environmental, social, human rights and governance costs and benefits.
• Inclusiveness: All creditors can participate in the restructuring process and the Affected Parties are able to make informed decisions about how it will impact them.
• Effectiveness: The Negotiating Parties should seek an Optimal Outcome in a timely and efficient manner.
Principle 2: Transparency: The Negotiating Parties and the Affected Parties should have access to the information that they need to make informed decisions regarding the debt restructuring.
The creditors have access to sufficient information that they can make informed decisions about the scope of the sovereign’s debt problems, the options for their resolution and their potential economic, financial, environmental, social, human rights and governance impacts.
The Affected Parties should also have access to sufficient information, subject to appropriate safeguards, that they can make informed decisions about how the restructuring may affect their rights and interests.
The creditors should inform the debtor and the Affected Parties about their environmental, social, and human rights obligations and responsibilities.
Principle 3: Due Diligence: The sovereign debtor and its creditors should each undertake appropriate due diligence before concluding a sovereign debt restructuring process.
The Negotiating Parties should utilize a debt sustainability analysis which credibly determines the sovereign’s debt restructuring needs and their impacts.
Principle 4: Optimal Outcome Assessment: At the earliest feasible moment, the Negotiating Parties should publicly disclose why they expect their restructuring agreement to result in an Optimal Outcome.
An Optimal Outcome requires the Negotiating Parties to assess the expected impacts of their proposed agreement on the economic, financial, environmental, social, human rights and governance condition of the sovereign borrower and the Affected Parties.
Principle 5: Monitoring: The restructuring process should incorporate credible mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of the restructuring agreement.
The Negotiating Parties should audit the financial aspects of the agreement and monitor its economic, social, environmental, human rights and governance impacts. This information should be published periodically.
Principle 6: Inter-Creditor Comparability: The restructuring process should ensure that all creditors make a comparable contribution to the restructuring of the sovereign’s debt.
The process should give creditors the confidence that all other creditors are making comparable contributions to an Optimal Outcome.
Principle 7: Fair Burden Sharing: An Optimal Outcome should share the burden of the restructuring fairly between Negotiating Parties and should not impose undue costs on any of the Affected Parties.
Both the debtor and the creditor bear some responsibility for causing debt crises and should absorb some of the restructuring costs. Moreover, they should seek to limit how much of the restructuring costs the Affected Parties will have to bear, considering their relative wealth and ability to absorb losses.
Principle 8: Maintaining Market Access: The restructuring agreement, to the greatest extent possible, should be designed to facilitate future market access for the borrower.
It is an unfortunate reality that debtor countries must seek financing from international financial markets. Thus, the Optimal Outcome should help the debtor regain access to financial markets as quickly as possible.
As the Zambian case demonstrates, the current arrangements for restructuring sovereign debt are sub-optimal. The DOVE Fund Principles seek to overcome this problem by offering both Negotiating and Affected Parties a common conceptual framework that facilitates a fair resolution of the crisis incorporating all its social, environmental, human rights, economic, financial and governance impacts.
They therefore can promote an Optimal Outcome.
Daniel D. Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria, South Africa
SSRN Author Home Page
www.chr.up.ac.za
For further information on this ongoing project, contact: [email protected]
Business and Human Rights Journal articles for further reading:
1) “Social Bonds for Sustainable Development: A Human Rights Perspective on Impact Investing” Stephen Kim PARK Journal: Business and Human Rights Journal / Volume 3 / Issue 2 / July 2018 pp. 233-255
2) The Record of International Financial Institutions on Business and Human Rights
Jessica EVANS Journal: Business and Human Rights Journal / Volume 1 / Issue 2 / July 2016
Carrying the Mayan flag, members of the Colibrí Collective lead a march against the Mayan Train in the city of Valladolid, in the southern Mexican state of Yucatán, in May 2023. The construction of the Mexican government’s most important megaproject has drawn criticism from affected communities due to its environmental, social and cultural effects. CREDIT: Arturo Contreras / Pie de Página
by Emilio Godoy (mexico city)
Inter Press Service
MEXICO CITY, May 18 (IPS) – Mexico’s development banks have violated their own socio-environmental standards while granting loans for the construction of the Mayan Train (TM), the flagship project of the presidency of Andrés Manuel López Obrador.
Banobras, which finances infrastructure and public services, granted 480.83 million dollars for the project in the Yucatan peninsula; Nafin, which extends loans and guarantees to public and private works, allocated 81 million; and Bancomext, which provides financing to export and import companies and other strategic sectors, granted 2.91 million.
Bancomext and Banobras did not evaluate the credit, while Nafin classified the information as “confidential”, even though it involves public funds, according to each institution’s response to IPS’ requests for public information.
In the case of Bancomext and Nafin, these rules are mandatory during the credit granting process, while Banobras explains that its objective is to verify that the loans evaluated are compatible with the bank’s environmental and social commitments.
Bancomext prohibits 19 types of financing; Banobras, 17; and Nafin, 18. The three institutions all veto “production or activities that place in jeopardy lands that are owned by indigenous peoples or have been claimed by adjudication, without the full documented consent of said peoples.”
Likewise, Banobras and Nafin must not support “projects that imply violations of national and international conventions and treaties regarding the indigenous population and native peoples.”
The total cost of the TM has already exceeded 15 billion dollars, 70 percent above what was initially planned, mostly borne by the government’s National Fund for Tourism Promotion (Fonatur), responsible for the megaproject.
Mexico’s three state development banks are partially financing the Mayan Train, for which they have failed to comply with the due process of the evaluation of socio-environmental risks that are part of their regulations. The photo shows the clearing of part of the route of one of the branches of the railway line in the municipality of Playa del Carmen, in the southeastern state of Quintana Roo, in March 2022. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy / IPS
Violations
Angel Sulub, a Mayan indigenous member of the U kúuchil k Ch’i’ibalo’on Community Center, criticized the policies applied and the disrespect for the safeguards regulated by the state financial entities themselves.
“This shows us, once again, that there is a violation of our right to life, and there has not been at any moment in the process, from planning to execution, a will to respect the rights of the peoples,” he told IPS from the Felipe Carrillo Port, in the southeastern state of Quintana Roo, where one of the TM stations will be located.
Sulub, who is also a poet, described the consultation as a “sham”. “Respect for the consultation was violated in all cases, an adequate consultation was not carried out. They did not comply with the minimum information, it was not a prior consultation, nor was it culturally appropriate,” he argued.
Official data indicates that some 17 million native people live in Mexico, belonging to 69 different peoples and representing 13 percent of the total population.
INPI initially anticipated a population of 1.5 million indigenous people to consult about the TM in 1,331 communities. But that total was reduced to 1.32 million, with no official explanation for the 12 percent decrease. The population in the project’s area of ??influence totaled 3.57 million in 2019, according to the Superior Audit report.
The conduct of the three financial institutions reflects the level of compliance with the president’s plans, as has happened with other state agencies that have refused to create hurdles for the railway, work on which began in 2020 and which will have seven routes.
The Mayan Train, run by Fonatur and backed by public funds, will stretch some 1,500 kilometers through 78 municipalities in the states of Campeche, Quintana Roo and Yucatán, within the peninsula, as well as the neighboring states of Chiapas and Tabasco. It will have 21 stations and 14 other stops.
The Yucatan peninsula is home to the second largest jungle in Latin America, after the Amazon, and is notable for its fragile biodiversity. In this territory, furthermore, to speak of the population is to speak of the Mayans, because in a high number of municipalities they are a majority and 44 percent of the total are Mayan-speaking.
The government promotes the megaproject, whose locomotives will transport thousands of tourists and cargo, such as transgenic soybeans, palm oil and pork – key economic activities in the area – as an engine for socioeconomic development in the southeast of the country.
It argues that it will create jobs, boost tourism beyond the traditional attractions and energize the regional economy, which has sparked polarizing controversies between its supporters and critics.
The railway faces complaints of deforestation, pollution, environmental damage and human rights violations, but these have not managed to stop the project from going forward.
In November 2022, López Obrador, who wants at all costs for the locomotives to start running in December of this year, classified the TM as a “priority project” through a presidential decree, which facilitates the issuing of environmental permits.
Gustavo Alanís, executive director of the non-governmental Mexican Center for Environmental Law, questioned the way the development banks are proceeding.
“They are committing internal violations of their own provisions in the granting of credits, in order to give loans to projects that are not environmentally viable and that do not respect the local communities. They are not complying with their own internal guidelines and requirements regarding the environment and indigenous peoples in the granting of credits,” he told IPS.
Groups opposed to the Mayan Train protest along a segment of the megaproject in the municipality of Carrillo Puerto, in the southeastern state of Quintana Roo, on May 3. CREDIT: Arturo Contreras / Pie de Página
Trendy guidelines
In the last decade, socio-environmental standards have gained relevance for the promotion of sustainable works and their consequent financing that respects ecosystems and the rights of affected communities, such as those located along the railway.
Although the three Mexican development banks have such guidelines, they have not joined the largest global initiatives in this field.
None of them form part of the Equator Principles, a set of 10 criteria established in 2003 and adopted by 138 financial institutions from 38 countries, and which define their environmental, social and corporate governance.
These standards address the impact of projects; sustainable client and user practices; consultation and participation of stakeholders; governance and institutional culture; as well as transparency and corporate responsibility.
Of the three Mexican development banks, only Banobras has a mechanism for complaints, which has not received any about its loans, including the railway project.
In this regard, Sulub questioned the different ways to guarantee indigenous rights in this and other large infrastructure projects.
“The legal fight against the railway and other megaprojects has shown us in recent years that, as peoples, we do not have effective access to justice either, even though we have clearly demonstrated violations of our rights. Although it is a good thing that companies and banks have these guidelines and that they comply with them, we do not have effective mechanisms for enforcement,” he complained.
In Sulub’s words, this leads to a breaching of the power of indigenous people to decide on their own ways of life, since the government does not abide by judicial decisions, which in his view is further evidence of an exclusionary political system.
For his part, Alanís warned of the banks’ complicity in the damage reported and the consequent risk of legal liability if the alleged irregularities are not resolved.
“If not, they must pay the consequences and hold accountable those who do not follow internal policies. The international banks have inspection panels, to receive complaints when the bank does not follow its own policies,” he stated.
Opinion by Monica Hirst, Juan Gabriel Tokatlian (rio de janeiro, brazil / buenos aires, argentina)
Inter Press Service
RIO DE JANEIRO, Brazil / BUENOS AIRES, Argentina, May 17 (IPS) – Half a century ago, the dominance of the United States dollar in the international finance and trade system was indisputable.
By 1977, the US dollar reached a peak of 85 per cent as the prevailing currency in foreign exchange reserves; in 2001, this position was still around 73 per cent. But today, it is at approximately 58 per cent.
The dominance of the dollar and the hegemonic position of the United States have for long been intertwined. And the recent global transformations are affecting American’s ability to sustain this: the gradual movement of the centre of gravity from the West to the East, the unravelling complexities of US domestic politics, the growing muscle of the international projection of China and an international assertiveness among the countries of the Global South have restrained the American dollar’s supremacy and status.
And yet, the currency still holds by far the largest share of global trade, foreign exchange transactions, SWIFT payments and debt issued outside the United States. In fact, Western financial agents, government officials and renowned experts tend to downplay the so-called de-dollarization arguing that a relatively debilitated dollar doesn’t necessarily mean its demise.
Notwithstanding controversial standpoints, it is undeniable that the world system faces more complex, diverse and plural challenges that involve currency competition and new inventive financial pathways.
Resistance against the US Dollar
The so-called de-dollarization in global finance has its landmarks. The launch of the Euro in 1999 was crucial since the European currency, by now, represents 20 per cent of the global foreign exchange reserves. By the dawn of the 21st century, an Asian Currency Unit came to life as well: it represented a salad bowl of 13 currencies from East Asian nations (ASEAN 10 plus Japan, China and South Korea).
Along with the successful spill overs of economic regionalisation, Western-led geopolitics also came to be a source of global financial novelties that affected the US dollar’s pre-eminence.
The growing recourse to a sanction regime against countries such as Iran, especially since 2006, and Russia after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, encouraged alternative currency arrangements. As of today, Washington’s sanctions policy punishes 22 nations.
The invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 and the extension of sanctions hampering the use of the US dollar encouraged even more de-dollarized practices. In response to the decision to disconnect Russia from SWIFT, Moscow advanced bilateral fuel transactions with partial payment in Rubles.
Simultaneously, Russia and a group of African countries initiated talks to establish settlements in national currencies, discontinuing both the US dollar and the Euro. Meanwhile, China is trying to insulate itself from the West and is attempting to internationalise the Renminbi, even though it represents less than 3 per cent of the official reserves worldwide.
Moscow and Beijing are coming closer in terms of financial cooperation, France and Saudi Arabia agreed to use the Renminbi in certain oil and gas deals, while Bangladesh became the 19th country to commerce with India in Rupees.
Last but not least, a gold rush is also picking up. As Ruchir Sharma has recently observed, key buyers are now central banks, which are procuring ‘more tons of gold now than at any time since data begins in 1950 and currently account for a record 33 per cent of monthly global demand for gold and 9 of the top 10 are in the developing world.’
Besides, some African nations seem willing to trade in currencies backed by rare-earth metals. In the Global South, in fact, there is a growing perception that de-dollarization is a step towards a multipolar world in which new actors, interests and rules interplay. In that sense, it is becoming evident that a multi-currency trading regime is slowly emerging.
How Brazil ‘de-dollarizes’
De-dollarization has been included in Brazil’s foreign policy strategy. Since the inauguration of his third mandate, President Lula da Silva rapidly disclosed the intention of overcoming his discrepancies with Western rule-setting. An adjourned narrative that contests the Global North’s preponderance in the World Order has resurfaced.
Demands for inclusive reforms in global governance, the condemnation of geopolitical worldviews leading to securitised methods and military escalation, and the questioning of the Dollar’s dominance in international trade and finance have arisen. In the present context of tensions and rivalries between the Great Powers, Brazil strives to speak of an autonomous voice of the Global South.
And thus, Lula has tried to promote peace in Ukraine on the basis of negotiations that recognise the voices of all parties involved in the war.
Lula’s de-dollarization standing has been stimulated by Brazil’s association with the BRICS, as well as its expanded bilateralism with China. The continuously record-breaking Brazilian-Chinese trade relationship reached a peak of $150,5 bn in 2022 (while the Russia-China trade relationship for the same year was $190,2 bn).
As bilateral ties are expanding further, during Lula’s recent state visit to China, novel settlements are being negotiated, aiming to put trade and financial operations on track directly with Chinese Renminbi and Brazilian Reais.
Concurrently, the Brazilian government has decided to use the New Development Bank (NDB), the BRICS’ multilateral bank, as a platform to defend a de-dollarized trade system among its members and with the countries that benefit from NDB credit lines.
By positioning former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff as the head of the bank, Lula has upgraded the Brazilian political commitment to this frontline. Most certainly, this will become a reiterated pledge in Brazil’s performance in global governance arenas, with mention to its 2024 presidency of the G20.
It is remarkable how the Lula government has sought a prudent strategy balancing its anti-dollar hegemony signals among its BRICS partners with a constructive presence in a dollar-dominating terrain such as the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB).
By holding the presidency of the IDB since last December, supporting the candidacy of Brazilian ex-IMF official Illan Goldfajn, Brazil has stretched its footprint in international finance from Washington to Shanghai.
Beyond Brazil
Brazil has made a first attempt to bring in the de-dollarization card to its South American neighbourhood, particularly together with Argentina. Last February, bilateral talks took off to begin working on a common currency project that could reduce reliance on the US dollar. This could mean ingraining de-dollarization within the MERCOSUR area.
Following Brazil’s example, Argentina has started to consider the use of the Renminbi in its trade with Beijing. For Brazil, these are moves that could, step-by-step, lead to a regional financial terrain with relative distance from US dollar dominance. However, ongoing macroeconomic turbulences in Argentina, together with an extremely low level of foreign exchange reserves, will surely obstruct these plans in the short term.
Besides, more than two will be needed to tango. If a sustained economic recovery of Argentina takes place, Brazil will need to assure the support of extra-regional, heavyweight, non-Western actors, particularly China and India, in investment and trade flows to trigger a renewed insertion of MERCOSUR into the world economy.
De-dollarization could become a part, among others, of a dynamic reconfiguration of financial and productive intersections of Brazil and its neighbours with other regions and economic powerhouses of the global economy. Needless to say, this is a long-term strategy. The key consideration is the role of South America, that, in the near future, may play into the promotion of a multi-currency trading regime.
For now, while a strident flag of Lula’s presidential diplomacy, Brazilian ties with the US Dollar can be reduced but remain of unquestionable relevance. Decision-making in Brazil is conducted by a complex inter-ministerial web responsible for the states’ international sector that cannot avoid the influence of key production segments in the private sector.
Thus, transforming the Brazilian international financial modus operandi will depend on major accommodations that cannot overlook a broad domestic negotiation process, particularly if conjoined with the strengthening of democracy.
Monica Hirst is a research fellow at the National Institute for Science and Technology Studies in Brazil; Juan Gabriel Tokatlian is Provost at the Torcuato Di Tella University, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Source: International Politics and Society (IPS), published by the Global and European Policy Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin.
UAE’s role as COP28 host will be judged on results. Will COP deliver an operational and meaningful loss and damage fund? Will it produce a global stocktake that invigorates international action? How will discussions on a new global finance goal shape up? And will Sultan Al Jaber’s overtures towards the private sector turn the steady trickle of pledges into a giant wave of action? Credit: Isaiah Esipisu/IPS
Opinion by Felix Dodds, Chris Spence (new york)
Inter Press Service
NEW YORK, May 16 (IPS) – The hosts of COP28 are betting big on business and a private sector “mindset” to deliver a successful event. Are they right? Professor Felix Dodds and Chris Spence review the current state-of-playPerhaps one of the least well known among Dubai’s many attractions is surfing. Locals and visitors enjoy the sport at Sunset Beach and elsewhere, especially in winter. There is even an artificial wave pool where surfers can hone their skills. To some, the pool is just another example of the host country’s entrepreneurial outlook.
With COP28 on the horizon, the host government of the United Arab Emirates is once again promoting the virtues of business. In a recent interview with the Guardian media outlet, COP28 president-designate Sultan Al Jaber said the world needs a “business mindset” to tackle the climate crisis. What’s more, he laid out plans to use the COP to promote private sector goals as well as those for governments.
Will this focus on business signal a genuine new green wave, or will it wipe out? This article assesses the state of play and the host’s approach as we head into the official preparatory meetings taking place in Bonn, Germany, in June.
What was achieved at COP27?
To understand the situation, we need first to look at what happened at COP27. This is important not just in terms of the current landscape, but because the COP27 hosts, Egypt, technically continue to hold the presidency until COP28 officially starts on November 30th.
While all incoming presidencies are incredibly active in the months leading up to the event they will host, the outgoing presidency has a role to play, too, and the quality of the relationship between the two governments is important.
For many UN insiders, COP27 exceeded expectations. Admittedly, expectations were not high, particularly since COP27 was viewed by many as an “in-between” COP rather than one with critical milestones of the sort that occur every few years. While all COPs matter, most insiders will tell you not all are equal in importance.
The COP in Sharm El-Sheikh had a menu of issues it was dealing with, but it was not one where, say, a new global agreement was expected (such as COP21 in Paris), or a global stock take was due (as will happen at COP28 later this year). There had been calls for governments to strengthen their Nationally Determined Contributions (pledges and commitments) at COP27, but few did.
The major achievement at COP27—and the reason the meeting exceeded expectations—was an agreement to establish a loss and damage fund to support vulnerable countries. Few anticipated such a positive outcome even a few weeks prior to the meeting.
Although the agreement on loss and damage did not include acceptance of historical responsibility, it was viewed as a big win for the Egyptian Presidency, small islands and other vulnerable states, as well as the Group of 77 developing countries, which in 2022 was under the presidency of Pakistan.
Under the terms of the agreement at COP27, the loss and damage fund will need to be operationalized at COP28 and a transitional committee is already working on this. In the world of multilateral diplomacy, this is an ambitious timeframe.
There was another positive development on a modest scale at COP27 on the Global Goal on Adaptation. Delegates agreed to “initiate the development of a framework” to be available for adoption in 2024. Meanwhile, on agriculture a new four-year process was agreed to carry on the work started under the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture. There is a sense now that agriculture and food security are gaining the attention they deserve in climate negotiations.
Outside the formal negotiations, many projects and alliances were advanced, including plans to accelerate the decarbonization of five major sectors: power, road transport, steel, hydrogen, and agriculture. Noteworthy initiatives included the launch of the Global Renewables Alliance, which brings together leaders from the wind, solar, hydropower, green hydrogen, long duration energy storage, and geothermal sectors.
Research released just before COP27 showed that the Global North is still not delivering on its commitment to provide $100 billion a year to the Global South. One silver lining to this dark cloud is that this goal may finally be reached in time for COP28. Still, that is three years too late. Credit: Shutterstock
What was not achieved at COP27?
The main source of disappointment at COP27 was the absence of ambition on mitigation. There was a noteworthy lack of new and ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) from governments.
What this means is that the critical needle has not shifted when it comes to keeping global warming to less than 1.5 Celsius, or even under 2C. According to the Climate Action Tracker, our long-term scenarios are still well above 2C under most scenarios, and as high as 3.4C under their most pessimistic estimate. This means things have not really improved since COP26.
What’s more, research released just before COP27 showed that the Global North is still not delivering on its commitment to provide $100 billion a year to the Global South. One silver lining to this dark cloud is that this goal may finally be reached in time for COP28. Still, that is three years too late.
Meanwhile, COP27 did less to clarify new rules for the global carbon market than many were hoping to see. While COP26 in Glasgow had provided more details about Paris Agreement Article 6 (which sets out a framework for international cooperation and carbon markets), more granular guidance is still needed.
Some fear that without more details on accountability and measurement, for instance in terms of carbon offsets, we could end up with a “wild west” when it comes to the markets.
There was also little progress in negotiations aimed at encouraging the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. On the private sector side, while many companies have made net-zero targets, research suggests many do not have robust plans to deliver this, and there is uncertainty over how the private sector will use carbon offsets. Without greater clarity, this hyped-up “wave” of pledges from businesses around COP26 and before may end up a damp squib.
Looking to the Bonn climate conference
The political backdrop to the UN Bonn climate conference in June is complex. On the downside, governments are still emerging from the COVID pandemic and many are still focused on, and feeling the impact of, the war in Ukraine.
On the positive side, the cost of solar and wind continues to fall and European countries are moving more quickly because they want to be independent of Russian fossil fuels. Although others are taking advantage of Europe’s reduced demand to increase purchases of Russia’s fossil fuels at reduced prices, the growing focus on renewable energy in many countries should be seen as a positive overall in terms of climate mitigation.
With some major milestones coming up at COP28 later this year, the Bonn conference in June will give us some signals of how close we will be to delivering success in December.
Global Stocktake: UN climate negotiators are expected to take stock of progress on the Paris Agreement every five years. COP28 marks the culmination of the first “stocktake” and will be expected to shape and catalyze future action.
The stocktake has three phases. In the first phase, which started at COP26, information is collected and prepared from various sources to help assess progress. Phase 2, which started last year, includes in-person “technical dialogues” focused on mitigation, adaptation, and implementation. These will conclude in Bonn this June.
Finally, the stocktake will end at COP28 with a presentation of findings and discussions on how to respond. The Bonn meeting will therefore present an opportunity to take the pulse of these discussions. How robust have the technical dialogues been? Is there a surge of support from governments to make COP28 a major milestone for climate action? Bonn should provide clues about this.
Loss and Damage Fund: The transitional committee has been established and had its first meeting in Luxor, Egypt, in April. It will meet again in Bonn. Its role is to make recommendations on how to operationalize both the new funding arrangements and the fund at COP28. How are these discussions proceeding? Bonn should give some indications on progress, as well as potential areas of discord and disagreement.
Global Goal on Adaptation: With significant change already “baked in” to our climate system, effective adaptation will be critical. The Global Goal on Adaptation was agreed under the Paris Agreement and recognizes the need to build adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and limit vulnerability.
Adaptation will be addressed in Bonn under both the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA). It also links to the work of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, a related UN initiative which is having its “mid-term review” at UN Headquarters in New York from 18-19 May.
New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance: The goal of providing $100 billion in support annually for the Global South by 2020 was originally set in 2009. Now it is up for review. Since that earlier goal was viewed as a “floor” rather than a ceiling, many are expecting more ambitious targets in future.
A new goal is supposed to be set before 2025, meaning COP29 in 2024 should mark the moment when a new number (or set of numbers) is agreed. Again, Bonn will mark a moment to assess how those conversations are going, especially given the wide differences in the type of dollar figures being bandied about by the Global North and Global South (many of whom are calling for trillions). Those following this topic can look to the 6th Technical Expert Dialogue, which is taking place in Bonn, to get a sense of progress.
Carbon Markets: As mentioned above, in spite of progress many are still hoping for more granular details on the carbon markets. This will be vital to curtail greenwashing with offsets.
Coalitions of the Willing: Sultan Al Jaber, the COP28 president-designate, recently highlighted the private sector’s role in combating climate change. In fact, all stakeholders will need to be fully engaged if we are to have any chance of staying withing 1.5C of warming. Voluntary coalitions of governments, the private sector and many others will be vital, especially when it comes to advancing issues where all 190+ governments that are party to the UN climate treaty and Paris Agreement are not yet ready or willing to agree.
Such voluntary initiatives offer considerable scope for those who want to move ahead. In turn, this has the potential to set precedents and entrench ideas that might be taken up by all governments in future formal UN negotiations. An example of this is the methane pledge, which involved some 50 countries reporting on progress at COP27. More should be looked for at COP28. Likewise, the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero, which has reportedly had some teething problems since its launch in 2021, will hopefully use COP28 as a moment to showcase progress and put its early difficulties behind it.
Will COP28 Launch a New Green Wave?
Eyebrows were raised when the United Arab Emirates was first named as host of COP28. Why, people asked, would a climate COP be held in an OPEC state? Furthermore, many wondered publicly whether Sultan Al Jaber, who is likely to preside over the meeting, should do so given his role as chief executive of UAE’s national oil company? Does this represent a conflict of interest?
These are fair questions that will only be fully answered by the COP and what it achieves. However, it is worth noting that the prospects of a fossil fuel-producing country hosting COP28 were always quite high.
As UN insiders know, the climate COPs are typically hosted on a rotating basis in each of the UN’s five “regional groups.” This time around, it was Asia-Pacific’s turn.
Many countries in this region, including more than a dozen small island nations, probably do not have the internal capacity to host an event of this magnitude. Of those that do, many—from Saudi Arabia to India, Indonesia to China, Iran to Australia—are fossil-fuel producers.
Furthermore, while Sultan Al Jaber has a history in the fossil-fuel industry, he has also been prominent in the UAE’s work on renewable energy and is the founding CEO and current Chair of Masdar, a UAE-owned renewable energy company. Depicting him simply as a fossil fuel “dinosaur” does not do justice to a more nuanced and complicated situation.
Ultimately, UAE’s role as COP28 host will be judged on results. Will COP deliver an operational and meaningful loss and damage fund? Will it produce a global stocktake that invigorates international action? How will discussions on a new global finance goal shape up? And will Sultan Al Jaber’s overtures towards the private sector turn the steady trickle of pledges into a giant wave of action?
Finally, will other stakeholders, like non-governmental organizations, be embraced and welcomed? We should also note the significance of appointing Razan Al Mubarak as UN Climate Change High-Level Champion for the COP28 Presidency, given she is also IUCN President and a former head of Abu Dhabi’s Environment Agency.
One early indicator in Bonn will be an expected update on COP28 logistics. This is likely to include more details on the “Blue Zone” (where negotiations are held and many stakeholders usually have pavilions and stalls). Will the Blue Zone offer easy access to all stakeholders? And how will the “Green Zone,” which at past COPs has been open to the public, operate?
Only time will tell if COP28 marks the start of a new green wave or ends in an unfortunate wipe out.
Professor Felix Dodds is Vice President of Multilateral Affairs, Rob and Melani Walton Sustainable Solutions Service (RMWSSS) at Arizona State University. He is also Adjunct Professor and Senior Fellow at the Global Research Institute, University of North Carolina, and Associate Fellow at the Tellus Institute, Boston.
Chris Spence is a consultant and advisor to a range of international organizations on climate change and sustainable development, as well as an award-winning writer. Spence and Dodds recently co-edited Heroes of Environmental Diplomacy: Profiles in Courage (Routledge, 2022).
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