Reconciliation Back to Square One? — Global Issues

Credit: Jenny Evans/Getty Images
  • Opinion by Ines M Pousadela (montevideo, uruguay)
  • Inter Press Service

On a 90 per cent turnout under mandatory voting, 60 per cent voted against. Supporters of the referendum were left pointing the finger at disinformation – and those who pushed it for political gain.

A history of exclusion

For a long time, Indigenous Australians – currently 3.8 per cent of the country’s population – lacked any recognition. European settlers didn’t see any need for a treaty with the people already there. Indigenous Australians only got the vote in 1962 and, following a referendum, were put on the census as late as 1972 – until then, they literally didn’t count. They remain unrecognised in the country’s constitution.

For most of the 20th century, assimilation laws saw Indigenous children forcibly taken from their families on a mass scale. It’s estimated that between 1910 and 1970 10 to 30 per cent of Indigenous children were handed to childless white couples to be raised as white. The horror of the ‘stolen generations’ only began to be acknowledged in the mid-1990s.

In 1997 the Australian Human Rights Commission issued a report with recommendations for healing and reconciliation. But a belated prime ministerial apology came only in 2008. That same year, the government issued a plan to reduce disadvantage among Indigenous people. After most of its targets expired unmet, a new approach was developed in partnership with an Indigenous coalition in 2020.

But little progress has been made in overcoming exclusion. On almost any indicator, Indigenous people remain two to three times worse off than non-Indigenous Australians. Being dramatically underrepresented in decision-making bodies, they also lack the tools to change it.

The Uluru Statement from the Heart

The road towards the referendum started more than a decade ago, when an expert panel found that constitutional recognition was the way to go. But the call for a referendum was delayed. In 2016, a Referendum Council again concluded that constitutional reform should proceed.

In 2017, the First Nations Dialogues issued the Uluru Statement from the Heart, which called for a Voice to Parliament for Indigenous people, a truth commission and a treaty. The Voice was viewed as the first step to open up a conversation and enable further progress.

Then-Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, of the centre-right Liberal Party, rejected the Uluru Statement. But in 2018 another committee was set up to investigate options for constitutional change – and again, it endorsed a constitutionally enshrined Voice. The Labor opposition promised to put the proposal to a referendum if it won the next election.

Political change: potential and limitations

The Liberal/National coalition lost the May 2022 election, and Labor’s incoming prime minister Anthony Albanese promised progress on long-stalled policies to address Indigenous rights.

The proposed constitutional amendment and text of the ballot question were made public in March 2023 and approved by parliament in June. The government endorsed a set of principles of representation, transparency and accountability that would be used to design the Voice. It was made clear that, as the name implied, this new body would give a voice to Indigenous people but not have decision-making authority or veto power. Any further decision on its composition, functions, powers and procedures would be in the hands of parliament.

Foreshadowing what was to come, the Liberal and National opposition parties submitted dissenting reports, and the Nationals rejected the proposal entirely. By siding with the No campaign, the opposition doomed the referendum. No referendum has ever been carried without bipartisan support.

For and against

Given the legal requirement to distribute an official pamphlet presenting the case for both sides, members of parliament who’d voted for and against the amendment bill drafted and approved a text containing their side’s arguments. This meant that disinformation was inserted into the process from the start: as an independent fact-checking initiative showed, several claims in the No pamphlet were false or misleading.

The Yes campaign focused its messaging on fairness, reconciliation and healing, seeking to sell the idea that Australia would be made better by the recognition of a space for Indigenous people to have a say in national politics.

Indigenous people overwhelmingly supported the proposal, although some opposed it – because they thought it didn’t go far enough, saw it as whitewash or hoped not to see relationships they’d painstakingly developed sidelined. The No campaign made a point of foregrounding contrarian Indigenous voices, disproportionately boosted by supportive media.

Different organisations in the No camp appealed to different groups. Advance, a conservative lobby group, went after young progressives with its ‘Not Enough’ campaign, suggesting that the Voice wasn’t what Indigenous Australians wanted and wouldn’t solve their problems. The Blak Sovereign Movement questioned the timing, arguing that a treaty should be negotiated first. Disinformation and racial abuse were rife.

Two much-repeated claims were that the Voice would divide Australians and enshrine privileges for Indigenous people. No campaigners peddled a zero-sum idea: that non-Indigenous people would lose if Indigenous people won. They falsely claimed that people would lose their farms or that Indigenous people would charge them to access beaches.

Another fear-stoking argument was that the Voice was only the beginning – after they secured this, Indigenous people would go for more, until they took everything from the rest. It could, for example, open up a conversation about land rights. That may have been a genuine fear for Australia’s powerful extractive industries, explaining why the right-wing think tanks that have consistently opposed climate action also lobbied against the Voice.

Having sowed disinformation and confusion, the No campaign told voters that, if in doubt, they should play it safe and vote no. It worked.

What next?

The result could bring even greater backlash. Emboldened, some opposition politicians have since withdrawn their previously stated support for a treaty and suggested rolling back practices they now present as inadmissible concessions to identity politics. This could be a harbinger for the opposition pinning its comeback hopes on a culture war strategy.

But while the referendum defeat has dealt a hard blow to hopes of challenging the exclusion of Indigenous Australians, it isn’t quite game over. A specific proposal has been defeated, but there’s plenty left to advocate for. Progress on the wider reconciliation agenda, including other forms of recognition and redress, could still be possible, particularly at state and local levels. The Uluru Statement from the Heart remains the compass, and civil society will keep urging politicians and the public to follow its path.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.


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Global Call to Action on World Toilet Day to Meet 2030 Sanitation Goals — Global Issues

Marking World Toilet Day on November 19th, the global community faces a pressing sanitation crisis affecting 3.5 billion people. Credit: Lova Rabary-Rakontondravony/IPS
  • Opinion by Thokozani Dlamini (pretoria, south africa)
  • Inter Press Service

Even today, a staggering 3.5 billion individuals lack safely managed sanitation, and an appalling 419 million people continue to use ‘open defecation’, a condition that encourages the spread of diseases and claims the lives of 1,000 children under the age of five daily. This sanitation crisis, a hazard to human health and the environment, disproportionately affects women, girls, and other vulnerable groups.

Given the fact that only seven years remain to attain the 2030 target for Sustainable Development Goal 6 – ensuring safe water for all – the global community needs to accelerate its efforts to ensure that the 2030 agenda is realized.

Our current pace, coupled with insufficient funds, escalating demand, deteriorating water quality, and the inadequacies of existing governance frameworks, gravely threatens the realization of this goal.

In alignment with this year’s theme – ‘Accelerating Change’ – it’s imperative that we expedite our global efforts to achieve the UN’s 2030 target. Governments and major institutions must synergistically operate, take accountability for their promises, and timely deliver on them. Actually, every individual, regardless of their contributions’ scale, has a role in accelerating this progress.

Implications of poor sanitation

The implications of poor water and sanitation are widespread and deleterious, gravely affecting individuals who are forced to use unsanitary toilet facilities or consume and utilize contaminated water. Diseases linked to sanitation, like diarrheal diseases, cholera, typhoid fever, hepatitis A, and various parasitic infections, pose significant public health risks.

These illnesses can result in extensive sickness, hospitalizations, and even fatalities, particularly in areas with sparse access to clean water and adequate sanitation facilities. Enhancements of sanitation infrastructure can decrease these disease burdens and elevate public health globally.

Benefits of good sanitation

Absolutely, having good sanitation facilities indeed has numerous benefits. They go beyond the improvement of public health. Proper sanitation infrastructure can reduce healthcare costs as there are fewer cases of sanitation-related diseases. It can also increase productivity as individuals are healthier and can devote more time to work. studies, or other activities.

This results in a better quality of life for individuals and their communities. Furthermore, good sanitation infrastructure contributes to environmental sustainability. It aids in reducing pollution since waste is properly managed and does not end up contaminating water bodies and other natural environments. A safe and clean environment, in turn, helps protect vital natural resources, including clean water sources.

Collaborative efforts

Governments, donors, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations all play significant roles in advancing sanitation infrastructure. They need to cooperate and work cohesively towards delivering water and sanitation services effectively. Furthermore, research institutions can contribute by providing the necessary scientific understanding and technological innovations. This joint endeavour will not just help in achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, specifically Goal 6, but also improve public health and well-being on a global scale.

SADC-GMI’s efforts

SADC-GMI has made commendable efforts by implementing various projects in SADC Member States to ensure everyone has access to water and sanitation as per the United Nations Agenda 2030. These initiatives have positively impacted local communities by ensuring a continuous water supply which ultimately leads to better hygiene. Beyond hygiene, these water supply projects have also brought about improved economic benefits for the communities. Indeed, the projects are transformative, aiding communities in gaining access to dependable water supply for both domestic and economic uses.

These projects, despite the complications posed by climate change, continue to thrive and be sustainable. This resilience greatly benefits communities, offering steady water for various needs. This ties into reaching the sanitation goals defined by the United Nations Agenda 2030.

Yes, with the 2030 deadline of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals approaching, fast progress is needed to ensure everyone has access to basic sanitation facilities and clean water. Sanitation and drinking water are human rights, and access to these services is crucial for people’s health and the integrity of the environment. To this end, cooperation between different sectors – governments, donors, the private sector, research institutions, and civil society will be critical in facilitating this progression.

Thokozani Dlamini is SADC-GMI Communication and Knowledge Management Specialist

© Inter Press Service (2023) — All Rights ReservedOriginal source: Inter Press Service

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Climate Summit in Closed Civic Space — Global Issues

  • Opinion by Andrew Firmin (london)
  • Inter Press Service

In short, there’s a lot at stake as the world heads into its next climate summit.

But there’s a big problem: COP28, the latest in the annual series of conferences of parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, will be held in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This is a country with closed civic space, where dissent is criminalised and activists are routinely detained. It’s also a fossil fuel power bent on continuing extraction.

At multilateral summits where climate change decisions are made, it’s vital that civil society is able to mobilise to demand greater ambition, hold states and fossil fuel companies and financiers to account and ensure the views of people most affected by climate change are heard. But that can’t happen in conditions of closed civic space.

Concerning signs

In September, the UAE was added to the CIVICUS Monitor Watchlist, which highlights countries experiencing significant declines in respect for civic freedoms. Civic space in the UAE has long been closed: no dissent against the government or advocacy for human rights is allowed, and those who try to speak out risk criminalisation. In 2022, a Cybercrime Law introduced even stronger restrictions on online expression.

There’s widespread torture in jails and detention centres and at least 58 prisoners of conscience have been held in prison despite having completed their sentences. Many of them were part of a group known as the UAE 94, jailed for the crime of calling for democracy. Among the ranks of those incarcerated is Ahmed Mansoor, sentenced to 10 years in jail in 2018 for his work documenting the human rights situation, and held in solitary confinement for over five years and counting.

Ahead of COP28, civil society has worked to highlight the absurdity of holding such a vital summit in closed civic space conditions. Domestic civil society is unable to influence COP28 and its preparatory process, and it’s hard to see how civil society, both domestic and international, will be able to express itself freely during the summit.

Civil society is demanding that the UAE government demonstrate that it’s prepared to respect human rights, including by releasing political prisoners – something it’s so far failed to budge on.

An ominous sign came when the UAE hosted a climate and health summit in April. Participants were reportedly instructed not to criticise the government, corporations, individuals or Islam, and not to protest while in the UAE.

Civic space restrictions aren’t the only indication the UAE isn’t taking COP28 seriously. The president of the summit, Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, also happens to be head of the state’s fossil fuel corporation ADNOC, the world’s 11th-biggest oil and gas producer. It’s like putting an arms manufacturer in charge of peace talks. Multiple other ADNOC staff members have roles in the summit. ADNOC is currently talking up its investments in renewable energies, all while planning one of the biggest expansions of oil and gas extraction of any fossil fuel corporation.

Instead of real action, all the signs are that the regime is instrumentalising its hosting of COP28 to try to launder its reputation, as indicated by its hiring of expensive international lobbying firms. An array of fake social media accounts were created to praise the UAE as host and defend it from criticism. A leaked list of key COP28 talking points prepared by the host made no mention of fossil fuels.

A summit that should be about tackling the climate crisis – and quickly – is instead being used to greenwash the image of the host government – something easiest achieved if civil society is kept at arm’s length.

Fossil fuel lobby to the fore

With civil society excluded, the voices of those actively standing in the way of climate action will continue to dominate negotiations. That’s what happened at COP27, also held in the closed civic space of Egypt, where 636 fossil fuel lobbyists took part – and left happy. Like every summit before it, its final statement made no commitment to reduce oil and gas use.

The only way to change this is to open the doors to civil society. Civil society has consistently sounded the alarm and raised public awareness of the need for climate action. It’s the source of practical solutions to cut emissions and adapt to climate impacts. It urges more ambitious commitments and more funding, including for the loss and damage caused by climate change. It defends communities against environmentally destructive impacts, resists extraction and promotes sustainability. It pressures states and the private sector to stop approving and financing further extraction and to transition more urgently to more renewable energies and more sustainable practices. These are the voices that must be heard if the cycle of runaway climate change is to be stopped.

COPs should be held in countries that offer an enabling civic space that allows strong domestic mobilisation, and summit hosts should be expected to abide by high standards when it comes to domestic and international access and participation. That should be part of the deal hosts make in return for the global prestige that comes with hosting high-level events. Civil society’s exclusion mustn’t be allowed to happen again.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.


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A Bigger and More Relevant Role for Youth Within the UN System

  • Opinion by Simone Galimberti (kathmandu, nepal)
  • Inter Press Service

So far, initiatives have been fragmented with each agency and programs doing a bit on its own, mostly through symbolic and tokenistic ways.

Dr. Felipe Paullier of Uruguay, the recently appointed first Assistant Secretary-General for Youth Affairs, instead, has an opportunity to significantly change this current situation.

He could start from reviewing the role and functions of some existing mechanisms, proposing ways to strengthen them, bringing coherence, stopping overlapping and inefficiencies, revamping the way the UN works and making it more youth-centric as one of his major goals.

Then, there is another area where the Assistant Secretary-General can make a difference: ensure that youths have a role and voice on the table when we talk about localizing the SDGs.

This is a domain that could truly bring transformative changes in the way governments, at local and central level, works. Potentially this is where youths can take a role in how decisions are made.

The ECOSOC Youth Forum

Reflecting on the role and functions of the Economic and Social Council Youth Forum could help this brainstorming.

One key question that must be addressed relates to the links between a future Townhall mechanism and the reinforcement and strengthening of the Forum. The potential of the Forum is also highlighted in the Policy Brief and surely there is wide scope to strengthen it.

Certainly, the Forum could definitely be made more fit for its purpose as it only meets for few days every year and is just a consultation exercise without real power. Can it be turned into something truly permanent, a sort of parliament of youths with his own secretariat?

Besides trying to reform the UN governance system and making it more youth centric, Mr. Paullier should focus on effective mainstreaming of meaningful youth engagement and youth centered activities throughout each UN entity.

That’s why it is really indispensable assessing what each agency, program and department of the UN have been doing with and for youth.

What about IANYD?

On this part, a conundrum will be deciding on what to do with United Nations Inter-Agency Network on Youth Development (IANYD) that supposedly facilitates youth centered cooperation on youths.

Does it make sense to maintain this mechanism? How effective has been so far? Which major outcomes were brought and joint initiatives forged and facilitated by the IANYD?

Dr Paullier could initiate some consultation on the future the Network, possibly through an open process that would engage youths based civil society across the world. At minimum, the UN Youth Office should be leading this group that could be turned into a forum and knowledge creator on all matters related to young people.

It will also be interesting how he will work with The Major Group for Children and Youth or MGCY. This is a mechanism that supposedly acts as “a bridge between young people and the UN system”.

It has an extremely complex governance that lacks visibility and its levels of openness and inclusiveness should be analyzed. Related to this, Dr. Paullier should engage Children and Youth International, the legal entity behind the MGCY, towards a possible process of reform and organizational development.

A Global Board of Advisors that trickles down

I have no doubt that the new Assistant Secretary-General will prioritize the creation of a global board of advisors. This is a great idea but such mechanism should have linkages or spilled over effects and real implications on the ways the UN works with youths locally around the world.

The focus should be especially on how youths can interact and engage with the Resident Coordinators and all agencies and programs at country level.

The bottom line is that the value of any future work of the UN Youth Office is going to be judged in terms of how much transformational is going to be in changing the working paradigms of the UN around the world.

The new UN Youth Office can make the UN at local level more inclusive, open, accessible by enabling youths to have a role to play locally. That’s why it is going to be paramount to closely engage the offices of UN Resident Coordinators that should be asked to better share their best practices and new ideas and proposals to have local youths’ voice heard and visible.

Multilevel governance and localizing the SDGs

Ultimately the agenda of localizing the SDGs could be the gamechanger for meaningful youth participation. It offers the best pathway to ensure real youth engagement all over the world.

As far now the process of localizing the SDGS greatly highlighted the role of local governments, from cities to regional administrations.

There is no doubt that cities and regional bodies must have a much stronger saying, a voice on the table when discussions on implementing the goals happen. It is also unquestionable that having a saying also implies much more resources.

Yet, truly and effective localization won’t happen only with more budget allocation from the central governments and a better recognition of local governments.

That’s why all the talks about “multilevel” governance that has been proposed, though still in vague terms, require a clear blueprint on how youths must be enabled to be part of the policy formulation process.

Involving them in the NVRs and LVRs, the former used by central government and the latter by local governments, including municipalities, to report on their progress towards the SDGs is not enough.

These two reporting mechanisms should become planning exercise to whom youths have not only easy access to but they are welcome to participate in. That’s why we need to make the discussions on multilevel governance tangible and concrete.

Clear proposals, in collaborations with United Cities and Local Governments or UCLG and the Global Taskforce of Local and Regional Governments, must be tabled on forecasting how such multilevel governance can unfold in practice by involving and engaging youths.

It is really about re-imagining the way local governments work and youth should not only be part of the discussions. This is also one of the recommendations of the latest progress report on implementing the UN Youth Strategy that was published over the summer.

Any new template to make cities and local governments more effective and efficient policy making engines, must necessarily involve the citizens. It could start from finding new venues to bring on board the youth.

The fact that, the Mayor of Montevideo, Carolina Cosse has tons of influence in the UCLG (after all, she is its outgoing President) could help, considering that Dr. Paullier had several high-level positions in the government of the capital of Uruguay.

Conclusions

There is no doubt that there is a lot on the plate of Dr. Paullier. Not all the proposals made in this piece can be made easily actionable.

Mr. Guterres and the Ms. Amina J. Mohammed, the Deputy Secretary General, should become his most important allies. It will take time to build alliances but, one year from now, there will a unique opportunity: the Summit of the Future.

There it is where the new Assistant Secretary-General will have to make his case for truly radical reforms to meaningfully engage and involve youths. This should happen, not only within the UN level and other international institutions like multilateral banks but also within local and national governments.

Re-booting the governance systems around the world, making youth centric, is going to be one of the most consequential challenges we must tackle. That’s why the work of Dr. Paullier and his office could really be transformational.

This is the second and final piece on a series of op-ed essays focused on the recent appointment of Dr. Felipe Paullier of Uruguay as the first Assistant Secretary-General for Youth Affairs. The series offers some ideas and advice on how this new position within the UN System can truly be transformative.

Simone Galimberti, based in Kathmandu, is the Co-Founder of ENGAGE and The Good Leadership. He writes about reforming the UN, the role of youth, volunteerism, regional integration and human rights in the Asia Pacific region.

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New Cold War Weapon Backfires — Global Issues

  • Opinion by Jomo Kwame Sundaram, Ong Kar Jin (kuala lumpur, malaysia)
  • Inter Press Service

Despite its lofty pronounced goals, IPEF’s shortcomings expose a disconcerting lack of political will, inconsistent trade policies, and US inability to match China’s infrastructure initiatives.

Bull in a China shop?

Launched in Japan in May 2022, IPEF was widely touted as the Biden administration’s better follow-up to Trump’s withdrawal from Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

Many had anticipated a robust reply to China’s growing economic influence in the region, particularly following US depiction of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as an instrument of Chinese expansion.

China may well stand to benefit most from RCEP by virtue of its size and economic relations with the region. But outside the US echo chamber, RCEP is seen as truly East Asian led. It has involved not only ASEAN leadership, but also Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore, all long-term US allies.

In sharp contrast, IPEF has disappointed many. It seems to be little more than a half-hearted economic cooperation appendix to the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

The alternative US infrastructure initiative – coordinated with NATO allies in Europe – is small potatoes compared to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which – unlike most of its allies – the US has attacked from the outset.

Also, the US has no answer to China’s flagship ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) – which succeeded ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR) and earlier Chinese Silk Road initiatives. BRI ostensibly focuses on critical transport and communications infrastructure like internet cables, roads, ports and railways.

These projects are seen as directly contributing to economic development, making them highly attractive to developing nations. In contrast, IPEF offerings appear more like diplomatic gestures with little for infrastructure development.

The chasm between IPEF’s lofty rhetoric and its actual content shines light on modest US capacities and commitment. US inability to offer substantial benefits through IPEF not only jeopardizes its standing, but also cedes influence to China.

Domestic quagmires bog down IPEF

The hasty negotiations are seen as catering to the Biden’s re-election campaign. This is a far cry from what US allies were expecting, to signal greater commitment to the region. In its current form, IPEF offers little in tangible benefits.

As a Biden White House initiative without Congressional support, IPEF is dismissed in some circles – especially in the US – as part of Biden’s re-election strategy. It will most certainly be dropped if he does not secure a second term.

The irony is palpable: while there is bipartisan agreement to ‘contain’ China, US politics is so mired in partisan squabbles that it fails to act, even when interests are aligned. This lack of political will is not just a domestic failing; as a result, the international community sees the US as unreliable.

No more trade liberalization?

Despite decades of ‘free trade’ rhetoric from the US, its NATO allies, the Bretton Woods institutions and others, US commitment to trade liberalization has long not been taken seriously, especially since the Trump administration.

Before that, the Obama White House had blocked appointments to the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement panel, effectively rendering the WTO’s most important component dysfunctional.

IPEF’s modest content is largely due to increasingly hostile US public sentiment on trade liberalization. By 2016, most presidential candidates seeking to succeed Obama – from both major parties – opposed the TPP.

While most US voters know nothing about IPEF, ‘outsourcing’ manufactured imports is widely seen as behind the decline of US manufacturing, as well as related ‘good’ jobs and incomes.

While many initially expected a more Obama-like approach from the Biden administration, policy developments so far suggest Trump’s ‘America first’ rhetoric and policies are here to stay.

Unsurprisingly, the White House has promised IPEF would “ensure American workers, small businesses, and ranchers can compete in the Indo-Pacific”. US domestic re-industrialization efforts have already triggered more blatant protectionism since Trump.

Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act denies Hyundai, the Korean industrial conglomerate, as well as other foreign automotive brands, the significant tax credits available to domestic electric vehicle manufacturers.

Outdoing Trump, the Biden administration has broadened technology bans and restrictions, e.g., in its ‘microchip war’ with China. US allies – notably the Netherlands and South Korea – have largely agreed to restrict chip technology exports to Chinese companies.

Ceding regional hegemony

While initially welcomed despite qualms, IPEF has not been attractive to the region, especially to developing countries, including India. It does not even offer US market access, a staple of earlier free trade agreements. Instead, it mainly seeks to impose new standards associated with the new US protectionism.

IPEF’s lack of tangible benefits is unlikely to be of much interest to member governments and prospective members, let alone their publics. Worse for the US, IPEF’s modest offer may unwittingly strengthen longer term concerns about US hegemony and leadership, instead of restoring confidence in it.

The largely cool and ambivalent reception to IPEF reflects a divide. On one side, the US and its allies seek to strengthen their hegemony in the region. On the other are the mixed interests and ambivalent attitudes of others, mainly developing countries, coping with US-China rivalry.

IPEF’s fate is compounded by domestic political constraints on US foreign policy, which have reduced its room for manoeuvre. To be attractive to the region, IPEF needs to offer more tangible benefits to current and prospective members, especially developing countries.

Thus far, it has appealed to fears of Chinese expansionism and its alleged ‘debt traps’. For all but the staunchest US allies, however, concerns about privacy, surveillance or sovereignty are secondary to the need for finance and economic development.

China understands this, often sweetening its infrastructure deals, and making them more attractive to developing countries. Without a more generous response, it will be difficult to overcome IPEF’s current reputation as a low-cost means to enhance US dominance of the region.

Currently, the US is imposing itself on, rather than trying to be supportive of the region. Hence, the IPS and IPEF run the risk of simply being the latest in a series of US hegemonic initiatives from the first Cold War’s Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in the 1950s to Obama’s TPP.

Ong Kar Jin is an independent researcher and writer focusing on the socio-political dimensions of technology.

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Exposing Dark Web of Fisheries Labour Abuses — Global Issues

The Indonesian Migrant Workers Union (SBMI), with Greenpeace, Indonesia, conducted a peaceful action in front of the Presidential Palace in Jakarta to encourage the President to immediately ratify the Government Regulation draft on the Protection of Indonesian migrant fishers. Credit: Adhi Wicaksono / Greenpeace
  • by Joyce Chimbi (nairobi)
  • Inter Press Service

A new report by the Financial Transparency Coalition – a group of 11 NGOs from across the world, including Transparency International and Tax Justice Network has taken a deep dive into distant waters, exposing a web of ruthless players behind fisheries labour abuses in total disregard of labour and human rights. One in four fishing vessels accused of forced labour is owned by European companies, a quarter of them flagged to China, while one-fifth carried flags of convenience with lax controls, financial secrecy, and low or non-existent taxes.

“Forced labor aboard commercial fishing vessels is a human rights crisis, affecting more than 100,000 fishers every year, leading to horrific abuses and even deaths among fishers who mainly come from global South regions like south-east Asia and Africa. Yet those owning these vessels mostly hide behind complex, cross-jurisdictional corporate structures ranging from shell companies to opaque joint ventures,” says Matti Kohonen, executive director of the Financial Transparency Coalition.

Titled Dark webs: uncovering those behind forced labour on fishing fleets – the report is the most extensive analysis of forced labour abuses in commercial fishing vessels to date. It found companies from just five countries – China, Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea, and Spain – own almost two-thirds of accused vessels for which legal ownership data is available.

An estimated 22.5 percent of industrial and semi-industrial fishing vessels accused of forced labour were owned by European companies, topped by Spain, Russia, and UK firms. The report warns that beneficial ownership information is rarely if ever, requested by most countries when registering vessels or requesting fishing licenses, meaning that those ultimately responsible for the abuses are not detected and punished.

“Forced abuse in commercial fishing vessels is widespread and is often linked to other violations such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which generates more than USD 11.4 billion a year in illicit financial flows from Africa alone every year. Yet financial secrecy still surrounds the fishing sector, and there’s little political will to improve financial transparency that’s needed to target those ultimately responsible for these crimes,” says Alfonso Daniels, the lead author of the report.

The report’s highlights include revelations that more than 40 percent of commercial vessels accused of forced labour operated in Asia, followed by Africa with 21 percent, 14 percent in Europe and 11 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Additionally, 475 commercial vessels accused of being involved in labour and human rights violations between January 2010 and May 2023 were identified. The geographical location of these vessels where they operated was identified for 63 percent of the cases, totalling 298 vessels.

Of these, 42.28 percent or 128 vessels for which location data for the offences is available, were found in Asia, followed by Africa with 63 vessels or 21.14 percent of the total, and Europe has 13.76 percent of the total or 41 vessels. LAC has 11.07 percent or 33 vessels, and Oceania has 7.72 percent or 23 vessels, with additional vessels identified in other regions such as the United States.

Overall, the top 10 companies own one in nine vessels accused of forced labour. Of these, seven are from China – some partly owned by the Chinese government, two from South Korea and one from Russia. Indonesia emerged as the global hotspot for forced labour cases, with nearly one-fourth of detected vessels operating in its waters. In addition, 45 percent of accused vessels operated or were detected in just five countries: Indonesia, Ireland, Uruguay, Somalia, and Thailand.

“Forced labour is a serious concern for fishers around the world who frequently suffer abuse and exploitation. European companies and consumers aren’t immune from this, as global seafood supply chains being long and opaque. We call on all companies to conduct proper and meaningful human rights due diligence. The EU Commission current proposal to ban products of forced labour from entering the European market also needs to be urgently approved and put into practice,” says Rossen Karavatchev, Fisheries Coordinator of the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), which supported this report.

Against this backdrop, the Financial Transparency Coalition calls for five key measures to protect fishers and enhance transparency in the sector, including an urgent need to improve publicly available vessel information. Stressing that, before awarding a fishing license or authorisation, flag and coastal States should require information on the managers, operators and beneficial owners of the vessel. In addition, unified and publicly available lists of vessels accused of forced labour and IUU fishing should be created.

Further highlighting the need to “create publicly accessible beneficial ownership registries: Unless there is publicly available beneficial ownership information, states will only end up sanctioning or fining the vessel’s captain, crew or the vessel itself, without being able to pursue the legal and beneficial owners who are profiting from these crimes.”

Additionally, identify forced labour and IUU fishing as predicate offences for money laundering purposes and that fisheries-related crimes should also be considered “predicate offences” for money laundering as it is an illegal activity that generates proceeds of crime that are then laundered and therefore treated as illicit financial flows.

Importantly, the Coalition emphasizes that States should ratify key international fisheries treaties and conventions to prevent forced labour and IUU fishing. This includes the International Labor Organization (ILO) Work in Fishing Convention of 2007, whose objective is to ensure that fishers have decent conditions of work on board fishing vessels and has only been ratified by 21 countries, and the Cape Town Agreement of 2012.

Further calling for the expansion of extractive industry reporting to include fisheries so that fisheries are included as an extractive industry in key initiatives, including the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) and other global as well as regional initiatives concerning regulation and transparency of extractive industries.

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Smallholder Farmers Gain Least from International Climate Funding — Global Issues

David Obwona at his seed rice farm in Katukatib village, Amoro district, northern Uganda. The farmer is part of a group that is now engaged in seed rice farming to climate-proof agriculture courtesy of the Regional Universities Forum for Capacity Building Agriculture. Credit: Maina Waruru/IPS
  • by Maina Waruru (nairobi)
  • Inter Press Service

The family farmers and rural communities received around USD 2 billion from both public and private international climate funds out of the USD 8.4 billion that went to the agriculture sector in 2021, even as over 2.5 billion people globally depended on the farms for their livelihoods.

The USD 8.4 billion was almost half of the USD 16 billion that was availed for the energy sector and is only a fraction of the estimated USD 300-350 billion needed annually to “create more sustainable and resilient food systems,” a new report has found.

The amount was also quite different from the USD 170 billion that smallholder farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa alone would require per year, the study on global public finance for climate mitigation and adaptation conducted by Dutch climate advisory company Climate Focus has found.

The low level of climate finance for agriculture, forestry, and fishing is of concern, given the impact of climate change on food production and the extent to which food and agriculture are fueling the climate and biodiversity crisis.

Agricultural productivity has declined by 21 percent due to climate change, while the food and agriculture sector as a whole is responsible for 29 percent of greenhouse gas emissions and 80 percent of global deforestation, the study explains.

The farmers have been sidelined by global climate funders and locked out of decision-making processes on food and climate despite being the engines of rural economic growth. This is especially so in Sub-Saharan Africa, where up to 80 percent of agriculture is by smallholder farmers and where 23 percent of regional GDP is attributable to the sector.

It reveals that 80 percent of international public climate finance spent on the agri-food sector is channeled through governments and donor country NGOs, making it hard for smallholder farmers’ organizations to access it. This is because of complex eligibility rules and application processes and a lack of information on how and where to apply.

Many family farmers also lack the infrastructure, technology, and resources to adapt to climate impacts, with serious implications for global food security and rural economies as well, it notes.

The study ‘Untapped Potential: An analysis of international public climate finance flows to sustainable agriculture and family farmers,’ published on 14 November, laments that only a fifth of international public climate finance for food and agriculture supports sustainable practice. The money mainly goes to the Global North, even as agriculture becomes the third biggest source of global emissions. and the main driver of biodiversity loss.

“Climate change is hitting harvests and driving up food prices across the globe. It has helped push 122 million people into hunger since 2019. We need to create more sustainable and resilient food systems that can feed people in a changing climate, but we can’t do this without family farmers,” the report compiled on behalf of ten farmer organizations in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Pacific says.

“Family farmers are also key to climate adaptation. They are at the forefront of the shift to more diverse, nature-friendly food systems, which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) says is needed to safeguard food security in a changing climate,” it further notes.

The groups are led by the World Rural Forum and include African groups—the Eastern Africa Farmers Federation, Eastern and Southern Africa small-scale Farmers Forum, the Regional Platform of Farmers’ Organisations in Central Africa, and the Network of West African Farmers’ and Producers’ Organisations. Also part of the group is Northern Africa’s Maghreb and North African Farmers Union.

The Asian Farmers Association for Sustainable Rural Development, the Pacific Island Farmers Organization Network, the Confederation of Family Producers’ Organizations of Greater Mercosur, and the Regional Rural Dialogue Programme are also represented in the study.

Many of the farmers are already practicing climate-resilient agriculture, including approaches such as agroecology, which implies a wider variety of crops, including traditional ones, mixing crops, livestock, forestry, and fisheries, while reducing agrochemical use, and building strong connections to local markets.

The study by the new alliance of farmer networks representing over 35 million smallholder producers ahead of COP28, which is set to agree on a Global Goal for Adaptation, is concerned that since 2012, overall, only 11% of international public climate finance has been targeted at agriculture, forestry, and fishing, which amounts to an average of USD 7 billion a year.

In 2021, the World Bank, Germany, the Green Climate Fund, and European Union institutions contributed around half—54 percent, amounting to USD 4 billion collectively, while Nigeria, India, and Ethiopia were the top recipients, receiving a combined USD 1.8 billion. Notably, some of the world’s most food insecure countries, including Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Zambia, each received less than USD 20 million, it discloses.

“As the climate crisis pushes the global food system ever closer to collapse, it is vital that governments recognize family farmers as powerful partners in the fight against climate change,” it warns.

Hakim Baliriane, Chair of the Eastern and Southern Africa small-scale Farmers Forum, observed: “Climate change has helped push 122 million people into hunger since 2019. Reversing this trend will not be possible if governments continue to tie the hands of millions of family farmers.”

The study defines small-scale family farms as those of less than two hectares, mainly in developing countries.

On the other hand, international climate finance broadly refers to finance channeled to “activities that have a stated objective to mitigate climate change or support adaptation. These include multilateral flows in and outside the (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement, as well as bilateral flows at national and regional levels, including the Global Environment Facility, Adaptation Fund, and Green Climate Fund, and are usually disbursed as grants and concessional loans

The study finds that family farms are also the backbone of rural economies, supporting over 2.5 billion people globally who depend on family farms for their livelihoods. It says that in Sub-Saharan Africa, where up to 80 percent of farming is done by smallholder farmers, agriculture contributes 23 percent to regional Gross Domestic Product.

Family farmers are also key to climate adaptation in that they are at the forefront of the shift to more “diverse, nature-friendly food systems,” which, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), are critical in safeguarding food security in a changing climate.

It finds that millions of smallholder farmers are already practicing climate-resilient agriculture, including approaches such as agroecology—growing a wider variety of crops, including traditional crops, mixing crops, livestock, forestry, and fisheries, reducing agrochemicals use while building “strong connections to local markets.”

It concludes that governments must ensure that available climate finance for sustainable climate-resilient practices is increased, including that of agroecological approaches.

It explains: “This means funds to support diverse, nature-friendly approaches and to create community-based solutions that build on traditional expertise and experience.

It recommends that small-scale family farmers ought to have direct access to more climate finance and that financing mechanisms and funds should be developed with the participation of farmers’ organizations to meet their needs.

In addition, efforts should be made to ensure longer-term, flexible funding so that communities can determine their own priorities.

The role of the farmers as powerful catalysts for climate action, food system transformation, and the protection of biodiversity should be acknowledged and given a “real say” in decision-making on food and climate at the local, national, regional, and international levels. This should include decisions on land reform and agricultural subsidies.

The COP28 in Dubai later this month has food systems as a big part of the agenda.

An August report by the UK’s ActionAid has found that climate adaptation and green transition initiatives in the Global South received 20 times less financing when compared to main global emitters, fossil fuels, and intensive agriculture sectors in the last seven years.

It found that leading banking multinationals funded the emitters’ activities in the southern hemisphere to the tune of USD 3.2 trillion since 2015 when the Paris Agreement on Climate was adopted. German agrochemical giant Bayer was the biggest recipient of the financing, receiving an estimated USD 20.6 billion since 2016.

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Symbolic Change or Real Hope?– Part I — Global Issues

  • Opinion by Simone Galimberti (kathmandu, nepal)
  • Inter Press Service

There are many risks that this potential “gamechanger”, the opportunity of having young people better represented within the UN, would turn just into a gimmick, a tokenistic progress.

After all, the way that the whole UN system has been designed and evolved, is stacked against bold reforms and radical shifts are opposed. There is an overall staunching tendency to counter and refrain from undertaking any major reform. This is not because the resistance coming from the member states alone.

It’s also the way agencies, programs and departments within the UN tend to work and operate. Certainly, none of them are losing sleep over the appointment of Dr. Paullier, a medical doctor by training and currently the head of the youth agency in his native Uruguay.

The reason is that the position of Assistant Secretary-General for Youth Affairs in place is not a real breakthrough or at least, it is not yet a breakthrough. Certainly, it is a positive evolution, and Dr Paullier has definitely his work cut out. Yet he could, with some help, turn his new position in a powerful figure within the UN and beyond.

The positive factor is that, as an outsider of the UN, he can bring in fresh ideas and his ways of thinking won’t be conditioned nor limited by the structural constraints, procedural, administrative but also in mindsets, that are all imbedded in the system.

Resources will be needed and a lot of them

The first task for Dr Paullier is building, almost from scratch, the UN Youth Office. This is itself a recently new institution based on what was the Office of the Youth Envoy that was directly responding to the UN Secretary General.

Resources, a lot of them, will be needed to enable the Office to have its voice heard across the table of those who hold power and sway within the UN HQ in New York.

In relation to the finances, optimistically speaking, it should not difficult to find member states or even major philanthropic organizations like Ford Foundation, the Open Societies Foundation or Rockefeller Foundation, willing to step in.

Resources will be certainly needed to recruit a strong but agile team. Ideally Dr. Paullier could bring in some passionate young officers within the UN System, especially those who have a rare quality for the UN: an out of the box mentality.

With them, new members should also come from outside the UN orbit, from both the global civil society but also from the private sector. Only such a good mix could potentially create some positive disruptions in New York where the UN HQ is located.

A seat on the tables that count

In terms of influencing the decision-making process and have the voice of Dr. Paullier heard, Secretary General Antonio Guterres could do his bit. He should ensure that the new Assistant Secretary-General for Youth Affairs is nominated in the Senior Management Group (SMG) that consists of his most senior aides, all high-ranking officers.

In addition, Mr. Guterres should facilitate that the UN Youth Office gains a seat on the table with United Nations Sustainable Development Group that, serving as “a high-level forum for joint policy formation and decision-making”, brings together, twice a year, all the heads of agencies, programs and department.

A holistic and Broad Review Process

Second, if provided with power and resources, Dr. Paullier should start a serious process of review of the work done so far by the UN for and with the youths.

For example, Dr. Paullier should a undertake a major “system” review of the UN Youth Strategy. The process must be open, an inclusive, transparent process that assesses its progress and its setbacks.

This would be way beyond the existing practice of reporting on the progress of implementing the Strategy. Learning from the existing progress review exercises, that happens annually, makes sense but the scope of the work could be made wider, radically open and more inclusive.

In addition, the UN Youth Office could facilitate a major and more specific assessment exercise of each entity within the UN System. This would be surely a bold and radical undertaking that would go much deeper than simply reporting on implementation of the strategy as it happens now.

Building on The Youth2030 Scorecard for UN Entities that was prepared by the outgoing Youth Envoy, Ms. Jayathma Wickramanayake, the UN Youth Office should do something bolder.

Dr. Paullier and his team should go beyond providing guidance, the technical parameters through which agencies and programs should assess their work with youth.

They should do more: carrying out its independent evaluation in each agency and program within the UN System. Will the new Assistant Secretary-General for Youth Affairs muster the political skills for this massive exercise that that, probably, would necessarily require the involvement of third-party consultancies?

Implementing the Policy Brief

Any review and plans being charted out by the UN Youth Office also needs to make efforts to provide pathways to implement Meaningful Youth Engagement in Policy and Decision-making Processes.

This is one among the many Policy Briefs that are laying the ground for of Our Common Agenda, the ambitious plan of reforms proposed by the Office of the Secretary General that should discussed and finalized during the Summit of the Future next year.

Interestingly, this Brief already offers key principles on meaningful youth engagement, that could offer the parameters against which the work of each entity within the UN System could be assessed against.

The true is that while the Policy Brief comes up with some interesting ideas, none of them is truly transformative. Perhaps the most promising among them is creating a standing United Nations Youth Townhall that is supposed to be a platform where youths can be engaged with.

A key task of the new Assistant Secretary-General for Youth Affairs would be coming up with some practical proposals on how to “concretize” and make practical this idea.

This is a series of two opinion pieces focused on the recent appointment of Dr. Felipe Paullier of Uruguay as the first Assistant Secretary-General for Youth Affairs. The series offers some ideas and advice on how this new position within the UN System can truly be transformative.

Simone Galimberti, based in Kathmandu, is the Co-Founder of ENGAGE and The Good Leadership. He writes about reforming the UN, the role of youth, volunteerism, regional integration and human rights in the Asia Pacific region.

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Time to Convert Climate Change Rhetoric into Action, Says WFP’s Gernot Laganda — Global Issues

Gernot Laganda, Director / Climate and Disaster Risk Reduction at United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)
  • by Stella Paul (hyderabad, india)
  • Inter Press Service

Laganda leads WFP country offices to support governments dealing with the effects of climate change on food systems, prioritize concrete actions to avoid, reduce, or transfer growing climate risks in-country programs, and work with new and emerging climate finance mechanisms to implement adaptation solutions for the most vulnerable and food-insecure communities.

In this exclusive interview with IPS, Laganda speaks about a wide range of issues, including the climate disasters that WFP has responded to this year—and the impact of the humanitarian aid the programme has provided across the world, among the most vulnerable people who climate-induced disasters have directly impacted. As the world zooms towards 1.5 degrees of global warming, the number of climate disasters is rapidly increasing, and so is the requirement for more humanitarian aid. However, the current aid financing methods are not able to meet this unprecedented need, and there is always a gap between the requirement and the actual funding received.

As the 28th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP28) draws near, Laganda speaks of the funding challenges humanitarian aid agencies are facing—an issue that requires urgent attention from the governments and investors gathering at the COP. He also speaks of his expectations from the negotiations, the actions, and the decisions that will determine the success of the conference.

Here are excerpts from the interview:

IPS: Which climate disasters did WFP respond to this year, and what kind of assistance did you provide?

Laganda: This year, of course, is a very peculiar year because it is really on track to become the warmest year on record. We have an El Niño phenomenon that overlays with global warming. Last month, on the 2nd of October, we had 86 days above the 1.5-degree threshold, so this year was out of the ordinary. This year, in March, we had tropical cyclone Freddie, which hit Madagascar, Mozambique, and Malawi. This was the longest-lasting tropical cyclone on record for Africa. It killed 860 people with floods and landslides. But it had a peculiar behavior. Typically, cyclones are fed by heated energy from the oceans, so they lose intensity when they touch land. But Freddie developed in February on the west coast of Australia, across the Indian Ocean, made landfall in Madagascar, then to Mozambique before returning to the ocean. But then it gained more energy and hit land again in Malawi. So, it’s a very uncommon behavior.

The response related to humanitarian assistance, of course, is related to supporting the governments with relief operations. For example, in Malawi, which was badly hit by cyclone Freddie, we helped distribute two months of food basket items targeting the most affected districts. We used schools as entry points to provide emergency rations. And, in the case of farmers from whom we buy food for local school meal programs, we substituted these with a feeding (scheme) to allow farmers to recover from the loss. So, there’s the typical humanitarian response machine that kicks into gear. These climate extremes are now happening more frequently; they hit more strongly, and this humanitarian response needs more finances, which is currently not there in the system.

To give you some numbers, in the Horn of Africa, we had an unprecedented sequence of drought in three countries – Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya; 47,000 people died in Somalia during the drought in 2022 (and) WFP distributed food assistance to a record 4.7 million people.

IPS: What kind of loss and damage did these disasters cause?

Laganda: First, there’s a national picture, and then after the disaster, you have the loss and damage figures, and the context is very different in different parts of a country, especially in countries like Somalia, where there is also an overlay of climate effects on conflict, on inflation and economic shock. However, the biggest impact is on housing and natural capital.

IPS: Can you elaborate further?

Laganda: Okay. For example, when you are a farmer in a developing country, you have several assets or capitals, including natural capital. This natural capital includes your natural resources like forest and fiber products, cattle, land, and soil. Then, there are disaster preparedness elements like insurance coverage, access to savings, and access to insurance protection. If these capitals are strong and intact, you can recover from disaster shocks and overcome the disaster impact shocks. You can also recover if you have soil restoration, insurance coverage, and access to savings.

But when many of these natural capital areas are degraded or hit (as happened in these above-mentioned disasters), you have no protective shields.

IPS: Three years ago, at COP25, you had said that only 60 percent of the climate finance that’s needed in the aftermath of a disaster is funded, while 40 percent is not funded. Has this ratio changed since then? How?

Laganda: Unfortunately, humanitarian aid after disasters remains chronically underfunded. Also, over the period of five years, UN humanitarian appeals after climate disasters were only funded 54 percent on average. At the same time, we see that these disasters increase, and our requirements are now eight times higher than they were 20 years ago. So, we are really in a time when humanitarian needs are increasing very sharply, especially when it comes to people suffering from acute hunger, but there is not enough financing to meet all these needs after climate disasters.

It’s the same with climate finance. As the recently published Adaptation Gap Report shows, there is a massive gap in investment in adaptation. Also, from 2014 to 2021, the climate finance available per capita in non-fragile states was USD 161, while it was only USD 2.1 in extremely fragile states. So, there is a huge disparity between where that money goes and where people are most vulnerable. This means two things: we need to make sure there is more funding in the system for the humanitarian needs after climate disasters, but it also means we need to invest much more strategically and faster because we are already in the state where we are reaching the 1.5-degree threshold as mentioned in the Paris Agreement. So, we need more targeted efforts in climate projection and protection in the most vulnerable context.

IPS: What is the main reason behind this continued funding gap? Is there some sort of fatigue among funders, or is this just a case of reduced priority?

Laganda: Many disasters are now compound and protracted. That means there are many countries and sectors where humanitarian aid needs to stay for decades. So, it’s not like there is one disaster, then there is humanitarian relief, and then it’s over. You have decades of humanitarian needs that never stop, right? So, it’s really hard to sustain that financing commitment in an ever-growing number of countries where people have this acute humanitarian need. For example, the number of people facing acute hunger has doubled only in a span of three years. We have been seeing a situation where people are caught between these different risk drivers: conflict, economic shocks, and climate change. And so, the old models of humanitarian aid that we have just don’t work anymore.

IPS: Currently, all eyes are on the Loss and Damage Fund. Civil society is already alleging that the fund is compromised and that it lacks the commitment to human rights. What are your thoughts?

Laganda: The Loss and Damage Fund was a very difficult negotiation, and I think it’s understandable that the fund should be guided by human rights. If you ask what climate justice is, then the litmus test for climate justice is at the local level. So, climate justice needs to be judged by how many people are protected from climate-vulnerable conditions that they have no hand in creating. That’s ultimately what we all want to do. But the mechanism that we have available for loss and damage—this has been a very polarized conversation. I understand that there was some disappointment with the way the reference to human rights was being discussed, but I am sure that when this conversation happens again at COP28 in Dubai, there will be a great push to put this language back into the agreement.

At this point, there is a provisional way forward, and I do not think this will be a smooth process, but I do hope that at the end of COP28, there will be a functioning operational modality for a loss and damage facility because this is really a very important aspect to the entire climate change policy landscape.

A decade ago, we were excited about climate change mitigation and adaptation. But now we are failing at mitigation, and adaptation is too little too late. We need an expansion of this conversation from climate mitigation and adaptation to loss and damage, and I think at COP28, this will take center stage. I think it’s important to have that agreement because nobody wants to have a COP28 that is not successful, and that would be an important part of the success.

IPS: And what are your expectations from the COP28? What actions should be prioritized to combat climate-induced hunger?

Laganda: It’s a good question. When we stay on these three headlines – climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation, loss, and damage, it’s clear that on the mitigation side, we would like to see greater ambition, and where governments are making investments, the actions are compatible with the rhetoric because at the moment there is a gap between the rhetoric and the reality.

The Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) need to be more ambitious. We need to bend the temperature curve – there is no question about it. We cannot adapt our way out of the problem. The Adaptation Gap report says there is only USD 21 billion in public financing per year. We need at least USD 40 billion, which is also the goal that the UN secretary-general has. Also, adaptation investment needs to happen much faster and in a less bureaucratic manner, so more funding and more efficient deployment of that financing. And, in loss and damage, we would like to see a successful conclusion to the negotiations so that a Loss and Damage Fund is established with operational criteria that live up to the needs. We have to protect vulnerable people on the frontline of the climate crisis. So, this loss and damage fund makes sure that vulnerable people are protected immediately and not five years from now because 2024 and 2025 are critical years as we are already crossing the 1.5-degree threshold of the Paris Agreement.

These are the expectations I have for COP28, and this is how we will judge its success by the end of the day.

IPS: Finally, do you think the ongoing conflict in Gaza and the conflict-effected humanitarian aid needs will overshadow the discussions of climate-induced humanitarian aid requirements in Dubai?

Laganda: COP28 is the first COP that dedicates an entire day to peace and fragility. There is, for the first time, a recognition that there is a link between climate and fragility and that there needs to be more investment in climate action in a fragile context and in a conflict-inflicted context. There really is a bridge between the climate theme and conflict theme, which will make us think about how we can place investments in places like Yemen, Syria, and Somalia. So, I don’t think this (political conflict) will overshadow it, but how climate risks and conflict risks intersect will be prominent.

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Carbon Market Greenwashing Systems Deepen Inequalities in Global South

Kenya’s extensive coastline has been fronted as a hub for carbon trading due to its lush mangrove forests. But now experts caution that carbon markets are exploitative greenwashing systems. Credit: Joyce Chimbi/IPS
  • by Joyce Chimbi (nairobi)
  • Inter Press Service

Flash floods, failed rainy seasons, severe food insecurity, and climate-induced health disasters such as cholera are becoming frequent, and their debilitating effects are increasingly difficult to mitigate. In late 2022, for instance, floods caused extensive damage to farmlands in Nigeria, and projections show 25 million Nigerians could face high levels of food insecurity by the end of 2023.

Against this backdrop, there is growing concern that the carbon market has failed Africa and other developing countries in the global South. Governments and companies created carbon market systems to address their greenhouse emissions – a trading system in which carbon credits are sold and bought. One tradable carbon credit is equivalent to one tonne of carbon dioxide, or the amount of different greenhouse gases reduced, sequestered, or avoided.

Fadhel Kaboub, a Tunisian economist based in Nairobi, a senior advisor with Power Shift Africa and the President of the Global Institute for Sustainable Prosperity, tells IPS, “Carbon credits are pollution permits that allow global North polluters to continue polluting while offering financial crumbs to the global South. They displace vulnerable communities from their ancestral territory and pastoral land. They enrich middlemen and speculators.”

Kaboub, who is also an Associate Professor of Economics at Denison University, says, “Through the dominant market power of the corporations that buy these pollution permits, they pass the cost of the carbon credits on to their customers, many of whom are actually in the Global South, so we end up paying for it indirectly.”

There are experts, however, such as those powering the Africa Carbon Markets Initiative (ACMI), who are proactively promoting the carbon market systems as a powerful tool to deliver carbon justice. And for developing countries to accelerate socio-economic development by leveraging on selling carbon while transitioning to a low-carbon economy.

ACMI seeks to capture more of Africa’s potential in carbon markets by addressing the challenges to voluntary carbon market growth and building the foundations for a thriving voluntary carbon market ecosystem in Africa by 2030. Its priority areas are “not only on driving decarbonisation activities but also on driving economic development by supporting energy access, scaling the clean energy transition, protecting forests, improving agriculture, and creating new income sources.”

However, a recent report found that “ACMI’s growth target would allow big private companies to emit an additional 1.5-2.5 Gigatonnes CO2e per year by 2050, more than the total emissions from fossil fuels from all of Africa in 2021 and double the entire annual CO2 emissions from all of sub-Saharan Africa.”

IPS reached out to ACMI for comment, but it had not come back to us at the time of publication.

This week, JSE Ventures launched South Africa’s first carbon market at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.

But carbon trading is not universally seen as a panacea to addressing global warming.

South African-based Dr Shehnaaz Moosa, the director and head of finance hub at SouthSouthNorth, which is a climate change non-profit organisation, tells IPS that carbon markets have the potential to either reinforce or mitigate historic structural inequalities between the global North and South.

“But given the dismal failure of the Clean Development Mechanism and the greenwashing of the voluntary carbon market, I am in the camp that believes it will reinforce these deep inequalities. The carbon market allows big polluters to keep doing so with no overall reduction in their emissions. Local projects in the global South that reduce carbon are exploited with no real benefit accruing to the communities.”

Moosa, who also lectures in Chemical Engineering at the University of Cape Town, says carbon trading must be seen for what it is, “a lot of hot air to legitimise the continued production of greenhouse emissions. We keep hearing the rhetoric that depending on how the market is structured, it will be of benefit, which is a Northern narrative, and there is no way to structure exploitation that will make it equitable because it is exactly what carbon trading is: exploitation.”

Kaboub affirms, citing a recent investigation that found that the majority of carbon offset projects essentially amount to greenwashing fraud – making false or misleading statements about the environmental benefits of a product or practice – that does nothing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Stressing that this is one of the most disturbing climate finance false solutions and dangerous distractions.

Moosa and Kaboub emphasise that the cause of disagreement is that carbon markets are attractive to high polluters as they enable wealthy industrialised nations and corporations to maintain carbon-intensive and climate-warming practices while transferring their emission reduction duties to Africa. Stressing that it is time to explore other climate financing mechanisms and bring into full effect the Polluter Pays Principle – one of the key principles underlying the European Union’s environmental policy.

The principle demands that polluters bear the costs of their pollution, including the cost of measures taken to prevent, control and remedy pollution and the costs it imposes on society. As such, polluters are incentivised to avoid environmental damage and are held responsible for the pollution that they cause. It is also the polluter, and not the taxpayer, who covers the cost of remediation.

Moosa is particularly focused on Loss and Damage, “while the Loss and Damage funding arrangements are being designed, we do not need to be distracted by a concept that only works for the big polluters. The developing countries’ energies should be directed to Loss and Damage and Adaptation finance because there cannot be climate justice until climate injustice is addressed. The global North has a long way to go to address these injustices, and carbon markets are not a way to do it.”

Kaboub agrees, calling for a need to steer clear of the carbon market as African countries that have not contributed to climate change and who are, in fact, the victims of climate-induced shocks are now being forced to give up territorial sovereignty over large swaths of land to foreign corporations to issue pollution permits – adding that this is a new form of colonialism.

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