At least 28 others are missing after a boat carrying 77 asylum seekers sinks, according to the UN’s migration agency.
At least 16 people are dead and 28 others are missing after a boat carrying asylum seekers capsized off the coast of the Horn of Africa nation of Djibouti, according to the UN’s migration agency.
The accident occurred on Monday night, about two weeks after another boat carrying mainly Ethiopian asylum seekers sank off the Djibouti coast, killing several dozen people, on the perilous so-called “eastern migration route” from Africa to the Middle East.
“Tragedy as boat capsizes off Djibouti coast with 77 migrants on board including children,” the International Organization for Migration (IOM) said on Tuesday in a post on X.
“At least 28 missing. 16 dead,” it said, adding that the local IOM branch was “supporting local authorities with search and rescue effort”.
Yvonne Ndege, a spokeswoman for the agency, told the AFP news agency that the 16 deaths included children and an infant, without offering further details.
❗️ Tragedy as boat capsizes off #Djibouti coast with 77 migrants on board including children. At least 28 missing. 16 dead. @DjiboutiIOM supporting local authorities with search and rescue effort. pic.twitter.com/s4L7ASNW4o
— IOM – UN Migration News (@UNMigrationNews) April 23, 2024
Ethiopia’s ambassador to Djibouti, Berhanu Tsegaye, said on X that the boat was carrying Ethiopians from Yemen and that the accident occurred off Godoria in northeastern Djibouti.
He said 33 people, including one woman, survived.
Another boat carrying more than 60 people sank off the coast of Godoria on April 8, according to the IOM and the Ethiopian embassy in Djibouti.
The IOM said at the time that the bodies of 38 people, including children, were recovered, while another six people were missing.
The Ethiopian embassy had said the boat was carrying Ethiopians from Djibouti to war-torn Yemen.
‘Eastern Route’
Each year, many tens of thousands of African asylum seekers brave the “eastern route” across the Red Sea and through Yemen to try to reach Saudi Arabia, escaping conflict or natural disaster, or seeking better economic opportunities.
“On their journeys, many face life-threatening dangers including starvation, health risks and exploitation – at the hands of human traffickers and other criminals,” the IOM said in a statement in February.
Ndege said the IOM’s data from 2023 showed that “the number of people trying to cross is on the rise”.
According to the IOM, Ethiopians make up 79 percent of about 100,000 people who arrived in Yemen last year from Djibouti or Somalia, the remainder being Somalis.
Africa’s second-most populous country, Ethiopia is blighted by various conflicts and several regions have suffered from severe drought in recent years.
More than 15 percent of its 120 million inhabitants depend on food aid.
In February, the IOM said that according to its Missing Migrants Project at least 698 people, including women and children, had died crossing the Gulf of Aden from Djibouti to Yemen last year.
Rift comes after Somaliland deal giving landlocked Ethiopia access to the Red Sea.
A deal between Ethiopia and the breakaway region of Somaliland involving the lease of coastline and establishment of a naval base has further worsened diplomatic relations with Somalia.
Somalia’s government is furious at the agreement, which would give landlocked Ethiopia access to the Red Sea.
So far it is only a diplomatic dispute. But why is this rift worsening, and could there be wider consequences?
Presenter: James Bays
Guests:
Samuel Getachew – political commentator specialising in Ethiopia
Sharmake Ali – activist with UK-Somaliland Alliance
Abdulkareem Jama – chair of the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, a think tank based in the Somali capital, Mogadishu
Human Rights Watch says Ethiopia’s army ‘summarily executed’ several dozen civilians in the country’s northwestern Amhara region in January.
Ethiopia’s army “summarily executed several dozen civilians” and committed other war crimes in the northwestern Amhara region earlier this year, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has said, as it called on the United Nations to launch an independent investigation.
The incident in the city of Merawi in late January was among the deadliest for civilians since fighting began between Ethiopian federal forces and Fano militia in the restive region in August, the New York-based rights group said in a report on Thursday.
“Civilians are once again bearing the brunt of an abusive army operating with impunity,” Laetitia Bader, deputy Africa director at HRW, said.
“The Ethiopian armed forces’ brutal killings of civilians in Amhara undercut government claims that it’s trying to bring law and order to the region.”
There was no immediate comment by the Ethiopian government or the army, but a separate investigation conducted by the state-appointed Ethiopian Human Rights Commission estimated that at least 45 people were killed by government forces in Merawi.
HRW said it was unable to determine the total number of civilian killings in Merawi, adding that some accounts put the figure to more than 80.
More than a dozen witnesses, including victims and their family members, told the rights groups about the alleged abuses carried out by the army in the city.
HRW said it had also analysed and verified videos posted to social media in the aftermath of the January 29 attack and examined satellite imagery that corroborated witness accounts.
‘Pillage’ of civilian properties
HRW urged the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to lead the investigation into the alleged abuses.
It also called on the African Union to suspend all deployments of Ethiopian federal forces to peacekeeping missions until “commanders responsible for grave abuses are held accountable”.
“Under international humanitarian law applicable to the armed conflict in Amhara, the deliberate killing or mistreatment of civilians, and looting and pillage of civilian property are prohibited and may be prosecuted as war crimes,” HRW said.
Testimonies collected by HRW revealed that after Fano fighters withdrew from Merawi following an attack on Ethiopian forces, the soldiers shot civilians on the streets as well as during house raids over a six-hour period.
“The soldiers also pillaged and destroyed civilian property,” HRW said in a statement.
Several residents also told HRW that soldiers remaining in the town also refused to allow the community to collect and bury those who were killed.
Bader said the Ethiopian government’s “failure” to ensure accountability for abuses “contributes to ongoing cycles of violence and impunity”.
Fano fighters took part in a week of violent protests across Amhara in April last year after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed ordered that security forces from Ethiopia’s 11 regions be integrated into the police or national army.
Protesters felt the order was meant to weaken Amhara – the country’s second-biggest region. The federal government denied this.
The Fanos and other Amharas felt betrayed by a peace deal signed in November 2022 by the government and dissident leaders of the Tigray region – longtime foes of Amhara nationalists who claim parts of Ethiopia’s northernmost region as their ancestral lands [Tiksa Negeri/Reuters]
President Mohamud ‘categorically objects’ to Ethiopia’s Red Sea port deal with Somaliland, territory Somalia claims as its own.
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has accused Ethiopia of trying to annex part of his country’s territory by signing a sea access deal with the breakaway region of Somaliland.
Speaking at the African Union summit in Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa on Saturday, Mohamud also said Ethiopian security forces tried to block his access to the summit amid a dispute between the two countries.
The agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland signed on January 1 “is nothing more than annexing part of Somalia to Ethiopia, and changing the borders of Somalia,” Mohamud told reporters. “Somalia categorically objects to that.”
As part of the deal, signed by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland’s leader Muse Bihi Abdi, Somaliland grants Ethiopia a 50-year lease on a naval base with access to Somaliland’s Berbera port for commercial marine operations.
Neither side has made the terms of the deal public, but it appears to give Ethiopia the right to build a port in Somaliland in exchange for recognition.
Somaliland has enjoyed de facto independence for three decades, but Somalia considers the self-governing region and its four million people to be a part of its northern territory.
Mogadishu regards any international recognition of Somaliland as an attack on Somalia’s sovereignty, and the Somali government has called the port deal with Addis Ababa “outrageous” and “unauthorised”.
“Ethiopia is misleading the world by claiming that they need an access to the sea,” Mohamud said on Saturday. “The question is not an access to the sea. The question is how Ethiopia wants access to the sea.”
He claimed senior officers from Ethiopia’s military were in Somaliland “preparing the ground” for the territory’s annexation. It was not possible to verify his allegation.
Somalia has suggested it would be prepared to go to war to stop Ethiopia from building a port in Somaliland. But Ethiopia’s Abiy has played down fears of an armed conflict over the Somaliland deal, telling lawmakers earlier this month that he had “no intention” of going to war with Somalia.
‘Provocation’
Reporting from Addis Ababa on Saturday, Al Jazeera’s Mohamed Vall noted that Somalia’s president had been very outspoken in his remarks at the AU Summit.
“[Mohamud] accused Ethiopia not just looking for access to the sea in a normal way, because Ethiopia has lots of other neighbours who have access to the sea, who have sea shores … The real purpose, he said, of Ethiopia’s [deal] is to annex Somaliland, which is a part of the sovereign republic of Somalia,” Vall said.
“The Somali president condemned the behaviour of the Ethiopian government, saying that they have even tried to block his access to the venue of the summit today,” our correspondent added. “He wondered how can this happen in a country that hosts the AU, an organisation based on equality between African states and the freedom of the leaders coming here to access the summit.”
Mohamud, attending the 37th summit of the AU, said that Ethiopian security services tried to block him from leaving his hotel in Addis Ababa on Saturday morning, forcing him to travel in the convoy of Djibouti’s president.
When the pair arrived at the AU headquarters, armed guards tried to prevent them from entering the building, Mohamud said, describing the alleged action as “provocation”.
Ethiopia however said it had “warmly welcomed” Mohamud and accorded him the full honours of visiting heads of state and governments to the summit.
Prime Minister Abiy’s spokesperson Billene Seyoum told the AFP news agency that the Somalia delegation was blocked when its security detail tried to enter a venue with weapons.
“The Somali delegation security attempted to enter the AUC premises with weapons which was blocked off by AUC security,” she said.
As African leaders convene in Ethiopia for the AU summit, Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh also attended the two-day gathering and raised the issue of Israel’s war in Gaza with leaders of the AU who remain divided over their support for Palestine.
African leaders will be convening in Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, for the 37th summit of the African Union on Saturday. During the two-day gathering, the Heads of State and Government of the African Union will discuss issues of peace, development and integration against the backdrop of resurgent coups, global food and commodity crises and heightened geopolitical competition across the continent.
The integration agenda holds particular significance as global powers vie for influence over African states, evident in the growing number of “Africa summits” hosted by individual countries outside the continent in recent years.
Africa faces several complex and multifaceted challenges, yet the urgent priority today must be continental integration which would remove barriers to labour and capital mobility. To this end, I urge the leaders gathered in Addis Ababa to rise above customary speechmaking and confront this challenge head-on. They can draw inspiration from the unwavering resolve of AU founders who united to alleviate the adverse effects of colonialism.
To this end, the summit must take concrete and practical steps to accelerate the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), a trade regime that aims to establish a tariff-free market for goods and services. In addition, the summit should lay the groundwork for the creation of a “Made in Africa” economic corridor that would augment the continental efforts towards a pan-African marketplace.
I have witnessed such promises made in the past. In May 2022, during the Extraordinary AU Summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, I was part of the Ethiopian delegation led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. That trip took us to Kenya, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea. As minister of minerals and energy, I attended ministerial meetings and AU sessions that seemed routine, rather than practical steps to address real challenges. As we flew across the continent and during the summit, a single question kept percolating in my head: Why can’t Africa and its leaders join hands and realise the prosperity that our people so richly deserve? Are there, perhaps, some invisible chains holding us back? If so, what are they?
Then, I remembered the fable of the elephant rope: the story of a young man who, while travelling through the forest, stumbles across a camp of elephants; he finds the mighty elephants tied to a small tree with thin pieces of rope and unable to roam freely. The elephants, the man later learns, had been held in place by the same chain since childhood, conditioned as they were, believing they could never break free. It is an apt metaphor for the structural impediments and systems of thought that still hinder the age-old dream of integrated Africa.
The truth is our continent is filled with big elephants now: a young and rapidly growing population; proliferating technological and economic innovations; vast reserves of human and material resources that are yet to be fully explored and utilised; and a growing consumer base for global goods and commodities. However, it seems Africa is still being held back by a tiny rope: post-colonial artificial borders and a governance model that keeps it in shackles. The convergence of colonial borders and leadership failures continues to push African countries into internal conflicts, civil wars, border disputes, and fragile political, economic, and institutional predicaments.
Kenyan-American scholar Makau W Mutua has argued for a return to the pre-colonial map – to a world before European colonisers divided our overlapping communities. But, this, of course, poses more questions than it answers: who would initiate or even be trusted to embark on such a controversial project? Are colonial borders truly the root causes of African conflicts and barriers to its integration?
Across Africa, the boundaries of ethnic and cultural groups are often fluid and porous. It would be challenging indeed to determine where one group’s territory ends and another’s begins. Additionally, redrawing the map of Africa would likely lead only to more conflicts. It might increase economic disparities and language barriers. Importantly, doing away with post-colonial borders would not promote the goal of a united and prosperous Africa. We must think differently.
Let us take a step back a few decades. At the inaugural summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the forerunner of AU, in 1963, the founding fathers laid down a resounding vision for continental integration, unity and solidarity. They stressed the critical need for Africans to unite in order to overcome their shared difficulties and shape the continent’s future. There was a strong sense of optimism, resolve and dedication to cooperating for the advancement and welfare of African people. The leaders articulated a shared vision of a united Africa, free from conflict, division, and underdevelopment. They set up African states to assume their rightful place as influential, independent nations.
The aspiration for unity, integration and intercontinental solidarity has been a recurring theme in AU policy blueprints and the rhetoric of African leaders since the 1960s. The chorus of calls often stresses the need for a single African organisation through which Africa’s voice could be heard on the global stage and its problems resolved. One key question continues to reverberate: could African unity be achieved through top-down or bottom-up approaches, or by winning the hearts and minds of African people in the march to dismantle postcolonial national boundaries?
Here are some modest proposals.
First, our leaders need to show the resolve and determination of their 1960s predecessors to alleviate the adverse effects of colonialism, which still persist. Now, as then, the goal of unifying and integrating Africa requires removing barriers, not redrawing borders. We need to think bigger.
To this end, we should eliminate restrictions on the flow of labour and capital within the continent of Africa. This must be accompanied by major public and private investment in quality products in sectors ranging from agriculture, minerals and natural resources, renewable energy, technology and innovation, and tourism. The sluggish productivity of our small-holder farmers, for instance, can only be enhanced through the removal of barriers and the promotion of large-scale commercial farming agriculture.
Second, we should establish an integrated financial and logistics system to boost a single “Made in Africa” economic bloc. Lessons can be drawn from “made in” initiatives in emerging economic powerhouses such as India and China. The development of integrated infrastructure networks to ease supply chains within Africa is a crucial element of this. Only when we become suppliers, producers and exporters to global markets can we meet the demands of our people.
At the same time, advanced technologies are transforming global economies and power dynamics. New financial technologies have the potential to empower Africa’s youthful population. But, we should make it much easier for ordinary Africans to get online and participate actively in a pan-African marketplace. A “Made in Africa”’ initiative and its attendant marketplace would spur lagging industries across the continent and enhance Africa’s status as a global economic player, rather than a dumping ground for cheap consumer goods. A robust and competitive marketplace necessarily requires prioritising and investing in robust regional infrastructure, energy and connectivity.
The list goes on. Protectionist telecoms, customs, port and immigration systems are yet more barriers limiting Africa’s integration and economic prosperity. The existing international aid model also remains short-sighted: African nations have the know-how, resources, and technical capabilities to build what is required. We can no longer look outside of Africa to feed our growing populations. Geopolitical tensions beyond our continent continue to highlight how risks to global trade impact our already overstretched resources. The development of regional and continental infrastructure networks to efficiently transport goods and services can no longer wait. These are the basics of a thriving global economy. Many of these concepts are already incorporated into AfCFTA, the second largest free-trade area after WTO, established in 2018. But its lofty promise of eliminating tariffs and creating a single market for goods and services needs to be implemented fast. The speed of its implementation has already been slowed by obstructive bureaucracy and a lack of urgency.
To conclude, now is not 1963. All African states are independent. At 1.3 billion, Africa has the fastest-growing population in the world. But, still, continental gross domestic product remains far smaller than the GDP of some US states. As capital in other parts of the world dries up and protectionist regulations expand everywhere, African countries cannot rely on donor funding to power their prosperity. Neither can solutions come from the ever-proliferating Africa summit diplomacy. Although the renewed diplomatic engagement with the continent is welcome, African leaders must create platforms to pursue mutually beneficial deals and ensure the collective interest of all African nations.
While in Addis Ababa next week, African leaders must work to identify bilateral strategies for joint investments and resource sharing. The question for African leaders remains the same: are we to be tied down by that tiny rope, or can we stand up and build the Africa of tomorrow that we all desperately need?
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
The Amhara violence is Ethiopia’s most serious crisis since a 2022 peace agreement ended war in neighbouring Tigray.
Ethiopia’s federal security forces killed at least 45 civilians in a massacre in Amhara state in late January, the independent state-affiliated Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) said on Tuesday.
A statement said the EHRC had confirmed “the identity of at least 45 civilians who were extrajudicially killed by government security forces for allegedly ‘supporting [ethnic Amhara armed group] Fano’.”
“However, it can be assumed that the number of victims is even higher,” it said.
The killings in the Amhara town of Merawi follow months of clashes last year between Ethiopia’s military and Fano, a “self defence” organisation with no publicly known command structure that draws volunteers from the local population.
The fighting prompted the federal government to impose a state of emergency in August that politicians extended by four months, this month.
There has also been a rise in deadly drone activity in the region.
Tewodrose Tirfe, chairman of the United States-based advocacy group Amhara Association of America, told Al Jazeera in December that his organisation has accumulated data on about 70 drone strikes that caused civilian casualties in the Amhara region since May.
The Ethiopian army is the only operator of armed drones in the Horn of Africa country,
Last week, the United States said it was deeply concerned by reports of “targeted civilian killings” in Merawi and called for an independent investigation.
The Amhara violence is Ethiopia’s most serious crisis since a peace agreement was signed in November 2022 to end a two-year conflict in the neighbouring region of Tigray.
Amhara regional forces including Fano fought alongside federal troops against Tigrayan rebels but ties frayed in April last year when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government decided to dismantle state paramilitaries across the country.
Amhara nationalists said it would weaken their region and protested against the move.
In September, the EHRC accused federal government forces of carrying out extrajudicial killings in Amhara, and mass arbitrary detentions in the region and elsewhere.
On January 1, a controversial memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed between Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and President Muse Bihi Abdi of Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia.
Purportedly, this agreement grants landlocked Ethiopia a 20km piece of coastal land for establishing a naval base and the right to build a commercial port. In return, Ethiopia said it intends to recognise Somaliland as an independent country, making it the first nation to do so.
Ethiopian leaders have said that this move is aimed at correcting what they frame as a “historical mistake” of not having access to the sea. But Somalia holds no responsibility for this supposed historical injustice; Ethiopia lost its coastline after Eritrea gained its independence in 1993 following a three-decade-long war. Moreover, Ethiopia’s claim that it needs access to the sea to grow its economy conveniently ignores the fact that its economy became the fastest growing in the continent after it became landlocked.
Now Addis Ababa’s actions are threatening to spark yet another war in East Africa. Unless forces of reason prevail among Ethiopian leaders, the whole region could be dragged into conflict.
Two desperate leaders
By all accounts, this provocative move is rooted in the profound domestic crisis confronting the leaders of both Ethiopia and Somaliland. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, governs a fractious Ethiopia, grappling with widespread ethnic conflicts and increasingly intensifying armed rebellions.
Ethiopia’s government, emerging from a devastating civil war in the Tigray region, faces fresh pogroms by rebel forces from the Amhara and Oromo communities – the two largest ethnic groups – challenging the authority in Addis Ababa.
Regionally, Ethiopia is in a precarious position. The détente with Eritrea is crumbling as mutual acrimony between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea intensifies. Tensions with Egypt over the Renaissance Dam are reaching a boiling point, as Cairo recently withdrew its representative from a platform for negotiations on how to share the waters of the Nile River. Relations with neighbouring Sudan are not at their best since December, when PM Abiy extended a red carpet welcome for the leader of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, a staunch foe of the Sovereign Council that rules Sudan.
Economically, Ethiopia is experiencing severe financial strain. Last month, the government failed to pay $33m in interest on its international government bond and in recent years, it has struggled to maintain sufficient hard currency, restricting the movement of United States dollars out of the country. The official exchange rate is considerably lower than that of the black market, a reliable indicator of deep financial woes.
For Abdi, the leader of the Somalia breakaway region of Somaliland, the situation is equally dire on the domestic front. Last year, he lost approximately a third of the erstwhile “British-Somaliland” territory to SSC-Khaatumo, a regional administration recognised by the Federal Government of Somalia.
Other communities, notably in the Awdal region, are also rising up as a result of the MOU with Ethiopia. Last week, the defence minister of Somaliland, who hails from the same region, resigned in protest of the MOU.
On top of that, President Abdi’s five-year term expired more than a year ago. An unelected senate, known as “Guurti”, extended his term by two years, to the objection of Somaliland’s opposition parties in the elected lower house of the regional parliament.
This MOU, therefore, is widely seen in Ethiopia and Somaliland as a desperate attempt by their leaders to deflect attention away from their deep domestic troubles. However, the global response and domestic reactions have been remarkably swift and consistent.
Diplomatic backlash
The MOU has been met with a swift and unanimous international response, affirming the inviolability of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Major global and regional powers, including the African Union, the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the European Union, China, the United Kingdom and the US, among others, have stood firm against Ethiopia’s violation of the sovereignty of Somalia.
China’s strong response is particularly significant given Somaliland’s ties with Taiwan and Somalia’s historic support for the “One China” policy. Russia, on the other hand, has remained silent, possibly seeing an opportunity to further its strategic interests in the region.
On the African front, Ethiopia could find itself in isolation if it proceeds to recognise Somaliland and violates a founding principle of the African Union, which is to safeguard the territorial integrity of member states.
Ethiopia’s reckless action could lead to a campaign to move the AU headquarters from Addis Ababa, as it would be deemed inherently unfit to host a union built on respecting the sovereignty of all member states. Moreover, the vast majority of AU member states are principally and politically opposed to recognising secessionist movements as that would open a can of worms across the continent.
Regional stakes
The MOU threatens to reignite historical hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia. The two nations have a history of conflict, notably the 1977-1978 war, and the 1,600km (994-mile) border between Somalia and Ethiopia remains officially disputed. This latest move by Ethiopia is by far the most significant violation of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity since its independence in 1960.
Should Ethiopia proceed with establishing a naval base in Somaliland, Somalia’s strategic response would be multifaceted and equally dramatic. Among the proportional countermeasures it may undertake, Somalia would almost immediately sever diplomatic ties, eject all Ethiopian forces from Somalia and suspend virtually all commercial transactions. That might include banning Ethiopian Airlines from using the Somali airspace — a move that would almost certainly cripple Africa’s biggest airline and the largest source of hard currency for Ethiopia.
Additionally, Somalia might seek to sign strategic defence pacts with Egypt, Eritrea and other countries as part of its long-term territorial fortification strategy. Such moves would not sit well with Ethiopia, and the resulting escalation could trigger a regional conflagration in the Horn of Africa, already one of the most volatile regions around the world.
Perhaps more ominously for regional stability, the Ethiopian action could radicalise tens of thousands of young Somalis who are already outraged by what they view as a historic enemy dismembering their country.
Coincidently, it was Ethiopia’s 2006-2008 invasion of Somalia that gave rise to al-Shabab, the most violent militant group in Africa today. This MOU would be the most poignant recruitment tool for violent extremist groups as well as for irredentist movements.
Options for de-escalation
In signing this MOU with Somaliland, Ethiopia gambled on a rules-based international world order, weakened by the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. However, the response from Somalia and across the world has been firm and has reflected strong support for its sovereignty.
Rather than pursuing this dangerous path, Ethiopia should engage directly with the Federal Government of Somalia to discuss cooperative arrangements, such as the utilisation of existing Somali ports, following the model between Djibouti and Ethiopia. This approach would be more conducive to regional stability and respect for Somali sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity.
Somalia has repeatedly affirmed its willingness to engage constructively with Ethiopia on mutually beneficial trading arrangements that include the usage of its ports by its larger neighbour to the south. And Ethiopia has many things to offer to Somalia, such as cheap electricity and transportation and logistics hubs.
But the path that Addis Ababa has taken with this MOU assures a mutually destructive outcome for both countries. The only difference is that, more than most countries around the world, Somalia knows how to survive – and even thrive – under a comprehensive state failure. Ethiopia, on the other hand, wouldn’t be able to cope with the resulting conflagration.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
El-Sisi’s comments come amid dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia over the latter’s deal with Somaliland.
Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has said Cairo stands shoulder to shoulder with Somalia and has slammed Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland to obtain access to the sea and establish a marine force base.
“Egypt will not allow anyone to threaten Somalia or affect its security,” el-Sisi said, speaking at a news conference with visiting Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.
“Do not try Egypt, or try to threaten its brothers especially if they ask it to intervene,” he said.
Somaliland, a region strategically located by the Gulf of Aden, broke away from Somalia in 1991 as the country collapsed into a civil conflict. The region has maintained its own government despite a lack of international recognition.
On January 1, in a memorandum, Ethiopia said it would consider recognising Somaliland’s independence in return for the port access. It would lease 20km (12 miles) of coastland around the port of Berbera, on the Gulf of Aden, for 50 years for military and commercial purposes.
Ethiopia’s current main port for maritime exports is in the neighbouring country of Djibouti.
Sheikh Mohamud, the president of Somalia, rejected the deal as a violation of international law and said: “We will not stand idly by and watch our sovereignty being compromised.”
He arrived in Egypt over the weekend to rally support for his government. Besides meeting President el-Sisi, he met with Arab League chief Ahmed Aboul Gheit and Al-Azhar Mosque’s Grand Imam, Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayeb.
“My message to Ethiopia is that … trying to seize a piece of land to control it is something no one will agree to,” el-Sisi said, noting cooperation on development was a better strategy.
On Sunday, Ethiopia rejected criticism from Egypt over the deal, saying it was merely a commercial agreement aimed at securing access to the sea and not an attempt to annex land.
“It isn’t annexation or assumption of sovereignty over the territory of any state,” Redwan Hussien, national security adviser to the prime minister of Ethiopia, said in a post on X.
Ethiopia’s commitment for peace and security in Somalia has been demonstrated through the blood and sweat of its precious sons and daughters. Ethiopia & Somalia are not just neighbors who share a border but they are fraternal nations sharing a common language, culture & people.
Relations between Egypt and Ethiopia have been tense for years over a major dam Ethiopia has built on the Blue Nile.
For over a decade — along with Sudan — the countries have been trying to reach a negotiated agreement on the filling and operation of the $4bn Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
The latest round of talks last month ended without a deal and Cairo and Addis Ababa traded blame for the failure.
Negotiators have said key questions remain about how much water Ethiopia will release downstream if a multiyear drought occurs, and how the countries will resolve any future disputes.
Mogadishu says a deal to grant Addis Ababa access to sea in Somaliland is a violation of its sovereignty.
An agreement between Ethiopia and a breakaway part of Somalia is raising tension on the Horn of Africa.
Somalia regards Somaliland as part of its territory, and has warned Ethiopia against interfering in its affairs. But Ethiopia is landlocked and wants access to the sea – something Somaliland can provide.
Regional blocs are trying to mediate, but neither side is willing to back down.
So how will this dispute play out? And is war a possibility?
Presenter: Elizabeth Puranam
Guests:
Kemal Hashi Mohamoud – Member of the Ethiopian parliament
Matt Bryden – Strategic adviser at Sahan Research, a political think tank covering the Horn of Africa
Abdi Aynte – Former Somali minister of the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development
On Monday, an agreement signed in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and President Muse Bihi Abdi of the breakaway republic of Somaliland preceded a shocking announcement that has already set the tone for interstate relations in the Horn of Africa this year.
The memorandum of understanding was for the leasing of 20km (12 miles) of Somaliland’s sea coast to landlocked Ethiopia. In exchange, Somaliland will receive shares in its neighbour’s flagship carrier, Ethiopian Airlines – and receive formal recognition as a sovereign state.
International recognition has been a long-sought goal for Somaliland, a region in northern Somalia that has enjoyed de facto independence since 1991. But the groundbreaking agreement has created shockwaves in the region and fury in Somalia, which views it as a hostile violation of Somalia’s sovereignty.
“As a government, we have condemned and rejected the illegal infringement of Ethiopia into our national sovereignty and territorial integrity yesterday,” Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said in a statement on X shortly after convening an emergency cabinet session on Tuesday. “Not an inch of Somalia can or will be signed away by anybody.”
In Ethiopia, where for much of 2023 the government stressed the economic need for a seaport and even subtly hinted at possibly invading Eritrea for access to the Red Sea, the deal is being portrayed as a victory.
But the terms of that victory differ for Ethiopia and Somaliland, and that could further complicate the situation in the coming days.
While Somaliland insists that recognition has already been agreed upon and settled, Addis Ababa has been reluctant to firmly address the matter of statehood. In a published communique, the government said it had yet to formally recognise Somaliland. But social media posts by Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official Mesganu Arga this week appear to support Somaliland’s interpretation of the deal.
The ambiguity of the messaging continues to fuel speculation. A draft of the agreement has yet to be published, but all indications suggest that it would all but nullify a 2018 tripartite treaty cementing ties between Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea, details of which were similarly never made public.
Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi, right, and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed attend the signing of an agreement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on January 1, 2024, that allows Ethiopia to use a Somaliland port [Tiksa Negeri/Reuters]
Pressure or patriotism?
Ethiopian officials have been far more eager to speak of the benefits the agreement is said to have secured.
“The agreement is mutually beneficial, and Ethiopia will share military and intelligence experience with Somaliland, so the two states can collaborate on protecting joint interests,” Redwan Hussein, Abiy’s national security adviser, said at the event announcing the agreement. “To facilitate this, Ethiopia will establish a military base in Somaliland as well as a commercial maritime zone.”
Abiy hopes the agreement can help kick-start Ethiopia’s revival after a year of worsening economic woes, internal conflicts and a breakdown in relations with Eritrea. Since the signing of the two countries’ widely heralded peace treaty in 2018, which helped Abiy land the Nobel Peace Prize a year later, Ethiopia has been keen to redirect its imports to Eritrean ports.
But this has never materialised.
“Previously, Abiy had cultivated a personal relationship with [Eritrean President] Isaias Afewerki for access to the Red Sea, but the Pretoria agreement has seen it stumble,” author and researcher Mohamed Kheir Omer explains, referring to the 2022 mediated peace process that ended Ethiopia’s war in its northern region of Tigray. Eritrea, whose troops were allied with Ethiopia in that conflict, opposed the deal.
Domestically, conflict with Faro militiamen in Amhara and unrest in Oromia has weakened key support bases for Abiy. Failure to make payments on Ethiopia’s eurobonds at the end of 2023 has also heightened pressure on the prime minister.
So there are whispers in the Horn of Africa and in foreign circles that he has turned to the popular move of getting port access for Africa’s second most populous nation to shore up his support.
There are also domestic woes in Somaliland, which has known relative stability for decades. The enclave is struggling with an uprising by local clan militia who pushed its forces out of the disputed town of Las Anod in August.
That conflict is seen as a blow to Somaliland’s hopes for recognition, which had been pinned on maintaining stability in a functioning state. But some observers said it is unclear if the conflict factored into Bihi’s decision to sign the agreement in Addis Ababa.
“It would be too speculative to link the agreement to Somaliland’s current domestic issues, considering its persistent pursuit of international recognition since 1991,” Muhammad Abdi Duale, founder and senior editor of the Somali news portal Horn Diplomat, told Al Jazeera. “Somaliland … established diplomatic ties with Ethiopia long before the port deal was announced.”
A military truck takes part in a parade to celebrate the 24th self-declared independence day for Somaliland, the breakaway region in Somalia, in Somaliland’s capital, Hargeisa, on May 18, 2015 [File: Feisal Omar/Reuters]
Ethiopia’s quest for a port
Diplomatic ties between them date back to the 1980s when Ethiopia supported Somaliland rebel fighters who helped win its de facto independence in 1991, the same year Ethiopia became landlocked after Eritrea’s successful war of independence.
Ethiopia continued to use Eritrea’s Red Sea ports until the two states severed ties and fought a 1998-2000 border war, which killed 70,000 people.
Since then, Ethiopia has used Djibouti’s port as its main trade conduit, but the billions Djibouti is believed to charge Ethiopia annually in port fees has had it exploring alternatives in Sudan, Somaliland and Kenya since the mid-2000s.
Agreements between Ethiopia and Somaliland over the use of its Berbera port date as far back as 2005, but issues including logistics and potential harm to relations with Mogadishu have prevented Addis Ababa from implementing a wholesale shift from Djibouti.
In 2017, Ethiopia acquired shares in Berbera port as part of a deal involving Emirati logistics management company DP World to expand the port and turn it into a lucrative trade gateway catering to the needs of 119 million Ethiopians. At the time, Somalia denounced the deal as illegal. Ethiopia did not follow through on commitments and eventually lost its stake by 2022.
Despite this history and the generally warm relations between authorities in Addis Ababa and Hargeisa, Addis Ababa had never openly considered granting Somaliland full recognition.
Even now, Redwan has stressed that the agreement signed this week is only a starting point for negotiations – with no specified timetable – that would require extensive deliberations and approval of both parliaments.
Nevertheless, the possibility of Ethiopia becoming the first state to formally acknowledge Somaliland’s independence threatens to damage diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Somalia, two states with a lengthy history of military conflict and animosity.
A new strain in relations
After Somali independence in 1960 and until the end of the Cold War, the status of Ethiopia’s Somali region, its second largest by area, has been hotly contested between the two countries.
The region, also known as Ogaden, is home to ethnic Somalis, who make up about 7 percent of Ethiopia’s population. It has witnessed numerous conflicts. One was the Ogaden War from 1977 to 1978, which killed tens of thousands of people before Ethiopia, with the assistance of Soviet military advisers and Cuban troops, reasserted dominance over the land.
Under the governments of Ethiopia’s Mengistu Hailemariam and Somali President Siad Barre, both countries supported rebel factions in each other’s countries, which would go on to weaken and eventually lead to the overthrow of both leaders by 1991.
Somalia has never regained the stability it knew during the Barre era. Swathes of the country currently are under the control of fighters from al-Qaeda offshoot al-Shabab.
A considerable segment of Ethiopian troops has been part of the African Union peacekeeping mission mandated to fight the rebels in Somalia. Their semi-permanent presence in the country since 2006 has fuelled further resentment.
So Monday’s agreement has only further strained fragile relations between the neighbours.
“This is by far the most egregious violation of the sovereignty of Somalia by a foreign country in about a decade and a half,” Abdi Aynte, a Somali politician and former minister of planning, told Al Jazeera. “The last country to have violated Somalia’s sovereignty was Ethiopia when it invaded in 2006, which ended disastrously. [The 2006 invasion] in fact led to the rise of al-Shabab, the most violent militant group in the region, so you can only imagine what this could do in Somalia and across the region.”
Another politician, lawmaker Abdirahman Abdiskakur, has called for the African Union’s headquarters to be moved away from Ethiopia, according to the Somali National News Agency.
With military action unfeasible, Somalia will likely use formal diplomatic channels at the AU or United Nations to prevent any implementation of the agreement. Thus far, the European Union and the United States have issued statements expressing support for Somalia’s position.
The stance of other influential players in the region isn’t as clear yet.
“It’s possible that the UAE, which has cordial relations with both Ethiopia and Somaliland, may have encouraged the parties to proceed with the deal,” Mohamed explained. “The UAE is ambitious to have presence in ports along the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. With the Rapid Support Force [paramilitary] it supports gaining ground in Sudan, the UAE may be keen on consolidating its gains in the region.”
Meanwhile, Israel’s bombardment of the Gaza Strip has had a ripple effect, including most recently, Houthi rebel attacks on ships in the Red Sea, impacting the strategic Bad al-Mandeb Strait.
With both areas just off Somaliland’s coast, the New Year’s Day agreement in Addis Ababa could set off more than just economic activity in Ethiopia’s latest quest for a seaport.
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