Opinion by David Ferrari – Sudip Ranjan Basu – Kimberly Roseberry (bangkok, thailand)
Inter Press Service
BANGKOK, Thailand, Feb 09 (IPS) – The last three years have seen the Pacific impacted negatively due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The tourism industry, a key source of national revenue and jobs creation, received a severe blow due to closure of borders and reduced travel.
In April 2020, a major cyclone caused widespread destruction in the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji and Tonga. In early 2022, a volcanic eruption in Tonga further caused significant damage to domestic physical infrastructure.
Adding to these existing pressures, the food, fuel and finance crises have had a crippling impact on national economies throughout the Pacific. The vulnerabilities to both manmade and natural disasters are all but obvious. There is a need for an acceleration of transformative energy policy actions and ambitions.
Growing costs of fuel imports
A glance at the data shows that most Pacific countries – particularly the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) – remain highly dependent on imported petroleum fuels and are expected to do so for many years.
Outside of Australia and New Zealand, oil makes up about 80 per cent of the Pacific’s total energy supply, of which 52 per cent is used for transport, 37 per cent for electricity generation and 12 per cent for other applications such as process heating. Renewable energy accounts for only 17 per cent of the total energy supply.
Fuel imports cost the region US$6 billion annually, or around 5 to 15 per cent of GDP for each economy. This is an enormous economic burden. With its vast natural resources, a history and culture of independence and subsistence together with its low energy intensity, the Pacific subregion offers great advantages for energy transition leadership. So, there are solutions to alleviate this cost.
ESCAP’s new report – Pacific Perspectives 2022: Accelerating Climate Action – makes the case for a rapid transition of the Pacific’s energy sector away from fossil fuel imports and to increase access to modern energy services to deliver Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG 7) in harmony with global climate goals.
This strengthens the case for alleviating reliance on imported fossil fuels. A move to locally generated renewable energy sources is supported by both the economic gains and the energy security benefits.
Advancing the implementation of SDG 7
It is widely recognized that the Pacific is not on track to deliver universal access to clean cooking fuels and technology by 2030. In fact, this target may present one of the largest hurdles to achieving SDG 7.
However, experts have recognized that energy access is best achieved through utilization of solar energy, and for many of those who remain without electricity across the Pacific, the best access solution will be the installation of stand-alone solar home systems.
Experts now suggest moving beyond minimum levels of electricity access and employing metrics such as multi-tier frameworks or the “modern energy minimum” of consumption of at least 1,000 kWh per year as a better indicator of access.
On the other hand, the rates of access to clean cooking fuels and technologies are amongst the lowest in the world as depicted in the chart below. In 2020, almost 10 million people across the Pacific lacked access to clean cooking, the bulk of whom (8.1 million people) were in Papua New Guinea. Furthermore, the rate of access to clean cooking in many countries is stagnating and, in some cases, even declining.
Figure 1: Proportion of population with access to clean cooking fuels and technologies (Data source: World Health Organization, via the Asia Pacific Energy Portal. Data was unavailable for New Caledonia, Northern Mariana Is., American Samoa, French Polynesia and Guam.)
Focusing on solution-oriented energy transition policies
A wide range of policy interventions and intergovernmental mechanisms are available to support policymakers to address the issues of over-reliance on fossil fuels and the lack of access to modern energy.
Firstly, renewable energy offers some very low hanging fruit. As imported petroleum accounts for about 72 per cent of the electricity supply and almost 100 per cent of transport energy; renewable sources can in many situations deliver clean energy at a lower cost. Developing infrastructure to support the shift to electric vehicles offers an opportunity to channel renewable energy into the transport sector.
Secondly, the business case for energy efficiency is strong and brings with it the potential to reduce energy demand across multiple sectors. However, a large proportion of these opportunities remain unfulfilled.
Finally, policymakers should collaborate through existing Pacific regional initiatives to support the scaling-up of local capability and capacity through coordinated training and knowledge transfer in the area of energy transition.
By putting people at the center of policymaking, the ESCAP Commission remains the most agile and vibrant anchor to accelerate energy transition and promote regional solidarity.
While it raises some complex questions, researchers have analysed the relationship between energy efficiency and demand response in various situations and determined that a high degree of complementarity is possible.
David Ferrari is ESCAP Consultant, Sudip Ranjan Basu is Deputy Head and Senior Economic Affairs Officer and Kimberly Roseberry is Economic Affairs Officer
Hydrogen (H2) is an essential component of today’s energy and industrial systems. Credit: Shutterstock.
Opinion by Adalberto Castaneda Vidal (new york)
Inter Press Service
The region is definitely taking this opportunity seriously. Over the past years, 11 countries in the region have published national hydrogen strategies. While this is an excellent policy signal, it might not be enough to win the race against other regions.
For the region to realize its hydrogen exporting potential, I would argue that governments should move from broad national roadmaps to a more tailored and assertive hub development strategy.
This is because the first movers are going to be the ones securing the offtake contracts and attracting investments. Following are some considerations and proposals to promote low-hydrogen hubs across the region to turn Latin America into a hydrogen success story.
Hydrogen’s potential in Latin America
Hydrogen (H2) is an essential component of today’s energy and industrial systems. Around 90 million tons (Mt) of H2 are produced and used yearly from natural gas and coal, emitting 9-23 kg CO2/kg H2.
Chemicals, refineries, and steel production dominate today’s demand. Recent technological developments that allow the production of low-carbon hydrogen, position it as an alternative to decarbonize hard-to-abate sectors. In optimistic scenarios, hydrogen’s global demand can reach 115 Mt by 2030 and 528 Mt by 2050.
The two most prominent low-carbon hydrogen types are:
Green hydrogen, produced through water electrolysis paired with 100% renewable electricity, emits (0 CO2/kg H2).
Blue hydrogen, produced from fossil fuels combined with carbon capture and sequestration technologies (CCS), emits 1-3 kg CO2/ kg H2.
The global hydrogen generation market was valued at USD 129.85 billion in 2021 and is expected to expand at a compound annual growth rate of 6.4% from 2022 to 2030. New value chains will be needed to support this upscaling, including installing electrolyzer manufacturing plants in the region, which could create thousands of high-quality jobs.
Latin America has a competitive advantage in the global hydrogen race as it has one of the most abundant endowments of solar and wind resources which are key for the production of green hydrogen.
Reasons for a hydrogen-hub strategy for Latin America
Some examples of planned hydrogen hubs already exist in Chile and Brazil. However, most hydrogen strategies in the region present broad national targets that lack demarcation and definition of particular incentives directed at the most strategic locations.
A hub is a specific geographic location with resources that provide a competitive advantage for developing the hydrogen supply chain. This pathway could facilitate cooperation between public and private stakeholders and community engagement. It also may provide increased visibility to attract first movers.
In this regard, hydrogen hubs are industrial areas with a competitive advantage in developing multiple projects for hydrogen production, distribution, utilization, and export. These hubs also have the presence of potential off-takers and existing infrastructure, which could be repurposed as the base for the hydrogen supply chain.
Hydrogen hubs can also be defined in opposition to its alternative, which is developing stand-alone individual projects. The lack of success of CCS projects over the past decade provide a good example of how stand-alone models face significant technical and commercial risks that can lead to inconsistent policy support and investments.
According to a study by the University of California, 80 percent of CCS projects ended in failure in the US. The projects failed due to a lack of off-takers, poor plant siting, and little support from local coalitions. These conditions impacted the project’s credibility of revenues and continued incentives support, which weakened their financial footing.
It is crucial to learn from these examples to mitigate such risks, considering particular vulnerabilities in Latin America that are hard to control, such as higher capital costs and exchange rate risks.
A hydrogen hub approach as a way to mitigate investments risks
While hydrogen’s potential is huge in the energy transition, as of the end of 2021, investments were still $863 billion short. This is when competition with other regions comes into play. Latin American economies must show more ambitious strategies to generate new opportunities and attract that capital. The key to facilitating the allocation of capital is to mitigate risks with strong market signals and the development of key infrastructure.
The benefits of a more focused hydrogen hubs promotion strategy can be divided into three parts: risk reductions, optimization of resource allocation, and securing policy and social support.
First, hubs can help mitigate market risks by building redundancy of supply and demand. This prevents risks associated with allocating production and demand to individual projects. Furthermore, it can help distribute technical risks among more players for the construction of key infrastructure projects, such as transmission lines, pipelines, and geological storage.
Second, according to experiences obtained from other clean energy projects, hubs are more efficient for optimizing planning and operation. Sole point-to-point projects run the risk of tailoring the technical decisions to the specific needs of one producer and one off-taker. However, with a hub approach, big market players cooperate and can involve smaller players, hence providing more opportunities to take advantage of economies of scale.
Lastly, stakeholders need to generate community acceptance and ensure the support of local authorities. Research from the Inter-American Development Bank found that of 200 conflict-affected infrastructure projects, 36 were canceled, 162 faced delays, and 116 faced cost overruns.
Therefore, community engagement cannot be regarded as a secondary requirement. A transparent hub proposal regarding its benefits, costs, and transition plans for communities and workers could help garner local support and, therefore, ensure consistent policy and social backing.
While clean hydrogen hubs can help reduce risks, optimize resource allocation, and garner local support, key decisions must be made by several actors with different goals. This creates a risk of delaying the projects or failing to reach agreements to get to final investment decisions. In this regard, it is important to consider lessons learned from failures and successes in other regions.
For instance, Europe is at the forefront of clean hydrogen development with a top-down and stakeholder-based approach. Lessons on the role of both national and local authorities in the pioneer hubs in Teesside and Rotterdam need to be taken into consideration.
In Latin America, Chile provides an excellent example of how to map and market hydrogen hubs at a global scale. In 2020, the Ministry of Energy published its National Green Hydrogen Strategy, outlining national priorities and targets. While the national strategy provided insights for three regions, in 2022, the government published a new report that identified two potential hydrogen hubs in Antofagasta (Atacama desert) and Magallanes. Both regions have well-defined projects and are working to attract investments and secure long-term offtake contracts with international partners.
To reproduce this strategy, the first hypothesis governments need to prove is the availability of natural resources, renewable resources for the development of green hydrogen or suitable geological storage, for blue hydrogen. The regions must ideally have the presence of relevant industries with experience in similar sectors, such as natural gas producers or renewable developers, as well as potential off-takers.
Then the government needs to devise a plan for incentives, such as tax deductions, accelerated depreciation, and customs exemptions, among others. On top of that, policy accelerators need to be implemented to allow faster deployment of technology, such as specialized land tenders and fast-track licensing and permitting.
Companies with international experience can work closely with local governments and federal agencies to ensure regulations do not hinder projects’ development.
Parallelly, hub participants need to engage with local communities. Plans must be outlined diligently to conduct consultations and provide attractive compensation when needed. A poor implementation of this requirement can create a bad reputation for key stakeholders and the industry as a whole.
While some international and regional examples show the benefits of following a hub-centered strategy, Latin American countries must face crucial challenges to make it work. First, the recent leftist turn in the region may pose some uncertainties about market-aligned policies.
With so much risk and lower margins, governments must prove they can attract and lay appropriate foundations for private investments.
On the other hand, with the broader land requirements for hydrogen projects, companies must show their commitment to building local support and respecting communities and regulations. A clean energy business cannot be developed with old dirty tactics. The potential for the region is evident. Will Latin America be able to work in teams and win this race?
Adalberto Castañeda Vidal is a second-year student of the Master of Public Administration at Columbia University – School of International and Public Affairs concentrating in Energy. He worked as a research assistant for the Center on Global and Energy Policy, where he participated in research projects about hydrogen and natural gas. He is originally from Tabasco, Mexico, and holds a bachelor’s in International Relations from the National Autonomous University of Mexico.
Energy-efficient solar systems in the UN Compound in Timor-Leste are helping cut down costs and reduce CO2 emissions. Credit: UN
Opinion by Ahmed Saleem (dili, timor-leste)
Inter Press Service
DILI, Timor-Leste, Feb 08 (IPS) – Access to energy remains a concerning challenge for many in Timor-Leste. The centralised nature of the local electricity supply chain has traditionally kept consumers reliant on the national grid to overcome chronic energy shortages.
While more than 200,000 households have access to electricity, the distribution network is in poor condition, with excessive voltage drops and persistent service outages. The cost of electricity is also higher than in neighbouring countries, and Timor-Leste has been slow to transition from expensive diesel generation to renewables.
With the new UN reforms, the United Nations in Timor-Leste, under the leadership of the Resident Coordinator (RCO) has now started lighting the way with its solar-powered grid which has begun to give maximum dividends.
A powerful 300 kWp photovoltaic system is producing 400,000 kWh of clean electricity annually, filling critical gaps in energy supply. “It covers 75 per cent of the daytime electricity consumption of the entire UN House, which hosts 14 UN agencies in Dili and has reduced reliance on fossil fuels and generators, leading to 286.000 kg of CO2 emission saved every year,” said Project Coordinator Ulderico Ze Machado.
It took almost a year – from feasibility to completion – to see the solar panel installed at the UN Timor-Leste compound. Credit: RCO Timor-Leste
This move comes with the UN’s revised Business Operations Strategy (BOS) that guides strategic planning, management, monitoring, and reporting of the UN Country Team’s joint support.
The Operations Management Team started weighing the feasibility and working on a cost-efficient alternative energy solution in 2016-2017 when Timor-Leste was facing high electricity costs and increased CO2 emissions.
“In Timor-Leste, our road to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development starts at home. Our solar energy system can be a model for other UN Country Offices to show how we can jointly, sustainably and effectively tackle greenhouse emissions while reducing operational costs, and scale up support across the United Nations System”.
“Greening our business operations can help maximise efficiency, improve productivity, and in turn support the transition of the country to a more sustainable energy future,” noted UN Timor-Leste Resident Coordinator Funmi Balogun.
The project has already substantially reduced electricity costs, which were 40% of the entire Common Premises budget. “We now save USD 90,000 annually on electricity bills and diesel costs with the hope that a 100 per cent return on the investment will be materialised within six to seven years,” added Ulderico Ze Machado.
In line with the UN’s commitment to the ‘Smart UN Facilities and the Sustainable Development Goals’, this solar project shows how a UN Common premises can work in action, and how the the United Nations Sustainable Development Coordination Framework can be coherently implemented in countries.
The infographic outlines the impact of the solar panel operations in the UN Timor-Leste compound. Credit: RCO Timor-Leste
“A project like this goes beyond providing energy. It showcases a value addition to the Government, partners, and stakeholders as to how such initiatives can help create other socio-economic benefits, including employment, greener environment, cheaper energy, and sustainable lifestyles.
So, the more we implement such projects, the more we empower our communities and bring impact.
The project also evidences the skillset and expertise to support the country to transition to a more sustainable energy future and supporting the deployment of renewable energy technologies,” said UNDP Resident Representative Munkhtuya Altangerel, who is also chair of the UN Operations Management Team.
Based on this successful experience, the UN Operations Management Team is now working on upscaling the project and making the UN House, a 100 per cent solar-energy-run compound.
Ahmed Saleem is Communications Officer, Resident Coordinator’s Office, Timor-Leste. Editorial support by UNDCO.
For more information on the UN’s work in Timor-Leste, please visit? Timorleste.un.org
BOA VISTA, Brazil, Feb 06 (IPS) – Roraima, the northernmost state of Brazil, on the border with Guyana and Venezuela, is undergoing an energy transition that points to the dilemmas and possible solutions for a safe and sustainable supply of electricity in the Amazon rainforest.
As the only state outside the national grid – the National Interconnected Electric System (SIN) – it is dependent on diesel and natural gas thermoelectric plants, which are expensive and polluting sources, that account for 79 percent of Roraima’s electric power.
The financial and environmental cost is exacerbated by the transportation of fossil fuels by truck from Manaus, the capital of the neighboring state of Amazonas, 780 kilometers from Boa Vista, the capital of Roraima.
But the people of Roraima pay one of the lowest prices for electricity in Brazil, thanks to a subsidy paid by consumers in the rest of the country.
These subsidies will cost about 2.3 billion dollars in 2023, benefiting three million people in this country of 214 million people, according to the National Electric Energy Agency regulator.
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A fifth of the total goes to Roraima, which from 2001 to 2019 received electricity imported from Venezuela. This meant the state needed less subsidies while it enjoyed a degree of energy security, undermined in recent years by the deterioration of the supplier, the Guri hydroelectric plant, which stopped providing the state with energy two years before the end of the contract.
Fortunately, Roraima has natural gas from deposits in the Amazon, extracted in Silves, 200 kilometers from Manaus, to supply the Jaguatirica II thermoelectric power plant, inaugurated in February 2022, with a capacity of 141 megawatts, two thirds of the state’s demand.
Roraima thus reduced its dependence on diesel, which is more costly and more polluting.
But what several local initiatives are seeking is to replace fossil fuels with clean sources, such as solar, wind and biomass.
This is the path to sustainable energy security, says Ciro Campos, one of the heads of the Roraima Renewable Energy Forum, as a representative of the Socio-Environmental Institute (ISA), a pro-indigenous and environmental non-governmental organization.
The city government in Boa Vista, the state capital, home to two thirds of the population of Roraima, has made progress towards that goal. Solar panels cover the roofs of the city government building, municipal markets and a bus terminal, and form roofs over the parking lots of the municipal theater and the Secretariat of Public Services and the Environment.
In addition, a plant with 15,000 solar panels with the capacity to generate 5,000 kilowatts, the limit for so-called distributed generation in Brazil, was built on the outskirts of the city.
In total there are seven plants with a capacity to generate 6,700 kilowatts, in addition to 74 bus stops equipped with solar panels, some of which have been damaged by theft, lamented Thiago Amorim, the secretary of Public Services and the Environment.
In addition to the environmental objective, solar energy allows the municipality to save the equivalent of 960,000 dollars a year, funds that are used for social spending. Boa Vista describes itself as “the capital of early childhood” and has won national and international recognition for its programs for children.
The Renewable Energies Forum and the Roraima Indigenous Council (CIR), which promote clean sources, say the aim is to reduce the consumption of diesel, a fossil fuel transported from afar whose supply is unstable, and to avoid the construction of the Bem Querer hydroelectric plant.
The project, of which there are still no detailed studies, would dam the Branco River, Roraima’s largest water source, to form a 519-square-kilometer reservoir that would even flood part of Boa Vista. It would affect nine indigenous territories directly and others indirectly, said Edinho Macuxi, general coordinator of the CIR.
Bem Querer would have an installed capacity of 650 megawatts, three times Roraima’s total demand. It has awakened interest because it would also supply Manaus, a metropolis of 2.2 million inhabitants that lacks energy security, and could produce more electricity just as the generation of other hydroelectric plants in the Amazon region is declining.
Almost all of Roraima is in the northern hemisphere, and the rainiest season runs from April to September, when water levels run low in the rest of the Amazon region. The state’s hydroelectricity would therefore be complementary to the entire Brazilian portion of the rainforest.
That is why Bem Querer is a project inextricably connected to the construction of the transmission line between Manaus and Boa Vista, already ready to start, which would integrate Roraima with the national grid, enabling it to import or export electricity.
“We can connect, but we reject dependency, we want a safe and autonomous energy model. We will have ten years to find economically and politically viable solutions,” said Ciro Campos.
Opinion by Jomo Kwame Sundaram (kuala lumpur, malaysia)
Inter Press Service
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Feb 02 (IPS) – Few policymakers ever claim credit for causing stagnation and recessions. Yet, they do so all the time, justifying their actions by some supposedly higher purpose.
Now, that higher purpose is checking inflation as if it is the worst option for people today. Many supposed economists make up tall tales that inflation causes economic contraction which ordinary mortals do not know or understand.
Jomo Kwame SundaramInflating inflation’s significance
Since early 2022, like many others in the world, Americans have been preoccupied with inflation. But official US data show inflation has been slowing since mid-2022.
Recent trends since mid-2022 are clear. Inflation is no longer accelerating, but slowing. And for most economists, only accelerating inflation gives cause for concern.
Annualized inflation since has only been slightly above the official, but nonetheless arbitrary 2% inflation target of most Western central banks.
At its peak, the brief inflationary surge, in the second quarter of last year, undoubtedly reached the “highest (price) levels since the early 1980s” because of the way it is measured.
After decades of ‘financialization’, the public and politicians unwittingly support moneyed interests who want to minimize inflation to make the most of their financial assets.
War and price
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine began last February, with retaliatory sanctions following suit. Both have disrupted supplies, especially of fuel and food. The inflation spike in the four months after the Russian invasion was mainly due to ‘supply shocks’.
Price increases were triggered by the war and retaliatory sanctions, especially for fuel, food and fertilizer. Although no longer accelerating, prices remain higher than a year before.
To be sure, price pressures had been building up with other supply disruptions. Also, demand has been changing with the new Cold War against China, the Covid-19 pandemic and ‘recovery’, and credit tightening in the last year.
There is little evidence of any more major accelerating factors. There is no ‘wage-price spiral’ as prices have recently been rising more than wages despite government efforts ensuring full employment since the 2008 global financial crisis.
Despite difficulties due to inflation, tens of millions of Americans are better off than before, e.g., with the ten million jobs created in the last two years. Under Biden, wages for poorly paid workers have risen faster than consumer prices.
Higher borrowing costs have also weakened the lot of working people everywhere. Such adverse consequences would be much less likely if the public better understood recent price increases, available policy options and their consequences.
With the notable exception of the Bank of Japan, most other major central banks have been playing ‘catch-up’ with the US Federal Reserve interest rate hikes. To be sure, inflation has already been falling for many reasons, largely unrelated to them.
Making stagnation
But higher borrowing costs have reduced spending, for both consumption and investment. This has hastened economic slowdown worldwide following more than a decade of largely lackluster growth since the 2008 global financial crisis.
Ill-advised earlier policies now limit what governments can do in response. With the Fed sharply raising interest rates over the last year, developing country central banks have been trying, typically in vain, to stem capital outflows to the US and other ‘safe havens’ raising interest rates.
Having opened their capital accounts following foreign advice, developing country central banks always offer higher raise interest rates, hoping more capital will flow in rather than out.
Interestingly, conservative US economists Milton Friedman and Ben Bernanke have shown the Fed has worsened past US downturns by raising interest rates, instead of supporting enterprises in their time of need.
Four decades ago, increased servicing costs triggered government debt crises in Latin America and Africa, condemning them to ‘lost decades’. Policy conditions were then imposed by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank for access to emergency loans.
Globalization double-edged
Economic globalization policies at the turn of the century are being significantly reversed, with devastating consequences for developing countries after they opened their economies to foreign trade and investment.
Encouraging foreign portfolio investment has increasingly been at the expense of ‘greenfield’ foreign direct investment enhancing new economic capacities and capabilities.
The new Cold War has arguably involved more economic weapons, e.g., sanctions, than the earlier one. Trump’s and Japanese ‘reshoring’ and ‘friend-shoring’ discriminate among investors, remaking ‘value’ or ‘supply chains’.
Arguably, establishing the World Trade Organization in 1995 was the high water mark for multilateral trade liberalization, setting a ‘one size fits all’ approach for all, regardless of means. More recently, Biden has continued Trump’s reversal of earlier trade liberalization, even at the regional level.
1995 also saw strengthening intellectual property rights internationally, limiting technology transfers and progress. Recent ‘trade conflicts’ increasingly involve access to high technology, e.g., in the case of Huawei, TSMC and Samsung.
With declining direct tax rates almost worldwide, governments face more budget constraints. The last year has seen these diminished fiscal means massively diverted for military spending and strategic ends, cutting resources for development, sustainability, equity and humanitarian ends.
In this context, the new international antagonisms conspire to make this a ‘perfect storm’ of economic stagnation and regression. Hence, those striving for international peace and cooperation may well be our best hope against the ‘new barbarism’.
A wind energy generation plant located in Loiyangalani in northwestern Kenya. Credit: Isaiah Esipisu/IPS
Opinionwashington dc
Inter Press Service
WASHINGTON DC, Jan 31 (IPS) – Meeting our climate change goals will require massive investments in clean energy projects, in both advanced economies and across the Global South. But financing projects in the latter group of countries requires an increase in foreign capital inflows that will be constrained by currency exchange rate risk. Creating an innovative Exchange Rate Coverage Facility can help to overcome this constraint.
Over the coming two decades, annual energy emissions across the Global South (not counting China) are currently projected to grow by 5 Gt. Analysis by the International Energy Agency, the World Economic Forum and the World Bank shows that reversing this dynamic so as to meet the climate goals of the Paris Agreement, while also supporting the development needs of these countries, will require a four- to seven-fold increase in clean energy investments by 2030 from the current level of $150 billion.
Significantly, most of the needed clean energy projects provide domestic-oriented services (such as power from solar or wind power plants, public transit systems, building efficiency retrofit campaigns, electric vehicle charging stations). These generate local currency revenues.
Although much of the funding for these projects will come from domestic resources, the sheer magnitude of the required investment will necessitate significant amounts of foreign capital, potentially $180 billion or more per year by 2030.
Exchange rate risk (i.e., the potential that the local currency devalues relative to the foreign currency loan or other investment) is a major impediment to mobilizing large foreign capital flows for these projects (albeit, not the only one).
This risk translates into many problematic impacts. Notably, it increases the cost of capital, raises the financial liabilities of domestic stakeholders as their local currency depreciates, and, perhaps most significantly, constrains the level of foreign investment.
While currency hedging and other options exist (including specialized programs for developing countries), they can be expensive and are lacking for many Global South currencies, particularly at the long tenors, low cost and large scale required to support many clean energy investments.
If this currency risk cannot be overcome, it will be impossible to mobilize the level of foreign capital inflows that developing countries require to grow their energy systems with a low-emissions trajectory. This poses risks for both rich and poorer countries in the global effort to lower greenhouse gas emissions.
What to do to address this impediment? We propose an Exchange Rate Coverage Facility (ERCF), a blended-finance vehicle that would be funded by a combination of host country stakeholders, multilateral/bilateral development and climate agencies, and climate-engaged international capital.
The ERCF would be established as an offshore facility to absorb currency exchange risk on its balance sheet. It would issue guarantees protecting international lenders against this risk (see figure 1), while in parallel helping to insulate domestic sponsors from it. The Facility would pay any and all shortfalls between the value of contracted local currency (LC) payments and foreign currency (FC) debt repayments if the local currency (LC)depreciates relative to pre-defined exchange rate .
Figure 1: Clean Energy Exchange Rate Coverage Facility Model
Under our proposed financing structure, the Facility would be a “blended finance” vehicle funded by the following :
(i) carbon credits generated by the clean energy project that are assigned to the Facility, which would cover “first loss”;
(ii) multilateral development banks (including guarantees counter-guaranteed by host countries), development finance institutions and other development/climate agencies, providing funding for defined subsequent losses; and
(iii) international capital, including philanthropies, sovereign wealth funds, and interested private institutions, covering “third loss”.
Figure 2: The “Ladder” of Coverage for Local Currency Depreciation in the ERCF
The Facility could generate multiple benefits:
(i) catalyzing additional foreign financing for clean energy projects in developing countries;
(ii) lowering exposure of local project stakeholders to currency exchange rate shifts, thereby reducing prospect of tariff increases if the LC depreciates;
(iii) reducing the cost of foreign financing to clean energy projects;
(iv) facilitating scalability of coverage;
(v) supporting the growth of carbon credits projects and markets;
(vi) enabling funders to leverage financial impact through blended-finance structure; and
(vii) flexibility to include specialized windows (e.g., country-specific programs, including under the Just Energy Transition Partnerships being discussed with South Africa, Indonesia, Vietnam and others).
To mobilize international capital flows in the magnitude required to achieve the dual objectives of sustained development and low emissions, there is a need for new financial tools.
The proposed blended-finance ERCF is being incubated as a solution to address currency exchange risk as part of the initiative on Mobilizing Investments for Clean Energy in Emerging Economies. Its proponents welcome interested organizations and individual experts to join forces on the implementation of a pilot Facility to facilitate increased funding for the global clean energy transition.
Authors: Philippe Benoit, Adjunct Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University; Jonathan Elkind, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University; Justine Roche, Energy Initiative Lead, World Economic Forum
Solar panels with a capacity to generate 30 kilowatts no longer work in the Darora Community of the Macuxi people, an indigenous group from Roraima, a state in the far north of Brazil. The batteries only worked for a month before they were damaged because they could not withstand the charge. CREDIT: Boa Vista City Hall
by Mario Osava (boa vista, brazil)
Inter Press Service
BOA VISTA, Brazil, Jan 25 (IPS) – “Our electric power is of bad quality, it ruins electrical appliances,” complained Jesus Mota, 63. “In other places it works well, not here. Just because we are indigenous,” protested his wife, Adélia Augusto da Silva, of the same age.
The Darora Community of the Macuxi indigenous people illustrates the struggle for electricity by towns and isolated villages in the Amazon rainforest. Most get it from generators that run on diesel, a fuel that is polluting and expensive since it is transported from far away, by boats that travel on rivers for days.
Located 88 kilometers from the city of Boa Vista, capital of the state of Roraima, in the far north of Brazil, Darora celebrated the inauguration of its solar power plant, installed by the municipal government, in March 2017. It represented modernity in the form of a clean, stable source of energy.
A 600-meter network of poles and cables made it possible to light up the “center” of the community and to distribute electricity to its 48 families.
But “it only lasted a month, the batteries broke down,” Tuxaua (chief) Lindomar da Silva Homero, 43, a school bus driver, told IPS during a visit to the community. The village had to go back to the noisy and unreliable diesel generator, which only supplies a few hours of electricity a day.
Fortunately, about four months later, the Boa Vista electricity distribution company laid its cables to Darora, making it part of its grid.
“The solar panels were left here, useless. We want to reactivate them, it would be really good. We need more powerful batteries, like the ones they put in the bus terminal in Boa Vista,” said Homero, referring to one of the many solar plants that the city government installed in the capital.
Tuxaua (chief) Lindomar Homero of the Darora Community is calling for new adequate batteries to reactivate the solar power plant, because the electricity they receive from the national grid is too expensive for the local indigenous people. Behind him stands his predecessor, former tuxaua Jesus Mota. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS
Expensive energy
But indigenous people can’t afford the electricity from the distributor Roraima Energía, he said. On average, each family pays between 100 and 150 reais (20 to 30 dollars) a month, he estimated.
Besides, there are unpleasant surprises. “My November bill climbed to 649 reais” (130 dollars), without any explanation,” Homero complained. The solar energy was free.
“If you don’t pay, they cut off your power,” said Mota, who was tuxaua from 1990 to 2020.”In addition, the electricity from the grid fails a lot,” which is why the equipment is damaged.
Apart from the unreliable supply and frequent blackouts, there is not enough energy for the irrigation of agriculture, the community’s main source of income. “We can do it with diesel pumps, but it’s expensive; selling watermelons at the current price does not cover the cost,” he said.
“In 2022, it rained a lot, but there are dry summers that require irrigation for our corn, bean, squash, potato, and cassava crops. The energy we receive is not enough to operate the pump,” said Mota.
A photo of the three water tanks in the village of Darora, one of which holds water that is made potable by chemical treatment. The largest and longest building is the secondary school that serves the Macuxi indigenous community that lives in Roraima, in northern Brazil. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS
Achilles’ heel
Batteries still apparently limit the efficiency of solar energy in isolated or autonomous off-grid systems, with which the government and various private initiatives are attempting to make the supply of electricity universal and replace diesel generators.
Homero said that some of the Darora families who live outside the “center” of the village and have solar panels also had problems with the batteries.
Besides the 48 families in the village “center” there are 18 rural families, bringing the community’s total population to 265.
A solar plant was also installed in another community made up of 22 indigenous families of the Warao people, immigrants from Venezuela, called Warao a Janoko, 30 kilometers from Boa Vista.
But of the plant’s eight batteries, two have already stopped working after only a few months of use. And electricity is only guaranteed until 8:00 p.m.
“Batteries have gotten a lot better in the last decade, but they are still the weak link in solar power,” Aurelio Souza, a consultant who specializes in this question, told IPS from the city of São Paulo. “Poor sizing and the low quality of electronic charging control equipment aggravate this situation and reduce the useful life of the batteries.”
The low quality of the electricity supplied to Darora is due to the discrimination suffered by indigenous people, according to Adélia Augusto da Silva. The water they used to drink was also dirty and caused illnesses, especially in children, until the indigenous health service began to chemically treat their drinking water. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS
In Brazil’s Amazon jungle, close to a million people live without electricity, according to the Institute of Energy and the Environment, a non-governmental organization based in São Paulo. More precisely, its 2019 study identified 990,103 people in that situation.
Another three million inhabitants of the region, including the 650,000 people in Roraima, are outside the National Interconnected Electricity System. Their energy therefore depends mostly on diesel fuel transported from other regions, at a cost that affects all Brazilians.
The government decided to subsidize this fossil fuel so that the cost of electricity is not prohibitive in the Amazon region.
This subsidy is paid by other consumers, which contributes to making Brazilian electricity one of the most expensive in the world, despite the low cost of its main source, hydropower, which accounts for about 60 of the country’s electricity.
Solar energy became a viable alternative as the parts became cheaper. Initiatives to bring electricity to remote communities and reduce diesel consumption mushroomed.
But in remote plants outside the reach of the grid, good batteries are needed to store energy for the nighttime hours.
Part of the so-called “downtown” in Darora, which has lamp posts, houses, a soccer field and a shed where the community meets. A larger community center is needed, says the leader of the Macuxi village located near Boa Vista, the capital of the northern Brazilian state of Roraima. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS
A unique case
Darora is not a typical case. It is part of the municipality of Boa Vista, which has a population of 437,000 inhabitants and good resources, it is close to a paved road and is within a savannah ecosystem called “lavrado”.
It is at the southern end of the São Marcos indigenous territory, where many Macuxi indigenous people live but fewer than in Raposa Serra do Sol, Roraima’s other large native reserve. According to the Special Secretariat for Indigenous Health (Sesai), there were 33,603 Macuxi Indians living in Roraima in 2014.
The Macuxi people also live in the neighboring country of Guyana, where there are a similar number to that of Roraima. Their language is part of the Karib family.
Although there are no large forests in the surrounding area, Darora takes its name from a tree, which offers “very resistant wood that is good for building houses,” Homero explained.
The community emerged in 1944, founded by a patriarch who lived to be 93 years old and attracted other Macuxi people to the area.
The progress they have made especially stands out in the secondary school in the village “center”, which currently has 89 students and 32 employees, “all from Darora, except for three teachers from outside,” Homero said proudly.
A new, larger elementary and middle school for students in the first to ninth grades was built a few years ago about 500 meters from the community.
Water used to be a serious problem. “We drank dirty, red water, children died of diarrhea. But now we have good, treated water,” said Adélia da Silva.
“We dug three artesian wells, but the water was useless, it was salty. The solution was brought by a Sesai technician, who used a chemical substance to make the water from the lagoon drinkable,” Homero said.
The community has three elevated water tanks, two for water used for bathing and cleaning and one for drinking water. There are no more health problems caused by water, the tuxaua said.
His current concern is to find new sources of income for the community. Tourism is one alternative. “We have the Tacutu river beach 300 meters away, great fruit production, handicrafts and typical local gastronomy based on corn and cassava,” he said, listing attractions for visitors.
A gas flare at installations of the state-owned Pemex oil company in the town of Reforma Escolín, Papantla municipality in the southeastern Mexican state of Veracruz, on Jan. 11, 2023. More than 100 gas wells operate in the area, several of which release gas without controls and put the local population and their property at risk. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS
by Emilio Godoy (papantla, mexico)
Inter Press Service
A dark mole dots the brown earth, among the green scrub at this spot in southeastern Mexico. A repetitive “glug, glug,” a noise sounding like a thirsty animal, and an intense stench lead to this site, hidden in the undergrowth, where a broken pipe has created a pool of dense oil.
The smell of fuel overpowers the usual aroma of the surrounding vegetation.
The oil and natural gas leak runs freely in a well belonging to the state-run oil giant Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) in Reforma Escolín, part of Papantla, a municipality in the southeastern state of Veracruz, in the vicinity of a natural gas flare that illuminates the semi-cloudy environment and warms the already high temperature.
Far from the gaze of Mexico’s Agency for Security, Energy and Environment (ASEA), responsible for monitoring the fossil fuel industry in the country, and Pemex, the gas flares in an area dotted with oil and gas wells.
“The infrastructure is old, they don’t maintain it. When there are leaks, you hear a ‘ssssss’ and the smell is unbearable, you can’t stay in your house,” Omar Lázaro, a delegate to the municipality of the non-governmental National Indigenous Congress, which brings together native peoples and organizations, told IPS.
The local community all too vividly recalls the Jun. 4, 2022 explosion of a Pemex gas pipeline that put residents on edge and confirmed, for the umpteenth time, the potentially catastrophic impacts of fossil fuels.
Lázaro, a local musician, recalled that the leak flowed for two days, there were four fires in the affected area and the fire lasted two weeks, some 300 kilometers from Mexico City, in Papantla, (which means “place of abundant papán” – a local bird – in the Nahuatl language), home to just under 160,000 inhabitants in its extensive rural and semi-urban territory.
“In some places there was a smell of gas before the explosion. The problem was that the scrubland began to burn and there was no water to put it out. Pemex threatened that it would not take responsibility if people went in to put out the fire and something happened to them,” said Lázaro, who is also a member of the Assembly for the Defense of the Territory, which represents some 20 communities and five municipal organizations.
In essence, the gas is methane, 86 times more powerful at trapping heat than carbon dioxide (CO2) over 20 years, even though it spends less time in the atmosphere.
That means it is important to control it to curb the rise in the planet’s temperature to no more than 1.5 degrees C, according to the commitments made by the international community.
In the municipality of Papantla, in the southeastern Mexican state of Veracruz, oil and gas wells abound, emiting polluting gases, such as methane, a major contributor to global warming. The photo shows the “Escolín 238” well in operation. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS
Massive
The incident in the town of Reforma Escolín is part of a pattern of gas leaks from the extraction and transportation of oil and gas by Pemex and private companies in Mexico, without enforcement by the environmental authorities of the existing regulations.
IPS reviewed Pemex databases on leaks and its prevention plans, obtained through public information requests, which point to underreporting of gas emissions – composed mainly of methane – and confirmed the evidence that leaks devastate an area where gas wells abound.
Historically, Pemex has been the biggest culprit in the gas leaks, due to the size of its infrastructure in Mexico.
After a drop between 2017 and 2019, gas explosions have been on the rise since 2020. Most of the incidents occur at hydrocarbon facilities in the states of Campeche, Tabasco and Veracruz in southeastern Mexico.
In 2020, 78 gas leaks by Pemex and its subsidiaries were registered, 85 by private companies, and 32 by the National Center for Natural Gas Control (CENAGAS), which manages the gas pipelines that belonged to the state oil company, without estimates of the resulting methane emissions, according to ASEA figures.
A year later, Pemex reported 91 leaks, private companies 74, and CENAGAS 28.
These leaks come from gas pipelines, compressor stations and other facilities that transport, store and distribute gas, infrastructure that adds up to some 30,000 facilities and 50,000 kilometers of gas pipelines.
The face of Pastora García, one of the 11 members of the Municipal Council of Papantla, reflects concern about the leaks.
“Things are bad here, there are a lot of risks. This is how Pemex works and we’re screwed. It is worrisome, because people live here,” she told IPS while she was working in Reforma Escolín, a town of some 1,000 people.
García was a municipal councillor in the small town and submitted three requests for pipeline repairs in 2011 and 2020, obtaining no response, and the leaks continued.
In and around the town, local residents grow citrus fruit, beans and corn, and raise cattle, and the pollution harms their activities. In the area, the ground looks like Swiss cheese from which gas frequently emanates, as during the great leak of 2013.
Although ASEA does not record the volumes of leaks, Mexico ranked tenth in the world in methane emissions in 2021, a list led by China, India and the United States, and which also includes Brazil, according to data from the International Energy Agency (IEA), an intergovernmental grouping of large oil consumers.
In addition, since 2019 oil and gas infrastructure has released methane into the atmosphere in Mexico, according to satellite images.
In June 2022, a group of European scientists revealed that Pemex released 40,000 tons of methane in December 2021 from an offshore platform in the Gulf of Mexico.
In the case of Pemex, one of the aggravating factors is the deliberate venting or release and flaring of gas, which has been on the rise since 2017 due to the lack of capture technology and economic incentives for its use, since it is more convenient for the oil company to simply release and burn it off.
This practice grew from 3,800 cubic meters (m3) of gas in 2017 to 6,600 in 2021, according to the World Bank’s Global Gas Flaring Reduction Initiative (GGFR), made up of 20 governments, 12 oil companies and three multilateral organizations. Mexico forms part of the alliance, but Pemex does not.
The IEA measured Mexico’s emissions at 6.33 million tons of methane in 2021, equivalent to 1.8 percent of the world total, to which agriculture contributed 2.53 million, waste 2.28 million, and production and energy consumption 1.47 million. In this segment, venting and flaring represent the main factors, and in gas pipelines, leaks.
Itziar Irakulis, a researcher at the Polytechnic University of Valencia, told IPS from that Spanish city that “from the satellite we see that every time the gas flaring stops (the torch goes out), about 100 tons of methane per hour are vented. This turns the oil platform into what in the literature we call an ultra-emitter.”
The expert, co-author of a study on the release of gas from Pemex platforms, stressed that, in the face of the climate crisis, “the last thing we need is more ultra-emission events of this type.”
Pemex resorts to the practice of flaring gas due to the lack of technology for its retention and economic incentives for its use. The photo shows a pipeline in Reforma Escolín, Papantla municipality in the southeastern Mexican state of Veracruz, on Jan. 11, 2023. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS
Anaid Velasco, research coordinator at the non-governmental Mexican Center for Environmental Law (CEMDA), described the “important challenges” in accounting for and curbing methane emissions.
“There is more talk about methane, but there is still no public policy. This disconnect between what is said and what is done has to do with not creating more responsibilities that could be binding, in order to apply an energy policy based on fossil fuel sources. They don’t want to generate a greater regulatory burden” for the oil industry, especially Pemex, she told IPS.
ASEA partially applies the regulation to control methane emissions, which is why Mexico faces hurdles to meet its Nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The regulation was supposed to enter into force in December 2019, after it was drafted in 2018. But in July 2020, under the pretext of the COVID-19 pandemic, ASEA postponed its application for 19 months, until the end of January 2022.
As of August 2022, 18 companies, including the subsidiaries Pemex Exploración y Producción (PEP) and Pemex Logística, had presented to ASEA their program for the prevention and comprehensive control of methane emissions from the hydrocarbons sector, the fundamental component of the regulation.
The state Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) had not delivered its plan.
Between 2017 and October 2022, ASEA imposed 26 fines on state-run and private companies totaling 3.83 million dollars, of which they have paid 3.29 million, without specifying the reason, which means it is not clear if the fines targeted methane emissions.
From 2017 to 2021, it fined Pemex Transformación Industrial three times for undisclosed reasons, which the company appealed.
But ASEA did not investigate the two fires on the surface of the ocean in the Gulf of Mexico, caused by methane leaks in July and August 2021, according to its own records. After the explosion in Reforma Escolín, a group of residents filed a complaint with ASEA, to no avail.
Pemex abandoned its plan to reduce gas flaring in its fields and the ministry of energy blocked the application of regulations in this regard, as reported by the British news agency Reuters throughout 2022.
In August, the state-run National Hydrocarbons Commission, the regulator of the oil industry, fined Pemex about two million dollars for excessive gas flaring at the Ixachi oil and gas field in Veracruz.
Gas deals
In 2021 Mexico signed the Global Methane Pledge, aimed at cutting emissions by 30 percent in 2030, from 2020 levels. But the country has not yet set a specific goal.
Along these lines, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who supports fossil fuel energy over renewables and promotes Pemex, announced in June 2022 that the oil giant would invest two billion dollars, with international aid, to cut methane emissions by 98 percent.
But there is no detailed plan to reach that target, beyond Pemex’s previous program to curb them.
In its methane control plan, obtained by IPS through Mexico’s freedom of information act, the oil company set an annual reduction goal in the Cantarell field, the country’s biggest, in the Gulf of Mexico, of four percent between 2017 and 2022. and calculated that emissions totaled 27,175 tons per year. But it is not known how much progress has been made towards this target.
However, the oil company uses an emission factor – the average amount of a pollutant coming from a specific process, fuel, equipment or source – instead of a measurement at the source site.
For the Ku Maloob Zaap field, the country’s second-largest, there are no measurements. The highest estimate comes from the Macuspana-Muspac deposit, located between the states of Chiapas and Tabasco, which emit 199,222 tons, followed by the Poza Rica Altamira Reynosa deposit – between Veracruz and Tamaulipas – with 73,352 tons; the Nejo Olmos field in Tamaulipas (53,395 tons); and Samaria-Luna in Tabasco (52,669 tons).
These emissions come from equipment, gas pipelines, compressors, leaks and venting. Pemex, which did not include infrastructure in other areas of the country, estimates decreases between four percent and 25 percent over a period of six years.
Throughout 2023, public and private companies must submit their annual reports to ASEA.
For the Cantarell deposit, the oil company ordered a halt to the flaring of 80 million Bcf/d, equivalent to 72.74 tons of methane. In addition, PEP applied measures to reduce flaring by 291 billion Bcf/d.
As natural gas for consumption in Mexico continues to be imported via pipelines and burned in combined-cycle power plants that also use steam, methane emissions will also continue, as occurred in the United States.
In places like Reforma Escolín, people have not gotten used to living among time bombs and are only asking that the leaks be repaired, although opposition by the local community is waning.
Lázaro lamented that “After the accident, some community assemblies were held, but the social mobilization dwindled, undermined by the local authorities.”
Without fighting methane emissions, Mexico will have a hard time reaching its Nationally determined contributions, presented to comply with the Paris Agreement on climate change, signed in 2015.
Velasco the environmentalist doubts that Mexico will meet its commitments. “They set goals because there is a lot of international interest. It is good that they make commitments, because it gives us tools to monitor the situation and demand compliance. If Pemex receives financing, we don’t know how it will execute it. Transparency and traceability are needed,” she said.
Spanish researcher Irakulis said maintenance and continuous flaring prevent ultra-emissions.
“It is true that the flares already have other types of emissions associated with them, and there are more environmentally friendly ways than flaring to treat the excess gas obtained from oil extraction. A significant reduction in emissions can be realistic as long as they invest in improving the maintenance of the facilities,” she stated.
In Reforma Escolín, the only option seems to be the dismantling of the gas infrastructure, which is impossible. “Pemex says there is no money. We have not seen machinery to replace the pipeline, they are not doing anything. Where are we going to go? We live here, and we’re staying here,” said García the town councillor.
TOKYO, Japan, Jan 18 (IPS) – The Ukraine crisis that erupted in February last year continues with no prospect for cessation. The intensified hostilities have inflicted great suffering in population centers and destroyed infrastructure facilities, compelling large numbers of civilians, including many children and women, to live in a state of constant peril.
The history of the twentieth century, which witnessed the horrors caused by two global conflicts, should have brought home the lesson that nothing is more cruel or miserable than war.
During World War II, when I was in my teens, I experienced the firebombing of Tokyo. To this day, I remember with great vividness getting separated from family members as we fled desperately through a sea of flames, and not learning that they were safe until the following day.
How many people have lost their lives or livelihoods in the ongoing crisis, how many have found their own and their family’s ways of life suddenly and irrevocably altered?
Many other countries have also been seriously impacted in the form of constrained food supplies, spiking energy prices and disrupted financial markets.
It is crucial that we find a breakthrough in order to prevent any further worsening of the conditions facing people worldwide, to say nothing of the Ukrainian people who are compelled to live with inadequate and uncertain supplies of electricity amidst a deepening winter and intensifying military conflict.
I therefore call for the urgent holding of a meeting, under UN auspices, among the foreign ministers of Russia, Ukraine and other key countries in order to reach agreement on a cessation of hostilities. I also urge that earnest discussions be undertaken toward a summit that would bring together the heads of all concerned states in order to find a path to the restoration of peace.
Together with calling for the earliest possible resolution to the Ukraine crisis, I wish to stress the crucial importance of implementing measures to prevent the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, both in the current crisis and all future conflicts.
Nuclear rhetoric has ratcheted up, and the risk that these weapons might actually be used stands today at its highest level since the end of the Cold War. Even if no party seeks nuclear war, the reality is that, with nuclear arsenals in a continuing state of high alert, there is a considerably heightened risk of unintentional nuclear weapon use as a result of data error, unforeseen accident or confusion provoked by a cyberattack.
Along with reducing tensions with the goal of resolving the Ukraine crisis, I feel it is of paramount importance that the nuclear-weapon states initiate action to reduce nuclear risks as a means of ensuring that situations do not arise—either now or in the future—in which the possibility of nuclear weapons use looms. It was with this in mind that in July last year I issued a statement to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in which I urged the five nuclear-weapon states to make prompt and unambiguous pledges that they would never be the first to launch a nuclear strike—the principle of “No First Use.”
Regrettably, the August NPT Review Conference was unable to reach consensus on a final document. But this in no way means that the nuclear disarmament obligations set out in Article VI of the treaty no longer pertain. As the various drafts of the final document indicate, there was widespread support for nuclear risk reduction measures such as the adoption of No First Use policies and extending negative security assurances, by which nuclear-weapon states pledge never to use nuclear weapons against states that do not possess them.
The pledge of No First Use is a measure that nuclear-weapon states can take even while maintaining for the present their current nuclear arsenals; nor does it mean that the threat of the some 13,000 nuclear warheads existing in the world today would quickly dissipate. However, what I would like to stress is that should this policy take root among nuclear-armed states, it will create an opening for removing the climate of mutual fear. This, in turn, can enable the world to change course—away from nuclear buildup premised on deterrence and toward nuclear disarmament to avert catastrophe.
Looking back, the global state of affairs during the Cold War era was characterized by a series of seemingly insoluble crises that rattled the world, spreading shockwaves of insecurity and dread. And yet humankind managed to find exit strategies and pull through.
One example of this is the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) held between the United States and the Soviet Union. Intention to hold these was announced on the day of the 1968 signing ceremony for the NPT, which had been negotiated in response to the bitter lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The SALT negotiations were the first steps taken by the US and the USSR to put the brakes on the nuclear arms race based on their nuclear disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT.
For those involved in these talks, to impose constraints on the nuclear policies that had been developed as the exclusive prerogative of the state could not have been easy. Nonetheless, this was a decision indispensable to the survival not only of the citizens of their respective nations, but of all humankind.
Having experienced first-hand the terror of teetering on the brink of nuclear war, the people of that time brought forth historic powers of imagination and creativity. Now is the time for all countries and peoples to come together to once again unleash those creative powers and bring into being a new chapter in human history.
The Gabura union, a small island adjacent to the Sundarbans forest, is expected to be submerged in seawater by 2050. Credit: Mohammad Rakibul Hasan
by Mohammad Rakibul Hasan – and AI Artificial Intelligence (dhaka, bangladesh)
Inter Press Service
DHAKA, Bangladesh, Jan 18 (IPS) – Climate change is a global problem that requires a global solution. However, negotiating a solution has been challenging due to several factors. One of the main reasons that recent COP Climate summits and other international climate talks have not been able to resolve climate change is that there is a lack of consensus among countries on how to address the issue. Developed countries, which have historically been the largest emitters of greenhouse gases, are often unwilling to take on significant emissions reductions or to provide financial assistance to developing countries to help them adapt to the effects of climate change.
The Gabura union, a small island adjacent to the Sundarbans forest, is expected to be submerged in seawater by 2050. Credit: Mohammad Rakibul Hasan
Another significant barrier to progress on climate change is the need for more political will among leaders of countries. In some cases, leaders may not see climate change as a priority or may be reluctant to take on the economic and political costs of reducing emissions or investing in clean energy due to political reasons. Some countries may be influenced by powerful fossil fuel lobbies that push against climate action. Developed countries must be willing to take on more significant emissions reductions and provide financial assistance to developing countries to help them adapt to the effects of climate change. Developing countries, in turn, need to be willing to take on emissions reduction measures and invest in clean energy and other climate mitigation measures.This can happen through more effective multilateral negotiations such as United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), where all countries agree to set emissions reduction targets and support developing countries.
Bangladesh is located in the low-lying delta region of the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna rivers, making the country particularly susceptible to flooding and rising sea levels. Bangladesh is also prone to cyclones and other extreme weather events, which are becoming more frequent and severe due to climate change. The country has a long coastline, much of which is low-lying and vulnerable to flooding. As sea levels continue to rise, the risk of coastal flooding is increasing, devastatingly impacting the lives and livelihoods of the people in these areas. These events are causing widespread damage to homes and infrastructure and affecting the country’s agricultural sector, a significant source of income for many people in Bangladesh. Many people in the coastal areas have lost their homes and livelihoods due to sea level rise and coastal flooding. They face food and water insecurity due to increased soil and water salinity.
Globally, rich countries can assist Bangladesh cope with climate change in several ways. One crucial way is by providing financial assistance to help the country adapt to the impacts of climate change. This may include funding for building sea walls and other flood protection infrastructure and programs to help people in coastal areas relocate to higher ground. Another way rich countries can help is by providing technical assistance to Bangladesh to develop and implement clean energy and other climate mitigation measures. This could include funding and expertise to help the country develop renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power, as well as to improve energy efficiency and to reduce emissions from the industrial and transportation sectors.
The Sundarbans forests, located in the coastal belt of Bangladesh, is one of the most vulnerable areas in the country to the impacts of climate change. The forests span over 10,000 square kilometres and is home to various plant and animal species, including the Royal Bengal tiger. Sea level rise is one of the most significant threats to the Sundarbans forest making it particularly susceptible to flooding and rising sea levels. According to a study by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, sea levels in the Bay of Bengal are projected to increase by up to 1 meter by the end of the century. This would devastate the Sundarban forests, as seawater would submerge large areas.
The impacts of climate change on the Sundarban forests are also likely to have knock-on effects on the people living in the surrounding areas. The forests are a significant source of livelihood for many people in the region, who rely on it for fishing, agriculture, and other activities. As the forests are damaged by sea level rise and extreme weather events, these people will also be affected by food and water insecurity and the loss of their homes and livelihoods. Many people who lost their homes and land to flooding, were forced to relocate to higher grounds.
The health impacts of climate change on people living around the Sundarban are also significant. As a result of sea level rise and increased flooding, many are at risk of waterborne diseases such as cholera and diarrhea. Extreme weather events are accelerating salinity across the coastal belt of Bangladesh. Women are experiencing uterus cancers, infertility, and skin diseases, and men, too, are experiencing fertility problems and other health issues. Due to the loss of livelihoods and displacement, many people face food insecurity and malnutrition. In addition to these immediate impacts, climate change exacerbates the region’s existing social and economic inequalities. People living in poverty and marginalized communities are disproportionately affected by climate change, as they have fewer resources to cope with the impacts and less access to services and support.
Climate change has led to a growing number of people migrating from these areas, searching for better opportunities and escaping the impacts of climate change. Most climate migrants from coastal belt areas of Bangladesh are moving to urban areas, such as the capital city of Dhaka and other major cities. These migrants often seek better job opportunities and access to services and support. However, many migrants face challenges in their new locations, such as a lack of affordable housing, discrimination, and limited access to services and support. The future is uncertain for those still living in coastal areas of Bangladesh and fighting the climate crisis. Many of the people living in these areas are among the country’s most vulnerable and marginalized communities, making them particularly susceptible to the impacts of climate change. Climate conversations worldwide by world leaders and major organizations have been occurring every year. But they must see the severity of the situation for the people suffering and take concrete actions beyond being in a room to converse about the effects of climate change.
Climate conversations by world leaders are occurring worldwide but how much is changing ? Credit: Mohammad Rakibul Hasan Many indigenous communities across the Sundarbans forest have been experiencing extreme weather conditions. Credit: Mohammad Rakibul Hasan Fishing communities face extreme poverty due to the lack of fish available in the rivers. Credit: Mohammad Rakibul Hasan Women around coastline areas of Bangladesh face increased salinity, a major cause of uterus cancer. Credit: Mohammad Rakibul Hasan Due to climate change, extreme heat and salinity are declining birth rates across the coastal belt in Bangladesh. Credit: Mohammad Rakibul Hasan Climate change is accelerating the displacement of inhabitants across the coastal belt of Bangladesh. Credit: Mohammad Rakibul Hasan Four families are sitting with what remains in their food storage. Due to high salinity, agricultural products cannot grow well anymore. Credit: Mohammad Rakibul Hasan
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