The cumulative needs of injured patients from the war have created a medical crisis. Credit: James Jeffrey/IPS
Opinion by Abdo Husen (addis ababa)
Inter Press Service
ADDIS ABABA, Mar 30 (IPS) – There are about 5 billion people globally who cannot access surgery. In Ethiopia, for every 5,000 needed surgeries per 100,000 people, the country’s health system can only provide 192. Yet, this is Africa’s second largest population, with over 120 million people.
The statistics are worrying. This is further exacerbated by a recently ended two-year war in the northern part of the country that devastated among others, the health sector. There is however an opportunity to build back better as the government institutes post-war reconstruction. This is possible through prioritizing access to surgical care as part of restoring the country’s health system in post-war reconstruction efforts.
Armed conflict increases the demand for health services yet hampers the system’s ability to deliver these services as it disrupts the supply chain, results in direct damage to health facilities, and forces health workers to flee their duty stations. In Ethiopia, unofficial estimates put the proportion of health workers who fled their duty stations at over 90% of the pre-conflict numbers.
The cumulative needs of injured patients from the war have created a medical crisis. It is a vicious cycle whose victims are innocent civilians. Take for instance patients with open fractures and bullet wounds who require some form of reconstructive surgery. This service is largely unavailable in affected regions, particularly in Tigray. If left untreated, these injuries can result in infections, amputation, permanent disability, or even death.
This was the case for 17-year-old Hakeem* (not his real name). He suffered bone and nerve damages as a casualty of the war. Hakeem was facing the threat of disability from abnormal bone healing and wrist-drop, which is paralysis of the muscles that enable hand function.
Fortunately, he received surgical care that allowed him to return to his daily activities with reduced physical challenges. Not many people have been as lucky. Reports show that over 100,000 people died from lack of access to medical care in war time. This includes lack of access to surgical care.
Additionally, the influx of surgical patients owing to the war has slowed down the already strained health system’s ability to provide non-emergency surgical care. Although not life threatening, these surgical needs have a major impact on improving the quality of life of those in need.
These include cleft lip and cleft palate, which are birth defects that occur when a baby’s lip or mouth do not form properly during pregnancy. Failure to correct this, often results in social and economic exclusion of patients who are often ostracized by their communities for allegations based on false and harmful cultural and religious beliefs including their participation in witchcraft.
To restore all social service infrastructure- including health facilities damaged by conflicts in the country, the government has allocated 20 billion ETB into the capital budget for the current fiscal year. This is way below the requisite threshold to rebuild the health services alone.
There is indeed urgent need to prioritize surgical care at the forefront of rehabilitation efforts. The Ministry of Health must provide health workers – including specialist surgical and anesthesia workforce with monetary and non-monetary incentives to return to their pre-war duty stations to fill the gaping vacuum in human resourcing.
The federal government must allocate resources towards the rehabilitation and equipping of all health facilities including surgical theatres in northern Ethiopia. This budgetary allocation must be included in the 2023/2024 budget cycle (2016 Ethiopian fiscal year). Critics could argue that there is simply not enough money to this end.
While the government could be cash-strapped to rebuild different sectors of the economy; it is its ultimate responsibility to ensure the life and health of its citizens. It must therefore seek innovative ways to fund reconstruction efforts. One such way could be through leveraging public private partnerships.
Not only will this provide the necessary funds but has the prospect of being an accountability mechanism to ensure lasting peace as a condition of the disbursement of funds or gifts in kind. These would be tangible steps towards reconstruction, alleviating the suffering of Ethiopians who without these services, continue to suffer preventable medical conditions and deaths.
Abdo Husen is a public health specialist by training, Program Lead at Operation Smile Ethiopia, and a 2023 Global Surgery Advocacy Fellow
SA’ANA, Yemen, Mar 30 (IPS) – As Yemen enters its ninth year of war, its people are facing a humanitarian crisis of horrifying proportions. In my role as Oxfam’s Yemen Country Director, I have witnessed firsthand the effects of the humanitarian catastrophe, worsened by economic collapse and sharp increases in the cost of food and other essential commodities.
Over 17 million people are experiencing high levels of food insecurity, 75% of whom are women and children. The situation is further aggravated by the global food crisis, leaving millions more at risk of catastrophic hunger.?
The time for global action is now.
The current conflict has its roots in the 2011 Arab Spring, when mass protests led to the ousting of long-serving President Ali Abdullah Saleh. His successor, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, struggled to address a range of issues, including corruption, unemployment, and food insecurity. In 2014, the Houthi rebel movement, seized control of large parts of the country, including the capital, Sana’a.
In March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states, backed by the United States and other Western powers, launched military operations against the Houthis to restore Hadi’s government. The ensuing conflict has led to widespread destruction, civilian casualties, and an unprecedented humanitarian crisis.
The war has also been characterized by numerous violations of international humanitarian law, such as indiscriminate attacks on civilian infrastructure, the use of child soldiers, and the imposition of constraints that hinder the delivery of aid.
This past Sunday, March 26, marked eight years since the conflict in Yemen escalated. The expiration of a temporary UN-brokered truce in October has left the country in a precarious state. While the truce has largely held, the political and economic future of Yemen remains uncertain.
The UN estimated in 2021 that there had already been 337,000 deaths due to the conflict and associated issues like lack of access to food, water, and healthcare. Millions have been displaced and more than 21.6 million people—two-thirds of the population—require humanitarian assistance and protection.
Despite the severity of the crisis, international donors have committed only about a third of the necessary funds for the past few years.
The importance of international aid in humanitarian emergencies cannot be overstated. Such aid provides a lifeline to affected populations, helping them meet their basic needs, rebuild their lives, and restore hope for the future. In times of crisis, international aid can mean the difference between life and death.
Moreover, it can help prevent the spread of conflict and instability by addressing root causes, such as poverty, inequality, and social unrest. As global citizens, we have a moral obligation to support those in need and to promote peace and stability worldwide.
I have seen the exhaustion and desperation of the Yemeni people firsthand. Rising food prices and unpaid salaries mean even basic foodstuffs have been pushed beyond the reach of many Yemeni families.
We cannot let donors turn their backs on one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises. It is also past time for world leaders to exert real pressure to bring all sides back to the table so they can bring a permanent end to the conflict. They must also ensure that the voices of the most marginalized—most notably women women—are included and heard.
Yemen’s cost of living crisis is compounded by the worsening global food situation. The country imports 90% of its food, with 42% of its wheat coming from Ukraine. Importers warn that rising global costs will challenge their ability to secure wheat imports into Yemen, potentially pushing millions towards starvation.
The impact on households is profound, forcing families to adopt negative coping mechanisms—such as eating lower quality foods, limiting portion sizes, going into debt to buy food, and borrowing from friends and neighbors—to survive.
As a result, 2.2 million Yemeni children under the age of five are now acutely malnourished.
The international response has been insufficient. Despite the growing need, the World Food Program has been forced to reduce the amount of aid it provides. A high-level pledging event earlier this year co-hosted by the UN and the governments of Sweden and Switzerland concluded with a collective commitment of under a third of the amount needed for 2023 ($1.2 billion of the $4.3 billion required).
At Oxfam, we work in Yemen to provide basic services like clean water, sanitation, cash, and establishing solar energy at household and community levels. However, more must be done.
I call upon the international community to provide adequate funding for life-saving aid, a rescue economic package to stabilize the economy and put money into people’s pockets, and increased efforts to negotiate a lasting comprehensive peace in Yemen.
The situation in Yemen is dire, and the international community must no longer remain passive. As we recall the grim anniversary of eight years of conflict, we must keep in mind the millions of Yemenis who continue to suffer.
It is time for world leaders to come together and take action to bring an end to the conflict and to provide the necessary resources for the people of Yemen to rebuild their lives.
Opinion by Ines M Pousadela, Andrew Firmin (london / montevideo)
Inter Press Service
LONDON / MONTEVIDEO, Mar 29 (IPS) – Brave protests against women’s second-class status in Iran; the mass defence of economic rights in the face of a unilateral presidential decision in France; huge mobilisations to resist government plans to weaken the courts in Israel: all these have shown the willingness of people to take public action to stand up for human rights.
The world has seen a great wave of protests in 2022 and 2023, many of them sparked by soaring costs of living. But these and other actions are being met with a ferocious backlash. Meanwhile multiple conflicts and crises are intensifying threats to human rights.
Vast-scale human rights abuses are being committed in Ukraine, women’s rights are being trampled on in Afghanistan and LGBTQI+ people’s rights are under assault in Uganda, along with several other countries. Military rule is again being normalised in multiple countries, including Mali, Myanmar and Sudan, and democracy undermined by autocratic leaders in El Salvador, India and Tunisia, among others. Even supposedly democratic states such as Australia and the UK are undermining the vital right to protest.
But in the face of this onslaught civil society continues to strive to make a crucial difference to people’s lives. It’s the force behind a wave of breakthroughs on g abortion rights in Latin America, most recently in Colombia, and on LGBTQI+ rights in countries as diverse as Barbados, Mexico and Switzerland. Union organising has gained further momentum in big-brand companies such as Amazon and Starbucks. Progress on financing for the loss and damage caused by climate change came as a result of extensive civil society advocacy.
The latest State of Civil Society Report from CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance, presents a global picture of these trends. We’ve engaged with civil society activists and experts from around the world to understand how civil society is responding to conflict and crisis, mobilising for economic justice, defending democracy, advancing women’s and LGBTQI+ rights, calling for climate action and urging global governance reform. These are our key findings.
Civil society is playing a key role in responding to conflicts and humanitarian crises – and facing retaliation
Civil society is vital in conflict and crisis settings, where it provides essential services, helps and advocates for victims, monitors human rights and collects evidence of violations to hold those responsible to account. But for doing this, civil society is coming under attack.
Catastrophic global governance failures highlight the urgency of reform
Too often in the face of the conflicts and crises that have marked the world over the past year, platitudes are all international institutions have had to offer. Multilateral institutions have been left exposed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It’s time to take civil society’s proposals to make the United Nations more democratic seriously.
People are mobilising in great numbers in response to economic shock – and exposing deeper problems in the process
As it drove a surge in fuel and food prices, Russia’s war on Ukraine became a key driver of a global cost of living crisis. This triggered protests in at least 133 countries where people demanded economic justice. Civil society is putting forward progressive economic ideas, including on taxation, connecting with other struggles for rights, including for climate, gender, racial and social justice.
The right to protest is under attack – even in longstanding democracies
Many states, unwilling or unable to concede the deeper demands of protests, have responded with violence. The right to protest is under attack all over the world, particularly when people mobilise for economic justice, democracy, human rights and environmental rights. Civil society groups are striving to defend the right to protest.
Democracy is being eroded in multiple ways – including from within by democratically elected leaders
Economic strife and insecurity are providing fertile ground for the emergence of authoritarian leaders and the rise of far-right extremism, as well for the rejection of incumbency. In volatile conditions, civil society is working to resist regression and make the case for inclusive, pluralist and participatory democracy.
Disinformation is skewing public discourse, undermining democracy and fuelling hate
Disinformation is being mobilised, particularly in the context of conflicts, crises and elections, to sow polarisation, normalise extremism and attack rights. Powerful authoritarian states and far-right groups provide major sources, and social media companies are doing nothing to challenge a problem that’s ultimately good for their business model. Civil society needs to forge a joined-up, multifaceted global effort to counter disinformation.
Movements for women’s and LGBTQI+ rights are making gains against the odds
In the face of difficult odds, civil society continues to drive progress on women’s and LGBTQI+ rights. But its breakthroughs are making civil society the target of a ferocious backlash. Civil society is working to resist attempts to reverse gains and build public support to ensure that legal changes are consolidated by shifts in attitudes.
Civil society is the major force behind the push for climate action
Civil society continues to be the force sounding the alarm on the triple threat of climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss. Civil society is urging action using every tactic available, from street protest and direct action to litigation and advocacy in national and global arenas. But the power of the fossil fuel lobby remains undimmed and restrictions on climate protests are burgeoning. Civil society is striving to find new ways to communicate the urgent need for action.
Civil society is reinventing itself to adapt to a changing world
In the context of pressures on civic space and huge global challenges, civil society is growing, diversifying and widening its repertoire of tactics. Much of civil society’s radical energy is coming from small, informal groups, often formed and led by women, young people and Indigenous people. There is a need to support and nurture these.
We believe the events of the past year show that civil society – and the space for civil society to act – are needed more than ever. If they really want to tackle the many great problems of the world today, states and the international community need to take some important first steps: they need to protect the space for civil society and commit to working with us rather than against us.
Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief. Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist. Both are co-directors and writers of CIVICUS Lens and co-authors of the State of Civil Society Report.
QUEBEC, Canada, Mar 29 (IPS) – In the wake of Finland’s announcement last fall that it will build a barrier along its border with Russia, the discussions surrounding the European Council meeting of 9 February 2023 confirmed that the tide had turned.
Demands for stronger border measures have multiplied and some states have made it clear that they are willing to finance border barriers in other member states on the edge of the European Union.
They are thus projecting their own anxieties beyond their territories: in the midst of a moral panic, Europe now seems to be building what the geographer Klaus Dodds calls a ‘barbed-wire curtain’: a protective bulwark, in the spirit of what Samuel Huntington imagined when he wrote The clash of civilizations.
However, Brussels doesn’t seem quite ready to build a continuous external and concrete border wall itself. Yet.
Europe has a historical yet complicated relationship with walls. At the outset of the millennium, the continent, which had long rejected the idea of border walls as relics of a bygone era, in time would change its tune.
As the European Union expanded, it inherited the fenced-off borders in the heart of Cyprus and on the edge of Lithuania. But these were seen as mere remnants of conflicts from the past.
For in the 1990s, the EU became the champion of a world without borders, a world of free movement and flow. Yet, this was a mirage: the Schengen area abolished internal border controls while the physical barriers on its periphery were gradually hardening — such as Spain, which was walling up its border with Morocco in its two enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, situated on the African continent. However, towards the end of the Cold War, there were still only 200 km of fenced borders in existence: vestiges of an ancient period, reminders of geopolitical obsolescence.
Breaking ‘the wall’ taboo
The great change towards erecting walls instead of tearing them down in Europe happened in two phases, starting in 2015, when the Syrian crisis led the EU to believe that there was also a ‘migratory crisis’ in Europe.
Then, in the following years, the change in the mindset continued both because of the Russian strategic threat in the wake of the invasion of Crimea and the instrumentalisation of refugee flows by Europe’s cumbersome neighbours.
Thus, in 2023, all over Europe, stretching from Finland to Greece, from Ukraine to Calais in France, there are 17 walled-in dyads. While 1.7 per cent of Europe’s land borders were barricaded at the end of the 20th century, 15.5 per cent are fenced today – 2008 kilometres of walls now scar the continent.
The fact that Europe is fully embracing the walled-in world and its own border limits is effectively breaking a taboo – that of the wall – as explicitly expressed by some heads of government on the eve of the European summit in February 2023. The Trumpian formulae, both gruesome and horrifying, is no longer an exception.
The wall has become an acceptable solution no longer limited to the vocabulary of populism and the Far Right, but rather entering fully mainstream discourse; legitimising exclusion as a tool of identity-based resistance in a world shaken by the winds of globalisation.
Yet, walls, which now represent a lucrative and globalised market with astronomical direct and indirect costs, do not fulfil the objectives for which they are being built. While political rhetoric suggests they are intended to seal and render the border impervious, it fails to recognise that flows shift – both spatially and temporally – when impeded.
Smuggling (whether of drugs, weapons, or people), irregular crossings and insurgency reorganise and become more opaque and thus more difficult to monitor. Flows disappear briefly to reappear elsewhere or in other forms. In the meantime, passage (both legal and illegal) becomes more costly and a magnet for organised crime.
Thus, although border walls sketch a fantasised imperviousness, they are not meant to serve as watertight membranes but rather as mere sieves.
Research shows that not only do walls burden bilateral trade and borderlands’ health, and affect a nation’s image, but they are also limited in effectiveness, as they do not block unwanted flows nor do they significantly increase security. Indeed, the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) website has long claimed that the wall serves only as a ‘ speedbump’.
This perspective is shared by Finland’s Border Guard which states that the prototype barrier being tested will ‘slow down and guide the movements of any crowds that form’, adding that ‘even if people skirt the fence, it still fulfils its task by slowing down illegal entry and helping the authorities to manage the situation.’
However, this clear-mindedness doesn’t necessarily spill over into the public arena because border walls, as Trump proved in 2016, are an undeniably effective electoral weapon. An aspect that does not seem to have escaped the Austrian chancellor when he recently called for the erection of a wall along Europe borders – with the upcoming legislative elections in Austria less than a year away.
The wall as a silver bullet?
Just as a wall obscures the other side of the border, it also hides disagreements and opportunities for cooperation between border actors and border security policies. By de-structuring border areas economically, politically and ecologically, border walls amplify vulnerabilities and differences, which in turn accentuate violence. In their subsequent quest for security, states engage in damaging behaviours (such as suddenly shifting funding priorities, militarising border areas and mismanaging labour migration at the expense of local economies and ecosystems) – motivated by the prevailing rhetoric of a visible, theatrical silver bullet: the wall as a panacea.
As a matter of fact, border walls accentuate the global hierarchisation of mobility: a wall isn’t an impenetrable rampart for everyone but a filter that dissociates flows, selecting which is the wheat and which is the chaff. For some, it will impose cruel choices and added difficulties. For others, it will be barely a speck in the landscape.
For a few, it will even be an opportunity to enrich themselves. This unbalancing contributes to the political longevity of the wall-building process while also accomplishing a self-fulfilling prophecy: it becomes the announced remedy to the instability it breeds. Border walling creates a ‘tragedy by design’.
Hence, any transgression of the wall – Professor Scott Nicol calls these barriers ‘ladder magnets’ – becomes a demonstration of its very necessity, despite the fact that the wall itself is the reason some of these activities are now illegal.
By succumbing to the sirens of border fortification, European states are contributing to the normalisation and dissemination of the walling phenomenon. Walls are – above all – an admission of failure (of cooperation – both international and European) and a renouncement of the founding values of the European Union.
The resulting backlash will see an increased rift, accentuated flows, growing incomprehension and fears that are ever more primal, for which only greater cooperation can offer a remedy. For walls do not solve the problems they address. They merely act as a bandage on a broken limb, a smokescreen before increasingly glaring problems that remain unsolved.
Élisabeth Vallet is an Associate Professor at the RMCC-Saint Jean in Canada. She is also the director of the Centre for Geopolitical Studies of the Raoul-Dandurand Chair in Strategic and Diplomatic Studies (UQAM-Canada). Her main field of interest include Borders, border walls and US politics.
Source: International Politics and Society (IPS) which is published by the Global and European Policy Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin.
Opinion by Marine Olivesi (ouagadougou, burkina faso)
Inter Press Service
OUAGADOUGOU, Burkina Faso, Mar 23 (IPS) – Over a million children in Burkina Faso are currently affected by school closures with 6,134 academic institutions shut as of February 2023, an increase of over 40 per cent since the end of the last school year.
Nearly one out of four schools country-wide are now out of service due to rampant insecurity and violence, which has forced close to two million people into displacement.
On the eve of the high-level conference on Education in Emergencies, organised by the European Commission and the United Nations Children’s Fund in Brussels, the Norwegian Refugee Council together with the Education Cluster in Burkina Faso and the FONGIH, two umbrella entities representing 87 national and international organisations operating in the country, called for increased access to education for children left behind, whether they are internally displaced or live in enclaved areas.
“Only about a quarter of the children driven out-of-school have been given new classrooms. The majority are left without access to education, robbing them of their childhood and of their chance to become independent adults and citizens,” said Hassane Hamadou, NRC’s country director in Burkina Faso.
“The longer this situation drags on, the graver it becomes, the harder it will be to reverse this trend and protect their futures. The authorities in Burkina Faso as well as humanitarian and development organisations must urgently renew their efforts to stop this educational hemorrhage.”
Out of eight schools, only two are operational in the blockaded town of Pama in the East region, one of the three regions with the highest number of school closures along with Sahel and Boucle du Mouhoun. Six teachers and a few volunteers are currently serving over 1,000 children in Pama.
“For those of us who are still here, it’s a very personal decision to stay,” explained a teacher. “Education is a universal right, so we feel it’s our duty to carry on. But fear doesn’t go away easily. Often, we have to stop classes because we hear gunshots here or there.
Threats loom large, and conditions are tough, but we can and must overcome challenges to assist children who never wished to be put in this situation.”
Over 31,000 teachers have been affected by the education crisis nationwide, of which about 6,300 have been redeployed so far in schools hosting large numbers of internally displaced students. The reopening or relocation of around 300 schools since January marks a welcome step in the right direction.
However, it is now crucial to increase the use of “double shifts approach” in operating schools, to set-up more classrooms wherever possible, and to accelerate the reassignment of teachers to new sites in displacement areas.
This crisis has disproportionately impacted girls. A study conducted by Plan International revealed that girls are 2.5 times more at risk of being driven out of schools than boys in a crisis situation. Meanwhile, ongoing efforts to help teachers meet the growing psycho-social needs of students often traumatized by displacement and conflict must be sustained and increased nationwide.
“Insecurity is a big part of why so many schools close, but food insecurity in the Sahel and East regions is also a driver of school dropouts,” said Tin Tua’s director, Yembuani Yves Ouoba. “Guaranteeing that schools and non-formal education centers provide meals and children are being fed are effective ways of keeping them in the system.”
“We are witnessing an accelerating assault on education. Teachers are threatened and parents are frightened. Children are paying the heaviest price. When a child is not at school, he is more at risk of being exploited, being a victim of violence and trafficking, or even being recruited by armed groups,” said the Representative of UNICEF in Burkina Faso, Sandra Lattouf.
“We welcome the effective partnership and collaboration with the Ministry of National Education, Literacy, and Promotion of National Languages, which is strengthening access to education in challenging contexts. We must act now to not lose the next generation and renew efforts to strengthen emergency and alternative education solutions.”
Parties to the conflict must do more to protect school infrastructures from attacks and not occupy academic buildings. We welcome the upcoming inter-ministerial order to set up national and regional committees in charge of the implementation of the Safe School Declaration and hope they help make schools safe for all Burkinabè children.
• At the end of February 2023, 6,134 schools were closed in Burkina Faso, a 44% increase since May 2022 (4,258). This represents 24% of all academic structures in the country. (Source: Ministry of Education’s statistical monthly report on Education in Emergencies from February 28, 2023)
• Number of closed schools in other West and Central African countries due to insecurity: 3,285 in Cameroon, 1,762 in Mali , 1,344 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 878 in Niger, 181 in Nigeria, 134 in Chad and 13 in Central African Republic (Source: Unprecedented School Closures Jeopardise the Future of Millions in West and Central Africa, NRC, UNHCR, UNICEF, Education Cannot Wait, March 2023).
• The regions of Boucle du Mouhoun, East and Sahel in Burkina Faso are the most impacted by school closures and each hosts between 1000 and 1200 closed schools. (Source: Ministry of Education’s statistical monthly report on Education in Emergencies from February 28, 2023)
• School closures impact 1,050,172 students as well as 31,077 teachers. 262,388 of these children have so far reintegrated a formal classroom. (Source: idem)
• Girls are 2,5 times more at risk of being driven out of school than boys in a crisis situation according to a 2020 study conducted in Mali and Burkina Faso (Adolescent girls in crisis, voices from the Sahel, Plan International, August 2020)
• Two schools out of eight are currently operational in Pama, with 6 teachers and 6 volunteers serving over 1,000 children. (Source: NRC interviews of teachers in Pama, March 2023)
Marine Olivesi, is Advocacy Manager for Norwegian Refugee Council in Burkina Faso
Black Sea Grain Initiative has been renewed – for now. Credit: Ihor Oinua/Unsplash
by Alexander Kozul-Wright (geneva)
Inter Press Service
GENEVA, Mar 22 (IPS) – Given the complex interplay between geopolitics and financial markets, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 sent shockwaves across the global economy. Admittedly, the implications both within and between countries have varied. However, there were some common denominators, including higher commodity prices.
Price disruptions were particularly severe for ‘soft’ agricultural commodities. During peacetime, Russia and Ukraine produced a large amount of the world’s grain, supplying 28 percent of globally traded wheat and 75 percent of sunflower products. Before the war, they were also among the world’s top providers of barley and corn.
After the start of hostilities, exports of grain were severely disrupted. For four months, Russian military vessels blocked Ukrainian ports. Supply constraints triggered market volatility and price rises. Wheat, for instance, reached a record high in March 2022. This left millions of people, particularly in developing countries, at the frontline of a food crisis.
Then, in July 2022, two agreements were signed: one was a memorandum of understanding between the UN and Moscow to facilitate global access for Russia’s food and fertilizer exports; the second was the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), signed by Russia and Ukraine, facilitating the safe export of grain and other foodstuffs from Ukrainian ports via the Black Sea.
Brokered by the UN and Turkey, the BSGI opened a protected maritime corridor through Ukraine. The agreement assuaged concerns about global grain supplies and led to price declines. Over 900 ships of grain and other foodstuffs have left Ukraine’s major ports since last summer.
Prior to the conflict, between 5-6 million tons of grain were exported from Ukraine’s seaports every month, according to the International Grains Council. By the end-2022, Ukraine had once again reached its historical exporting capacity (at just under 5 million tons). Production responses elsewhere also helped to increase global supplies.
Still, Ukrainian exports to developing countries remain below pre-war levels. And while unblocking the trade corridor did help to address food insecurity in 2022, export backlogs were significant. Today, grain prices (while they have come down in recent months) remain elevated.
Against this backdrop, negotiations between UN officials and Russian Federation representatives – headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin – kicked off in Geneva last Monday on a possible extension of the BSGI. Subsequent to a four-month renewal last year, the deal was set to expire on March 18th.
Earlier this month, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres highlighted the deal’s importance. He stressed that “it contributed to lowering global food costs and offered critical relief to people…, particularly in low-income countries.” Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, also called for the initiative to be extended.
For their part, Russian officials argued that ‘hidden’ sanctions – targeting fertilizer firms and the country’s main agricultural bank – have undermined commodity exports. By way of background, exemptions were carved out for some Russian food and fertilizer products after Western sanctions first targeted the Kremlin in February 2022.
In Geneva, delegates stressed that over-compliance and market avoidance by private companies had resulted in Russian commodity exports being under-traded. They noted that sanctions on its payments, logistics, and insurance systems created a barrier for Moscow to sell its grains and fertilisers in international markets.
In response, they requested that national jurisdictions enhance exemption clarifications for food and fertilizers products. “I think it’s a fair request,” says Jayati Ghosh, professor of economics at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. “Hidden sanctions are impeding Russian financial transactions and undermining allegedly exempted exports.”
When the BSGI was last renewed in November, Russia threatened to renege on the deal unless hidden sanctions were addressed. While they eventually agreed to an extension, Moscow has since insisted that its own agricultural exports (notably ammonia) be included in the BSGI as a condition for its renewal.
Under the deal’s latest iteration, Russia’s pre-condition went notably unaddressed. Moscow, in turn, agreed to extend the deal for just two months. Ukraine, meanwhile, issued conflicting statements on the matter. Over the weekend, Deputy Prime Minister Oleksandr Kubrakov tweeted that the agreement had been extended for four months.
So far, the UN has not specified the length of the renewal, but “this could be the last time an extension is agreed,” according to Ghosh. “Russia is probably going to use this latest agreement as a threat. Rejecting a third extension in the spring may force the international community to listen to their concerns”.
Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital, has been attracting hundreds of thousands of Russians since the war in Ukraine started in February 2022. The city is a favored destination where Russians can still travel visa-free.
by IPS Correspondent (tbilisi)
Inter Press Service
TBILISI, Mar 21 (IPS) – Since the war in Ukraine started in February last year, at least 1.5 million Russian citizens have crossed the Russia-Georgia border, official data states. However, as of today, it needs to be clarified how many of them stayed in the country, but walking the streets of the Georgian capital Tbilisi, the presence of Russian nationals can be seen almost everywhere.
Right after the war started and even more when Russia announced a partial mobilization in September 2022, hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens – primarily men – traveled to countries where they could travel visa-free, including Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Turkey, and Georgia. Among those destinations, Georgia is among the most enticing because of its mild climate, wine, food, and nightlife-heavy capital. At the moment, Russian citizens can spend twelve renewable months in Georgia, and many of them are planning to stay in the long term, as the war seems would still last long.
The arrival of thousands of Russians has significantly impacted Georgian society. The country is known for its hospitality, but many Georgians are concerned about the effect such a large influx could have on their country’s social fabric. There have been reports of tension between Russians and locals and concerns about potential cultural clashes. While walking in Tbilisi, the Russian language can be easily heard in most bars, cafes, and restaurants, day and night. In contrast, there is a solid pro-Ukrainian sentiment and a not-so-hidden antagonism toward Russians. Every twenty meters or so, it is possible to spot on the streets of Tbilisi a Ukrainian flag hanging from a balcony, at the entrance of a restaurant or bar, or drawn on a wall.
As the Russians poured into Georgia, many Georgians have come to fear that the emigres somehow could serve as a pretext for Putin to target their country in the future, just as it did happen to Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. For this reason, the recent influx of Russians—mainly men who fear being conscripted into arms—has created a tense social climate in Georgia and an increased distrust towards Russians.
Suspicion towards Russian emigration is also motivated by historical events indicating the two countries as potential enemies. Indeed, Russia currently occupies 20 percent of Georgia; in 2008, a five-day conflict (“South Ossetia conflict”) broke out between the two countries over the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia lost control of both areas, and Russia later recognized them as independent states. As a consequence, Tbilisi cut off diplomatic relations with Moscow, after which Switzerland took up the role of mediator country.
Today, stickers reading “Russia currently occupies 20 percent of Georgian territory” are prominently displayed at the entrance to many restaurants, bars, coworking spaces, and local shops. Many Georgians believe that the Russians who have fled their country are not opponents of the Moscow government but do not want to risk their lives at the front in Ukraine. Irakli, a baker from central Tbilisi, told IPS: “If they don’t like Putin, and they don’t share his war, then they should fight and oppose him in Russia, not run away here to Georgia.”
Many Georgians fear that the recent wave of Russians fleeing to their country is less ideological than the first one that occurred right after the beginning of the war in February 2022. There is a widespread belief that, while the first wave mainly included activists, intellectuals, and anti-Putin individuals, the current wave might consist of people who fear being conscripted to fight in Ukraine but do not oppose the Russian government’s policies—including its decision to invade Ukraine.
Because of these concerns, a survey conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers in February-March 2022 revealed that 66 percent of Georgians favor re-introducing a visa regime for Russians. That visa regime was abolished for Russians in 2012, but now many Georgians think it should be revisited. However, the same survey revealed that 49 percent of respondents approved the Georgian national government’s rejection of imposing sanctions on Russia. On the one hand, this data could be interpreted as a tightening of ties with the Kremlin. More simply, it should be read as a policy aimed at not worsening diplomatic relations, as Georgia could fear some retaliation—even military—from Moscow.
Furthermore, Georgia depends on remittances from its citizens working in Russia, and, in the past, its tourism industry has prospered from Russian visitors. Most Georgian politicians agree that the country is pursuing a ‘pragmatic and careful stance toward Russia’ by not imposing sanctions and keeping the current visa-free regime. For example, Eka Sepashvili, a member of parliament who left the governing Georgian Dream party, remains aligned with it on this policy.
Adverse effects aside, Russian migration to Georgia has undoubtedly stimulated the local economy. Many among those migrants are information technology (IT) remote workers, sometimes even hired by Western companies. Therefore, their salaries are way higher than the Georgian average (300-500 US dollars per month), and their living in Georgia guarantees an essential boost to local consumption.
According to the World Bank, the 2022 Georgian economic growth was 10 percent. The surge in money transfers from Russia, the recovery in domestic demand, and the rebound of tourism after the pandemic have been the main reasons for the positive performance. The World Bank further forecasted a 4 percent and 5 percent economic growth for 2023 and 2024, respectively.
Furthermore, a recent Transparency International (TI) report shows 17,000 Russian companies are registered in Georgia. More than half of them were registered after the start of the war in Ukraine. Only in March-September of 2022, up to 9,500 Russian companies were registered, which, according to the report, is ten times more than the entire figure for 2021. According to TI, this trend indicates that many Russian nationals plan to stay in Georgia long term. Not coincidentally, in April-September 2022, remittances from Russia to Georgia amounted to 1,135 million US dollars—a fivefold increase.
Artem, a Russian engineer in his forties, arrived in Tbilisi in October 2022 after Putin announced the partial mobilization. He works remotely, so he can afford to continue living in Georgia as long as his salary allows. He stays in a guest house that is usually intended for tourists. The structure has six single rooms and two with more beds to share. In recent months, 95 percent of the tenants have been Russians who have started living here for medium-to-long periods.
Since it is the low tourist season, the landlord has agreed to rent to Russians. Still, with the arrival of the high season in May, he may return to prefer the more profitable short-term rentals.
“For now, I am staying here, but with the arrival of spring, I will probably have to look for a new place,” Artem told IPS.
Despite having a higher salary than the local average, Artem cannot afford many accommodations since prices have skyrocketed. Talking to him and other current tenants of the guest house – all Russian men – it isn’t easy to find someone who would say he doesn’t like Putin. They say they are against the war and worried about the current situation. Still, they go no further, perhaps for fear of sharing their ideas or probably because their opposition to the Moscow government is, in fact, minimal, as many Georgians believe.
Georgi, a Georgian tour guide, tells us that, according to him, Russian migrants are divided into two large groups: men—especially IT workers—who are mainly afraid of being called up but are not great opponents of Putin and those who oppose him fervently. The latter are activists, journalists, intellectuals, and members of the LGBT community—people who risked their lives in Russia—even before the start of the war in Ukraine.
The distrust towards Russians emerged even more during the first days of March when many Georgians complained that Russian citizens living in Georgia had not taken to the streets with them to protest against the so-called “foreign agents’ law.”
The law, which lawmakers dropped on March 11 after days of mass protests in Tbilisi, would have required individuals, civil society organizations, and media outlets that receive 20 percent of their funding from abroad to register as an “agent of foreign influence” with the Georgian Justice Ministry.
The law was largely criticized by civil society groups, opposition politicians, human rights organizations, and even US and EU institutions. They argued the law was an attempt to suppress dissent and restrict freedom of expression in the country, and they compared it to similar legislation in Russia that Moscow has used to crack down on NGOs and independent journalism.
The government of Georgia has been defending the law, saying it was necessary to prevent foreign interference in the country’s political affairs. The term “foreign agent” has highly negative connotations in Georgia and is often associated with espionage and foreign interference. Therefore, supporters of the law argue that foreign governments or organizations may influence “agents” receiving funding from foreign sources and that it is important to ensure that they are transparent about their funding sources. On the other hand, critics of the law argue that by forcing entities and individuals to register as “foreign agents,” the government is trying to delegitimize them in the eyes of the public and stigmatize them as tools of foreign powers.
Alisa, a Russian woman who arrived in Tbilisi in April 2022 and who clearly defines herself as anti-Putin, told IPS that she was contacted on social media by a local resident with whom she had interacted. That person pressed for her to take to the streets to protest against the “foreign agents” law. The Georgian person told Alisa that it was not fair that Russians living in Georgia stand by and watch the protests without joining them and that if they wanted to enjoy the freedoms that are lacking in Russia, then they should actively participate in all aspects of the civic life of an ordinary Georgian citizen, including protesting against that law.
“I didn’t join the protests, not because I disagreed with the demonstrators. Indeed, it was a glorious moment for democracy and the demand for freedom. However, some Georgians should understand that for some Russian citizens, exposing themselves in a protest that is also indirectly against Russia can threaten their lives,” Alisa told IPS.
As Georgia continues to navigate its relationship with Russia and the West, the influx of Russians will undoubtedly play a role in shaping the country’s future. As of today, it is still not clear whether the Georgian government will change its policy toward Russian migrants. The country seems trapped in a dilemma that crosses economic, social, political, and geopolitical aspects. The need to ensure the continuation of economic growth in the short and medium terms suggests keeping the doors open to Russians.
On the other hand, this influx is causing ever-higher prices, which in the long run will probably end up harming the living conditions of the more economically vulnerable locals, facilitating urban gentrification and, potentially, higher social tensions. Finally, from a political and geopolitical perspective, the government in Tbilisi will have to deal with a growing push from the population to get closer to the West and Europe – as seen with the recent protests against the “foreign agents” law – in the face of an inevitable growing link with Russia, precisely given the strong presence of Russians in the country.
As Georgia continues to navigate its relationship with Russia and the West, the influx of Russians will undoubtedly play a role in shaping the country’s future. As of today, it is still not clear whether the Georgian government will change its policy toward Russian migrants. The country seems trapped in a dilemma that crosses economic, social, political, and geopolitical aspects.
The need to ensure the continuation of economic growth in the short and medium terms suggests keeping the doors open to Russians. On the other hand, this influx is causing ever-higher prices, which in the long run will probably end up harming the living conditions of the more economically vulnerable locals, facilitating urban gentrification and, potentially, higher social tensions. Finally, from a political and geopolitical perspective, the government in Tbilisi will have to deal with a growing push from the population to get closer to the West and Europe in the face of an inevitable growing link with Russia, precisely given the strong presence of Russians in the country.
Karim Asad Ahmad Khan was elected on 12 February 2021 as the new chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Credit: UN Photo/Loey Felipe
by Thalif Deen (united nations)
Inter Press Service
UNITED NATIONS, Mar 20 (IPS) – Come April 1, a post-Ukraine Russia, will preside over the UN Security Council in a month-long presidency on the basis of alphabetical rotation.
But Russia will not be the first or the only country – accused of war crimes or charged with violating the UN charter—to be either a member or preside over the most powerful political body in the United Nations.
Stephen Zunes, a professor of politics and coordinator of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of San Francisco who has written extensively on the politics of the Security Council, told IPS the United States has served as president of the Security Council while committing war crimes in Vietnam and Iraq.
France and the United Kingdom, he pointed out, served while committing war crimes in their colonial wars. China has recently served despite ongoing war crimes in Xinjiang.
“So having Russia take its turn as Security Council president would hardly be unprecedented.”
“It is certainly true that Russia would be the first to illegally annex territory seized by military force. However, given how the United States has formally recognized illegal annexations by Israel and Morocco of territories seized by military force, it’s not like Russia is the only permanent member to think that is somehow okay,” declared Zunes.
The ICC has also previously accused several political leaders, including Omar Hassan al-Bahir of Sudan, Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia and Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi of war crimes or genocide.
Karim Asad Ahmad Khan was elected on 12 February 2021 as the new chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Credit: UN Photo/Loey Felipe
Asked at a press conference last week about the anomaly of a member state that commits war crimes presiding over the UN Security Council, UN Deputy Spokesperson Farhan Haq told reporters: “You’re well aware of the rules of the Security Council, including the alphabetical rotation of the Member States of the Security Council for the Presidency of the Council, which is a policy that is held throughout the lifespan of the Security Council,”.
“And we have nothing further to say than that,” he added, just ahead of the ICC announcement.
But in a stunning new development, the ICC last week accused Russian President Vladimir Putin of war crimes and issued a warrant for his arrest, along with a similar arrest warrant for Russia’s Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova.
The announcement on March 17 specifically charged them for the illegal transfer of children out of war-devastated Ukraine, which was invaded by Russia last year, in violation of the UN charter.
Russia, which is not a signatory for the Rome Statute which created the ICC, dismissed the warrants.
In a statement released last week, ICC’s Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan, said “on the basis of evidence collected and analysed by my Office pursuant to its independent investigations, the Pre-Trial Chamber has confirmed that there are reasonable grounds to believe that President Putin and Ms Lvova-Belova bear criminal responsibility for the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, contrary to article 8(2)(a)(vii) and article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute.”
Incidents identified by the ICC office include the deportation of at least hundreds of children taken from orphanages and children’s care homes. “Many of these children, we allege, have since been given for adoption in the Russian Federation. The law was changed in the Russian Federation, through Presidential decrees issued by President Putin, to expedite the conferral of Russian citizenship, making it easier for them to be adopted by Russian families”.
Thomas G. Weiss, Distinguished Fellow, Global Governance, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, told IPS the statement by the UN spokesperson is completely accurate.
“There is no precedent for preventing a rotating chair in the Security Council (SC)—yet another and only the most recent indication of the aberrant way that it was constructed.”
That said, the Russian ambassador will perhaps be squirming in his SC chair after the ICC’s embarrassing arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin, he noted.
“While it is extremely unlikely that he will be in The Hague anytime soon, the international pressure will only increase—we should recall the itinerary of Slobodan Miloševi?”.
Moscow is extremely unhappy with this development, Weiss said, as they were when the General Assembly unceremoniously ejected them from the Human Rights Council last year.
Bouncing Russia off (or Libya in 2011) was an important precedent to build upon for other UN bodies (other than the SC). Moscow detests being isolated, and fought against the decision for that reason, he added.
The biggest “what if?” takes us back to December 1991 when the USSR imploded. That was the moment to have called into question Russia’s automatically assuming the seat of the Soviet Union.
“We have thirty years of state practice, and so, we cannot call that into question (although Ukrainian President Zelensky has); we can only wish that we had raised that question then, instead of heaving a huge sigh of relief that the transition was so smooth,” declared Weiss, who is also Presidential Professor of Political Science, and Director Emeritus, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, the CUNY Graduate Center.
James Paul, a former Executive Director, Global Policy Forum, told IPS the Russian military campaign in Ukraine has raised many questions about international peace and security. Inevitably the debate has produced heated arguments at the United Nations.
Many Western governments (and liberal “idealists” among their citizenry), he said, would like to punish Russia in various ways through sanctions and isolation, in hopes that this will cause Russia to withdraw its military forces and give up its strategic goals in Ukraine.
“Some have proposed that Russia should not be able to take its monthly rotating seat as President of the UN Security Council in the month of April.”
This is a position that shows weak familiarity with international affairs and the workings of the world’s most powerful state actors, including ignorance of the military history of the Western powers, now so exercised about Russian transgressions, said Paul, author of “Of Foxes and Chickens”—Oligarchy and Global Power in the UN Security Council
If the Security Council, he argued, had even-handedly denied its rotating presidency to members that break international law, invade other countries, forcibly change the boundaries of sovereign states or engineer the overthrow of elected governments, then all permanent members of the Council (not least the Western powers) would lose their presidencies.
Asked for the UN Secretary-General’s reaction to the ICC arrest warrants, UN Spokesperson Stephane Dujarric told reporters March 17: “As we’ve said many times before here, the International Criminal Court is independent of the Secretariat. We do not comment on their actions.”
Asked whether Putin will be permitted to enter the UN premises either in Geneva, Vienna or New York, or meet with Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, he said: “I don’t want to answer hypothetical questions because … as you know, issues of travel involve others. We will continue… As a general rule, the Secretary-General will speak to whomever he needs to speak in order to deal with the issues in front of him”.
Balkees Jarrah, associate international justice director at Human Rights Watch, said the ICC announcement was a big day for the many victims of crimes committed by Russian forces in Ukraine since 2014.
“With these arrest warrants, the ICC has made Putin a wanted man and taken its first step to end the impunity that has emboldened perpetrators in Russia’s war against Ukraine for far too long”.
The warrants, Jarrah pointed out, send a clear message that giving orders to commit or tolerating serious crimes against civilians may lead to a prison cell in The Hague.
“The court’s warrants are a wakeup call to others committing abuses or covering them up that their day in court may be coming, regardless of their rank or position.”
Elaborating further, Paul said in a world of violent and powerful states, the UN is useful because it can bring warring parties together and promote diplomacy and conflict resolution.
“Those calling for punishment for Russia should realize that the United States would (if even-handed rules were enforced) be subject to regular penalties, since it has violated other states’ sovereignty with military forces on many occasions to pursue its own interests,” he noted.
The Iraq War, he said, typifies the US disregard for UN rules and Security Council decisions. US wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan are further high-profile wars of this type. There are dozens of cases.
“Britain and France, too, have used their powerful militaries in contravention of international law, to carry out bloody wars against decolonization as well as later post-colonial interventions to insure access to mines, oil resources, etc.”
The Suez War, launched against Egypt jointly with Israel, was a classic of this genre. Russia and China have had their share of military operations and interventions as well, including Russia’s intervention in Afghanistan and its many wars in the Caucasus.
China, famous for promoting territorial integrity as a principle, annexed Tibet and fought several wars with its neighbor Vietnam, he said.
“So, the Permanent Members of the Security Council have a very poor record when it comes to setting the standard for international law. Even smaller states (with bigger protectors) have been in the invasion business. Israel, Turkey and Morocco come quickly to mind”, declared Paul.
Asked whether the President of the General Assembly Csaba K?rösi would be willing to meet with President Putin, his Spokesperson Pauline Kubiak told reporters that “President K?rösi represents all Member States of the General Assembly, which includes Russia. He has been willing and remains willing to meet with President Putin”.
LONDON, Mar 17 (IPS) – Georgian civil society can breathe a sigh of relief. A proposed repressive law that would have severely worsened the space for activism has been shelved – for now. But the need for vigilance remains.
Russia-style law
A proposed ‘foreign agents’ law would have required civil society organisations (CSOs) and media outlets in Georgia receiving over 20 per cent of funding from outside the country to register as a ‘foreign agent’. Non-compliance would have been punishable with fines and even jail sentences.
The law’s proponents, including Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili, claimed it was modelled on one passed in the USA in 1938. The US law was introduced to check the insidious spread of Nazi propaganda in the run-up to the Second World War, and wasn’t targeted at CSOs.
For civil society it was clear the source of inspiration was much more recent and closer to home: Russia’s 2012 law, since extended several times, which allows the state to declare a ‘foreign agent’ any person or organisation it judges to be under foreign influence. The law has been used extensively to stigmatise civil society and independent media. It’s been imitated by other repressive states looking for ways to stifle civil society.
In Georgia, as in Russia, the ‘foreign agent’ terminology is deeply suggestive of espionage and treachery. Any organisation it’s applied to can expect to be instantly viewed with suspicion. This meant the law would stigmatise CSOs and media organisations.
Alarmingly, the proposed law was no isolated event: the government has been ramping up the rhetoric about groups ‘opposing the interests of the country’ and the need to save Georgia from foreign influence.
The initial proposal for the law came from a populist political faction, People’s Power, that split from the ruling party, Georgian Dream, but works in coalition with it. People’s Power has a track record of criticising foreign funding, particularly from the USA, which it claims undermines Georgia’s sovereignty, and has accused CSOs and the main opposition party of being US agents.
CSOs insist they already adhere to high standards of accountability and transparency, making any further regulations unnecessary. They point to the vital role civil society has played over the years in establishing democracy in Georgia, providing essential services the state fails to offer and helping to introduce important human rights protections.
This work necessarily requires financial support, and since there are few resources within Georgia, that means foreign funding, including from the European Union (EU) and other international bodies – sources the government is also happy to receive funding from.
The power of protest
The scale of the reaction took the government by surprise. Many states around the world have enacted repressive civil society laws, and it’s often hard to get the public to take an interest. But the issue cut through because of the larger concerns many people have about Russian influence, heightened by the war on Ukraine.
Russia is an ever-present issue in Georgian politics. The two countries went to war in 2008, and two breakaway parts of Georgia – Abkhazia and South Ossetia – claim autonomy and receive heavy Russian support. Georgian Dream, founded by billionaire business tycoon Bidzina Ivanishvili, has an official policy of pragmatism towards Russia while also cultivating links with the EU – but opponents accuse it and People’s Power of being too close to Russia.
Many see the country’s future as lying within a democratic Europe and fear returning to Russia’s domination. This made the proposed law about a fundamental question of national identity.
That’s why, when parliament started discussing the bill in early March, thousands gathered over several nights, many waving Georgian and EU flags and chanting ‘no to the Russian law’.
When the bill passed its hurried first reading it sparked some violent clashes. Some people threw stones and the police responded disproportionately with teargas, stun grenades, pepper spray and water cannon. But people kept protesting and the government feared the situation could spiral out of its control. So, at least for the time being, it backed down.
What next?
The immediate threat may have passed, but it isn’t game over. The government hasn’t said the law was a bad idea, merely that it failed to explain it properly to the public and withdrew it to reduce confrontation.
Georgia was one of three countries that applied to join the EU following the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While the other two, Moldova and Ukraine, were quickly granted EU candidate status, Georgia wasn’t.
The EU cited the need for both economic and political reforms. This includes measures to reduce corruption, organised crime and oligarchic influence, improve the protection of human rights and enable civil society to play a stronger role in decision-making processes. In introducing the proposed law, the government took steps further away from the EU and made clear it doesn’t trust civil society.
This raises concerns the bill could return in some revised form, or other restrictions on civil society could be introduced. In numerous countries, the kind of verbal attacks on civil society recently made by the government have led to restrictions.
But Garibashvili should be more attentive to the message of the protests. By taking to the streets, people told the government they’re paying attention and disagree with its current direction – and forced it to back down. Civil society has shown its power, and deserves to be listened to rather than treated with suspicion.
LONDON, Mar 15 (IPS) – Last October, Ales Bialiatski was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. He was one of three winners, alongside two human rights organisations: Memorial, in Russia, and the Center for Civil Liberties in Ukraine. The Nobel Committee recognised the three’s ‘outstanding effort to document war crimes, human rights abuses and the abuse of power’.
But Bialiatski couldn’t travel to Oslo to collect his award. He’d been detained in July 2021 and held in jail since. This month he was found guilty on trumped-up charges of financing political protests and smuggling, and handed a 10-year sentence. His three co-defendants were also given long jail terms. There are many others besides them who’ve been thrown in prison, among them other staff and associates of Viasna, the human rights centre Bialiatski heads.
Crackdown follows stolen election
The origins of the current crackdown lie in the 2020 presidential election. Dictator Alexander Lukashenko has held power since 1994, but in 2020 for once a credible challenger slipped through the net to stand against him. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya ran against Lukashenko after her husband, democracy activist Sergei Tikhanovsky, was arrested and prevented from doing so. Her independent, female-fronted campaign caught the public’s imagination, offering the promise of change and uniting many voters.
Lukashenko’s response to this rare threat was to arrest several members of Tsikhanouskaya’s campaign staff, along with multiple opposition candidates and journalists, introduce additional protest restrictions and restrict the internet. When all of that didn’t deter many from voting against him, he blatantly rigged the results.
This bare-faced act of fraud triggered a wave of protests on a scale never seen under Lukashenko. At the peak in August 2020, hundreds of thousands took to the streets. It took a long time for systematic state violence and detentions to wear the protests down.
Everything Lukashenko has done since is to suppress the democracy movement. Hundreds of civil society organisations have been forcibly liquidated or shut themselves down in the face of harassment and threats. Independent media outlets have been labelled as extremist, subjected to raids and effectively banned.
Lukashenko’s repression is enabled by an alliance with an even bigger pariah: Vladimir Putin. When the European Union and democratic states applied sanctions in response to Lukashenko’s crackdown, Putin provided a loan that was crucial in helping him ride out the storm.
This marked a break in a long strategy of Lukashenko carefully balancing between Russia and the west. The effect was to bind the two rogue leaders together. That’s continued during Russia’s war on Ukraine. When the invasion started, some of the Russian troops that entered Ukraine did so from Belarus, where they’d been staging so-called military drills in the days before. Belarus-based Russian missile launchers have also been deployed.
Just days after the start of Russia’s invasion, Lukashenko pushed through constitutional changes, sanctioned through a rubber-stamp referendum. Among the changes, the ban on Belarus hosting nuclear weapons was removed.
Belarussian soldiers haven’t however been directly involved in combat so far. Putin would like them to be, if only because his forces have sustained much higher-than-expected losses and measures to fill gaps, such as the partial mobilisation of reservists last September, are domestically unpopular. Lukashenko has struck a balance between belligerent talk and moderate action, insisting Belarus will only join the war if Ukraine attacks it.
That may be because Belarus’s enabling of Russia’s aggression has made people only more dissatisfied with Lukashenko. Many Belarussians want no involvement in someone else’s war. Several protests took place in Belarus at the start of the invasion, leading to predictable repression similar to that seen in Russia, with numerous arrests.
Crucially, Belarus’s security forces stuck by Lukashenko at the peak of protests; if they’d defected, the story could have been different. Full involvement in the war would likely see even Lukashenko loyalists turn against him, including in the military. Soldiers might refuse to fight. It would be a dangerous step to take. As Russia’s war drags on, Lukashenko could find himself walking an increasingly difficult tightrope.
Two countries, one struggle
It’s perhaps with this in mind that Lukashenko’s latest repressive move has been to extend the death penalty. State officials and military personnel can now be executed for high treason. This gives Lukashenko a gruesome new tool to punish and deter defections.
As well as worrying about their safety, Belarus’s activists – in exile or in jail – face the challenge of ensuring the cause of Belarussian democracy isn’t lost in the fog of war. They need continuing solidarity and support to make the world understand that their struggle against oppression is part of the same campaign for liberty being waged by Ukrainians, and that any path to peace in the region must also mean democracy in Belarus.
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