India already has 1.45 billion people. Why does it want more children?

Last year, India nudged past China to become the world’s most populous country, according to UN estimates.

With nearly 1.45 billion people now, you’d think the country would be quiet about having more children. But guess what? The chatter has suddenly picked up.

Leaders of two southern states – Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu – have recently advocated more children.

Andhra Pradesh is mulling providing incentives, citing low fertility rates and ageing population. The state also scrapped its “two-child policy” for local body elections, and reports say neighbouring Telangana may soon do the same. Next-door Tamil Nadu is also making similar, more exaggerated, noises.

India’s fertility rate has fallen substantially – from 5.7 births per woman in 1950 to the current rate of two.

Fertility rates have fallen below the replacement level of two births per woman in 17 of the 29 states and territories. (A replacement level is one at which new births are sufficient to maintain a stable population.)

The five southern Indian states lead India’s demographic transition, achieving replacement-level fertility well ahead of others. Kerala reached the milestone in 1988, Tamil Nadu in 1993, and the rest by the mid-2000s.

Today, the five southern states have total fertility rates below 1.6, with Karnataka at 1.6 and Tamil Nadu at 1.4. In other words, fertility rates in these states match or are less than many European countries.

But these states fear that India’s shifting demographics with varying population shares between states, will significantly impact electoral representation and state wise-allocation of parliamentary seats and federal revenues.

“They fear being penalised for their effective population control policies, despite being better economic performers and contributing significantly to federal revenues,” Srinivas Goli, a professor of demography at the International Institute for Population Sciences, told the BBC.

Southern states are also grappling with another major concern as India prepares for its first delimitation of electoral seats in 2026 – the first since 1976.

This exercise will redraw electoral boundaries to reflect population shifts, likely reducing parliamentary seats for the economically prosperous southern states. As federal revenues are allocated based on state populations, many fear this could deepen their financial struggles and limit policy-making freedom.

Demographers KS James and Shubhra Kriti project that populous northern states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar stand to gain more seats from delimitation, while southern states such as Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Andhra Pradesh could face losses, further shifting political representation.

Many, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi, have hinted that changes to fiscal shares and parliamentary seat allocations will not be rushed through.

“As a demographer, I don’t think states should be overly concerned about these issues. They can be resolved through constructive negotiations between federal and state governments,” says Mr Goli. “My concern lies elsewhere.”

The key challenge, according to demographers, is India’s rapid ageing driven by declining fertility rates. While countries like France and Sweden took 120 and 80 years respectively to double their aging population from 7% to 14%, India is expected to reach this milestone in just 28 years, says Mr Goli.

This accelerated ageing is tied to India’s unique success in fertility decline. In most countries, improved living standards, education, and urbanisation naturally lower fertility as child survival improves.

But in India, fertility rates fell rapidly despite modest socio-economic progress, thanks to aggressive family welfare programmes that promoted small families through targets, incentives, and disincentives.

The unintended consequence? Take Andhra Pradesh, for instance. Its fertility rate is 1.5, on par with Sweden, but its per capita income is 28 times lower, says Mr Goli. With mounting debt and limited resources, can states like these support higher pensions or social security for a rapidly aging population?

Consider this. More than 40% of elderly Indians (60+ years) belong to the poorest wealth quintile – the bottom 20% of a population in terms of wealth distribution, according to United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)’s latest India Ageing Report.

In other words, Mr Goli says, “India is getting old before getting rich”.

Fewer children also mean a rising old-age dependency ratio, leaving fewer caregivers for an expanding elderly demographic. Demographers warn that India’s healthcare, community centres and old-age homes are unprepared for this shift.

Urbanisation, migration, and changing labour markets are further eroding traditional family support – India’s strong point – leaving more elderly people behind.

While migration from populous to less populous states can ease the working-age gap, it also sparks anti-migration anxieties. “Robust investments in prevention, palliative care, and social infrastructure are urgently needed to look after the ageing,” says Mr Goli.

As if the southern states’ concerns weren’t enough, earlier this month, the chief of the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteers’ Organisation), the ideological backbone of Mr Modi’s BJP – urged couples to have at least three children to secure India’s future. “According to population science, when growth falls below 2.1, a society perishes on its own. Nobody destroys it,” Mohan Bhagwat reportedly said at a recent meeting.

While Mr Bhagwat’s concerns may have some basis, they are not entirely accurate, say demographers. Tim Dyson, a demographer at the London School of Economics, told the BBC that after a decade or two, continuing “very low levels of fertility will lead to rapid population decline”.

A fertility rate of 1.8 births per woman leads to a slow, manageable population decline. But a rate of 1.6 or lower could trigger “rapid, unmanageable population decline”.

“Smaller numbers of people will enter the reproductive – and main working – ages, and this will be socially, politically and economically disastrous. This is a demographic process and it is extremely difficult to reverse,” says Mr Dyson.

This is already happening in some countries.

In May, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol declared the country’s record-low birth rate a “national emergency” and announced plans for a dedicated government ministry. Greece’s fertility rate has plummeted to 1.3, half of what it was in 1950, sparking warnings from Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis about an “existential” population threat.

But demographers say that urging people to have more children is futile. “Considering the societal shifts, including the significant reduction in gender disparities as women’s lives have become increasingly similar to those of men, this trend is unlikely to reverse,” says Mr Dyson.

For Indian states like Tamil Nadu and Kerala, grappling with a declining workforce, the key question is: who will step in to fill the gap? Developed countries, unable to reverse declining fertility, are focusing on healthy and active ageing – prolonging working life by five to seven years and enhancing productivity in older populations.

Demographers say India will need to extend retirement ages meaningfully, and policies must prioritise increasing healthy years through better health screenings, and stronger social security to ensure an active and productive older population – a potential “silver dividend”.

India must also leverage its demographic dividend better – economic growth that occurs when a country has a large, working-age population. Mr Goli believes there’s a window of opportunity until 2047 to boost the economy, create jobs for the working-age population, and allocate resources for the ageing. “We’re only reaping 15-20% of the dividend – we can do much better,” he says.